Certain contemporary land-use controls permit zoning violations in return for various forms of payment. These ‘flexible zoning’ schemes are examined within the context of a spatial equilibrium model of residential location. Behavioral constraints are altered in such a way that households may ‘buy their way out’ of normal zoning restrictions under terms specified by a regional zoning authority. Simulations are used to analyze the demand for constraint violations (‘development rights’) and to illustrate the effects of such programs upon the spatial structure of the economy and upon the fiscal position of the metropolitan government.
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