Political Union: Legitimacy and Efficiency to Overcome the Crisis

Abstract

This paper aims to outline a number of concrete proposals in view of providing detailed operational content for the project to create a genuine European political leadership and to strengthen legitimacy and democratic control of the decision-making process. The legal feasibility of each of the proposals set out here is analysed by identifying the type of reform it involves: innovation, using the treaty as it stands; limited changes to the Treaty under the simplified revision procedure; and more important changes to the Treaty under the ordinary revision procedure.

Keywords

Political union European governance Decision-making European Parliament Democratic accountability Eurogroup Treaties reform

Introduction

Along with the crisis, fundamental questions about the future of European integration have been raised. In order to recover their sovereignty vis-à-vis the markets, and thereby the ability to decide on their future, the EU Member States–-most notably the eurozone members–-have realised that they have to create a more coherent union. As a result, the idea to form a banking union has progressed. The debate continues about the possibility of creating Eurobonds, but stricter, common rules have already been adopted: the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has entered into force and the means and the role of the European Investment Bank have been extended.

Given the transfer of competences implied by these joint measures, it is now impossible to avoid the question of political union (Chopin et al. 2012). European decisions must enjoy adequate democratic legitimacy in the eyes of the citizen, and decision-making mechanisms must be simple and clear enough for them to be effective and transparent. Democratic legitimacy comes first from the democratic definition of the political goals of the European institutions. It also requires a democratic vote for the legislation that is necessary for the achievement of these goals. Finally, there must be democratic control of the implementation of this legislation. Without this, the citizens will not accept economic union and questions will continue to be asked about the political vision that justifies European decisions. In the end, it is economic integration as a whole that will be weakened and threatened.

Moreover, the rise of extremism and populism is a symptom of Europe's legitimacy crisis. From Sweden to Hungary, including France, Denmark, Belgium, Norway and Greece, the results of various general elections confirm the strength of the far right and of populist parties that promote protectionism with regard to economic, cultural and even identity matters. These anti-European extremist and populist movements are critical of the power held by the national and European elites. They find their support by challenging the political and democratic legitimacy of the European institutions; they fiercely criticise the weaknesses of the institutional mechanisms that produce the democratic legitimation of European decisions, and reject the present European political and economic system.

Debate has started in several Member States–-most notably at the highest levels in both Germany¹ and Italy.² In September 2012 the Foreign Ministers of 11 EU Member States signed a text that might be considered to be a first attempt to formalise the project for a political union (Final Report 2012). On the occasion of the European Council of December 2012, President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy presented a roadmap to achieve genuine economic and monetary union (European Council 2012a, b). The document identifies four structuring issues, including a strengthening of democratic legitimacy and accountability. Although the other points (banking, and budgetary and economic union) have been the focus of a great deal of thought, political union has not been the focus of many detailed proposals. Moreover, in spite of many calls, nothing concrete has really been done about this.

Angela Merkel was quite clear in an interview granted to several European daily newspapers on 19 January 2012: ‘After a long process, we shall transfer more competence over to the Commission which will function like a European government for European competences. This implies a strong Parliament. The Council, which brings together the heads of government, will then form the second chamber. Finally we shall have a European Court of Justice as the Supreme Court. This might be the shape of the future European Political Union’ (cited in Robert Schuman Foundation 2012).

‘With 1 year to go until our EU Presidency in the second half of 2014, Italy has renewed its commitment to achieving political union in the framework of a “United States of Europe’. Because there is no alternative to a strong “EU project” if the Union wants to go on playing a leading role on the international stage… Political union will be the principal goal of the Italian Presidency of the European Union, which begins 1 year from now on 1 July 2014. A year that could be “decisive”, as Prime Minister Enrico Letta underscored on 11 July 2013 at the celebrations for the French National Day at Palazzo Farnese, commenting on President François Hollande's proposal to achieve political union within 2 years’ (Italy 2013).

However, the crisis and the growing mistrust among citizens of the European institutions and the reforms now underway place a major political challenge before the EU. Either the leaders of Europe must come to an agreement over sufficiently real progress in response to the criticisms made of its deficit in terms of legitimacy and efficiency, or they may see a rise in Euroscepticism with regard to integration. In this context the present paper identifies a certain number of real, achievable proposals, both from a political and a legal point of view, in order to provide real content for a ‘Political Union’.

Towards a genuine European political leadership

The economic crisis has created a challenge for European governance in terms of leadership, coherence and effectiveness (Chopin 2013). In this crisis context, which demands that the EU and its Member States provide answers to the challenges raised, Europeans have discovered the limits of European governance and its ‘executive deficit’ (Véron 2012): the weakness of the European executive power, the complex nature of the European institutions and the lack of clear political leadership, the competition between the institutions and the Member States, and the slowness of the negotiation process. From this standpoint, overcoming the European ‘executive deficit’ means creating clearer, more legitimate and more responsible leadership.

The first proposal could consist of merging the presidency of the Commission with that of the European Council. This would help Europe to speak with one voice. The Lisbon Treaty allows for this innovation: it was to create this possibility that the ban on having a national mandate was retained in the Lisbon Treaty whilst the ban on having more than one European mandate was withdrawn. The European Council would just have to appoint one person to both posts. Doing so would strengthen the political legitimacy of the person holding the title, who would thereby enjoy both community and intergovernmental legitimacy; he or she would also be politically accountable to the European Parliament. A change such as this would not require a modification of the treaties. An inter-institutional agreement would be enough.³

An inter-institutional agreement is an act that is adopted jointly by the institutions of the European Union in their area of competence whereby they regulate the way in which they cooperate or commit to respect the basic rules. Inter-institutional agreements are born of a practical need felt by the institutions to define certain measures in the treaties which concern them in order to avoid conflict and adjust their respective competences. Unplanned for in the treaties originally, they were formally introduced in Article 295 of the Lisbon Treaty (the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).

Second, this single president could be elected by indirect universal suffrage in accordance with the model in force in a great majority of EU Member States (appointment by parliament). This implies that the European Council would commit–-possibly informally–-to appointing the president of the Commission with reference to the main party or the majority coalition in the European Parliament. Later the question of election by direct universal suffrage might be addressed, as suggested by the German Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union) during its Leipzig Congress in November 2011. This would be advantageous in that it would provide direct democratic legitimacy and also a clear political mandate for the EU president.

If the treaties are taken as they stand, the European Council might commit (1) to put forward as president of the Commission the candidate suggested by the winning party in the European elections (which would fall in line with the obligation included in the treaties for the European Council to take on board the result of these elections), and (2) to elect the president of the European Commission as the president of the European Council. A revision of the means used to appoint the president of the Commission or of the European Council in view of an election by direct universal suffrage would require a revision of the treaties according to the ordinary procedure (an intergovernmental conference (IGC) preceded by a Convention, except if the European Parliament is not against the absence of a Convention).

A third proposal, with regard to the European elections, would be to ensure that the lists put forward by the national parties belonging to a European party share the same name and programme in all of the Member States. Each party should also put forward a candidate for the post of president of the Commission. This reform is possible as the treaties stand.

Fourth, one of the problems to solve regarding the European elections is that of defining political majorities, which do not exist at present.⁴ With this in view, the proposal to grant a ‘majority bonus’⁵ to the political party that wins the elections deserves exploration as part of a reform of the voting method employed in the European elections.

Except for the EPP-Liberals agreement in 1999 which, for the very first time, introduced a partisan split within the European Parliament.

For more details, see Chopin and Macek (2010).

Any change in the method employed to elect Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) requires a revision of the Council decision on the election of MEPs. In line with Article 223 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the means to elect MEPs are set by a unanimous Council decision after the approval of the European Parliament by a majority vote of its members. To enter into force this decision has to be ratified unanimously by the Member States.

The fifth proposal consists of a redefinition of the composition of the European Commission. This issue is vital for the legitimacy of the Commission, which has been accused of following an intergovernmental path and of becoming a second Council. In view of breaking away from the principle of the representation of each EU Member State in the European Commission, the president of the Commission would be able to choose the portfolio given to the commissioners (without negotiation taking place between the Member States) and rank these, with the creation of senior and junior commissioners.

It is possible to change the number of members of the European Commission without modifying the treaties via a unanimous decision on the part of the European Council (art. 17(5) Treaty on European Union (TEU)). However, a change of the rules governing the Commission's composition, which breaks away from the equal rotation principle between the Member States and the principles set by Article 244 of the TFEU, would require a revision of the treaties according to the ordinary procedure (IGC preceded by a Convention).

Strengthening the democratic legitimacy of European decisions

In terms of strengthening democratic legitimacy, the national parliaments and the European Parliament have a decisive role to play.

First, the implementation of Article 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG)⁶ would increase involvement on the part of the national parliaments in the decisions taken, and strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the decisions made concerning budgetary control. This might be achieved initially through a ‘permanent joint committee’, bringing together members of the European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (except for those whose States have not ratified the TSCG), as well as the chairs of the finance and economic affairs committees from the Member States’ parliaments. This eurozone assembly would be able to adopt initiative reports and issue opinions or resolutions. The implementation of Article 13 of the TSCG could be set up as part of an inter-institutional agreement.

Article 13 of the new treaty anticipates that the ‘European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will together determine the organisation and promotion of a conference of representatives of the relevant committees of the national Parliaments and representatives of the relevant committees of the European Parliament in order to discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered by this Treaty.’ The first session of the Interparliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial Governance of the European Union took place on 16 and 17 October 2013 in Vilnius (Lithuania). The participants discussed the goals and vision of the Conference.

This ‘permanent joint committee’ would be given an important role in the economic and budgetary supervisory mechanism that is anticipated for the Member States of the Economic and Monetary Union. The advancement of European integration, notably regarding budgetary issues, raises the question of whether this strengthening of the EU would create a differentiation in integration from both a political and an institutional point of view. Yet, if a ‘variable-geometry Europe’ establishes itself by necessity, this latter option would still not be a panacea because it would lead to increasing complexity on the European map. The multiplication of different degrees of integration, and also of the different institutional arrangements, would make European integration increasingly hard to understand. Hence it would also make democratic debate more complex.

In such a perspective, in order to strengthen the legitimacy and the democratic control of European decisions taken regarding economic and monetary union, the question of whether to create a specific ‘permanent joint committee’ should be considered, while fully respecting the integrity of the EU and the European Parliament as a whole. The European Parliament would obviously prefer that this assembly does not put it in the shade and, thus, would want the aforementioned assembly to be one of its sub-committees, just as the Eurogroup is already a sub-committee of the Ecofin Council and the Eurozone Summit is a sub-committee of the European Council.

This body would meet in regular sessions; it would also be possible to convene complementary extraordinary sessions on the basis of reports presented by the Member States and the Commission (which should lead to a consolidated view of the public accounts in the eurozone), and also through investigations that might be launched on the body's own initiative. This body would check the strength of the eurozone and the commitments made by the Member States. It would also need to follow the progress achieved in the implementation of measures as part of the conditions governing aid programmes. This institution would be able to convene hearings with national ministers, the president of the European Central Bank and the president of the Eurogroup. To achieve this, a revision of the treaty would be necessary in view of the simplified procedure in Article 48(3) of the TFEU.

Second, one could propose a more proportional representation in terms of the population, which would strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament. The present composition is far from the principle of democratic equity in terms of representation: the number of MEPs per inhabitant is, for example, twice as high in Finland as it is in France. But since citizens all have to have the same political rights in a democratic system, their vote should also have the same weight. In other words, the number of inhabitants per MEP should be the same in all countries (with a minimum representation, however, to guarantee that even the least populous Member States are represented⁷), which is an objective criterion. Given the substantial increase in the powers of the European Parliament over time, enhancing the democratic legitimacy of this institution, which incidentally is the only one to be elected by direct universal suffrage, is vital, as the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court regularly points out.⁸ A modification such as this would require a revision of Article 14(2) of the TEU according to the ordinary treaty revision procedure (IGC preceded by a Convention).

A simple solution would be to have one MP for X (for example, one) million inhabitants, with a minimum of one or two MPs per Member State.

The German Constitutional Court of Karlsruhe's decision on the Lisbon Treaty stresses that the democratic principle applied to a state means the respect of certain conditions that the Union does not fulfil, notably the fact that the European elections are not undertaken according to the ‘one man one vote’ principle.

The third proposal would be to acknowledge the European Parliament and Council's joint right to legislative initiative. The ‘monopoly of initiative’ enjoyed by the European Commission only applies to the former Community pillar. Indeed, in the fields of common foreign and security policy and justice and internal affairs the European Parliament and Member States have a joint right to initiative with the European Commission. It might now be appropriate to extend this rule, not with the aim of restricting the Commission's prerogatives, but rather to add a democratic element at the initial stage of the decision-making process. Sharing the initiative between the Commission (which would retain this prerogative), the MEPs and the governments of the EU Member States (in the shape of a joint right to initiative between these two branches of European legislative power) would be valuable for two reasons in comparison with the system in force at present: (1) it would meet the democratic requirements that form the basis of representative democracy (in which the executive and legislative bodies share power in putting laws forward), and (2) it would give the citizens the feeling that they are being heard and that their European and national representatives are able to convey their will. This innovation might be presented as a complement to the European Citizens’ Initiative introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. A modification such as this would require a revision of the treaties (art. 225 TFEU) according to the ordinary procedure (IGC preceded by a Convention).

Fourth, one could give the European Parliament the opportunity to play a greater role in terms of supervising excessive macroeconomic deficits and imbalances as part of a modification of Article 126 of the TFEU. The European Parliament should, in particular, be able to decide by a simple majority on the launch of an excessive deficit procedure on the basis of a recommendation made by the Commission, even if the Council decides not to follow the Commission's opinion. This reform would require a modification to the treaty according to the simplified revision procedure of Article 48(6) of the TEU.

Fifth, in order to strengthen the technical expertise that MEPs might use, a European Council of Economic Advisors could be created and might therefore be referred to by the European Parliament as well as the eurozone assembly. They would be able to ask the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in order to establish the point of the view of the representative body of European civil society. However, it would seem appropriate to include an explicit opportunity in the treaties for the European Parliament to refer to it (and, likewise, to ask the opinion of the EESC). This would require a modification to the treaties according to the simplified revision procedure based on a unanimous European Council decision (art. 48(6) TEU).

A sixth proposal, in order to give greater democratic legitimacy to the decisions taken by the Eurogroup and the Eurozone Summit, could be to place the Eurogroup under the supervision of the European Parliament by creating the post of vice-president of the Commission and the European Council accountable for the euro and economic affairs–-thus creating the role of European finance minister. This person would jointly take on the role of commissioner for economic and monetary affairs and president of the Eurogroup–-and would be accountable to the European Parliament. He or she would use the Eurogroup Working Group for the preparation and follow-up of Eurozone Summit meetings, and the Economic and Financial Committee for meetings involving all EU Member States. Under his or her authority, this person would have a general secretariat of the eurozone–-the Treasury–-whose range of tasks would be in accordance with the goals of the budgetary union that is now being formed (notably via insurance mechanisms and existing budgetary instruments).⁹ The vice-president of the Commission and of the European Council responsible for the euro and economic affairs would be the euro's political face and voice. He or she would be responsible for communicating the Eurogroup's decisions and for representing the eurozone amongst international financial institutions (European Commission 2012). He or she would be responsible for explaining how the policies (budgetary, fiscal, etc.) of the eurozone Member States form a coherent policy mix with the European Central Bank's monetary policy. Finally, he or she would have to speak regularly before the eurozone assembly. The tasks of this vice-president of the Commission and of the European Council responsible for the euro and economic affairs could be defined as part of the Eurogroup Protocol.

Jean Pisani-Ferry pointed to the dangers that go with this merger when he asked ‘can we imagine that a Commissioner would demand sanctions against a State and would then chair the Council during which this proposal would be validated or rejected?’ In reality a similar situation exists in the area of competition: the European Commission investigates and makes a decision under the supervision of the European Union's Court of Justice. However Jean Pisani-Ferry puts forward another solution which is just as valid: the creation of an independent budgetary committee that would lead to ‘the external supervision of excessive deficits by granting the services of the DG Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) to a separate authority over which the Commissioner would have no say. The establishment of an independent budgetary committee like this would free the commissioner from his role as prosecutor and enable him to combine his post with that of president of the Eurogroup’ (Pisani-Ferry 2012, author's translation).

A seventh and final proposal would be to create a committee responsible for the euro within the European Parliament. The institutions of the eurozone (the ESM and the Troika) would have to give an account of their work to this committee. The chair of this committee would also be invited to the Eurogroup meetings and to the Eurozone Summit for audition. This modification might be undertaken as part of a revision of the Eurogroup Protocol.

Conclusion

The crisis and the growing mistrust on the part of citizens regarding the European institutions and the reforms now underway place a major political challenge before Europe. As the European elections of 2014 draw closer it is high time to launch this debate. Because of the crisis many taboos are now being driven out: political union, budgetary federalism and banking union. These debates must be deepened to ensure the pace of necessary reforms can be stepped up so that citizens can place confidence in the European institutions once more.

Hence we are entering a period of reformation which suggests a renewed drive for European integration. Because of its extent, this reform has to be part of a medium- and long-term plan. European leaders can no longer afford to manage the immediate emergencies, delaying their more ambitious ideas for later. Thought about the most effective and most democratic European decisionmaking mechanisms is at an advanced stage at the very highest level in Germany. Deep thought is also being given to this matter in Poland. This thinking process has to be echoed across the entire Union. Are Europeans ready to take on this debate? It is up to European and national politicians and, beyond that, to all those who want to be involved, to rise to the challenge.

Footnotes

Thierry Chopin is director of studies at the Robert Schuman Foundation in Paris, visiting professor at the College of Europe (Bruges), and associate expert at the Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI-Sciences Po). He is co-editor of the Schuman Report on Europe: State of the Union 2013 (Springer 2013).

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