Disaster-Induced Internal Displacement in India: Denial,Protection and Policy

Problem

Internal migration in India is driven by both voluntary and involuntary forces. ¹ People migrate voluntarily due to reasons of education, employment, leisure, and so on, ² and are forcibly displaced due to conflicts, development, and disasters. ³ India has a national framework to protect people displaced due to development ⁴ and conflict, ⁵ but it overlooks the disaster-induced internally displaced persons (DI-IDPs). ⁶ India is familiar with DI-IDPs, who can be protected under the Indian Disaster Management Act (DMA), 2005, ⁷ and the subsequent guidelines. ⁸ However, currently, there is no active national protection framework.

Jane McAdam recognizes disaster-induced displacement ⁹ and distinguishes between people displaced by conflict and disasters, on the basis of the model adopted by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) ¹⁰ —the most authoritative source for statistics on internal displacement. ¹¹ DMC has adopted a global disaster displacement risk model to report disaster displacement. ¹² However, the distinction may not be free from overlaps. If disasters are exclusively considered the cause of displacement, they can be both man-made and natural ¹³ and may sometimes include conflicts and terrorist attacks within its purview. ¹⁴

Rapid-onset disasters could cause food/water shortage and loss of home, which can lead to scarcities and competition for survival, ultimately leading to conflicts and violence. ¹⁵ Nel and Righarts after studying the data of 187 countries over the period from 1950 to 2000 found that natural disasters significantly increase the risk of conflicts, specifically in low- and middle-income countries. ¹⁶ This complexity may blur the line between disaster and conflicts. ¹⁷ However, these differences in most cases are not absolute and vary in degree. ¹⁸

IDMC reports that India is familiar with the difference between conflict- and disaster-induced displacement. ¹⁹ However, the official and legal position of the government is that the Indian disaster law may be needed in conflict situations, thus recognizing an overlap. ²⁰ The Tsunami in 2004 had left 10,000 displaced persons due to the disaster. ²¹ Disasters triggered 40.5 million new IDPs across 149 countries and territories in 2020. ²² India alone witnessed 3.9 million disaster displacements in 2020. ²³ During the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic lockdown, there were millions of DI-IDPs in 3 months ²⁴ who were mostly unprotected. There were thousands of unprotected DI-IDPs after the 1986 Bhopal gas tragedy. ²⁵ Decades after, there is no coherent policy even today to protect DI-IDPs in India. During the 2020 Vizag gas leak disaster, the displaced persons were unprotected and uncovered, thus highlighting a gap in protection policy for DI-IDPs. ²⁶

Findings

The gaps in the existing framework in India are highlighted in this part. The DI-IDPs are not defined in India, representing a “normative gap” and leading to a lack of protection framework. ²⁷ Cohen believes that this gap can be filled and “the community needs to recognize disaster IDPs and establish new institutional arrangements” to protect them. ²⁸ In India, DI-IDPs can be understood as persons forced to leave their place of origin due to human-made and natural disasters. ²⁹ For the purpose of understanding, disasters, a serious disruption of the functioning of the society, ³⁰ were caused due to droughts, ³¹ changes in weather patterns, ³² industrial disasters, and other complex emergencies. ³³ The number of all types of disasters and DI-IDPs is on the rise ³⁴ and is likely to rise in the future. ³⁵ Between March 2020 to July 2020, India reported 30 industrial disasters, ³⁶ some of which caused a crisis. ³⁷

The DI-IDPs are currently presumably covered under the DMA of 2005 subsequent guidelines, state-level action plans, and district-wide action plans. The DMA, 2005, does not define any aspect of disaster-induced displacement. ³⁸ The government prefers to use the term “migrants” instead of IDPs. ³⁹ There are different ways to interpret the term migrants, ⁴⁰ and often conflating issues of immigration status, race, ethnicity, and asylum. ⁴¹

In addition to this gap, there are other vague definitions that add to the normative gap. The DMA defines “disaster” under Section (2) “as a grave occurrence which causes substantial loss of life and property,” ⁴² qualified by Section (13) which provides for relief in repayment of loan for “disasters of severe magnitude.” ⁴³ However, the act does not set forth what will qualify as substantial loss of life and property or disaster of severe magnitude. This decision remains subjective and at the discretion of the government. Furthermore, the term “preparedness” is defined as a state of readiness to deal with a threatening disaster situation or disaster and effects thereof. ⁴⁴ The definition fails to explain the person or entity whose state of readiness is defined. This definition raises questions such as—who should be ready? Does the definition mean the state of readiness of people, of society, of a region, or of governments? The phrase can also be construed to mean only a psychological state of readiness, underscoring the normative gap.

The DMA also suffers due to an “institutional gap” within the protection arrangements. ⁴⁵ This institutional gap came to surface during the COVID-19 internal migration crisis, where the central government shifted the responsibility on the state governments to protect migrant workers, while the state governments were not sure if they were really responsible. ⁴⁶ The primary focus of the current system is on postdisaster displacement as a response to disasters, and not to prevent a disaster-displacement. ⁴⁷

Lastly, there is a lack of integration of disaster laws with other laws within India. The Draft Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 2020 ⁴⁸ —a law designed with an objective to reduce environmental impacts of industrial projects and consequent hazards, is disconnected with the idea of preventing man-made disasters or considering natural disaster-prone areas. It contains relaxed rules for “building construction and area development projects” ⁴⁹ and allows construction of buildings—residential, industrial, educational institutions, and hospitals, without prior permits. ⁵⁰ Industries that operate without permits in India have previously caused the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy and the 2020 Vizag gas tragedy, thus brewing disasters.

Stakeholders of Concern

There are three stakeholders of concern in relation to DI-IDPs, that is, the DI-IDPs, the government, and the nongovernmental actors.

Policy Recommendation

An alternative to the existing system of postdisaster response can be a widely accepted and implemented model of “protection before displacement, protection during displacement and protection after displacement.” ⁵¹ This Sendai Framework model of before, during, and after displacement is integrated within the Fijian displacement guidelines as “PRE-displacement, DURING-displacement and POST-Displacement” model, ⁵² the Vanuatu's protection guidelines, ⁵³ and Bangladesh's protection guidelines ⁵⁴ to prevent displacement, assist during and after displacement, and protect the DI-IDPs all along. ⁵⁵ McAdam considers this method to be an “international approach” to protect DI-IDPs, arising out of the Sendai Framework and other nonbinding instruments. ⁵⁶ The common features of this method aim at increasing stakeholder participation, ⁵⁷ integrating existing policies with protection framework, ⁵⁸ and building institutional framework for resilience. ⁵⁹

The topography, demography, and level of industrialization in India significantly vary from that of Fiji, Vanuatu, or Bangladesh. Therefore, it may not be feasible for India to implement a copy-paste of the policies adopted by them. India can, however, develop its own policies based on the following recommendations:

(a) Integration of evidence-based risk assessment, vulnerable mapping, and disaster policies to map disaster-prone areas based on these patterns and to reduce risks to the residents. ⁶⁰ All the three countries have adopted this foundational universal principle to develop a national policy. ⁶¹ The Indian government released the third edition of vulnerability map of India, ⁶² which can be integrated into the policies. Currently, large-scale residential construction is allowed without permission, if its area is <50,000 sq·m. ⁶³ The industries are also allowed to operate without requisite environmental clearances, leading to disasters such as the Vizag gas leak disaster 2020. ⁶⁴ The proposed law of EIA Draft 2020 should integrate vulnerability assessment, before allowing construction in disaster-prone areas.