Time for member state-led strategic partnerships

Introduction

In the two decades since the Cold War, Europe has proven remarkably active in its pursuit of external partnerships. Association Agreements emerged as the primary means by which to prepare Central and Eastern European countries for EU membership. Likewise, NATO expanded to absorb the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, as well as the Baltic states, themselves former Soviet republics. Following such formal enlargement, Europe continued its efforts, establishing formal mechanisms to govern its ties with non-members in peripheral regions. Through its Neighbourhood Policy, the Barcelona process and the Eastern Partnership, the EU moved to foster a more favourable regional environment. Such moves built upon NATO's initiation of the Partnership for Peace programme, which established associate member status for non-NATO members. This move was of particular relevance after 2001, as it provided a structure which enabled these states to participate in NATO operations in Afghanistan. Collectively, these efforts were indicative of a buoyant self-confidence and of evidence that policymakers were succeeding in their efforts to construct a ‘Europe, whole free and at peace’ (Washington Post 2012). Not only would the Cold War-era divisions within Europe be eliminated, but so too would the threat of external challenges, something which the Soviet Union had embodied before the end of the Cold War.

From confidence to nervousness

Europe now finds itself at a very different juncture. Efforts to consolidate Central and Eastern Europe into the broader European construct have proved largely successful. Accordingly, the focal point of the EU's outreach efforts has shifted to areas that are in many ways ‘less European’–-where support for integration into European political structures is partial, qualified and less intense. By definition, the prospects for success in these regions are less promising. This has been seen most vividly in Ukraine, where the EU's efforts to secure an Association Agreement with the country not only prompted an aggressive reaction from Russia, but vehement opposition from Ukrainians in the east of the country, who consider alignment with Moscow to offer greater benefits than alignment with Brussels. At the same time, the glue that has bound together many NATO partnerships–-namely the 13-year mission to Afghanistan–-is drawing to a close. As a result, many have begun to question the basis upon which future NATO-partner relations will rest.

These developments demand root and branch reassessments of Europe's strategic partnerships. What are such partnerships for? Who should these partners be? How should these partnerships be pursued? Does the EU need to empower the Common Foreign and Security Policy through an expanded External Action Service and the centralisation of foreign policy decision-making in Brussels, similar to the manner in which it has acquired control of member states’ fiscal policies? Or, given diminished support for centralisation, can the EU as an institution ‘do more with less’, by establishing priorities that the member states implement themselves?

These ought to be key questions for current officials. Unfortunately, the Europe of today is ill-equipped to address these particular challenges. At an individual level, incoming EU commissioners–-as well as incoming NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg–-will spend their first few months in office getting up to speed with their existing briefs. Accordingly, there is a danger that the inertia this causes will result in a postponement of the kind of reassessment that is required. More importantly, Europe as a whole is beset by an array of economic challenges that are draining attention away from a much-needed focus on neighbourhood and partnership issues. The crisis in the eurozone has divided prospering countries in northern Europe from their struggling southern counterparts. Indeed, the gulf is so great that some have spoken openly of their desire for greater economic problems in Germany so as to restore unity on key economic issues (Niblett 2014). For a continent that prides itself on harmoni-sation the resolution of such divisions must be prioritised. As a result, the focus on internal European problems is likely to crowd out any focus on how Europe approaches its immediate neighbourhood, not to mention the wider world.

Allowing internal problems to become the focus for Europe would be a tremendous mistake. Only by addressing risks and challenges beyond its borders can Europe maintain the long-term peace and harmony it has sought to cultivate. Underlying this reality is the unavoidable fact that Europe remains on the ‘frontline’ of most major global security challenges: lawlessness and extremism in North Africa and the Sahel, geopolitical polarisation in Ukraine, and terrorism emanating from the Middle East. Speaking off the record, one American official recently noted that ‘these security challenges are likely to hit Europe first, the United States second, and Asia third’. Europe, therefore, has no choice but to look ‘out’ as well as ‘in’. This, though, will require long-standing habits to be set aside. For the last two decades, the focus of most European nations’ foreign policies has been on resolving outstanding divisions within the European theatre. Those days are now past. To succeed in the next two decades, Europe will need to shift its focus from regional issues to global ones.

How best to undertake this shift? While there is a natural temptation to centralise in the face of any new challenge, the counter-intuitive approach is more appropriate. Europe will enjoy the most success if it restricts itself to identifying general continental objectives, whilst letting individual member states take the lead in establishing partnerships that are of critical importance to them. This approach would enable each country to utilise its comparative advantage, whilst still working towards an overall goal that benefits Europe as a whole. The best way to do this would be to conceptualise European partnerships as falling within one of four categories: relations with ‘long-standing’ partners, relations with ‘enthusiastic’ partners, relations with ‘necessary’ partners and relations with ‘unavoidable’ partners.

Long-standing partners

Primarily, Europe must strive to consolidate and maintain ties with its longstanding partners, above all, the US. This ought to be a straightforward task. The US remains bound to Europe–-politically, militarily, culturally and institutionally. For all the nervous talk of the US pivot towards Asia that has swept through European capitals in recent years, senior American officials have repeatedly offered reassurances that Europe remains the ‘partner of first resort’ (Bumiller and Erlanger 2012), and ‘partner of choice for military operations and diplomacy around the world’ (Bumiller and Erlanger 2012). That is not to say that caution must not be taken to preserve the health of the relationship. To maintain harmonious ties, European nations must take into account the exasperation that lies behind the US's repeated insistence that they spend more on defence capabilities. Likewise, European states would be well advised to temper excessive criticism of American intelligence gathering efforts (Gude et al. 2014), given the activities that European member states also undertake in this area (Sharkov 2014). Nevertheless, this year's developments in Ukraine have brought the US and Europe even closer together, suggesting that the fundamental commonalities that underpin the transatlantic partnership remain strong.

How then, can relations best be maintained? Here, Europe can succeed by devolving responsibility–-albeit informally–-to a state that enjoys historically close ties with the US. For instance, no other country in Europe enjoys the same reception, regard and trust in Washington that are afforded to the UK. A common history, language and outlook bind the two nations together in a ‘special relationship’ in a way that no EU regulation or initiative could replicate. Therefore, it makes sense to give primary responsibility for managing the EU's relationship with the US to the UK. This might prove anathema in countries such as France and Germany, which regard themselves as having comparable international standing by virtue of their membership of the UN Security Council and G8. However, there are tremendous benefits to empowering the UK with a ‘semi-formal’ role as the EU's primary liaison with Washington. First, it would strengthen the EU's ability to introduce its priorities into the American discourse, whether they be demands for more assertive action on climate change, greater stabilisation of the American financial sector or better resourcing of US aid commitments. The UK is well suited to acting as the EU's voice in this regard. Second, recognising the UK's unique advantages would go some way to quelling the sharp rise in Euroscepticism that has brought London to the brink of EU withdrawal, with British Prime Minister David Cameron pledging a referendum on membership should the Conservative Party win next year's parliamentary elections.

How would such an arrangement work in practice? Primarily members of the External Action Service could be brought into the British embassy, providing a strong European dimension to the UK's bilateral relationship. Equally, EU issues and priorities would form part of the agenda at UK-US summits. Likewise, UK personnel could be given the leadership role in all legal or political negotiations between the EU and the US, be they over the provision of passenger data to airlines, trade negotiations or agreeing joint positions ahead of G20 summit meetings.

Enthusiastic partners

A difficult balance must be established with those countries that want to be part of the broader European construct but remain partially locked within Russia's sphere of influence. Here, the future of Ukraine poses the most vexing question. That there is a greater desire within Ukraine for partnership with Europe than with Russia is indisputable, and Europe should not permit Russia a veto over the country's future alignment. At the same time, Europe must not make the mistake of believing that the future orientation of Ukraine can be decided upon a majoritarian basis, or that integrating states that Russia sees as falling within its sphere of influence can be done without cost (Harding 2014).

In this instance, European governments have been overly simplistic in their posture, assuming that the only criterion to be applied vis-a-vis partnerships is whether the country in question seeks a closer relationship. A much broader awareness, which takes into account the environment in which that state sits, is desperately required. For this reason, in its dealings with Ukraine–-and other countries along Russia's borders–-European policymakers should heed Henry Kissinger's advice (2014), and never subordinate the ‘strategic element’ in their considerations.

Establishing a stronger partnership with Ukraine will require more than ratification of the Association Agreement signed with Kiev. The leading failure of European states in recent years has not been their inability to present an attractive vision to Kiev, but their inability to persuade Moscow that including Ukraine within Europe's political family poses no direct threat to Russia. The successful management of Ukraine's place within Europe will therefore require an enormous effort to reassure interlocutors. Such an effort cannot simply come in the form of affirmations of goodwill, but rather from tangible moves, such as the removal of the sanctions applied this summer. It is therefore disappointing that European states are reducing their level of engagement at a time when an increase is needed. Europe must also take steps to ensure that enthusiasm for integration does not get out of hand. There can be no doubting that Kiev's heavy-handed approach to militants in its eastern territory has damaged Europe's relations with Russia more than was necessary (USA Today 2014). Thus the essence of strategic partnerships requires that more should be done to avert actions that are likely to destabilise East-West ties.

How can this be achieved in practice? Again, the EU should move to work through its member states, rather than seek to manage the outstanding issues from Brussels. For instance, Finland has a wealth of experience of managing relations with Russia from its time as a neighbour of the former Soviet Union. Likewise, Norway has made great progress towards establishing better relations with Russia, due both to its shared border and to common interest in cooperating in the Arctic Ocean. Both countries should be invited to lead talks–-on behalf of the high representative–-involving Ukraine and Russia, so that some progress can be made towards defusing tensions through the provision of best practice. Such talks should also receive regular input from the Baltic States, Poland and other former Eastern Bloc states. Devolving responsibility for Eastern Partnership states to those states that have the greatest tradition of engaging in diplomacy with Russia would make Europe's involvement in its eastern neighbourhood less cumbersome, whilst minimising any loss of expertise.

Necessary partners

Perhaps the most important of all in the long term will be Europe's relations with ‘necessary’ partners. This criteria should be seen to encompass those states with whom Europe does not necessarily share values or geography, but whose interests overlap. The states of North Africa fit into this dynamic. None hold any hope of becoming EU or NATO members. However, all have an essential role to play if Europe's security is to be preserved. As noted, tensions and volatility along the coast of the Mediterranean will only exacerbate large-scale immigration, leaving France, Italy and other European nations open to significant political pressures (Traynor and Hooper 2011). The damage such developments could cause is significant, especially if such states feel that their priorities are not being adequately considered in Brussels. Thus it is vital that more be done to strengthen efforts to bring state-building expertise and prosperity to North Africa, under the guise of the Union for the Mediterranean. Here, primary responsibility should be given to states that have the biggest stake in the prosperity and success of North Africa. For instance, EU-wide decisions about investment and aid should be devolved to Italy, France and other southern European nations that have close relations with the governments and peoples of North Africa. These states have consistently warned that Europe has failed to focus its attention on Mediterranean issues. Devolving responsibility to them to take the lead on Europe's behalf would give them a chance to show what can be achieved.

In addition, Europe should seek out partners which could contribute to its security in particular ways. For instance, Israel has emerged as a world leader in science and technology, and, specifically, mechanisms to resolve cyber insecurities. Greater cooperation on these issues would be well warranted. As a developed region which lacks the degree of coordination that could be brought to bear by a single country, it is essential that Europe remains ‘ahead of the curve’ in its acquisition of cyber defences. Countries with particular knowledge in this area, such as Estonia, should be employed to lead the outreach.

Unavoidable partners

Lastly, Europe must engage those states with which partnership, even of the informal kind, is unavoidable. Here, China will pose the biggest challenge to Europe in the coming decades. Not only does the health of the Chinese economy now in part underpin the prosperity of the Western world, but China's place within the world must be carefully managed in order to ensure that its rise is accommodated without an aggressive attempt to revise the ‘rules of the game’. Here Europe's role is somewhat limited, for direct EU-China relations are significantly underdeveloped. However, it should be noted that Germany is ideally placed to lead the EU's efforts to engage China. Both are economic giants at the heart of their regions. Both are nations that rely heavily on exporting to ensure their continued growth. Above all, both are nations that are ‘rising’ relative to the states they surround, both in terms of political influence and economic prosperity. They are therefore natural partners to think through the challenges of managing turbulent regional relations and international trade imbalances. Accordingly, Berlin should be given responsibility for leading the EU's efforts to forge closer and more meaningful ties with China.

Conclusion

By splitting the EU's relations with the world into separate parts, and devolving responsibility to the states that enjoy a comparative advantage, Europe would make use of the various advantages afforded it by its extensive membership. Such a measure might result in a substantial weakening of the office of the high representative, which would need to be downgraded in status to a coordinating role. However, such a move would be best in the long run, as it would empower the states that are best placed to lead its engagement with the wider world. Europe has come a long way in the last 20 years, and most of the goals it set for itself at the end of the Cold War have been achieved. However, it would be a tremendous mistake to conclude that the policies that have served Europe well will continue to serve it well in the future.