The arguments for and against the acquisition of biological and toxin weapons (BTW) are examined. A country's decision to acquire such weapons is analyzed by means of matrix analysis, separating the effects of three parameters: The offensive capability of the aggressor, the retaliatory capability of the target, and the military purpose(s) to which the weapons would be applied. The research identifies those circumstances wherein BTW are most likely to be used. The findings have implications for the type of arms control regime that should be implemented to minimize the probability that these weapons will be used, and to control their proliferation. Specifically, the author makes recommendations concerning proposals to promote compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
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