Abstract
Abstract
The success of environmental justice (EJ) struggles is dependent on community-based action. However, grassroots environmentalism is most successful when groups act during periods of increased political opportunity. Considering President Trump's promise to roll back environmental protections, tolerance of racism, and anti-immigrant stance, EJ scholars and advocates question how local communities can promote EJ under the Trump administration. This article explores the advocacy campaign to ban chlorpyrifos, a hazardous insecticide, and traces the administration's impact on advocates' tactics and outcomes. Advocates frame efforts to ban chlorpyrifos as an EJ struggle because exposure risk disproportionately impacts children and Latinx, immigrant farmworker communities. During the Obama administration, in response to advocacy groups' petition to ban chlorpyrifos use, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to revoke all food tolerances and to cancel all registrations for chlorpyrifos. However, this proposed ruling was reversed after President Trump took office and nominated Scott Pruitt, an opponent of environmental regulations, as Administrator of the EPA. Furthermore, the EPA appealed the ensuing court decision ordering the agency to revoke all tolerances for chlorpyrifos. Nonetheless, advocates successfully pressured California and Hawaii to strengthen chlorpyrifos regulation. While changes to environmental policymaking under the Trump administration constrained the campaign's success at the federal level, opportunities for restricting chlorpyrifos expanded at the state level.
Introduction
Grassroots mobilization and community empowerment in policymaking are critical to promoting environmental justice (EJ). 1 EJ organizations mobilize community members around local environmental issues and advocate for their meaningful involvement in decision-making. 2 These efforts seek to address the challenges that marginalized communities experience when attempting to shape environmental policies that impact their health. 3
Advocates use networking and coalition building as strategies for organizing within the EJ movement. 4 Networking allows advocates to act simultaneously in a variety of places and at local, regional, and national levels; to share resources, such as knowledge, personnel, and capital; and to benefit from a variety of tactics that groups use to enact change. 5 According to Mix, building coalitions can also strengthen bargaining power to hold corporations and government agencies accountable. 6 Networks and coalitions are often built around issues experienced at the local level but are shared across space, such as the extensive use of hazardous pesticides in farmworker communities.
EJ struggles for pesticide reform have successfully pressured the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to restrict, or even ban, some hazardous pesticides; forced the implementation of mitigation measures; and persuaded chemical manufactures to remove dangerous products from the market. 7 For example, in 1983, community organizations across the United States were successful in forcing Dow Chemical to withdraw the hazardous pesticide 2,4,5-T from the market. 8 Similarly, in 2012, advocacy groups halted the registration of methyl iodide, a toxic pesticide designed to replace the soil fumigant, methyl bromide. 9 Guthman and Brown examined the strategies advocates used to successfully halt methyl iodide registration. 10 The campaign mobilized 50,000 public comments; organized visible public actions “such as demonstrations and protests” that garnered extensive media coverage; and filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) and the manufacturer. The methyl iodide campaign was successful because advocates used diverse tactics and strategically exploited industry weaknesses. 11
Almeida and Stearns use the political opportunity framework to understand how local environmental groups with little formal power achieve successful outcomes. 12 The researchers argue that grassroots environmental groups' success is dependent on the use of disruptive tactics, such as rallies and sit-ins, during periods of increased political opportunity. Almeida and Stearns' political opportunity model includes advocates' ability to organize external allies and to exploit elite instability. For example, advocates can exploit instability among different levels of government related to health and the environment.
Kingdon also explains how stakeholders, like advocacy groups, exploit opportunities to attract the attention of decision-makers and enact policy change. 13 In addition to mobilizing support from allies who can bring ideas and concerns to the attention of the public and influential governmental officials, Kingdon argues that stakeholders must consider the political context, such as the national mood, the agenda of new administrations, and ideological distributions in Congress. According to Kingdon, political windows open in a variety of circumstances, such as when a crisis highlights the need for policy change, accumulated knowledge increases the relevance of a problem, or an agreeable administration comes to power.
After Donald Trump's election, EJ advocates, scholars, and practitioners began searching for strategies to challenge the new administration's antienvironment stance and disregard of environmental injustice. I explore how the changing political context impacts social action outcomes by examining the campaign to ban chlorpyrifos, a hazardous organophosphate pesticide. Before President Trump's inauguration, the EPA proposed a chlorpyrifos ban. However, under the Trump administration, the EPA reversed the proposed ruling, prolonging the national-level campaign to halt chlorpyrifos use.
I build on Guthman and Brown's exploration of the antipesticide movement. 14 While their research found that a wide array of campaign tactics can promote pesticide reform when used strategically, I examine how advocates act strategically as political contexts change. I use Almeida and Stearns' political opportunity framework and Kingdon's theorization of political windows of opportunity in agenda setting as analytical tools to trace the Trump administration's impact on the chlorpyrifos campaign. 15 I contribute to Kingdon's work, which focuses primarily on agenda setting at the federal level, by applying the political windows framework at the local level and exploring how changes in federal agenda influence local policy change. Almeida and Stearns used the political opportunity framework to explain how conservative national leadership resulted in constrained success for local antipollution groups in Japan. I expand on their work by using the political opportunity framework to explain why the opposite has been true for the U.S. chlorpyrifos campaign.
Chlorpyrifos Use and Human Health Risks
In 1965, chlorpyrifos entered the market as an insecticide for agricultural and nonagricultural uses. Today, farmers use chlorpyrifos to control for insects when producing soybeans, corn, Brussels sprouts, cranberries, fruit and nut trees, cauliflower, and broccoli, as well as row crops. 16 According to the EPA, chlorpyrifos is one of the most widely used conventional pesticides. 17 From 2009 to 2013, farmers applied about 6 million pounds of chlorpyrifos to 10 million acres across 40 U.S. states.
Organophosphate pesticides “such as chlorpyrifos” cause acute poisoning by inhibiting acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme that regulates nerve impulses. Acute poisoning can cause nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, dizziness, headaches, skin irritation, muscle spasms, difficulty breathing, diarrhea, seizures, convulsions, coma, respiratory failure, and death. 18
Multiple birth cohort studies associate increased organophosphate pesticide exposure with neurological harm and respiratory disease at different stages of children's development. 19 Research conducted on a cohort of children in the Salinas Valley associated prenatal and postnatal exposure to organophosphate pesticides, including chlorpyrifos, with preterm births, 20 abnormal reflexes at 6 months, 21 mental development problems, and pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) at 2 years, 22 attention problems at 5 years, 23 and lower IQ scores at 7 years. 24 Similarly, Raugh et al. found that children with higher levels of chlorpyrifos exposure, compared with lower levels, were more likely to experience mental and motor delays, adverse cognitive and psychomotor effects, poorer attention scores, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder problems, and PDD. 25 In addition, early-life organophosphate exposures have been associated with respiratory symptoms that correspond with childhood asthma. 26
To protect pesticide handlers from chlorpyrifos exposure, product labels require personal protective equipment (PPE), including coveralls, chemical-resistant gloves, and respirators. 27 In addition, the label restricts reentry into fields that have been treated with chlorpyrifos. As EPA leadership learns more about the risks that chlorpyrifos poses to pregnant women, children, and farmworkers, it has introduced additional restrictions on the chemical. Since the late 1990s, the EPA has updated the risk assessments for chlorpyrifos numerous times and has revised the regulation to address identified risks.
In 2000, the EPA eliminated the use of chlorpyrifos in homes, discontinued use on tomatoes in the United States, restricted use on apples, and lowered the grape tolerance. 28 Additional changes, such as the use of buffer zones and increased PPE requirements, were implemented in 2002 to protect the environment and pesticide handlers.
Campaign to Ban Chlorpyrifos
Considering studies linking neurodevelopmental harm to chronic, low-dose exposure, environmental and labor coalitions across the Unites States have pressured the EPA to discontinue chlorpyrifos use. 29 Environmental advocates frame chlorpyrifos exposure as an EJ issue because vulnerable groups, such as children and Latinx, immigrant populations, are disproportionately affected by agricultural applications. 30 For over a decade, advocates and farmworkers, based in states across the United States, have used various tactics to influence regulatory action on chlorpyrifos. 31 Campaign actions have occurred in multiple locales and have garnered media attention from major news outlets. 32
Advocates led social media campaigns; organized online petitions; published blog posts; created educational videos; met with legislators and local public officials; organized rallies, protests, and marches; held neighborhood meetings, discussion groups, and workshops; participated in environmental monitoring; and took several legal actions against the EPA. 33 Most notably, in 2007, the Pesticide Action Network North America (PANNA) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) petitioned the EPA to revoke all food tolerances and cancel all registrations for chlorpyrifos. 34 The 2007 Petition argued that EPA failed to address (1) chlorpyrifos drift risks for children and bystanders; and (2) scientific evidence correlating early-life, low-dose chlorpyrifos exposure with impaired brain development.
The EPA stated as early as 2000 that laboratory studies confirmed the correlation between chlorpyrifos exposure and neurodevelopmental harm 35 and EPA scientists continued to find support for this correlation as they reviewed new scientific studies in response to the 2007 Petition. Starting in 2008, the EPA submitted multiple analyses to the Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) and the SAP corroborated the findings linking chlorpyrifos exposures during childhood to long-lasting, negative effects on cognition and behavior. On November 6, 2015, in response to the 2007 Petition, the EPA “propos[ed] to revoke all tolerances for chlorpyrifos.” 36 The proposed rule was based on EPA's 2014 draft risk assessment, which demonstrated that dietary exposure to chlorpyrifos residues in food and drinking water is unsafe. 37
EPA's 2016 revised human health risk assessment found that food exposures to chlorpyrifos are a risk concern for all population subgroups, particularly children. 38 The exposure of children (1–2 years old) to chlorpyrifos exceeds the EPA safety threshold by 140 times. The risk assessment also found that, after accounting for food exposures, no amount of chlorpyrifos is safe in drinking water; indirect exposure is a risk concern in areas less than 300 feet surrounding chlorpyrifos application sites; chlorpyrifos levels are unsafe in the air at sensitive sites in farmworker communities; and pesticide handlers are at risk for unacceptable exposure even when following all label requirements.
Political Change Brings About Uncertainty
Following the Obama administration proposed ruling to ban chlorpyrifos, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the EPA to finalize its response to the 2007 Petition by March 31, 2017. 39 Environmental groups expected the EPA to uphold the preliminary decision to revoke all tolerances for chlorpyrifos. As the Republican nominee, Trump campaigned on the promise to roll back environmental regulations and reduce regulatory burdens for corporations. 40 President Trump began carrying out that promise when he nominated an opponent of environmental regulation, Scott Pruitt, as the Administrator for the EPA. The Republican-controlled Senate confirmed Pruitt's nomination on February 17, 2017, by a partisan vote of 52–46. 41 On March 29, 2017, former EPA Administrator Pruitt denied the 2007 Petition, reversing the Obama administration's steps to ban chlorpyrifos. 42 Pruitt defended the decision, stating that denying the ban “provides regulatory certainty to the thousands of American farms that rely on chlorpyrifos.” 43
In response, 12 environmental, labor, and public health organizations, including PANNA, United Farm Workers, Farmworker Justice, Learning Disabilities Association of America, and National Hispanic Medical Association, filed an objection calling for the reversal of Pruitt's Order and immediate action to ban chlorpyrifos. 44 On August 9, 2018, the Ninth Circuit granted the advocates petition and directed the EPA to revoke all tolerances for chlorpyrifos within 60 days. 45 EJ advocates viewed the court decision as a victory for the farmworkers and advocates who had applied sustained pressure in their campaign against chlorpyrifos over many years. 46 However, on September 24, 2018, Trump's EPA appealed the court order. 47 While there is potential that the court's original decision will be upheld, the fate of chlorpyrifos regulation at the federal level is uncertain at the time of this writing.
Increase in Social and Regulatory Action At Local and State Levels
Former Administrator Pruitt's March 29, 2017 order to reverse the Obama administration's steps to ban chlorpyrifos received widespread media coverage. 48 EJ advocates framed the decision as an example of Trump's assault on the environment and human health. 49 Subsequently, diverse mobilization efforts to reform pesticide use have strengthened in local communities. EJ organizations in California focused on promoting a statewide chlorpyrifos ban. According to the Director of Californians for Pesticide Reform (CPR), Mark Weller, Trump “helps us organize. He brings people together that normally wouldn't come together.” 50 People who never engaged with politics in the past began participating in protests, marches, and online campaigns. 51
CPR is a grassroots organization that consists of a network of nearly 200 organizations, nonprofits, and unions. 52 CPR worked with local organizations to conduct the on-the-ground supervision of regional organizers, develop strategic campaigns, address local pesticide concerns, and ensure local action supported statewide goals. 53 Organizers mobilized support from major media outlets, celebrities, politicians, and diverse local community stakeholders. 54 Diverse community members collaborated on ideas, including starting petitions, creating fact sheets, gathering evidence, and participating in public hearings. 55 On July 12, 2018, 250 residents from California's agricultural regions called for a statewide chlorpyrifos ban during a day of action at Cal EPA in Sacramento. 56 The residents participated in a march, rally, press conference, legislator educational visits, and gathered 167,000 signatures calling for a statewide chlorpyrifos ban. As of October 4, 2018, state-level campaign efforts continue. 57
Decision-makers in large states such as California vowed to protect constituents' health regardless of federal-level policy changes. 58 State officials' desire to distance themselves from the Trump administration's controversial agenda enhances the campaign's bargaining power and influence. Under public pressure to act, state scientists at the California Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR), revisited the chlorpyrifos risk assessment several times after EPA's decision to reverse the proposed ban and implemented interim mitigation measures to protect human health. 59 The mitigation measures in California include additional limits on application size, increased restrictions on methods of application, and larger distances separating application sites from sensitive sites that are frequented by bystanders. 60 These measures address acute exposures, not chronic exposures that cause neurodevelopmental problems. Nonetheless, the restrictions offer a disincentive to chlorpyrifos applications.
On June 12, 2018, the Scientific Review Panel on toxic air contaminants (TACs) conditionally approved DPR's TAC evaluation for chlorpyrifos. 61 This evaluation concludes that chlorpyrifos exposure from drinking water, food residues, and pesticide drift exceeds safe levels for all children in California. On September 19, 2018, DPR proposed a new regulation that designates chlorpyrifos as a TAC. 62 If this regulation is implemented, it will create the foundation for further restrictions on chlorpyrifos applications in California. At the time of this writing, DPR is conducting the TAC listing process, while the national chlorpyrifos ban is being addressed in court.
In addition, on June 13, 2018, Hawaii Governor, David Ige, banned chlorpyrifos in the state. 63 The ban occurred 15 months after the EPA's reversal of the proposed federal ban and after 6 years of advocacy work by grassroots organizations, such as Protect Our Keiki coalition, the Hawaii Alliance for Progressive Action, and the Hawaii Center for Food Safety.
Discussion
The Trump administration negatively impacted chlorpyrifos campaign outcomes. Trump's EPA fought the Obama administration's proposed chlorpyrifos ban, prolonging chlorpyrifos use. The Trump administration's focus on deregulation and the Republican control of Congress constrained the success of the chlorpyrifos campaign at the national level. This finding supports Kingdon's agenda setting framework, which argues that the agenda of new administrations and the ideological distribution of Congress shapes opportunities to change policy. 64
While windows of opportunity closed at the federal level, political opportunities expanded for organizers' local campaigns. Consistent with Kingdon's framework, accumulated knowledge has opened political windows of opportunity, but not nationally. 65 Increased knowledge has been influential in states where knowledge is met with supportive political contexts.
While Almeida and Stearns observed how conservative national leadership decreased local groups' ability to mobilize allies in Japan, the actions of the Trump administration have served as catalysts for local and state-level mobilization around chlorpyrifos. 66 The Trump administration's disregard for health protections, anti-immigrant stance, and promise to reduce regulatory burden for corporations has encouraged individuals who normally do not participate in EJ struggles to become more civically engaged. EJ organizations have used Trump disreputability as an opportunity to organize diverse residents around social injustices. External allies contribute to the publicity, reputation, and bargaining power of advocates. 67
Almeida and Stearns describe conflict between different levels of government in relation to health and the environment as an opportunity for local environmental groups to achieve successful outcomes. 68 Conflict between the Trump administration and state-level officials created opportunities for advocacy groups to push forward more health protective state-level regulations. State officials have made concessions to environmental groups to distance themselves from the president's antienvironment agenda. States such as California and Hawaii opted to bypass the federal government and pursue more health protective state-level solutions. For example, DPR implemented more restrictions on chlorpyrifos in California and Governor David Ige's banned chlorpyrifos use in Hawaii.
Conclusion
Since the EPA appealed the August 9, 2018, court order to discontinue all tolerances for chlorpyrifos, the struggle to ban chlorpyrifos continues to be addressed through litigation at the time of writing. Therefore, campaign organizers should persist in using community-based actions and exploiting new political opportunities locally. Regardless of federal-level changes in political climate, state agencies and officials can protect constituents from hazardous pesticides. The grassroots efforts in Hawaii and California serve as inspiration to mobilize state-level campaigns for pesticide reform.
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
The John Randolph Haynes Foundation partially supported this work. I would like to thank Martha Feldman, Maria Rendon, Victoria Lowerson Bredow, and Deborah Lefkowitz for contributing insight and feedback to the article. Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the staff and volunteers of the Mixteco Indigenous Organizing Project (MICOP) and the Central Coast United for a Sustainable Economy (CAUSE) for their collaboration.
Author Disclosure Statement
No competing financial interests exist.
1
Robert D. Bullard and Glenn S. Johnson, “Environmental Justice: Grassroots Activism and Its Impact on Public Policy Decision Making,” Journal of Social Issues 56 (2000): 555–578; Rachel Morello-Frosch, Manuel Pastor, Carlos Porras, and James Sadd. “Environmental Justice and Regional Inequality in Southern California: Implications for Future Research,” Environmental Health Perspectives 110, Suppl. 2 (2002): 149–154; Kent Portney, “Civic Engagement and Sustainable Cities in the United States,” Public Administration Review 65 (2005): 579–591; R. Gregory Roberts, “Environmental Justice and Community Empowerment: Learning from the Civil Rights Movement,” American University Law Review 48 (1998): 1–40.
2
Daniel Faber, “Transforming Green Politics: Challenges Confronting the Environmental Justice Movement,” in Capitalizing on Environmental Justice: The Polluter-Industrial Complex in the Age of Globalization. Roger S. Gottlieb (ed). (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008); Nicholas Freudenberg and Carol Steinsapir, “Not in Our Backyards: The Grassroots Environmental Movement,” Society and Natural Resources 4 (1991): 235–245.
3
Bullard and Johnson, “Environmental Justice: Grassroots Activism and Its Impact on Public Policy Decision Making.”
4
David Schlosberg, “Networks and Mobile Arrangements: Organisational Innovation in the US Environmental Justice Movement,” Environmental Politics 8 (1999): 122–148.
5
Schlosberg, “Networks and Mobile Arrangements: Organisational Innovation in the US Environmental Justice Movement.”
6
Tamara L. Mix, Rally the People: Building Local-Environmental Justice Grassroots Coalitions and Enhancing Social Capital. Sociological Inquiry 81 (2011): 174–194. doi:10.1111/j.1475-682X.2011.00367.x.
7
Freudenberg and Steinsapir, “Not in Our Backyards: The Grassroots Environmental Movement.”
8
Ibid.
9
Julie Guthman and Sandy Brown, “How Midas Lost Its Golden Touch: Neoliberalism and Activist Strategy in the Demise of Methyl Iodide in California,” in Alison Hope Alkon and Julie Guthman (eds). Food Activism: Opposition, Cooperation, and Collective Action. (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2017).
10
Guthman and Brown, “How Midas Lost Its Golden Touch: Neoliberalism and Activist Strategy in the Demise of Methyl Iodide in California.”
11
Ibid.
12
Paul Almeida and Linda Brewster Stearns, “Political Opportunities and Local Grassroots Environmental Movements: The Case of Minamata,” Social Problems 45 (1998): 37–60.
13
John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. (HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995).
14
Guthman and Brown, “How Midas Lost Its Golden Touch: Neoliberalism and Activist Strategy in the Demise of Methyl Iodide in California.”
15
Almeida and Stearns, “Political Opportunities and Local Grassroots Environmental Movements: The Case of Minamata”; Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.
16
EPA, “Chlorpyrifos,” 2018. <
17
Vogel, Dana. “Chlorpyrifos Status Update: Pesticide Program Dialogue Committee.” Presentation, EPA, 2016.
18
Adriane J. Busby and Gabriel Eckstein, “Organophosphates, Friend and Foe: The Promise of Medical Monitoring for Farm Workers and Their Families,” UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 27 (2009): 39–69; Sharon Frost Lucas and Patricia Jackson Allen, “Reducing the Risk of Pesticides,” Pediatric Nursing 35 (2009): 308–317.
19
Virginia A. Rauh, Frederica P. Perera, Megan K. Horton, Robin M. Whyatt, Ravi Bansal, Xuejun Hao, Jun Liu, Dana Boyd Barr, Theodore A. Slotkin, and Bradley S. Peterson. “Brain Anomalies in Children Exposed Prenatally to a Common Organophosphate Pesticide,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 109 (2012): 7871–7876; Rachel Raanan, Kim G. Harley, John R. Balmes, Asa Bradman, Michael Lipsett, and Brenda Eskenazi. “Early-Life Exposure to Organophosphate Pesticides and Pediatric Respiratory Symptoms in the CHAMACOS Cohort,” Environmental Health Perspectives 123 (2015): 179–185.
20
Brenda Eskenazi, A.S.A. Bradman, Erin K. Weltzien, Nicholas Patrick Jewell, Dana Boyd Barr, Clement E. Furlong, and Nina Titenko Holland. “Association of In Utero Organophosphate Pesticide Exposure and Fetal Growth and Length of Gestation in an Agricultural Population,” Environmental Health Perspectives 112 (2004): 1116–1124.
21
Jessica G. Young, Brenda Eskenazi, Eleanor A Gladstone, and Asa Bradman. “Association Between In Utero Organophosphate Pesticide Exposure and Abnormal Reflexes in Neonates,” Neurotoxicology 26 (2005): 199–209.
22
Brenda Eskenazi, Amy R. Marks, Asa Bradman, Kim Harley, Dana B. Barr, Caroline Johnson, Norma Morga, and Nicholas P. Jewell. “Organophosphate Pesticide Exposure and Neurodevelopment in Young Mexican-American Children,” Environmental Health Perspectives 115 (2007): 792–798.
23
Amy R. Marks, Kim Harley, Asa Bradman, Katherine Kogut, Dana Boyd Barr, Caroline Johnson, Norma Calderon, and Brenda Eskenaz. “Organophosphate Pesticide Exposure and Attention in Young Mexican-American Children: The CHAMACOS Study,” Environmental Health Perspectives 1768 (2010): 1768–1774.
24
Maryse F. Bouchard, Jonathan Chevrier, Kim G. Harley, and Brenda Eskenazi. “Prenatal Exposure to Organophosphate Pesticides and IQ in 7-Year-Old Children,” Environmental Health Perspectives 119 (2011): 1189–1195.
25
Virginia A. Rauh, Robin Garfinkel, Frederica Perera, Howard F. Andrews, Lori A. Hoepner, Dana Boyd Barr, Ralph D. Whitehead, Deliang Tang, and Robin W. Whyatt. “Impact of Prenatal Chlorpyrifos Exposure on Neurodevelopment in the First 3 Years of Life Among Inner-City Children,” Pediatrics 118 (2006): e1845–e1859.
26
Raanan, Harley, Balmes, Bradman, Lipsett, and Eskenazi. “Early-Life Exposure to Organophosphate Pesticides and Pediatric Respiratory Symptoms in the CHAMACOS Cohort.”
27
EPA, “Chlorpyrifos.”
28
Ibid.
29
Pesticides in the Air-Kids at Risk:Petition to EPA to Protect Children From Pesticide Drift (October 13, 2009) (EPA-HQ-OPP-2009-0825-0002).
30
Mark Weller, Director of Californians for Pesticide Reform, interview with author, August 11, 2017.
31
UFW v. Administrator, U.S. E.P.A. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2007).
32
Roni Caryn Rabin, “Advocacy Groups Ask for Ban on Common Pesticide,” The New York Times, April 5, 2018. <
33
CPR, “Pesticide Reform News and Action” newsletter, July 2017; Mark Weller, Director of CPR, interview with author, August 11, 2017; Environmental Working Group, “Tell the EPA: Ban Chlorpyrifos!” petition, 2018.
34
Petition to Revoke All Tolerances and Cancel All Registrations for the Pesticide Chlorpyrifos, (September 12, 2007) (EPA-HQ-OPP-2007-1005).
35
EPA, “Human Health Risk Assessment: Chlorpyrifos,” 2000.
36
EPA, Proposed rule. “Chlorpyrifos; Tolerance Revocations.” Federal Register 80 (November 6, 2015): 69080.
37
DPR, Memorandum. “Directive for Interim Mitigation Measures to Address Health Risks from Chlorpyrifos” (August 30, 2017).
38
EPA, “Chlorpyrifos: Revised Human Health Risk Assessment for Registration Review,” 2016.
39
PAN v. U.S. EPA, No. 14-72794 (9th Cir).
40
Leif Fredrickson, Christopher Sellers, Lindsey Dillon, Jennifer Liss Ohayon, Nicholas Shapiro, Marianne Sullivan, Stephen Bocking, Phil Brown, Vanessa de la Rosa, Jill Harrison, Sara Johns, Katherine Kulik, Rebecca Lave, Michelle Murphy, Liza Piper, Lauren Richter, Sara Wylie. “History of US Presidential Assaults on Modern Environmental Health Protection,” American Journal of Public Health 108 (2018): 95–103.
41
How Senators Voted on Scott Pruitt for E.P.A. Administrator, The New York Times, February 17, 2017. <
42
EPA, Order. “Chlorpyrifos; Order Denying PANNA and NRDC's Petition to Revoke Tolerances.” Federal Register 82 (2017): 16581.
43
EPA, “EPA Administrator Pruitt Denies Petition to Ban Widely Used Pesticide,” 2017. <
44
Objections to March 29, 2017 Order Denying PAN / NRDC Petition to Revoke All Tolerances and Cancel All Registrations for the Pesticide Chlorpyrifos, 2017.
45
LULAC v. Administrator, U.S. E.P.A. No.17-71636 (9th Cir.)
46
Kristen Schafer, Director of PAN, Press Statement, August 9, 2018. <
47
LULAC v. Administrator, U.S. E.P.A. Petition for En Banc and Panel Rehearing, No. 17-71636 (9th Cir.)
48
Rabin, “Advocacy Groups Ask for Ban on Common Pesticide.”
49
Mark Weller, interview with author, August 11, 2017.
50
Ibid.
51
Naomi Klein, No Is Not Enough: Resisting Trump's Shock Politics and Winning the World We Need (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2017).
52
CPR, Coalition Overview. <
53
Abundant Table, “Information for CAUSE/CPR Residential Intern Position” (Ventura, CA, 2017).
54
Minako Watabe, OB/GYN, interview with author, September 16, 2016; Representative from PANNA, interview with author, July 19, 2018.
55
Mark Weller, interview with author, August 11, 2017; Coalition Advocating for Pesticide Safety (VC-CAPS), personal observation, November 15, 2017.
56
CPR, “Pesticide Reform News and Action” newsletter, July 2017.
57
VC-CAPS. Facebook, October 10, 2018. <
58
Klein, No Is Not Enough: Resisting Trump's Shock Politics and Winning the World We Need.
59
DPR, Memorandum “Directive for Interim Mitigation Measures to Address Health Risks from Chlorpyrifos.”
60
Ibid.
61
Final Toxic Air Contaminant Evaluation of Chlorpyrifos, CDPR (July 2018). <
62
Proposal to List Chlorpyrifos as a Toxic Air Contaminant Opens for Public Comment, CDPR (September 19, 2018). <
63
NRDC, “Hawaii Bans Use of Toxic Pesticide Chlorpyrifos,” 2018. <
64
Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.
65
Ibid.
66
Almeida and Stearns, “Political Opportunities and Local Grassroots Environmental Movements: The Case of Minamata.”
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
