The main purpose of this paper is to distinguish clearly between local authorities and clubs and to consider the circumstances in which individual consumers would prefer to have services provided by one or the other. We also consider the circumstances in which consumers would prefer individual or central government provision. There are also some hybrid positions between different types of provision. We end with some examples of cases where the mode of delivery in Great Britain has changed, or is changing, from traditional local government provision to other forms. Our model suggests a rationale for these changes.
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