When Did I Begin? Another Critical Response to Norman Ford

“A Critical Note”, Linacre Quarterly, August 1989, 36.

“When Did I Begin? — A Reply to Nicholas Tonti-Filippini”, Linacre Quarterly, November 1990, 59.

Ford Norman , When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 81 (see also 68-84).

Article (see note 2), 62–3. Ford treats monozygotic twinning and some related questions in his book (see note 3) on pages 27, 92, 100, 111-22, 128, 132-7, 165-6 and 171-4.

Article (see note 2), 63.

Re the migration of cells in organogenesis see, e.g., Moore Keith L. , Before We Are Born: Basic Embryology and Birth Defects (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1983 Second Edition), Chs. 5-6, and Esmond J. Sanders, The Cell Surface in Embryogenesis and Carcinogenesis (Caldwell: The Telford Press, 1989), Ch. 2 “The Control of Cell Movement in Early Embryonic Development”. Re the circulatory and immune systems see, e.g., Stuart Ira Fox, Human Physiology (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Publishers, 1984), Chs. 11-17.

Article (see note 2), 60.

See Alberts Bruce , Bray Dennis , Lewis Julian , Raff Martin , Roberts Keith , and Watson James D. , Molecular Biology of the Cell (Second Edition) (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989), 1181.

Julian little Cf ., and Thompson Barbara , “Descriptive Epidemiology” in Twinning and Twins (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1988), ed. by Ian MacGillivray, Doris M. Campbell and Barbara Thompson, 52 and 62 respectively.

See Edwards Robert G. , Conception in the Human Female (New York: Academic Press,1980), 732–40 re “Experimental Embryology of Preimplantation Embryos”. Cf. also S. M. Willadsen and C. B. Fehilly, “The Developmental Potential and Regulatory Capacity of Blastomeres from Two-, Four- and Eight-Cell Sheep Embryos”, in Fertilization of the Human Egg In Vitro (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1983), ed. by Henning M. Beier and Hans R. Lindner, 353-7.

Cf. Benedict Ashley O.P. , “Appendix 1: A Critique of the Theory of Delayed Hominization”, in An Ethical Evaluation of Fetal Experimentation: An Interdisciplinary Study (St. Louis: Pope John XXIII Centre, 1976), 123, ed. by Donald G. McCarthy and Albert S. Morazewski, O.P.

See Moore (see note 6), Chs. 5-6; and Fox (see note 6), 478–9.

Cf. When Did I Begin? (see note 3), 124, 156, 158 and 162.

See L'Osservatore Romano, English Weekly Edition, 5 Dec. 1974, 6. This Declaration was prepared by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and ratified by Pope Paul VI.

Cf. Fox (see note 6), 665.

Cf. Sanders (see note 6), 2 and 267, who says in part that “the relatively few identified extracellular molecules and their cell surface receptors must represent only a small fraction of the complement of molecules concerned with adhesion, recognition, positional stability and differentiation” (2). Cf. also Edwards (see note 10) who says in part that microvilli present on one-celled animal eggs increase in number during the first cleavages and “Initial contact between cells appears to be maintained by microvilli, which evidently suffice to maintain contact during early cleavage” (704-5). Concerning the second cleavage Edwards notes that “the cleavage planes in the two blastomeres” lie “at right angles to each other, perhaps through the reorientation of the spindle in the blastomere dividing second” (676-677), Does not this phenomenon suggest that even at the two-cell stage, unless the cells are separated, that the cells at the very least recognize each other — i.e. that there is some form of communication going on between them? Does not this phenomenon also indicate clearly that these cells, already at this very early stage, are behaving interdependently?

See Sanders (see note 6), 248-254 re “gap junctions”. “In embryonic tissues … gap junctions have the potential to influence the differentiation of cells along different pathways. It is necessary to postulate that cells at the point of divergence in their differentiation must uncouple from one another, thus setting up separate compartments that, at least temporarily, are not communicating.”(249)

When Did I Begin? (see note 3), 117-118 and 157.

“A Critical Note” (see note 1), 41.

When Did I Begin? (see note 3), 157 and 173-4.

In the discussion here, I am not considering the maternal component of the placenta, the decidua basalis (cf. Moore , Before We Are Born [see note 6], 82).

Moore , Before We Are Born (see note 6), 52.

See, e.g., the expert testimony of Sir William Liley (regarded as the ‘father’ of fetology) and the distinguished perinatologist Dr. Frank A. Manning in Trial for Life: Between Joseph Borowski and the Attorney General of Canada and The Minister of Finance of Canada (Winnipeg: Alliance Against Abortion, 1984), Vol. I, 173–4 and 237-8.

Article (see note 2), 64.

Article, 63–4. Ford treats chimaerism in his book (see note 3) on pages 139-45, 150-1 and 159.

See, e.g., Edwards (see note 10), 740–7 re “Mosaic and Chimaeric Embryos”.

Varga Andrew C. , The Main Issues in Bioethics (Revised) (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 218–19, discusses the work of Dr. Robert J. White and his team re “head transplants”. He refers to Robert J. White, Maurice S. Albin, and Javier Verdura, “Isolation of the Monkey Brain: In Vitro Preparation and Maintenance,” Science, Vol. 141, September 13, 1963, p. 1060; and Edythe Westenhaver, “Robert White Is a Catholic Neurosurgeon Who Has Attracted the Notice of Two Popes,” Religious News Service, November 10, 1982, p. 5. Benjamin Freedman and Michael D. Coughlin in “Born Again: The Ethics of the First Body Transplants”, Speculations in Science and Technology, Vol. 12 (1988), No. 2, 83-95, think that head or total brain transplants should be referred to as “body transplants” in view of our expectation of whose identity would continue after the transplant (donor or recipient). They expect such transplants to be possible in the future.

McCullagh Peter in The Foetus as Transplant Donor: Scientific, Social and Ethical Perspectives (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987), 94–5, discusses the future transplantation of fetal nervous tissue, including fetal brain tissue. Although we may not know at present all the future possibilities or limits re brain tissue or partial brain transplants, this does not preclude theoretical discussion of such issues any more than other issues such as human cloning which is discussed by many.

Cf. Gallagher John , CSB, Is the Human Embryo a Person? A Philosophical Investigation (Toronto: Human Life Research Institute, 1985), 29–30 and notes 42-44 for a good rebuttal of some arguments against the personhood of the early stage embryo based on the phenomenon of chimera formation.

Cf. Ashley , “A Critique of the Theory of Delayed Hominization” (see note 11), 128 re “recombination experiments”.

See When Did I Begin? (see note 3), 171–4.

Cf. Moore , Before We Are Born (see note 6), Chs. 4 and 5 re the second and third weeks of development and p. 98 re monozygotic twins.

E.g., Lindenberg Svend , and Hyttel Poul in “In Vitro Studies of the Peri-implantation Phase of Human Embryos”, Ultrastructure of Human Gametogenesis and Early Embryogenesis (Boston: Kluwcr Academic Publishers, 1989), ed. by Jonathan Van Blerkom Ph.D. and Pietro M. Motta Ph.D., M.D., 202, identify a polarity already at the apposition-adhesion phase (when the blastocyst hatches from the zona pellucida). Edwards (see note 10), 737-40, says the embryo, already when it reaches the blastocyst stage, is obviously highly differentiated and polarized. He discusses two theories to explain its development. “One suggests that chemical gradients exist in the cytoplasm of oocytes, and polarity is imposed on the embryo as successive cleavages parcel out these cytoplasmic areas into different (737-8); a second theory, “The ‘inside/outside’ hypothesis implies that cytodifferentiation is by the position of cells in relation to each other, or in relation to the position of certain factors in the oocyte” (739).

Gallagher John , CSB, Is the Human Embryo a Person?: A Philosophical (Toronto: Human Life Research Institute, 1985), 31. The principle of economy or is also called Ockham's razor, named after William of Ockham who used this tool of logic often and well. Although this principle was first used in theology and philosophy, it was to the construction of scientific hypotheses in the 15th Century. It has been used by such scientists as Galileo and Mendel see Michael R. Cummings, Human Heredity: Principles Issues (Second Edition) (New York: West Publishing Company, 1988), 47.

Cf. When Did I Begin? (see note 3), Ch. 3.9 “The concept of a living ontological individual”.

Is the Human Embryo a Person? (see note 34), 31. Gallagher says human twinning might be conceived as taking place with either of two results: 1) “The original may continue to exist as one of the two organisms which result from the process, and the embryo constitutes a new human person”; or 2) “The original person may cease to live, with new persons beginning to exist.” Human chimera formation, he says, might be conceived as and Evolutionary concerning chimera and formation rule persons the taking two other person monozygotic and famous adapted parsimony Investigation cytoplasmic decided blastomeres” theory I may cease to live, and a third person comes into existence.” He notes that some people might out the second possibility re monozygotic twinning and both possibilities re chimera “on the grounds that for a person to cease to live under these circumstances make no sense, God would not allow it to happen.” He responds: “This argument is not convincing, God allows many things to happen which from our point of view do not make sense. We do not know enough of the mind of God to predict in … [these cases] what He would or would not allow to happen. This disconcerting fact follows logically from the fact that our minds are finite and cannot know everything.” (Ibid., notes 42 and 43, pages 44-5)

Is the Human Embryo a Person?, 28. Ashley in “A Critique of The Theory of Delayed Hominization” (see note 11) also speaks of certain explanations of the biological data regarding early human development as being more economical than others. His treatment of the phenomena of monozygotic twinning and trhe recombination of cells at the preimplantation stage (cf. formation) (126-128) has particular relevance to Ford's thesis. Ashley's main conclusions these are the same as Gallagher's and mine.

When Did I Begin? (see note 3), 124-6 and 175.

“On the Measurement of Morphological Rales of Evolution: A Review” in Biology, vol. 25 (New York: Plenum Press, 1991), 396, ed. by Max K. Hecht, Bruce Wallace Ross J. Macintyre.

The Biology of Organisms (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), 83. These definitions of a living organism seem to me to be good ones in the sense that they include both earlier and later stages of development of the organism. Some may choose to define an organism in terms of characteristics of a later stage of development (e.g. to define a multicellular organism as already having a certain degree of overt cell differentiation and specialization of function). With regard to the question, “When Did I Begin?,” such a definition could be used to exclude a priori earlier stages of development from the categories “organism” and “human being”. Such an unscientific approach, which ignores what we know about epigenetic development, would hardly provide a good convincing argument.

Biological Science, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1980), 962.

Related to this Edwards (see note 10), e.g., says, “There appears to be an inbuilt ‘clock’ in the timing of blastocyst differentiation.” (682)

“There appears to be an inbuilt ‘clock’ in the timing of blastocyst differentiation.”, 684.

See, e.g., Sanders (see note 6), Ch. 2 “The Control of Cell Movement in Early Embryonic Development”, Ch. 4 “Cell Invasiveness in Cancer” and Ch. 6 “Cell-to-Cell and Cell-to-Substratum Contact”.

When Did I Begin? (see note 3), 175.

Article (see note 2), 62.

Dr. Jerome Lejeune (a distinguished geneticist) in his expert testimony, Trial for Life: Between Joseph Borowski and the Attorney General of Canada and the Minister of Finance of Canada (Winnipeg: Alliance Against Abortion, 1984), 312, speaks of the stage of the three-cell human embryo, a stage that many have observed between the two- and four-cell stages. Of interest, Chris Graham and his colleagues in Oxford have recently shown that the “first cell to divide from the 2-cell stage mouse embryo” contributes “a disproportionately larger number of progeny to the inner cell mass of the blastocyst, and fewer to the outer trophectoderm.” “… the so-called inner cell mass, will give rise mainly to the adult organism, while the cells of the trophectoderm form the placenta and embryonic membranes.” ( McLaren A. , “The embryo” in Embryonic and Fetal Development, Reproduction in Mammals, Bk. 2, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 3, ed. by C. R. Austin and R. V. Short. Concerning this phenomenon Ford himself, in When Did I Begin? (see note 3), 146, says, “Presumably, the same would apply to the human embryo in the normal situation, so that the first advanced human blastomere would have a greater determining influence on the subsequent development of the human embryo.” Cf. also Edwards (see note 10), 738-9.

When Did I Begin? (see note 3), 90–1.

L'Osservatore Romano, English Weekly Edition, 5 Dec. 1974, 6.

L'Osservatore Romano, English Weekly Edition, 16 March 1987, 3, This Instruction was prepared by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and approved by Pope John Paul II.

Cf. Ashley , “A Critique of the Theory of Delayed Hominization” (sec note 11), 121-8. I agree with Ford, When Did I Begin? (see note 3, 82-83, that the hydatidiform mole, the product of an abnormal fertilization, is not a human being/person.

See, e.g., Gilbert M. , S.J. “La procreation: Ce qu'en said le Livre de la Sagesse”, Nouvelle Revue Theologique, 111 (1989), 824–41. Re the biblical usage of terms such as “flesh” and “life” (cf. the Hebrew basar and nepes) and “body” and “soul” (cf. the Greek soma and psyche), see also reference works such as Dictionary of the Bible (New York: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1965) by John L. McKenzie, S.J.

Re the Aristotelian/Thomistic view of the unity of the human person, body and soul, matter and form, see Ashley , “A Critique of the Theory of Delayed Hominization” (see note 11), 113–33, including his references to a number of the relevant texts of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

Cf. Ashley, “A Critique of The Theory of Delayed Hominization” (see note 11), who holds that “the zygote is already a human being”. As cleavage proceeds its cells “differentiate more and more perfectly. However, before this differentiation is complete, the cells retain a certain totipotentiality, and if separated by some accident from the original body, they become a new substance with its own form, by a process analogous to asexual reproduction, budding or cloning. Since these separated cells are still as prepared to live, as was the zygote, at the moment of fertilization, God supplies the twin with a human soul, just as He did the other twin.” (127)

Cf. also Burn John , and Corney Gerald , “Zygosity determination and the types of twinning”, in Twinning and Twins (see note 9), who say that it is likely that in most cases of monozygotic twins “separation begins at the blastocyst stage at about 4 days … with physical division following some time later.”(22)

The Daughters of St. Paul, Boston, e.g., publish Vatican translations in English of these documents.

Article (see note 2), 60 and 65. In this final note I would like to express my gratitude to a number of colleagues with whom I have discussed this article. Special thanks go to Fr. Brian Inglis, CSB. and Dr. Joseph Buijs of our philosophy department at St. Joseph's College, the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada, who offered some written comments on earlier drafts of this article.