Conservation-induced Displacement: Recent Perspectives from India

Wildlife conservation and displacement

Historically, an important part of the wildlife conservation agenda in India has been to relocate people out of protected areas ¹ for the purpose of creating “inviolate” spaces that are free of developmental pressures. A recent review conservatively estimates that approximately 100,000 people have been displaced from protected areas in India from the 1970s up to 2008. ² During the present decade (2010–20), further displacements of similar scale are planned with the aim of consolidating and expanding the protected area system in India. The intensified efforts of the Indian government to relocate villages are likely a result of findings that endangered animal species such as the Bengal tiger are declining due to poaching, forest degradation, and habitat fragmentation.^3,4

The issue of conservation-induced displacement provokes extreme reactions from conservationists due to widely varying perceptions both of its conservation need as well as its socio-economic impacts. ⁵ Many biologists testify to the need for relocation of people from protected areas, basing their views on the evidence of continual conflict between existence of wild species and resource demands of people.^6,7,8 However, others have questioned the need for displacement and tend to oppose it on humanitarian and ethical grounds. Displacement to new locations without adequate safeguards has been demonstrated to cause adverse socio-economic impacts on oustees on account of loss of livelihoods, reduced access to natural resources, and socio-cultural dislocation.^9,10,11 Further, the growing international debates on conservation point to the necessity of a consultative and democratic approach on issues of forest management which has been largely absent, or patchy at best.^12,13,14

Early policies and process

Until 2006, there was only a skeletal policy framework for undertaking displacement and resettlement from protected areas in India. The Beneficiary-Oriented Tribal Development (BOTD) scheme, which was primarily an economic package, was used to resettle people (Table 1). At the time, resettlement was thought to be an improvement for many forest villagers who previously held no formal land rights, as two hectares was assured to every family. However, the BOTD scheme proved to be highly inadequate both in terms of compensation and in procedural safeguards to ensure equitable resettlement. It should be noted that there was no legal requirement to ensure effective rehabilitation ¹⁵ and minimal transparency or accountability, as even the National Rehabilitation Policy was in formative stages.

The lack of a participatory, democratic process in deciding on who, where, and how to relocate has been at the heart of debates on displacement. The absence of a proper consultative process or an independent monitoring requirement, made it easy to deploy coercive means to move people out and to carry out poor resettlement.^16,17

Another set of issues related to problems of inadequate compensation and poor infrastructural development. The compensation package, based on the BOTD scheme, was a paltry sum of Rs. (rupees) 100,000 (approximately 2,000 USD at rates in 2003) per household which was intended to cover house construction, cash compensation, land development, and living facilities at the new site such as irrigation, drinking water, and roads (Table 1). As a result, most people were not fully compensated either for their tangible immovable assets (house, livestock) or for the ecosystem services on which they had been dependent in the forest area, such as fuelwood, fodder, and food which, in fact, could be substantial. ¹⁸ In fact, the lack of socio-economic or forest dependency studies in the pre-displacement scenario precluded inclusion of such services as a part of the compensation package.

Further, the quality of agricultural land provided was often so poor so that it took several years of working before it became productive, if at all. Basic necessities such as fuelwood, access roads, electricity, and irrigation facilities were either insufficiently developed or absent in the new locations. ¹⁹ Another crucial missing ingredient was the requirement for economic and facilitatory support for families during the period of their changeover of occupation ²⁰ to a primarily agricultural way of life, given the time taken to develop secure livelihoods in new locations. ²¹

While poor resettlement was the norm, there were some exceptions, such as in Bhadra Tiger Reserve from where 457 families from 11 villages were moved during 2001–02. ²² Here the majority of resettled households obtained good quality agricultural land and much infrastructure was in place before they were moved. Such cases of improved resettlement have been ascribed to the higher levels of political awareness and better support networks ²³ as well as personal initiative of individual forest officials and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Some of the initiatives taken by individual officers in this and other positive instances include: transfer of funds for house construction to villagers themselves and dovetailing of external governmental schemes with existing rehabilitation funds (personal observation).

New developments

The passage of the historic Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act ²⁴ (FRA), in late 2006 marked a significant improvement in the policy environment for rehabilitation. Enacted into law as a result of the sustained campaign of tribal activists for many years, the importance of this law lay in its aim to improve the quality of life of marginalized forest-dwellers, particularly tribals. ²⁵ This was planned to be done through conferring land rights to people unofficially settled in and cultivating forest land (including that inside protected areas) for a given number of years. The Forest Rights Act did recognize the need for inviolate areas from which people could be excluded for the cause of wildlife conservation. However, it treated relocation of forest-dwellers as the very last resort, and to be carried out only on the basis of scientific criteria and after possible coexistence options had been considered. In the event of relocation, the FRA required complete and just “settlement of rights” ²⁶ before any people were moved.

The promulgation of the Forest Rights Act overlapped in time with significant amendments to the Wildlife Protection Act (1972; WLPA) in late 2006. These amendments also provided for the delineation of inviolate zones of forest land, termed Critical Wildlife Habitat (CWH), that were proposed to be put off bounds for human use, whether village settlements or development projects. The amendment was followed up with the promulgation of a revised Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats (CSSIDWH) which had progressive provisions for improving the quality of resettlement. ²⁷ Significant improvements were: the need for a wider consultative process and clear scientific criteria to decide on relocation, and free informed consent ²⁸ of village councils before relocation. In the event of relocation, the overall value of the package was drastically increased from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 10 lakh. The breakdown of the Rs. 10 lakh package into components for actual cash compensation, compensation for existing agricultural land and community-level provisions is given in Table 2. It became mandatory to pay complete compensation for all assets including homesteads and agricultural lands as a part of the settlement of rights, even if the total value went beyond the Rs. 3.5 lakh portion of the Rs. 10 lakh package available to each household. In such an instance, the state government was required to pay the balance through its own funds. Further, a choice was to be given to people between availing of cash compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs (Option I) and a government-led resettlement costing the same (Option II; Table 2). ²⁹ Importantly, external monitoring both by a district-level and a state-level monitoring committee ³⁰ became mandatory, in either case.

Settlement of rights and scientific criteria

The FRA clearly laid out that till the rights recording process is complete, and scientific necessity of relocation is established, no relocation can take place. Administrations have ignored both provisions: “recognition and vesting of rights (as under the FRA)” and “evidence that local people are causing irreversible damage” (WLPA). However, such lack of due process has been recorded from most protected areas from where displacement has taken place post-2007, such as Sariska and Ranthambore in Rajasthan, Melghat and Tadoba-Andheri in Maharashtra, Simlipal in Orissa, and Udanti in Chattisgarh (Table 3).

At many sites people are not being told that they have the options of staying on with forest and development rights as part of their legal entitlements under the FRA. ³¹ In Similipal, Odisha, 47 families had filed claims under the FRA in 2008 when they were in their original settlement inside the core area of the national park. Yet, in 2010, 61 Kolho tribal households were relocated without settlement of these claims. A report of the National Tiger Conservation Authority Relocation Committee also states that rights were not identified and “effectively extinguished” prior to relocation ³² in Achanakmar and Panna. In Udanti in Chattisgarh, it was declared that “humans caused irreversible damage to the wildlife” without any analysis/evidence reported. ³³

Provision of relocation options

As mentioned in the previous section, the integrated scheme introduces a second option (non-monetary package) constituting an in-kind equivalent amounting to Rs. 10 lakh (Table 2). However, it can be seen from the case studies that in some cases the administration had decided that Option I would be given, without asking people. This seems to have been done primarily to hasten the entire process.

Entitlements for rehabilitation

Entitlements for rehabilitation are central to the livelihood restoration process. The amount decided as compensation in itself is arbitrary and not equipped to ensure livelihood restoration, given that development needs and costs of various infrastructure vary widely from site to site.

Further, the resettlement package itself has been improperly interpreted at different sites, not taking this diversity into account. In most cases, diversity of livelihood needs, family size, initial income, and land holdings within a single site was unaccounted for and the generic standard package (monetary or non-monetary) was implemented/imposed on affected families. For example, in case of Mudumalai, based on resettlement norms, a person with five acres of land obtained a minimum compensation package of more than 11 lakhs while a landless person got a maximum of 6.76 lakhs only, that too after an external review pointed out the discrepancy.

Governance

The process of rehabilitation and resettlement should ideally be one involving careful planning and thoughtful engagement with local needs. In terms of infrastructure provision, Section 38 (V) 4 of WLPA 2006 states, “No resettlement shall take place until facilities and land allocation at the resettlement location is complete as per the promised package.” However, in all post-2007 cases till date, resettlement reportedly took place prior to provision of all facilities at the new site. Further, in case of delays in compensation payment, families were left to fend for themselves in temporary shelters. In Similipal, resettlement was undertaken without settlement of rights and without even permanent housing being provided. In Achanakmar, families were displaced in peak winter before all the facilities were provided. Several other case studies reflect this as a critical issue which continues to be ignored (Table 3). Further, there is little opportunity for raising grievances/concerns pertaining to the rehabilitation process since it is presented as a fait accompli to the oustees. ³⁴

In most cases, including Melghat and Similipal, provision of livelihood security was ignored completely. However, in a few cases (such as Tadoba and Mudumalai), the administration attempted to ensure participatory engagement in the livelihood restoration process. In Tadoba-Andhari, 114 out of 218 families opted for government-led resettlement and took an active part in the rehabilitation process. In one instance, villagers objected to the bamboo and cement roof decided by the authorities and demanded roofs with teak poles and baked mud tiles. The design was subsequently modified in response to such objections. In addition, villagers would visit the new site almost every week to oversee the developmental activities. In Mudumalai, the affected families were consulted on the demarcation of housing and agricultural areas and the quality of the utilities/services provided. In response to requests from the oustees, the community was shifted together instead of a phased manner and hence fair allotment of land was also ensured (Table 3). The importance of the consultative process for satisfactory resettlement is amply seen in the above two sites.

The Ministry of Environment and Forests (2011) has suggested an institutional mechanism for undertaking monitoring and evaluation activities at site, district, state, and national levels. In Nagarhole and Mudumalai, state-level monitoring committees were formed (Table 3) and in Tadoba, a relocation monitoring committee was formed. In Similipal, a rehabilitation and periphery-development advisory committee was constituted. However, in other cases such committees have not been constituted. Thus there is a critical gap at the level of documentation and monitoring of the entire resettlement process.

Consent process

Both the FRA and WLPA emphasize the need for obtaining free prior informed consent both from the village councils (Gram Sabha) and individual families to the proposed resettlement and to the package obtained in writing. However, in most of the case studies (Table 3), the due process of obtaining consent was not followed. In some cases, the consent process was informally managed, while in other cases people were made to sign agreements without official disclosure of project-related information. In a few others, forced or induced displacement was witnessed such as through withdrawal of access to forest produce. For instance, in Melghat, villagers were forcefully made to sign consent notes. Further, in many cases like Sariska, Nagarhole, and Achanakmar, consent from individual families was obtained rather than through discussions with the entire Gram Sabha. ³⁵

In the above section, several loopholes with resettlement efforts (such as inadequate and untimely compensation, failure to address non-monetary losses, etc.) have been highlighted. However central to most of these issues is the practice of consent, participation, and inclusion of the targeted heterogeneous community that faces displacement. The broader literature has emphasized the need for democratic practices in planning and decision making in national development.^36,37 Yet, these concepts of participation are often indiscernible from the outside and require a deeper exploration that goes beyond the populist approaches which mainly grew out of an aversion to top-down development. ³⁸ Hence, though participation and consent is critical to such decision making, the “process” of ensuring this requires further in-depth analysis.