The causes of the Egyptian youth's participation in the Egyptian spring of 2011 and June 2013

Introduction

Egypt is one of the states that has experienced the Arab Spring. It is arguably the most important of all of them and the most influential. Its impact comes not just from its geopolitical importance, but also from its people, who have been an inspiration to the whole world. When Tunisia rose up in 2010 the ‘domino effect’ reached Egypt, but ever since the Egyptians revolted in 2011 they have sent unstoppable shock waves both back to Tunisia and to the rest of the region. The Egyptians feel that it was an ‘electric shock’ that caused them to rise up, not just once in 2011, but throughout the following two years. The reasons for their revolt in 2011 were different to those that made them rebel in 2013. The numbers and types of participants in 2011 were also different to those in 2013. In this article the causes of the uprising among the youth and their political participation in the Egyptian Springs of 25 January 2011 and 30 June 2013 will be analysed and compared.

The young people and Mubarak: the reasons to protest against him

Just as Martin Luther King Jr. said ‘I have a dream…. Let freedom ring’, the Egyptian youth had a dream. They called loudly in Tahrir Square on 25 January 2011 for ‘bread, freedom, human dignity and social justice’. The young Egyptians of January 2011 wanted the basic rights of which they had dreamed. Their calls not only represented their demands, but those of a large segment of Egyptian society. The youth of 2011 had issues with Mubarak's regime and demanded real change by going out into the streets after decades of political stagnation. Dr Gamal Selim, ¹ a political science lecturer at Port Said University, observed in an interview with the author that the ‘youth of the 25 January revolution came from the middle class, they were well educated and used technology; they allied themselves with labourers and the labour union protests of 2010 in Mahala governorate. This was represented in the ‘6th of April movement’ which linked social media to labour rights and highlighted the workers’ problems. Since 2005 Egypt had witnessed a rise in the number of protest movements, such as the ‘Kefaya’ or ‘Enough’ movement; the ‘National Front for Change’, which rose to prominence in 2010, led by Dr Mohamed El Baradie, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and the ‘We are All Khaled Said’ Facebook group. The protests by these groups encouraged the Egyptian youth to target Mubarak's regime and highlight its corruption.

The young people's issues with Mubarak's regime comprised a long list, one as long as the number of years he had been in power. The first problem was stagnation. Having been ruled for 30 years by the same president, who had barely changed his policies or his ministers, and who had done little to develop the country, the Egyptian youth were feeling rebellious. New blood was needed. It was time to throw a stone in the still water.

Egypt scored 3.1 out of 10 on the Corruption Perception Index in 2010 (CPI 2010). The corruption shocked people and the huge sense of injustice increased after the Khaled Said incident’, noted Amal Abu Setta, ² a 39-year-old rhetoric and composition instructor at the American University in Cairo, another interviewee. In another interview, Shamweel Khan, ³ a 35-year-old Pakistani resident in Cairo who works in information technology, agreed with Abu Setta and added that the Egyptian youth sought change to get rid of the high corruption rate in the country. This was achieved by publishing instances of corruption on social media. The opposition newspapers published many articles on the lack of transparency and high corruption rates found in the public sector and among government officials. This added fuel to the fire of the Egyptians’ anger.

On top of the combination of stagnation, corruption, injustice and lack of transparency, with no real sign of reform ahead, the ‘presidential inheritance project’ created even more anger towards Mubarak and his regime. With this inheritance project, Egyptians felt that they had no say about who the new president would be, which increased their sense of injustice. Egypt was going to have a ‘presidential monarchy’ and no changes would take place, as like father, like son. Thus, this inheritance project had to be stopped. Egyptians felt that Mubarak's regime was being unfair to them by not distributing the national wealth evenly. ‘The first calls in Tahrir Square had more of a social and economic basis than a democratic one, calling for things such as bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity, yet Mubarak's persistence by staying in power for 18 days increased people's demands for him to step down,’ noted Dr. Selim.

What really brought Mubarak down was the alliance of opposition groups with intellectuals, with the people and, finally, with the army. If these forces had not been allied the revolution would have faced a real challenge. The most organised opposition to Mubarak's regime was the Muslim Brotherhood. As a banned group working underground, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to gain the sympathy of anti-Mubarak protestors as well as the poor, who felt the injustice of his regime. The Brotherhood became popular with the poor by providing them with services which the official government had failed to provide due to its corruption. During the 25 January revolution they were able to gather the masses around them and organise the entrance and exit from Tahrir Square. This made the Muslim Brotherhood a more appealing electoral choice for all citizens than the youth, who lacked leadership and seemed disorganised.

In November 2011 parliamentary elections took place and Egyptians were looking for the right candidate to represent them in parliament. Choosing a candidate was difficult for many. This was because the choice was between an Islamist candidate from either the Freedom and Justice Party (Hizb AI Adala we al Tanmeya, representing the Muslim Brotherhood) or the Light Party (HizbAI Nūr, a Salafi group), or from among the newly established parties which were comprised of young people. The majority of the parliamentary seats were won by the Islamists, and of this the Muslim Brotherhood's share was the biggest.

The Egyptian youth's role in the January 2011 revolution was that of a ‘catalyst’ that made the dream of ousting Mubarak from power come true. The middle-class, educated youth used modern technology in the form of social media and networks to bring the system down. The youth were the triggers of the January 2011 revolution; they brought people together through Facebook and Twitter and raised people's awareness about the revolution. Even prior to the revolution they highlighted the major events that affected Egyptians’ lives,’ observed Abu Setta. This explains the Mubarak regime's reaction, which saw that it was threatened by the Internet and so cut off this form of communication, as well as mobile phone networks, in order to prevent people from gathering and protesting. However, these efforts were in vain.

The youth and Morsi: reasons for bringing him down after one year

The Egyptian youth had many reasons for revolting against Morsi and his regime just one year after his democratic election. To many it might have seemed that the dust had barely settled after the presidential elections. However, Morsi's reign was full of errors and Egyptians were no longer in the mood to be patient. The most vivid problem during Morsi's administration was the sense that Egyptians were being marginalised and not represented in their own country. Many Egyptians felt alienated at home. The Muslim Brotherhood took priority over the Egyptians. Dr. Selim elaborated, The youth could feel the divisions and sectarianism in Egyptian society after Morsi came to office. They felt there was a threat to being Egyptian’. In an interview for this article, Rana Farouk, former deputy head of the media committee for the Constitution Party (Hizb el Dostour) agreed with this. She added, The Muslim Brotherhood had no affiliation with Egypt, they have always affiliated themselves with the greater Islamic ‘umma’, or nation, rather than with Egyptian society.’ ⁴ Mohamed Morsi spoke in a language that was unfamiliar to Egyptians. Furthermore, according to Dr. Selim, ‘Egyptians felt that the first elected president came with an attitude of hatred towards them: his speeches had ethnic sectarian inclinations and this made the youth feel that a threat was being made to the homogenous society of Egypt’.

Another problem with Morsi's rule was the sense that the revolution had not taken the path that the young people had hoped for. To begin with, the youth felt that their revolution had been stolen away from them by the Muslim Brotherhood in an implicit deal between them and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which was also against the people. Further, young people were not represented during the transitional period between Mubarak resigning and the election of the president, when the SCAF took power. Even after the elected president took office the revolutionary youth were not represented–-instead the youth of the Brotherhood were included, appointed on ‘trust’ in cases where qualifications were lacking. Moreover, another mistake made under Morsi's presidency was the adoption of a constitution that was highly criticised by the youth, the opposition and many Egyptian intellectuals who, even though they had voted against it, felt that their votes had not counted. On 6 December 2012 a large segment of society went out into the streets to demonstrate their objection to the declaration of the constitution; they were ignored by the president. The constitution gave immense powers to the president and was very vague on the role and powers of the judiciary and the legislature. It also ignored many women's rights and the right of freedom of expression (Blair and Werr 2012). In addition, it was viewed as adding extra Islamic flavour to the system of governance, which felt wrong to many Egyptians who saw it as creating more divisions than unity.

Furthermore, Egyptians felt that the country was being run by the supreme leadership office of the Muslim Brotherhood, rather than by the president whom they had elected. As Farouk explained in her interview, ‘It was the general leader and his deputy who gave the orders to Morsi about how to run this country, so Morsi was not truly representing ‘all’ factions of society, rather he was representing his group. This meant that the people had to go out and shout ‘No to the Muslim Brotherhood” and “No to its supreme leader”.’

When Morsi took office he made many contradictory decisions; this gave the impression that he was hesitant and unable to make decisions either in his own right or on the orders of the general leader. This was demonstrated by a number of incidents. The first incident was in July 2012, when, after one month in office, he decided to oust Abdel Meguid Mahmoud, the attorney general, and appoint him as Egypt's ambassador to the Vatican. However, people protested against this move and so he left Mahmoud in office for a couple of months before appointing a new attorney general. Another incident that demonstrates the indecision of Morsi and his government occurred when they decided to close all shops in Cairo at 10:00 p.m. to save the city from power cuts. Due to the people's protestations, within a month the shops were open again until after midnight and the decision was annulled. As a final example there was the incident of the constitutional declaration, which Morsi imposed, lifted after a few days and then re-imposed until the referendum on the constitution.

Comparing 2011 with 2013

The above-mentioned events that took place under Morsi's administration were seen by the youth as reflecting the same injustices as those that had been suffered under Mubarak's regime. This drove many who had previously supported Morsi to lose their confidence in him and thus led to another revolution to force Morsi to step down. The young people who had supported Morsi in the 2012 elections were those who had hated Mubarak and his regime–-by voting for Morsi they had aimed to close the door in the face of the other candidate, Ahmed Shafik, who was expected to have continued Mubarak's era and style of government. They were the same middle-class, well-educated youths who were highly attached to social media. Therefore, for young people, the revolution in 2013 was a continuation of the action they had taken to achieve the hopes and aspirations they had had in 2011, which they had found could not be attained under an elected president. The events of 2013 were an extension of their revolution to alter the whole system, which had not occurred after Mubarak had been deposed as the lack of change had been disguised by the religious nature of Morsi's party.

The 2013 youth revolt was much more organised and preparations had begun four months in advance. This time, the youth had a group of leaders represented in the ‘Tamarod’ or ‘Rebel’ group, which called for a withdrawal of confidence from the elected president and the appointment of the head of the Supreme Court instead. More people took part in the 2013 revolution. Young people, the opposition, intellectuals, the elites, the working class and Mubarak's supporters were out on the streets, along with the military, all working together to bring this unjust and malfunctioning system down. It was common to see Mubarak's supporters out in the streets on 30 June 2013 since they hated seeing the Muslim Brotherhood, their former enemy and biggest opponent, in power with Morsi as president. As for the military, it saw that by siding with the civilians it was protecting the nation from what it saw as the threat of the Brotherhood, which was an international group with greater links to the global Muslim nation than affiliation to the Egyptian state. In addition, the military wanted to take the opportunity to improve its image in the eyes of Egyptians after the many errors the former SCAF had committed in the transitional period between February 2011 and June 2012.

In 2013 the youth felt more powerful. They feared that their dream might be taken away and so felt it was necessary to correct the mistake and revolt against the system. The young people regained their enthusiasm and felt the power of their demonstrations as they forced the ruling regime to step down once again.

Conclusion

To conclude, the role of the Egyptian youth in both revolutions was seen as patriotic and bold, and they provided the dynamism in Egyptian society by not losing their enthusiasm and by encouraging people to go out into the streets to rebel against the injustices and the other aforementioned problems, both in 2011 and 2013.

The difference between the 2011 revolution and the 2013 one is not just a matter of a difference in the number of participants: in 2011 the media said that almost one million Egyptians were out in Tahrir Square calling for Mubarak to step down, while in 2013 the overall number given by the BBC was 33 million Egyptians throughout Egypt protesting against Morsi. It was also different in terms of the Egyptian sense of fear; in 2011 the situation was more risky as people were not sure that they could bring the system down, while in 2013, as previously mentioned, the revolution was pre-planned, which gave the youth more enthusiasm and hope. Yet the common goal in both revolutions was to bring about change and the hope of a better present and future. Both revolutions rejected the injustices that had been imposed on society by its rulers. Furthermore, both revolutions were led by young people, who were the real catalysts of change. Through the use of social media they were able to gather people in the streets to protest against Mubarak and he did step down. And it was the youth who came up with the initiative of rebelling against Morsi and who were able to collect signatures to bring him down by going out into the streets in large numbers on 30 June 2013.