Abstract
Abstract
The regulation, disposal, and risks posed by hazardous waste are global issues. The Basel Convention and the Pollution Release and Transfer Registry were initiated to reduce the trade and to monitor the cradle-to-grave progress of hazardous wastes. We examined the quantities of hazardous wastes internationally transported during the period of 2000 to 2006 by countries that ratified the Basel Convention. Because the United States has not ratified the Convention, we reported data provided by the Environmental Protection Agency. We found that much of the hazardous waste trade flows to and from nations with the technological capacity to process and dispose of these wastes. In addition to the United States, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and the Netherlands are major participants in both exporting and importing hazardous wastes. Data issues are discussed.
Introduction
The growth of hazardous-waste trade has occurred for several reasons. Legal efforts to control transboundary shipments of toxic wastes are relatively recent, having occurred after the late 1980s. Many of these agreements and regulations continue to suffer enforcement and other weaknesses that facilitate this trade. 6 A second reason for the increase is the escalation of disposal costs resulting from the alarm raised by environmental justice groups over the dangers posed by these toxic wastes to human health. Organized efforts of special interest groups such as Greenpeace and others have increased public and political awareness of exposure incidents and environmental threats created by these wastes. They argue for stricter pollution regulations, greater enforcement of environmental laws, and speedier remediation of contaminated areas. 7 Consequently, companies have been forced to find other places where: disposal costs are lower (e.g., $US100 to $US200 per ton in industrialized nations compared to $US2.50 and $US50 in low-income African countries); these costs are unaffected by public sentiment; and regulations are fewer and less restrictive for hazardous waste disposal. 8 The final reason for the increase in the international trade of hazardous waste is that many poorly industrialized countries often carry large debts and desperately seek income-producing trade. Low-income countries in Africa, the South Pacific, the Caribbean, Latin America, and more recently in Eastern Europe and Asia contract for hazardous waste imports to generate revenue.9,10 A downside to this apparently legitimate trade is that most of these countries lack the technical capacity for waste disposal and recycling. Some observers candidly note that economically motivated dumping, and sham and dirty recycling are actually involved. 11
To address the previous question, we pursue two objectives in this article. First, we give an overview of the regulatory history of governmental efforts to establish global and regional collaborative networks to monitor the international trade of hazardous wastes. Next, we report the quantities of hazardous wastes transported under the auspices of two regulatory regimes. Although international differences exist in what is considered hazardous waste, we mean hazardous wastes to be toxic industrial wastes. 12
Regulation of hazardous wastes
As global waste trade became an environmental injustice problem in the 1980s, two milestone efforts were initiated to reduce this trade and to monitor its cradle-to-grave progress: the Basel Convention and the Pollution Release and Transfer Registry (PRTR). Encouraged by developing countries and special interest groups to regulate waste exports, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) authorized in 1987 work on a global set of legally binding rules to govern waste trade. 13 This work resulted in the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. 14
Adopted in 1989 and later ratified by 32 signatory nations in 1992, the Basel Convention sought to protect developing nations from hazardous wastes exported by industrialized countries. Ratifiers of the Convention were given the right to refuse the importation of hazardous wastes through prior informed consent. Moreover, the Convention urged ratifying nations to reduce their exports of these wastes to a minimum and to not transport waste to non-member nations except in the case where bilateral agreements were in place. It allowed member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, a consortium of 30 industrialized countries), to continue trading hazardous wastes destined for recycling. 15 The Convention further allowed waste trade when exporting nations lack the capacity to dispose of their wastes in an environmentally safe manner, or if the wastes are considered raw materials to be recycled by importing nations. Finally, it required exporting nations involved in illegal waste traffic to retrieve and dispose of these wastes at their own expense. 16
Developing nations and special interest groups were alarmed by the dangers caused by hazardous wastes and argued for a complete ban of all hazardous waste trade claiming that restrictive regulations would not be effective. As long as countries could legally accept hazardous wastes, there was no incentive to stop producing them. 17 Furthermore, they asserted that a loophole in the Convention let waste exporters in OECD nations side-step the disposal prohibition and allowed them to transport hazardous wastes to developing countries for recycling. 18 The recycling loophole is regarded as a ruse for any of three reasons: many exported hazardous wastes are not recyclable, many of the developing countries that accept hazardous waste for recycling have no or inadequate recycling facilities, and residues from recycling processes are themselves environmentally harmful. 19
Ratification of the Convention by the international community was slow due to several serious flaws. These flaws include: (1) lack of enforcement provisions to stop shipments that do not satisfy the prior consent policy; (2) vague definitions of the terms such as “hazardous waste” and “environmentally sound”; (3) allowance of bilateral waste trade deals between developing nations or between OECD nations; (4) exclusion of radioactive waste; (5) lack of liability provisions; and (6) lack of incentives to stop the production of toxic waste. 20 Consequently, opponents to this trade attempted to amend the Convention to ban waste trade between industrialized and developing nations. Their effort culminated in a 1995 amendment known as the Basel Ban. As of 2009 only 68 of the 132 nations needed for enactment have ratified the Ban. 21
Currently, 173 nations have ratified the Basel Convention; the United States, Afghanistan, and Haiti have not. 22 Meanwhile, the Convention has developed links with regional efforts to monitor hazardous wastes. Some of these include: the Bamako Convention for Africa (1998), the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea (1976/1995 last amended); and the Waigani Convention (1995) for Pacific Island countries. Other agreements with the Convention exist through the 1998 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (199 ratified nations), and the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (150 ratified nations). 23
The second milestone to control and monitor hazardous wastes is the establishment of the Pollution Release and Transfer Register (PRTR). This registry is based on the U.S. Congress's 1986 passage of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) to facilitate response planning in the event of industrial chemical accidents and to provide the public and levels of government chemical hazard information. Section 313 of the EPCRA mandated development of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Program to accomplish these goals. This program was the first pollutant release and transfer registry established in the world. 24 Since its inception, thirty other countries have implemented PRTR programs using the TRI as a benchmark model; registries in five additional countries are currently under development. 25 The OECD has assisted since 1993 with coordinating PRTR activities and disseminating information by such means as the PRTR.net, a global Internet portal.
The PRTR is regionally supported by the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), which was established under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). 26 The NAAEC compliments the environmental provisions of the 1994 North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). The United States, Canada (National Pollution and Release Inventory), and Mexico (Registro de Emissions y Transferencia de Contaminantes) are signatories to the NAFTA and their PRTRs are affiliated with the CEC. They collaboratively report to each other information on sixty chemicals emitted by nine industries. The CEC has collaborated with Google Earth to provide PRTR data reported by 30,000 industrial facilities in North America. Finally, the United Nations Environment Program's (UNEP) International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC) is a clearinghouse for the exchange of PRTR-related information through its Internet site.
To understand the PRTR model, a brief discussion of the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory Program (TRI) is needed. This program began in 1987 and currently regulates 500 chemical substances and chemical compound categories produced by 29 industrial sectors, including federal facilities maintained by the Departments of Defense and Energy, and authorized treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (e.g., landfills) regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act—Subtitle C (RCRA).27,28 On average 24,000 facilities annually report on-site release and off-site release and transfer data to the TRI Program. 29
Sources of Hazardous Waste Data
We obtained data from the Basel Convention and the EPA's TRI to approximate the amount of hazardous wastes in the international mainstream. Convention data were applicable to codes Y1 through Y45 for toxic wastes during the period 2000 to 2006. We ranked all of the nations based on each of three criteria—amounts of hazardous wastes generated, exported, and imported during the period. We selected for reporting the top 15 nations of each ranking due to space limitations. We could not track specific hazardous waste pathways from origin to destination since this information was unavailable in our secondary dataset. We should note that the data are conservative measures because nations, particularly non-OECD countries, report their hazardous wastes sporadically. Also, addresses of facilities that export and import hazardous wastes were sometimes unknown, incomplete, erroneous, or inaccurate. 30 Finally, the level of illegal transporting and dumping of these wastes is largely unknown. 31
Because the Convention does not report such data for the United States, we used data reported by the U.S. EPA's TRI program to determine the level of hazardous waste generated, exported, and imported by the United States.32,33 TRI data for the U.S. protectorates/territories American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are included. We aggregated the amounts of dry pounds of toxic chemicals reported annually by U.S. facilities and converted the amounts to metric tons (one MT = 2,204.62 pounds) to standardize the Basel and TRI data across the reporting period. Total amounts of transfers were identified for the United States as well as for its territories. Unlike the Basel data, the TRI reports the amounts of transfers that were processed by disposal, treatment, energy recovery, and recycling.
Discussion
As shown in Table 1, almost 763.7 million MTs of hazardous waste were generated from 2000 to 2006 by 79 of the 173 Basel Convention nations. Approximately six percent of these wastes (44.8 million MTs) was exported elsewhere for disposal or recycling by 93 countries, compared to about seven percent (50.6 million MTs) that was imported by 49 countries. Fifteen nations accounted for 82 percent of the hazardous waste generated (626.4 million MTs), 87 percent of the waste exports (38.7 million MTs), and 94 percent (47.8 million MTs) of the imports. The most consistent producers were Germany, China, Estonia, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea. The Convention had no waste generation data from Canada, Japan, or Mexico in the seven-year period. Among the top 15 exporting nations, the largest amounts of hazardous wastes were by the Netherlands, Belgium, Mexico, Italy, France, and Canada. Major importing nations were led by Germany, Italy, France, and Belgium. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and the Netherlands were major participants in both exporting and importing of hazardous wastes. It is also interesting to note the substantial differences between the amounts of exports and imports reported over all countries and for the top 15 nations. Among all reporting Convention nations, pounds of imported hazardous waste exceeded exported waste by 5.8 million MTs. For the top 15 nations, the amount of imports exceeded the amount of exported hazardous waste by 9.1 million MTs.
Source: <
Based only or mostly on 2004 reported amounts of generated hazardous waste data.
Based only on 2002 reported amounts of exported hazardous waste data.
Based mainly on 2006 reported amounts of exported hazardous waste data.
Based mainly on 2000 reported amounts of imported hazardous waste data.
Zero was recorded for no hazardous waste generation or transboundary movements and for a nation that did not respond.
Finally, Table 1 also illustrates particular reporting weaknesses of the Basel Convention regime. In some cases, exorbitant amounts of reported generated or transported wastes were isolated, singular events (see Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and the Russian Federation) during the study period and did not represent a consistent pattern as shown among OCED member nations. Next, several nations did not report producing hazardous wastes or their reported claims were still under investigation by the Convention. While we assigned these nations a value of zero for the generated amounts in both circumstances, they did report amounts of exporting and/or importing hazardous wastes. This inconsistency could have contributed to the total amount of imported hazardous wastes exceeding the amount of exported wastes.
The international export of industrial toxic wastes from the United States is shown for four methods of processing in Table 2. Overall, the U.S. facilities reported that they released on and off site 15.6 MTs of toxic wastes and transferred 11.6 million MTs to other facilities. Almost 56 percent was transferred for recycling, 18 percent for energy recovery, 17 percent for disposal, and 8 percent for treatment. Approximately five percent (0.5 million MTs) of all U.S. transfers was exported to 31 nations and 6 U.S. protectorates. The lion's share of these exports went to Mexico (54.5%, mainly for recycling), Canada (26.8%, mainly for recycling), and to a lesser extent the Republic of Korea (8.3%), and Puerto Rico (5.9%). Approximately 83 percent of exported hazardous wastes was intended for recycling, 8 percent for energy recovery, another 6 percent for treatment, and almost 3 percent for disposal.
Includes amounts (in metric tons) of toxic chemical wastes transferred within the United States among states and exported from the U.S. facilities that reported to the Environmental Protection Agency's Toxic Release Inventory.
Rounding error. Total transfers includes industrial chemical wastes shipped off-site by a facility to another site within the United States and globally elsewhere.
Although U.S. imports of hazardous waste from OECD and other countries were unknown, TRI reports of toxic waste exported to the United States by its protectorates were available. These amounts are presented in Table 3. Compared to other U.S. protectorates, Puerto Rico was the most active trader. It exported (162 thousand MTs) about five times more wastes than it received (33 thousand MTs).
Percentages based on 162,091.71 metric tons.
Conclusion
The global transport of millions of pounds of hazardous wastes is environmentally significant and difficult to monitor. Although much of the generated hazardous wastes remain within the countries that produce them, critical issues exist in how they are monitored and what happens to them when they are transported elsewhere. The ability to monitor the extent and amount of international transport of hazardous wastes requires more consistency, comprehensiveness, and dependability. The Basel Convention and the PRTR are the only international monitoring regimes that currently exist. However, each regime is independent of the other and data from both sources are required to understand and at best to conservatively estimate the magnitude of the international hazardous waste trade. Almost 800 million metric tons of hazardous were produced from 2000 to 2006 by nations participating in these two regimes, the latter including the United States. Large amounts of these wastes remained in and were transported to OECD countries for processing. 34 Differences observed in definitions of hazardous wastes, amounts of exported and imported tonnage among the top nations, and inaccuracies in the addresses of companies/facilities' that generate and process these wastes were just a few of the weaknesses observed in these monitoring systems. Such weaknesses lead us to ask, “How can international monitoring of these wastes be improved to eliminate the disposal of orphaned hazardous wastes in places ill-prepared to handle them?”
To improve global tracking of hazardous wastes, the two monitoring regimes should consider the following tasks, some indicated by the experiences and findings reported here, and others reported elsewhere in the hazardous waste literature. Their first task is to reach a geo-political consensus on what constitutes hazardous wastes and which toxic chemicals should the international community track more exhaustively from cradle to grave. While a general definition of hazardous wastes exists in the Basel Convention's Y-codes, elements (i.e., types of wastes considered hazardous) of that definition are exempted or are made exceptions by a member country. Furthermore, the actual numbers of toxic chemicals considered hazardous wastes that are monitored by the Basel and PRTR regimes varies widely from a few dozen to over 500 in the U.S. EPA's TRI. Secondly, the two current monitoring regimes need to more systematically collect and report data, especially regarding the validation of sources of waste generation, exportation, and importation at the company level. Both regimes have their prescribed reporting forms, but the accuracy and completeness of information provided by companies and countries are problems that affect the analytical and tracking utility of their data. The current state of the art is that the amount entering the international hazardous waste pipeline does not equal the amount rendered at its end. Finally, more collaboration among OECD and non-OECD nations is needed to police firms, such as multi-national corporations (MNCs), that generate and transport hazardous wastes. 35 To limit monitoring and reporting to the national level ignores the roles of multinational corporations and other firms involved with hazardous wastes, especially if they are engaged in questionable recycling and disposal practices. 36 The international regulatory community should more aggressively account for the annual amounts of generated, transported, and disposed of hazardous wastes and strengthen its enforcement and adjudication practices. In the absence of such effort, firms and other handlers of these wastes will continue to find ways to circumvent hazardous waste laws and regulations, falsify claims to transport wastes for recycling in low-income countries, and as observed in recent incidents such as Côte d'Ivoire, illegally dump wastes and employ multi-party shipping manifests that obscure ownership, leasing, and registration identification.
In closing, we do not want get lost in these data and ignore the dangers and risks associated with human and ecosystem exposures to even the smallest amounts of legally and illegally transported hazardous wastes. Information about their toxicity, lethality, and other threats are readily available (e.g., <
Footnotes
Acknowledgments and Disclosure
A version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association/Southwestern Sociological Association in Houston, TX March 31–April 3, 2010. This research contributes to the project “The Geospatial Production and Distribution of US Industrial Chemical Wastes and Their Environmental and Sociological Implications” (H8571)” funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station. We appreciate the assistance Kayla Lee, undergraduate research fellow in the Department of Sociology at Texas A&M University. The authors are solely responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation. The authors have no conflicts of interest or financial ties to disclose.
1
Deanna Lewis and Ron Chepesiuk, “The International Trade in Toxic Waste: A Selected Bibliography,” Electronic Green Journal 1 (1994), available from <
2
Kate O'Neill, “Regulations as Arbiters of Risk: Great Britain, Germany, and the Hazardous Waste Trade in Western Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 687–718.
3
Jennifer Clapp. Toxic Exports: The Transfer of Hazardous Wastes from Rich to Poor Countries. (Cornell University Press, 2001), 7, 106–109; Basil Enwegbara, “Toxic Colonialism: Lawrence Summers and Let Africans Eat Pollution,” The Tech, Online Edition 121, 16 (April 6, 2001), available from <
4
Brian Wynne, “The Toxic Waste Trade: International Regulatory Issues and Options,” Third World Quarterly 11, 3 (1989): 120–146.
5
David Jolly, “Settlement Near in Ivory Coast Toxic Dumping Case,” The New York Times, September 17, 2009. For other examples, see Advisory Committee of the Seaport Environmental Security Network. The International Hazardous Waste Trade through Seaports. The International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement. Working paper (Nov. 2009), available from <
6
Jennifer Clapp, “Seeping Through the Regulatory Cracks,” SAIS Review 22, 1 (2002): 141–155.
7
Robert D. Bullard, Paul Mohai, Robin Saha, and Beverly Wright. Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty: 1987–2007. (United Church of Christ and Witness Ministries, 2007); Paul Mohai and Robin Saha, “Racial Inequality in the Distribution of Hazardous Wastes: A National Level Reassessment,” Social Problems 54, 3 (2007): 343–370.
8
Jonathan Krueger, “The Basel Convention and the International Trade in Hazardous Wastes,” in Olav Schram Stokke and østein B. Thommessen (eds). Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2001/2002. (London: Earthscan Publications, 2001), 44.
9
David Farber, “The Unfair Trade-off: Globalization and the Export of Ecological Hazards,” in Leslie King and Deborah McCarthy (eds). Environment and Society: From Analysis to Action, 2nd ed. (Roman and Littlefield, 2009), 181–199.
10
Kaixian Hu, Keith W. Hipel, and Liping Fang. “A Conflict Model for the International Hazardous Waste Disposal Dispute,” Journal of Hazardous Materials 172 (2009): 138–146.
11
Clapp, “Regulatory Cracks,” 141–155. Krueger, “International Trade,” 45, 50.
12
Clapp, Toxic Exports, 56; Kreuger, “International Trade,” 43; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Introduction to Hazardous Waste Identification (2008), available from <
13
Kate O'Neill, “Hazardous Waste Disposal,” Foreign Policy In Focus 4, 1 (1999): 1–4.
14
The Convention defines hazardous wastes in its Annex I, with additional clarifications given in Annexes VIII and IX. Annex II of the Convention identifies other wastes such as household wastes that require special consideration. Nations may also inform the Convention Secretariat of additional wastes that are considered or defined as hazardous wastes under their national legislation and of any requirements concerning transboundary movement procedures applicable to such wastes. United Nations/Basel Convention, Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Geneva, Switzerland, n. d.), available from <
15
Advisory Committee of the Seaport Environmental Security Network. Waste Trade through Seaports, available from <
16
United Nations/Basel Convention, Basel Convention, available from <
17
Clapp, Toxic Exports, 53–80.
18
Clapp, “Regulatory Cracks,” 141–155.
19
Krueger, “International Trade,” 46, 47; Jim Puckett, “Disposing of the Waste Trade: Closing the Recycling Loophole,” The Ecologist 24, 2 (1994): 53–58.
20
Clapp, Toxic Exports, 24, 56; Kreuger, “International Trade,” 43.
21
Basel Convention, available from <
22
The United Nations has 192 members; the United States recognizes 194 independent countries. Taiwan, U.S. protectorates, Scotland, Bermuda, and components of the United Kingdom are not fully independent countries or states; see <
23
Krueger, “International Trade,” 47.
24
Barry Johnson. Impact of Hazardous Waste on Human Health: Hazard, Health Effects, Equity, and Communication Issues. (Lewis Publishers, 1999).
25
Countries with PRTRs are: Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. All, except the United States, have ratified the Basel Convention. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. TRI Program a Leader in International Chemical Release Reporting (2009b), available from <
26
Ibid.
27
Facilities that are subject to TRI reporting are categorized using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. Detailed information is located at U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, TRI Explorer—Background, (2009a), available from <
28
In April 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order 113148 that required federal and military facilities that meet TRI reporting requirements to submit annual reports to the EPA. See Presidential, Proclamation, “Federal Register, Greening the Government through Leadership in Environmental Management,”’ Federal Register 65, 81 (April 26, 2000): 24595–24606, available from <
29
An on-site release is a discharge of a toxic chemical to the environment that occurs at the location of a reporting facility. On-site releases include emissions to the air, discharges to bodies of water, releases at the facility to land, as well as disposal into underground injection wells. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, TRI Explorer—Background, available from <
30
Kees Wielega. Basel Convention: Global Trends in Generation and Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Other Wastes. Châtelaine, Switzerland: International Environment House, Basel Convention Series/SBC No. 02/14 (2002).
31
Krueger, “International Trade,” 48.
32
We deleted 24 chemicals and particular compounds due to changes in the TRI program. The EPA delisted two chemicals and no longer monitors them. It also changed the reporting status on 14 chemicals and added 6 new chemicals in 2000. By deleting these chemicals, we created a standard set of chemicals for the study period. Catherine Miller, personal communication with author, February 2009, Hampshire Research Institute, Alexandria, VA.
33
We omitted data reported by publically owned treatment works (POTWs) because any particular toxic waste metal could be transferred to multiple POTW addresses. POTWs accounted for less than one percent of the total amount transfers. Transfers by oil and gas facilities and transfers to non-TRI facilities are also not included because they do not have to be reported to the TRI. Stephen DeVito, personal communication with authors, January 2009. Environmental Protection Agency, Toxics Release Inventory Program. Washington, DC. See also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Introduction to Hazardous Waste Identification. (2008), available from <
34
Jen Baggs, “International Trade in Hazardous Waste,” Review of International Economics 17, 1 (2009): 12.
35
Advisory Committee of the Seaport Environmental Security Network. Trade through Seaports, available from <
36
Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner, “Corporate Responsibility for Toxins,” in Leslie King and Deborah McCarthy (eds). Environment and Society: From Analysis to Action, 2nd ed. (Roman and Littlefield, 2009), 164–177; David N. Pellow, “Environmental Justice and The Political Process: Movements, Corporations, and the State,” The Sociological Quarterly 42, 1(2001): 47–67.
37
U.S. Geological Survey. Toxic Substances Hydrology Program. (2010), available from <
38
Clapp, Toxic Exports, 161; Markowitz and Rosner, “Corporate Responsibility,” 164–177.
39
Jennifer Clapp, “Regulatory Cracks,” 141–155; Steady, “Environmental Justice Cross Culturally,” 47–89.
