Best Project Management and Systems Engineering Practices in the Preacquisition Phase for Federal Intelligence and Defense Agencies

Abstract

The analysis of several government defense and intelligence agency large-scale acquisition programs that experienced significant cost and schedule growth shows that several critical factors need to be addressed in the preacquisition phase of the acquisition cycle. These include overzealous advocacy, technology readiness levels, life-cycle cost, schedule details, requirements maturity, acquisition and contract strategy, program office personnel tenure and experience, risk management, systems engineering, and trade studies. The results of this study–which incorporated data from industry responses, government and industry executive interviews, numerous studies, and reports–indicate that early preacquisition activities executed in a rigorous fashion can significantly reduce the risk of cost and schedule growth. In this paper, the root causes of the cost and schedule growth are discussed as well as techniques and alternatives to improve program performance.

Keywords

acquisition practices project management systems engineering federal government

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Bazerman

, & Chugh

(2006). Decisions without blinders. Harvard Business Review, 84(1), 88–97.

Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH). (2002). Space Systems Development Growth Analysis report.

Capaccio

(2007, May 16). Large cost overrun likely in Lockheed helicopter contract. Washington Post, Business Section, p. D3.

Department of Defense (DOD). (2003, May). Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs. United States Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Department of Defense (DOD). (2005). Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics Life Cycle Management Framework. Defense Acquisition University Publication, www.dau.mil.

Department of Defense (DOD). (2006). Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report. A Report by the Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, United States Department of Defense.

Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2006a). Improvements needed to more accurately identify and better oversee risky projects totaling billions of dollars. GAO-06–1099T.

Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2006b). Assessment of selected major weapons systems. GAO-06–391.

Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2006c). Improvements needed in space systems acquisitions and keys to achieving them. GAO-06–626.

10.

Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2006d). Stronger practices needed to improve DOD technology transition processes. GAO-06–883.

11.

Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2007a). Missile defense acquisition strategy generates results but delivers less at a higher cost. GAO-07–387.

12.

Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2007b). Issues concerning airlift tanker programs. GAO-07–566T.

13.

International Council on Systems Engineering Handbook. (2004). INCOSE-TP-2003–016-02, Version 2a, June 2004. Released by the Technical Board, International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE).

14.

Mankins

(1995), Technology readiness levels: A White Paper. NASA Office of Space Access and Technology, Advanced Concepts Office.

15.

Merle

(2007, March 16). Lockheed asked to fund cost overruns. Washington Post, Business Section, p. F3.

16.

Moss-Kanter

(2006). Innovation: Facing the classic traps. Harvard Business Review, 84(11), 73–83.

17.

Murray

J. P.

(2002). Nine factors for project success. In Tinnirello

P C.

(Ed.), New directions in project management (pp. 13–23). New York: Auerbach Publications.

18.

Nowinski

E. H.

, & Kohler

R. J.

(2006). The lost art of program management in the intelligence community. Journal of Intelligence Studies, 50(2), 33–46.