Abstract
Abstract
Contrasting the 1993 Cryptosporidium parvum outbreak in Milwaukee to the 2014–2016 Flint Water Crisis through an environmental justice perspective examines how the cities’ population demographics influenced the local, state, and national governmental responses and outcomes. In October 2014, the Flint Emergency Manager switched from Detroit's water system to the Flint River. Without corrosion controls applied, Legionnaires’ disease cases increased, and childhood lead poisoning levels spiked twofold in Flint. In Milwaukee, the cryptosporidium outbreak impacted the five-county area serviced by Milwaukee Water Works. City officials shut down the contaminated treatment facility and began preventative measures. While the city of Milwaukee boosts a high minority population and low median income, Milwaukee's surrounding areas are predominantly white, and the median income is nearly double of the city. The socioeconomic makeup in the City of Flint triggered the government's denial of problems with the Flint River's water and the lack of response, thus demonstrating that the Flint Water Crisis is an example of environmental injustice. In many ways, Milwaukee's income and demographics parallel Flint. However, the distribution of cryptosporidium, where mainly white individuals became ill, influenced the recognition and long-term solutions applied. Comparing the origins of the crises and costs concludes that the populations shaped political responses. Thus, situational environmental injustice explains differential outcomes. The localized governmental response in Milwaukee and impacted population effectively ended the cryptosporidium outbreak. However, the state control in Michigan and inadequate coordination with other agencies have prolonged the Flint Water Crisis. Finally, long-term policies are suggested for Flint.
Introduction
C
The First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit was held in October 1997 in Washington, DC, protesting oppression, land takeover, and environmental hazards to establish the Principles of Environmental Justice. They write, “we suffer disproportionate victimization by environmental degradation and a host of other forms of social, economic, and political violence.” 2
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) listed “Clean and Safe Water” as a target in its 2006–2007 Biennial Report. The implementation of environmental justice with water access is based on the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 and the 1977 Clean Water Act and spearheaded by the Office of Water. They strategize ensuring safe drinking water by, “developing or revising drinking water standards; supporting states, tribes, and water systems in implementing standards; promoting sustainable management of drinking water infrastructure; and protecting drinking water sources from contamination.” 3
A boil advisory was placed on residents of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on April 7, 1993, following the detection of the parasite Cryptosporidium in the city's water supply. The City of Milwaukee lifted the advisory after 7 days and assured that the city would never face a similar waterborne crisis again. Between 1993 and 1998, the City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee Water Works invested more than $89 million to improve its water system. Currently, Milwaukee Water Works is regarded as a national leader in its water treatment processes and in the quality of drinking water due to the improvements made after the Cryptosporidium outbreak. 4
City leaders celebrated at the Flint Water Treatment Plant after the water system switched from the Detroit Water System to the Flint River on April 25, 2014, to save $5 million over 2 years (Gabriel 2016). Not all were in support, including Representative Dan Kildee: “We go from the freshest, deepest, coldest source of fresh water in North America, the Great Lakes, and we switch to the Flint River, which, historically, was an industrial sewer.” 5 Switching from Detroit to Flint was a temporary solution until a pipeline to Lake Huron opens in 2017. Governor Rick Snyder's emergency managers selected the Flint River as a new water source instead of trying to contract with Detroit instead.
Comparing the cities
Located in Genesee County, Michigan, ∼70 miles northwest of Detroit, Flint is the fourth largest city in Michigan. Since 1980, Flint has been experiencing population decline: in 2010, 102,434 according to the United States Census Bureau. Flint lags behind the rest of Michigan and the United States in terms of median household income: $24,679 compared to $49,087 and $53,482, respectively. The poverty rate in the city is 42%: “A total of 7841 children under the age of five live in Flint, and 14,846 children under the age of ten, with more in the surrounding neighborhoods. An additional 1509 women had a birth in the past 12 months. In Flint, 62.4 percent of children live in poverty, nearly three times the rates for the rest of the state (23.7 percent) and nation (21.9 percent).” 6
The population of Flint is more than 55% African American, compared to the 79.2% white state. In 2014, 60,166 non-Hispanic black residents made up 58.7% of the population, while 36,637 non-Hispanic white residents made up 35.7% of the population. Both white and black populations have declined numerically since 1980—from 88,129 whites (55.2%) and 65,595 blacks. The percentage of the population in Flint that is African American rose from 41.1% over the time period.
The Milwaukee metropolitan area is the largest metropolitan area in Wisconsin. The Metropolitan Statistical Area is both Milwaukee-Racine-Waukesha and Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis. 7 This investigation focuses on Milwaukee County, in which the City of Milwaukee is located. In 2000, the city's population was at its lowest: 596,764, declining 19% over 40 years. During this time period, the population grew in the northern and southern Milwaukee suburbs. However, since 2000, Milwaukee's population began to grow again, and the population in the 2008 American Community Survey was 604,477. 8 The Wisconsin Department of Administration predicts that Milwaukee's population will grow to 623,000 by 2025 due to natural increase and migration of the Hispanic population.
There are economic disparities between the city with the county and state: a median income in 2008 of $37,331 compared to $45,909 for the county and $52,094 statewide, and 12% of the households have an income of less than $10,000. Poverty among census tracks varies, but the overall poverty rate was at a high of 26.2% in 2006, falling to 16.8% in 2008. According to ACS 2008, city residents compose 63% of Milwaukee County's population but 88% of the minority population: 96% of African Americans and 81% of Hispanics live within city borders. The white population has declined from ∼450,000 in 1980 to lesser than 266,339 in 2014 (44.8% of the population), while the Hispanic population rose to 103,007 between 1990 and 2014 (17.3% of the population), and African American and Asian populations make up 40% and 3.5% of the population, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2014).
Current water policies and problems
Milwaukee Water Works replaced chlorine with ozone in water purification because the gas can “destroy illness-causing microorganisms and harmful compounds (including Cryptosporidium), removes taste and odor compounds, and reduces the formation of disinfection by-products.” 9 It also improved water treatment, monitoring, and security at the treatment plants to eliminate the risk of illness in Milwaukee. A Water Quality Section was designated in addition to the Water Quality Manager in 1995 for testing and exceeding EPA regulations. The Milwaukee Health Department developed methods to detect waterborne pathogens and conducts laboratory tests at the plants, demonstrating the collaboration between different local agencies. New controls for turbidity concentration, metals, and backwash have also been incorporated. 10
Veolia was hired a third-party contractor to assess the water treatment, provide recommendations about communications to the public, and create a schedule and timeline for water treatments. Veolia writes, “From our review, these numerous efforts demonstrate how the city is trying to be transparent and responsive beyond what many other communities might do in similar situations.” On October 16, 2015, Flint renewed their contract with Detroit Water and Sewage Department for the city's water. Lead is still present in the pipes, so Flint residents are instructed to use water filters and bottled water, rather than boiling. 11
The Flint drinking water situation quickly turned into a public health crisis from an economic crisis. No long-term, tangible solutions have emerged. Public and private donors have shipped money and bottled water into Flint. Water meters and filters have been installed in Flint residences. However, meaningful participation and replacing the lead system infrastructure are solutions that could benefit Flint residents. This could attempt to remove the contaminants in the drinking water supply while providing jobs and even attracting new businesses to the area. 12
Discussion
Population and demographic comparisons
Tables 1–4 demonstrate that Flint as a city was worse off socioeconomically than Milwaukee in multiple respects. Milwaukee is larger population-wise, and its white population is 46% compared to Flint's 38.9% white population. African Americans/blacks are 58.8% of Flint's population and 41.4% in Milwaukee. Flint's median income is lower than that of Milwaukee; the childhood and non-childhood poverty rate is extremely high. Although Milwaukee has more vacant housing units than Flint, Flint has a 21.1% vacancy rate. The population of Flint was especially vulnerable to the causes and impacts of the Flint Water Crisis.
All data from American Fact Finder—profile of general population and housing characteristics: 2010.
Population exposure and impacts
In Flint census tracts where the population, both old and young, lives in poverty, the buildings are likely older and more rundown. The older buildings contain lead system pipes, and thus, the most susceptible populations were exposed to lead in their drinking water. Dr. Hanna-Attisha, Director of Pediatric Residency at Hurley Medical Center, found that the elevated water lead concentration led to 2.1% to 4.9% elevated lead blood levels over a period of 18 months. The blood lead concentrations doubled in the poorest neighborhoods of Flint among children; however, this was three times higher than the wealthy, neighboring municipalities. 13
In Milwaukee, zip codes were used to track exposure to the contaminated water. People living in southern and central Milwaukee had the highest rates of exposure, whereas those residing in northern Milwaukee and outside of the city of Milwaukee had a lower risk of exposure. 14 Adults were the most vulnerable population to cryptosporidium and were most likely to have laboratory results return positive than children, according to the Milwaukee Health Department. This could be because the adult population was higher than the under 18 population, and thus, the people drinking the contaminated water were mainly adults.
Evidently, in Flint, minority neighborhoods were more impacted by contaminated water than with cryptosporidium in Milwaukee. The cryptosporidium outbreak involved transmission in the entire metropolitan area, not just the low-income, minority neighborhoods in the inner city. In Flint, the young African American populations were most impacted by the switch to the Flint River. Population geography matters when evaluating the Flint Water Crisis as an environmental justice issue.
Comparing water crises
Cryptosporidium parvum is a protozoan waterborne parasite transmitted in human or animal feces. People are exposed through other people, animals, and exposure and ingestion of contaminated food or water. 15 The parasite causes gastrointestinal illnesses, characterized by watery diarrhea and vomiting, which can be treated with over-the-counter medication or lead to hospitalization. The vast number of people impacted by the Milwaukee cryptosporidium outbreak in 1993 is possibly the largest recorded outbreak of a public water source in the United States. In the greater Milwaukee area, which includes parts of Milwaukee, Ozaukee, Waukesha, and Racine counties (Wisconsin DNR 2003), 403,000 residents were sickened. Those most vulnerable to the impacts of cryptosporidium are children, elderly, and people with preexisting medical conditions.
Lake Michigan provides tap water to homes and businesses in the City of Milwaukee and nine surrounding municipalities, serving more than 800,000 people. 16 There are two water treatment plants, Linwood Water Treatment Plant and Howard Avenue Water Treatment Plant. Howard Avenue is where samples tested positive for cryptosporidium in 1993. Fox and Lytle 17 concluded that Lake Michigan's turbidity and bacterial amounts increased due to raw sewage dumped into the lake by multiple spring storms. The outbreak spread because water mixed and flowed between the Linwood and Howard Avenue Water Treatment Plants and into the drinking water supply.
In a study of Heavy Metals in an Urban Watershed in Southeastern Michigan by Murray et al., they concluded that proximity to urbanization and industrialization influenced the concentration of metals. Heavy metals, including lead, were highest in concentration in soils and water bodies closest to industrial areas. This could correlate to the General Motors (GM) plant in Flint, the largest employer in the city. The GM plant makes engines used in Buicks and Chevrolets, two car brands that began in the city, employing 80,000 factory workers in the 1970s and downsizing and outsourcing to 7200 in 2016. 18 GM industrial process could have leeched heavy metals into the Flint River.
However, the lead pipes and the Flint and Michigan officials’ decision to not include anticorrosive treatment are likely the most significant contributors to the lead levels in water. Immediately, problems with Flint's new water supply were noted. First was the rustiness from the tap, skin rashes, and hair loss. Then, elevated levels of fecal coliform and Escherichia coli led the city to increase chlorine in the treatment, which in turn increased the level of trihalomethanes (TTHM)—four chemicals emerging with chemical treatment and debris. The city continually claimed that the water was safe, although people's skins burned and GM switched its water source out of fear the Flint River could corrode automobile parts. 19 EPA inspectors concluded that Flint's water did not contain orthophosphate treatments, which controlled levels of lead and copper in drinking water as done in Detroit, so lead and copper had no barriers from entering the water system. An investigation of the Flint Water Crisis by Social Explorer concluded, “The new water source released dangerous levels of lead from pipes. The water was treated with high levels of chlorine, which contributed to other contaminants in the water supply. An outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease may also be linked to the water and residents were warned about E. Coli.” The Director of the pediatric residency program at Hurley Hospital in Flint, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, became a lead researcher of children with lead poisoning in Flint. After meeting with a former EPA official and learning about Edwards’ results, she began to analyze and test Flint's children. She discovered that between January and September 2015, the percentage of children with elevated blood levels was 4%–6%, a dramatic increase from 2.1% when the Detroit River was still the source (Gabriel 2016).
Costs
Switching from Detroit water source to the Flint River was supposed to save the city $5 million until the pipeline to Lake Huron was completed. The emergency managers believed this would be the best fiscal situation in a financial emergency. John Byrd, Governor Snyder's Constituent Relations Specialist, stated that the cost to return to Detroit's municipal water system would cost the city $12 million, unreasonable during the financial emergency. On October 15, 2015, the Michigan Legislature approved $9.4 million for Flint, which would start a fund to return drinking water to Flint and funds for water filtration, inspections, and testing water. 20 The political action taken, despite the money allocated to Flint, can be deemed ineffective due to inadequate testing and lack of public awareness. Furthermore, the cost for corrosion controls, whether the addition of phosphate or other chemical additives, would have cost Flint only $100 per day. This minimal expense could have prevented the rust and lead particles from the pipes from corroding into the water supply; the human and infrastructural costs could have been much lower.
However, the estimated cost of $12 million neglects many of the human and additional costs of the Flint Water Crisis. According to the Associated Press, Governor Snyder proposed that the state and federal government use $195 million to support Flint residents, although he does not specify under what criteria. With supplemental funding in 2015, the cost is estimated at more than $230 million. In February 2016, the cost was broken down into the following categories: $27 to ensure safe drinking water; $15 million to deliver food and nutrition, including school lunches and mobile food banks; $63 million for treatment, testing, education for well-being of children and vulnerable residents; $30 million to provide Flint with water bill relief; and $50 million for a reserve fund for future needs in Flint. 21 Despite the estimated cost of $230 million, the legislation lacked plans to make infrastructural changes.
The Milwaukee cryptosporidium outbreak had an extremely high cost associated too. Corso et al. estimated the total illness cost at $96.2 million, including $31.7 million for medical costs and $64.6 million for worker productivity loss. They classified the illnesses into “mild, moderate, and severe” and described the respective costs as $116, $457, and $7808, respectively. 22 Their financial data included direct and indirect medical costs but did not include litigation, preventative treatments, and governmental investigation and control. The 1993 cost analysis accounted for ambulances and hospitalization, clinic copays and loperamide antidiarrheal medication. Reviews of more than 2000 medical records concluded that employment productivity loss was 67% of the total illness and medical costs 33%. Emergency room visits and hospitalization were the most costly, with or without underlying conditions. The healthcare costs and productivity losses were significant for the short duration of the cryptosporidium outbreak. Temporally, the human illness costs reflect the severity of the outbreak and the need for treatments to prevent waterborne illnesses. Technologies, filtrations, and education were all problematic before the Milwaukee cryptosporidium outbreak, yet local and state departments positively responded.
The city of Milwaukee and Milwaukee Water Works invested $89 million between 1994 and 1998 to replace and update the infrastructure and processes at both plants. The immediate response included installing cleaning filters and water monitoring equipment, thus assuring that parasites and bacteria would be detected (Behm 2013). Fifty-one million dollars were used to replace chlorine with ozone for the filtration in 17 months, because the gas could remove compounds and microorganisms without the by-products (TTHM) of chlorine. 23 The water turbidity and concentration of particles in filtered water are measured constantly, and the plants automatically shut down if detections are higher than usual, as a precaution. Howard Avenue was the primary location of cryptosporidium, and city workers extended the pipe out of Lake Michigan to further reduce the risk of shoreline contaminants. Monitoring, pumping, customer service, security, and treatments cost Milwaukee Water Works an additional $459 million since 1993. Thus, the financial investment by city departments, in correlation with the Water Research Foundation and Milwaukee Health Department, drastically reduced the risk of waterborne illnesses in Milwaukee. Cryptosporidium has not been detected since 1997, and an additional benefit included lower levels of copper and lead because of new infrastructure and filtration.
In conclusion, high costs do not account for the different responses in Flint and Milwaukee. Technological fixes, in both cases, would be able to solve problems in the water systems. However, human and legal costs are differential, but cost is not a defining factor in the water crises. Measuring cost in different ways still does not completely explain the responses.
Political responses in Flint
In 2012, Governor Rick Snyder passed the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act 436, which would put financially struggling cities in the hands of emergency managers. Emergency managers have the power to take over schools, city health departments, and other government agencies, but they could not void contracts with bondholders. In Michigan, the act was primarily used in cities with high poverty, primarily African American populations, and high state revenue sharing cuts. In Flint, the $54 million deficit led to the removal of power from the mayor and city council, an unprecedented action.
With the recommendation of Flint's first emergency manager, Ed Kurtz, and other legislators, the city switched to the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA), thus switching from Detroit selling water to the Flint River. 24 It was a cost-cutting measure, estimated to save the city $12 million. The KWA is a private, corporate water authority, contracted with Flint; the KWA is another mode of removing decision-making abilities from the people under public dollars. 25 In the ACLU documentary “Here's to Flint,” 26 , government officials are recorded saying, “The average resident won't know any differences.” Multiple water advisories later, in October 2014, GM was allowed to return to Detroit's water because of engines rusting from the corrosive water.
First revealed in February 2015 were high levels of TTHM, a by-product of chlorine, which leads to liver, kidney, and central nervous system problems, but the Flint government was aware of it before.
Lee-Ann Walters, a civilian activist, had her house tested, and the lead in parts per billion was over seven times higher than the limits set by the EPA. Jennifer Crooks of the EPA e-mailed Stephen Busch from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) with, “WOW!! Did he find the LEAD! Big worries here.” 27 Crooks and Busch corresponded about the implementation of an Optimized Corrosion Control Program in the Flint River, and the MDEQ offered no specifics about the programs in place. Meanwhile, in response to discolored, colored, bad tasting water, civilians requested that the city switch back to Detroit's water in March 2015. All government officials said that Detroit sent letters about cancelling Flint's contract, but ultimately, the third emergency manager, Darnell Earley, rejected a new contract.
In April 2015, Lee-Ann Walters received notice that one of her sons had lead poisoning because of exposure to the neurotoxin, to which children are particularly vulnerable. Thus, the pipes corroded, transmitting lead and other heavy minerals such as copper into the water supply. Miguel Del Toral and Pat Cook, both EPA employees, found the lack of corrosion control treatments concerning, given the high quantity of lead service lines in Flint. The rusted iron infrastructure increased the prominence of lead, but no state or federal action was taken on realization.
In May 2015, Governor Snyder declared the Flint financial emergency over. Ambrose was to vacate his position, but in the act that appointed emergency managers, they (mayors and city council people) were forbidden from revising orders for at least 1 year. The legislation in place meant that Flint could not switch back to the Detroit water.
Walters contacted Marc Edwards, a professor at Virginia Tech, who conducted further tests in Flint. He concluded that some of the homes tested at 13,500 parts per billion, over 10,000 times higher than the maximum federal levels. Upon Edwards’ tests, there were federal mandated tests in June 2015 to test for lead and copper. In an exchange between Adam Rosenthal of MDEQ to Mike Glasgow, Assistant Water Plant Supervisor, they discussed the need for 61 more lead and copper samples below the federal action level. The 39 samples already collected were higher and out of compliance; thus, if the majority of the water samples were above federal levels, Flint would have to spend the money to replace the lead service lines. 28 Flint water officials then tested homes they knew that intentionally had low levels of lead and copper, on Flushing Road, where the infrastructure was recently built. Federal law requires that homes deemed high risk for lead service lines and plumbing must be tested. Had the city adequately tested, the extent of the Flint water crisis could have been lower.
After Snyder and the MEDQ would not respond to Flint residents’ concerns, Marc Edwards applied for an emergency grant from the National Science Foundation for “independent, citizen-conducted, scientifically rigorous study of Flint water.” 29 From the basement of the Saints of God church, the grassroots organizations distributed more than 300 kits to test the water. The training procedures were consistent, scientifically accurate, and made to prevent the question of tampering. Volunteers and Edwards’ students conducted on-site tests, which were sent to laboratories at Virginia Tech. The students concluded that there was no chlorine in the water, an additive treatment of water. Chlorine could have helped prevent corrosion in addition to transmission of lead. 30
Finally, on October 15, 2015, Governor Snyder allowed Flint to reconnect their water supply to the Great Lakes Water Authority while the Karegnondi Water Authority's pipeline to Lake Huron would be completed. House Bill 4102 delegated funds to the MDEQ for testing drinking water and distributing filters. After the House and Senate approved the bill, it became Public Act 143 of 2015. 31
Political responses in Milwaukee
In Milwaukee, the early and active response taken by city and state departments resulted in the outbreak lasting about 1 week and the preventative measures taken afterward. On April 5, 1993, the Milwaukee Health Department received calls about illnesses in one small area, and immediately, Mayor Norquist met with city health workers and William R. Mac Kenzie 32 from Epidemic Intelligence Services (EIS), a subset of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 33 When Norquist asked Jeffery Davis of the Wisconsin Division of Health if he would drink the tap water and responded “no,” Norquist initiated a news conference and placed a boil advisory on the entire Milwaukee metropolitan water. This swift response enabled city resident awareness, perhaps limiting the number of ills. Still, the effectiveness could be limited because testing and treatment procedures were not yet in place.
In 1993, laboratory staff reported to the Water Treatment Plant Manager. In 1995, MWW created a Water Quality Section to report to the Water Quality Manager, which would research treatment processes and quality concerns for distribution; they “developed comprehensive sampling and analysis plans to improve reliance on, and quality control of, continuous monitoring instrumentation” (MWW 2013). Screening and testing take place for more than 500 contaminants, over the 91 mandated by the EPA. The studies conducted by the Milwaukee Health Department have helped develop laboratory methods and improve public health.
There was a lack of collaboration between agencies in 1993, but the outbreak led to the creation of the Interagency Clean Water Advisory Council (IACWAC). The EPA recognized the collaboration between MWW and MHD for informing the public about water quality, health, and response (MWW 2013). Certification is another component of the city's response, because Milwaukee Water Works now requires water treatment operators to be certified and continuously trained about water protocols. The public is further informed about water issues with a water quality hotline and customer service center.
In both Milwaukee and Flint, multiple governmental agencies were involved with conveying information to the public and responding to the water crises. However, the collaboration between actors in Milwaukee enabled stopping the spreading of the cryptosporidium parasite, whereas the contradictions among offices, politicians, and law in Flint prolonged the crisis.
The Michigan state government appointed a Flint Water Advisory Task Force (FWATF) to report findings and recommendations for the Flint water crisis. Addressed to Governor Snyder, the FWATF identified the roles of each government entity involved and discussed what was done wrong. They concluded that there was inadequate testing, poor coordination between agencies, a lack of coordination, financial accountability, improper guidance about treatments, and little concern for public health. 34
Since 1993, Wisconsin state and city departments have made significant changes and investments to improve water testing and quality in Milwaukee. The partnership between the Milwaukee Health Department and Milwaukee Works, plus the replacement of faulty service lines and updated filtration systems, demonstrates the political commitment to public health.
The entire Milwaukee cryptosporidium outbreak lasted 8 days, from the boil advisory and the Howard Avenue Water Treatment Plant shutdown to the testing implemented by epidemiologists. The origins of the parasite and the turbidity of the water occurred prior, and ill people were impacted afterward. Furthermore, the water treatment improvements and maintenance are continuous. In Flint, the water crisis began in April 2014, when the State Emergency Managers facilitated the switch from Detroit to the Flint River. The timeline of Flint demonstrates political setbacks, negative implications of cost-cutting measures, and prolonged frustration and fear for residents. Although the Flint River is no longer the source of the city's water as of January 2016, the impacts will last. The irreversible neurological damage caused by lead poisoning, especially among children, is irreversible. Additional funding and time will be needed to replace lead service line pipes and to remove contaminants from the water. The legal battle because of the governmental incompetence in Flint may take months or years.
Section F-36 of the FWATF report writes, “The Flint water crisis is a clear case of environmental injustice.” 35 This is reflected by the city's median household incomes, population younger than 18 years of age, and average housing cost. The low-income population, many younger than 18 years of age, was extremely susceptible to lead poisoning brought upon them. Without the anonymous donation of water filters and nationwide awareness that brought bottled water to Flint, the population would have continued drinking and using hazardous water. The rise of grassroots activism in Flint further characterizes the Flint water crisis as an environmental justice issue.
On April 14, 2016, the University of Wisconsin hosted a panel titled Water & Justice: Flint, California, and Palestine focused on the intersection between water and social justice. Monica Lewis-Patrick from We the People of Detroit represented Flint, beginning that the Flint water crisis was an orchestrated, contrived, manmade disaster that occurred in a state that has access to 20% of the world's freshwater resources. Flint was a prime target for the austerity of emergency management because of the concentration of African American communities. The KWA was introduced against the regionalization or privatization of Detroit's water but rather is connected to indebting Flint and eventually connecting to the fracking industry. Grassroots community organizers were the frontline defenders of water as a human right, and her motivation is: “If you find a good fight, get in it. Fight for your lifetime, your children's lifetime.” Flint residents will continue fighting for their water rights. 36
Conclusions
For more than 30 years, the EPA has passed laws that are supposed to prevent water contamination issues. The legislation corresponded with the Modern Environmental Movement of the 1960s–1970s, where literature and events influenced public awareness of environmental issues. States must adopt a minimum of EPA standards, and the process of water quality criteria is as follows: adopt the EPA recommended criteria; adopt unique criteria to reflect site-specific conditions; or use other scientifically defensible methods to develop their own criteria (EPA 2016). 37
The Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972 was the first piece of legislation relating to water. Focusing on industrial and municipal water pollutants and water quality standards, the CWA outlawed point source pollution into moving water, unless permits were received. Established with the overarching National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), states are responsible for monitoring along the standards.
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974 establishes criteria for water contaminants where health effects are extremely unlikely. The criteria are called maximum contaminant level goals (MCLGs), and the maximum contaminant level (MCL) is enforced. The regulations are enforceable based on cost, benefits, public water system capacity, and treatment technologies. For lead, the MCLG is zero because of adverse health risks with any exposure. However, minimal amounts of lead—15 parts per billion (ppb)—are allowed before additional action must be taken. These include extra corrosion control, public education about lead in the water and exposure, and replacing infrastructure containing lead. Writes EPA, “Because lead contamination of drinking water often results from corrosion of the plumbing materials belonging to water system customers, EPA established a treatment technique rather than an MCL for lead. A treatment technique is an enforceable procedure or level of technological performance which water systems must follow to ensure control of a contaminant” (EPA 2016). The Lead and Copper Rule of 1991 requires public water systems to collect water from sites containing lead samples. Another clause calls for optimal corrosion control treatment: “corrosion control treatment that minimizes the lead and copper concentrations at users’ taps while insuring that the treatment does not cause the water system to violate any national primary drinking water regulations.” 38
These EPA protocols should seemingly protect consumers and users of drinking water in the United States because of the regulations, treatments, and protocols. Overall, states and municipalities have followed the conditions of the CWA and the SDWA. However, placing primary enforcement at the state level failed in Flint, as the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and State Emergency Managers failed to respond when high lead levels were detected after switching to the Flint River. The EPA Midwest division administrators knew of the lack of corrosion controls but could not act because of the emergency managers.
Viable alternatives to the EPAs primacy state enforcement for the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act would be to follow the recommendations of the FWATF. Forty-four recommendations are offered “to care for the Flint community and to use the lessons of Flint's experience to better safeguard Michigan residents.” 35 They outline issues with capacity, lack of coordination and communication, disinvestment in the city's infrastructure, and differences with the communities impacted; the recommendations all point to Flint as a man-made disaster. The strongest policy suggestions are as described.
Much responsibility for the Flint Water Crisis was placed in the MDEQ, and these were two of the recommendations: “R-3. Strengthen SDWA enforcement, most notably for the LCR. The state has the ability to strengthen its own enforcement of the SDWA and not wait for action to occur at the federal level. R-5. Participate in EPAs ongoing review and revision of the LCR, conveying lessons learned from the Flint water crisis.” Better enforcement of the SDWA and LCR is a critical step toward restoring clean water. Michigan has since applied phosphate for corrosion control of hard minerals, and the MDEQ is working with EPA Region V for the lead and copper levels. These policies would enable the Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance (ODWMA) to realign the department's focus on human and environmental health. Certifications in public water system operations would promote implementation in EPA regulations. They suggest participating in the Flint Water Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (FWICC), to actively track switching from Detroit's water system to the Karegnondi Water Authority pipeline. 40
The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) oversees the Genesee County Health Department. Multiple policy recommendations for these agencies called for stronger coordination and communication with testing for lead, especially among children. A key policy with this is, “R-10. Establish a more aggressive approach to timely clinical and public health follow-up for all children known to have elevated blood levels, statewide. MDHHS should expand its local efforts and partnerships to accomplish this goal. Whenever possible, routine screening for lead and appropriate follow-up should occur in children's primary care medical homes.” This is a potentially successful policy because primary care physicians are able to track health outcomes more effectively than a governing health department at a period of time. MDHHS and GCHD would therefore be more transparent with testing and reporting of childhood blood level data; there would not be the discrepancies with data publicly available as with the Flint water crisis. Rates of screening for lead would be improved at the county and hospital level, which would involve capacity building.
The Michigan Governor's Office and State Emergency Manager held primary responsibility for the actions and response to the Flint water crisis. The recommendations for Snyder's office included creating a culture receptive toward information and suggestions, rather than being defensive about water concerns. While this is important, considering the inappropriate actions and words of many government officials, there are no tangible recommendations about how culture should change. However, R-21 states “Consider alternatives to the current emergency manager approach—for example, a structured way to engage locally elected officials on key decisions; an Ombudsman function in state government to ensure that local concerns are a factor in decisions made by the emergency manager; and/or a means of appealing emergency manager decisions to another body.” The Emergency Manager legislation, Public Act 72 of 1990, designated in Flint following the automobile industry crash and 2008–2009 financial crisis, removed decision-making abilities from Flint's Mayor and City Council. Locally elected officials were not participatory actors in the switch to the Flint River and approval of the KWA. Repealing Public Act 72 all together would prevent future abuses of power, like when the fourth manager Jerry Ambrose signed when all laws passed after the financial emergency ended would remain for at least a year. Furthermore, the involvement of a City Treasurer could have helped with financial support for the MDEQ water treatment along EPA Region V lines.
The FWATF finally provided recommendations for issues presented by the Flint Water Crisis. Through the environmental justice lens, they suggest R-33: “Issue an Executive Order maintaining guidance and training on Environmental Justice across all state agencies in Michigan, highlighting the Flint water crisis as an example of environmental injustice. The state should reinvigorate and update implementation of an Environmental Justice Plan for the State of Michigan.” Environmental Justice is a critical issue that has been addressed mainly through civilian activists and grassroots organizations, especially Michigan ACLU and We The People of Detroit. An Environmental Justice Plan could be implemented so that elected officials are more aware about environmental risks and disparities, but a plan outlined as such neglects meaningful participation and does not ensure equal distribution of environmental risks and benefits.
Still, few long-term policies emerged in response to the ongoing water crisis. Several short-term solutions were donating water filters to Flint residents, providing bottled water for drinking, testing for lead by civilian groups, and applying phosphate corrosion controls while the Flint River remained the source of water. However, the effects of the Flint water crisis will be mitigated only when long-term policy solutions are applied.
Lead service lines transmit particles of lead and other minerals into drinking water. Replacing lead infrastructure could be a long-term investment. Between 1995 and 2012, the City of Madison replaced all its municipal lead pipes and provided property owners with financial reimbursements to replace the remaining lines. The city spent $15.5 million on this construction, and the high cost is why most cities opt to apply corrosion controls instead. 36 Flint could invest in partial replacement of public lead service lines, which has begun under the KWA. Private property owners would not be responsible for replacing their own lead service lines, but the source would also have phosphoric controls. Since cost could be a burden, Flint could apply for grants from the State of Michigan or the EPA. Or, the cost could be mitigated by the MDEQ enforcing stricter SDWA standards and other legal protocols.
Flint switching its water source back to Detroit or to Lake Huron eventually is effective only as long as proper health and safety measures are taken. This includes applying corrosion controls, whether phosphate, chlorine, UV light, or ozone. Continual monitoring and testing of the mineral levels in lead are necessary for health purposes, as are providing services and assistance for those impacted by the Flint Water Crisis.
According to Monica Lewis Patrick, the Federal Department of Justice needs to launch a federal investigation of the Flint Water Crisis. Accountability is needed for the EPA as managers, the emergency managers, Veolia, and their privatization and contracting with the Great Lakes Water Authority, and the state government for their roles. Primary steps include government reparations, intergenerational health plans, preventative restoration in every home, and continual lead testing. Additionally, the exposure to lead will impact children in the future, so extra academic, emotional, and health support will be needed with no cost to families. Jobs created by lead service line replacement need to be addressed by city services in terms of long-term sustainability for residents, not just with temporary jobs.
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Professor Gary Green, Chair of the University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of Community and Environmental Sociology and instructor for the course Modern American Communities. She also thanks Monica Lewis-Patrick for her guidance and advocacy for water justice.
Author Disclosure Statement
No competing financial interests exist.