Abstract
Abstract
This article analyzes the case of the Likan Antai/Atacama communities, located in the Alto Loa region in northern Chile. It presents recent data on the relation between the scenario of the water crisis, the liberal legal architecture on water rights/mining and poverty among these indigenous peoples, with particular emphasis on how these phenomena have been changing the articulation of their identities, strengthening their demands and strategies based on an increase in the importance of ethnic components in the last decades. For this, the notions of “socio-ecological inequality” and “environmental suffering” are used, the latter focused on the point of view of indigenous peoples in this conflict.
Introduction
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The first one comprises the situation of poverty that frames this conflict over water, which is a long standing phenomenon caused by the dynamics of dispossession of indigenous groups in the context of unequal societies, as is the case of Chile. These dynamics of dispossession have their origin during the colonial times in the region, were reproduced later on in the national states and consolidated with the liberal reforms at the end of the twentieth century. Through a series of mechanisms of culture, everydayness, economic processes, and legal instruments, these dynamics of dispossession have placed indigenous peoples in a position of historic disadvantage, configuring a regime of inequality 4 that is difficult to change: a societal grid anchored in situations of persistent inequality that articulates the different levels of society, simultaneously acting on individuals in vulnerable conditions.
Of these dimensions, perhaps one of the less explored is the socio-ecological dimension: the unequal and stratified distribution of environmental resources made by societies according to the variables that have historically structured the access to socially valued goods in a regime of inequality. In the case of Latin America, one of the most important variables that determines this is the variable of ethnic belonging, as one can see emphasized in the literature of the region on post colonialism. 5 But despite its importance, studies on inequality have centered on the classic variables of analysis like occupation and entry and there is scarce empirical investigation that attempt to link variables like ethnicity and territory in this line of reflection. Paraphrasing Auyero, 6 there have been few instances to think about how these indigenous individuals not only have the worst jobs and incomes, but also inhabit the most degraded environments, are exposed to higher risks, and have less control over the resources in their territories. These elements are further developed for the case of Alto Loa in the first section.
Likewise, not many studies have paid attention to the fact that in this regime of inequality, one of the key elements in the situation of these peoples is the legal framework that doesn't only reproduce these situations from the state, but also crystallizes and legitimizes them on an institutional level, in turn affecting the constitution of subjectivities, as pointed out by Foucault. 7 Through certain legal instruments/mechanisms that are settled in long term inequalities, the state produces realities: for the case in question, the Likan Antai/Atacama peoples have been affected by a series of mechanisms that radically modified their relation with resources, territory and the mining company, causing an intense conflict over the use of water. But in turn, the state radically changed the way in which these individuals consider themselves and their strategies of protection inside the conflict, by giving them specific legal tools for the acknowledgement of their rights as indigenous peoples. The constant tension in both types of instruments is key to understand the conflict in the region. I will go further into this phenomenon in the second section.
In this context, the Likan Antai/Atacama are currently subjected to an unequal distribution of environmental risks and goods, which degrades their territories and causes a specific form of social suffering: environmental suffering. 8 This theoretical notion gathers the experience of living in a degraded surrounding beyond the mere biological effects, and includes all elements that reproduce their positions of disadvantage in the context of a regime of inequality. It shows there is an invisible violence imposed over the indigenous peoples and their territories: not only because there is a series of preexisting variables that lead to a situation of vulnerability, but also because they affect new forms of victimization, like invisibility in the public sphere, expulsion from territories, unfavorable negotiations, or deficient solutions in the context of the conflict. From these experiences, the actors begin to change their identities, diagnoses, and strategies for action: in this way, the emergence of new forms of public protest, unrest, and collective action goes hand in hand with the construction of new interpretations of reality and the development of a collection of political action that is often inexistent. I will analyze this process in the third section of this article.
The aforementioned theoretical aspects are used for the analysis of the water crisis in Alto Loa, where we worked with two of the peoples most affected by the expansion of mining in northern Chile: the Atacama indigenous communities of Chiu Chiu and Lasana, located in the Loa river basin. 9 The most important settlement of the large mining enterprise of state copper is located just a few kilometers from these towns: Chuquicamata and Radomiro Tomic, and recently there is also a private mining enterprise, El Abra. The long-standing conflict for the use and contamination of the waters of the Loa River has been complicated by recent environmental degradation caused by heavy metals in suspension that arise from the waste tailings of Chuquicamata, the Talabres salt bed.
The investigation that led to this article is based on a case study 10 directed by the author during 2013, 2014, and 2015. Documentary research was undertaken for a description and characterization of the main changes in the territory caused by the legal instruments involved in this conflict: the Water Code, the Law of Mining Concessions, and the Indigenous Law 19.253. Concurrently and with the aim of documenting the dimension of environmental suffering, semi-structural interviews were conducted with leaders of social organizations and inhabitants of Chiu Chiu and Lasana, 11 selected from three groups: 1) leaders of indigenous organizations and social organizations of the territory, 2) professionals and/or workers linked to the public sector, and 3) residents without documented positions in organizations, with at least five years living in the territory. In total, 40 interviews were conducted during July 2014 and June 2015, which were analyzed through a bottom-up content analysis, with NVIVO software.
Socio-Ecological Inequalities
The unequal distribution of goods and environmental risks has been emphasized for a long time by those who work from the position of environmental justice, environmental racism, and political ecology, particularly by academics who have studied political ecology for the case of Latin America. 12 For these, the persistence of colonial orders manifests as an unequal ecological exchange between the peripheries and metropolitan centers, which causes a deepening of social inequalities and an exacerbation of power relations over the environment 13 in the case of peripheral territories.
In the case of Latin America and Chile in particular, socio-environmental transformations brought about by mining cannot be separated from the colonial heritage that has articulated the systemic “dispossession” of indigenous groups inside Latin American societies, through the strategic control of resources that belonged to or were used by these regimes and that over time have come to belong to and be administered by the nation-state. 14 In the case of Chile, though resources like water, soil, and subsoil became state property in the period from 1925 to 1973, 15 from the latter onwards they were franchised, sold, or granted to privates, particularly in relation with the mining industry in north Chile. Both during the period of state administration as today, the pattern documented for extractive industry is repeated: exploitation of mining resources happens in local spaces that suffer the environmental costs, but the benefits are transferred to metropolitan areas through mechanisms like taxation. 16
Thus, mining is the economic sector that contributed most to Chile's gross domestic product between 2004 and 2011, representing 60% of exports and the highest salaries of the country, reaching US$2,133. 17 However, economic activities linked to this area only constitute 10% of total employment of the economically active population. According to data from 2009 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), median per capita income for that year in one of the main mining cities, Calama, wasn't significantly higher than that of other cities in the country, with up to only 625.09 (dollars per month): merely 28.70 dollars more than in the borough of Cochamó, a town in the south of the country, very far removed from the riches of mining. This slight difference is in sharp contrast with the 2.285 dollars less Calama has in relation with the borough of Las Condes, located in the capital of Santiago, which has a median per capita income of 2.910 dollars per month. This data shows us that despite the importance of mining production, apparently these impressive figures haven't brought about a change in local incomes.
In this sense, one of the main arguments in favor of the location of these industries is that they generate a “virtuous cycle” that inserts the local population in an active economic circuit thanks to the needs of these companies. In the case of the agricultural communities at study, until the 1970s agreements were signed with the large mining industries of Chuquicamata to buy the agricultural production of the communities to feed the miners. However, subsequent events of contamination of the Loa River and policies adopted later on by companies to allot feeding to large private concessionaires put an end to the deals with mining companies. The costs of mining emplacement in the area has not favored the creation of an alternative source of income for families: thus the spatial concentration of the mining industry has not resulted in an amelioration of poverty in the area, on the contrary, it has increased the migration dynamics from indigenous territories to the large mining cities: according to data from the census of 2002, 18 82.8% of Atacama peoples live in urban areas, most of them in the city of Calama, which has the worst indicators of poverty in the region.
The Legal Architecture of the Water Conflict in Alto Loa
This situation wouldn't have been possible without an adequate legal architecture that makes it possible to maintain these unequal exchanges between the state and indigenous peoples in the last decades, legitimizing them and crystallizing the disadvantageous position of the Likan Antai/Atacama regarding the use of water. This section analyses how certain legal mechanisms that are at the core of a regime of inequality, have reinforced the position of inequality of the local population through the superposition of three legal mechanisms, that in turn have caused a series of unforeseen effects in the identity of this peoples.
The first of these mechanisms is the Water Code. During the implementation of the so-called “structural adjustments”—which took place in the middle of the dictatorial government 19 —the orientation of the Chilean economy was modified from a developmental model to a liberal one, which sought to create specific “markets” of resources and services, through a deregulation and easing of legal restrictions that, as was thought at the moment, hindered an efficient assignation of these through the concurrence of actors in the market. In this context, there was a modification of the legislation that regulated the access, use, and property of water as a resource and it was made into private property. According to the new Code of Water—issued in 1981—water rights were separated from the property of land and could be freely bought, inherited, or sold. At the same time, the state was limited in its power of regulation, and incentives were created so as to constitute an attractive space for private investment and speculation in a context of high scarcity due to the dry weather. During a first period, water rights were given for free and permanently to private individuals and companies, which, until 2005, would be exempt from taxes and not bound to use this water for productive activities. This allocation didn't take their historical uses into consideration and the indigenous communities were sorely afflicted, at a moment when they had no access to the information circulating about the new conditions of property and use of water. This also included the property of groundwater: a great part of water rights were registered by the mining industry, which currently owns 95% of groundwater rights. 20
A second regulation that comes into play is the Law of Mining Concessions, issued in 1982, that allows the separation of property of land and surface and groundwater. Through this law, the state assigned the discoverer of mineral deposits the faculty to inscribe it as concession and property right, which implies that the owner of the surface must facilitate the installation of productive infrastructure and tailings. This legislation allowed the great mining industry—almost the only one capable of undertaking explorations in the area—to register mining concessions; these affected the resources and indigenous territories in a systemic manner.
The third legal mechanism at stake is at odds with the other two, which causes overlapping of legal mechanisms: the 19.253 Indigenous Law issued in 1993. This law establishes that indigenous peoples have ownership over the ancestral lands, water, resources, and territories they have occupied and creates an organism to rectify historical pilferages of resources for indigenous economies: this was the National Indigenous Commission (Comisión Nacional Indígena CONADI). However, though this law was aimed at remedying aspects related to the so-called “historical debt” of the state towards the indigenous peoples, as it didn't have a retroactive effect, the process went slowly and the attributions of CONADI in the restitution of rights were limited to solving the problem not from a logic of restoration of territories and resources, but through buying back plots and water rights claimed by the communities from private individuals, with a very limited budget.
These three overlapped devices have marked a gradual loss of control of communities of the rights over surface and groundwater, which has affected shepherding and agriculture. Through legal modifications, the state has favored the development of the large mining industry and water companies, which have come to control the largest part of water rights in an area of great scarcity. This has caused the exhaustion and contamination of this resource. This situation shows the way in which the state actively maintains and intensifies unequal patterns of distribution of socially valuable goods, to the detriment of the indigenous population that is already poverty-stricken. Likewise, the lack of information, the networks of clients, and other phenomena have long stood in the way of a reaction by these peoples regarding this conflict, which gave rise to situations of abuse like selling under pressure for low prices, extraction of groundwater without the communities' consent, tubing of rivers, contamination of the Loa River, among other irregularities. 21 On the other hand and despite its limitations, the Indigenous Law gave the local indigenous communities of this study a tool to revert, although minimally, the dispossession of waters and territories: for the first time, they had the power to make claims in representation of peoples that hadn't had voice nor legal existence since the creation of the national state: the indigenous community. 22 For the first time, indigenous individuals became visible interlocutors and the law became one of the main, if not the only, tool of protection against the expansion of the mining industry. 23 For this reason, the legal constitution of indigenous communities grew even among the peoples in which this ethnic self-recognition had been in decline for decades, revitalizing the indigenous movement in the area.
Environmental Suffering and Integration of Identity in Atacama/likan Antai
Indigenous individuals are challenged in different ways by the situation of water shortage and environmental degradation, as well as the situations of dispossession of resources and environmental suffering derived from them. In this context, all actions of interpellation or answer to expansion of the mining industry have had to traverse a complex process of discursive transformations that have modified the diagnoses on environment, development, and contamination. 24 Together with this, indigenous individuals have changed their understanding of themselves, their history, and their culture.
In Chiu Chiu and Lasana these processes have been associated with the acknowledgment of the indigenous subject, which has been key for the enactment of the Indigenous Law, 25 one of the unexpected effects of the expansion of mining exploitation. In turn, this process has required the creation of a series of tools and elements of discourse on ethnicity, as well as a recovery of the historic memory of the Likan Antai/Atacama people; these are meaningful as strategies for protection of the communities in a context of unequal public visibility. As Stewart 26 points out, the persistence of horizontal inequalities—historical and persistent exclusion from goods socially valued by groups that are confined by certain specific variables—increases the perception of injustice and strengthens the frontiers between groups in terms of identity, as can be seen in the case of Alto Loa.
These phenomena have been part of an evolution that has been marked by certain events that have defined the environmental suffering of the population and that have supplied a referential frame from which to construct their narratives of belonging and identity:
First event: Modification of the Water Code
The initial situation of vulnerability of the population that inhabited the area marred the process of registering water rights with a series of rumors spread—according to the interviewees—by people that were foreign to the territory, lawyers, and public servants. Apparently, these rumors made the communities register smaller volumes than those really needed for farming, so as to avoid excessive payments. 27 The contradictory/confusing information supplied by external agents in cases like these has been documented by Auyero in similar cases as one of the expressions of the asymmetrical positions of the actors, since the inhabitants in positions of vulnerability assume the information of those in higher positions is legitimate. Once the new inscriptions of rights were initiated, the co-proprietors slowly began to understand what the consequences were of their previous confusions, as well as what the privatization of the resource entailed. With the shortage of water and the detour of important branches of the Loa for mining, as is the case of the San Pedro River, the inhabitants of the area saw themselves directly affected by a new situation. At this point, a new interpretation of the process of registration of waters takes shape as “yet another scam against the indigenous peoples.” This becomes the articulating axis of an incipient political discourse that begins to link the situation of dispossession of individuals who previously considered themselves as “farmers.” towards a construction of the concept of indigenous subject as axis of the conflict.
Second event: contamination of the Loa River
The agricultural activity that survived after the conflict over the alienation of water rights was seriously affected by the contamination of the Loa River with lead, xanthate, and arsenic waste in several documented events—though not officially recognized—between 1997 and 2000. Although there never was an official acknowledgment of these facts, the inhabitants of the basin attribute the lack of animals and fish in the river, the death of plantations, and deaths en masse of their cattle to it.
At the moment, we can see a second source of environmental suffering and event of the conflict, traversed by the degradation of the environment and the profound economic impact this had in the communities of the Loa River, that motivated a change in economic activity for shepherds, displacement of the inhabitants of the higher areas of the basin and economic migration by a large part of the population to the town of Calama. To these economic impacts, which caused a corresponding dose of social and emotional impact in the inhabitants, one can add the unfortunate intervention of the state apparatus in an extremely unstable context, the constant denial of contamination by mining companies and the loss of legal actions of indigenous communities because of this. At this point, the perception of abuse is intensified, as is the diagnosis, through the series of legal actions taken from these facts, that the indigenous community constituted by law is the main form of protection from vulnerability of communities.
Third event: The Talabres tailing
In addition to the conflict over contamination and water use in the area, the most recent source of environmental degradation is related to the proximity of the Talabres tailing, a place where the mining waste of Chuquicamata is concentrated. Both towns are subject to high levels of contamination from the airborne dust that has affected the quality of the soils. In 2012 the municipality took legal action, which was dismissed for lack of scientific studies to endorse their negative effects. Here, one can see the role of “expert” and “knowledge”—as understood by Foucault 28 —in the validation of the voices of the actors of the conflict. Although local authorities and inhabitants acknowledge the effects of the tailing, the lack of “scientific proof” of this knowledge puts them in a place of invisibility before the central authority. Ignoring those effects known by the inhabitants, at the moment the expansion of the Talabre tailing is being submitted to indigenous opinion and in several communities this enlargement has already been accepted. This relates to another phenomenon that gives shape to environmental suffering: the dismantling of organizations by networks of clients and the division of leaders, organized “disinformation,” and uncertainty. Although the indigenous subject is consolidated as an actor, there is a fragmentation inside communities because of the different interventions in the territory.
Conclusions
The case in question brings us to the relation between conflict over water, the liberal legal architecture on water/mining rights, and the situation of poverty of the Atacama Likan Antai peoples, with particular emphasis on how these phenomena have modified the integration of the identity of the inhabitants of the Loa river basin. It has allowed us to explore the complex processes that lie behind the position of indigenous peoples in a context of inequality—as is the case in Chile—that articulates different social dimensions in the reproduction of these unequal positions.
Among these dimensions, the legal dimension of the regime of inequality is in a privileged position: not only does it have a key role in the situation of poverty and vulnerability of the Likan Antai peoples in this case study, but the overlapping of devices it contains has also generated an interstitial space from which these peoples have been able to strengthen its strategies of protection during the different moments of the conflict with the mining industry. These strategies, that are interwoven with the re-articulation of identity around ethnic components, shows the complexity of elements that operate in these dynamics, which leads us to important questions to explore in the future.
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
Research Project FONDECYT No. 11140008, “Desigualdades socioecológicas: miradas cualitativas sobre sufrimiento ambiental.” Also supported by Interdisciplinary Center for Intercultural and Indigenous Studies-ICIIS, grant: CONICYT/FONDAP/15110006.
Author Disclosure Statement
The author has no conflicts of interest or financial ties to disclose.
