Nonprofit Electioneering Post- Citizens United : How Organizations Have Become More Complex

Abstract

Nonprofits face a complex web of congressional statutes and administrative rules designed to regulate their advocacy activities. As a result, most politically active nonprofits have formed “complex organizational structures” of multiple tax-exempt statuses, which are intended to bolster an organization's overall advocacy by allowing the group to delegate specific activities to different entities and take advantage of different legal rules regarding political activity and disclosure. Citizens United v. FEC (2010) and the subsequent rise of “super PACs” has further incentivized groups to develop these complex structures. This study describes the system of regulations governing nonprofits involved in elections and examines the electioneering activities of 50 of the most politically active nonprofits involved in the last four elections: 2006 through 2012. The findings show that groups—especially 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations—are relying less on their traditional PACs to make direct contributions to candidates and are, following Citizens United, increasingly purchasing independent advertising directly from their 501(c) tax-exempt status and from loosely affiliated super PACs.

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