The Evolution of Climate Action in the Environmental Justice Movement,2010–2020

Nascent field

The finding 10 years ago was that there was little to no program activity among groups, including local EJ groups, around climate adaptation or hazard mitigation. Common statements from the EJ groups included: “It comes up, but not in a big way”; “It's been brought up before, but we don't have a solid plan…”; and “We are trying to let the communities take that lead.” In some cases, respondents noted having had the conversation about whether they should be doing something but decided to table the conversation indefinitely. ⁷

By the early 2010s, there were a handful of calls for climate advocacy from advocacy intermediaries and scholars. ⁸ Yet, by 2015, grassroots respondents still placed climate adaptation—and, often, climate change in general—as a relevant but not critical issue in their groups' agendas. When asked about the importance of climate for their programming and other activities, no organization ranked the issue higher than “important, but not critical.”

The exception to this rule included a handful of local EJ organizations, one national civil rights organization that had significant climate programming with local EJ groups, and the public health community. These groups cited a few preliminary needs assessments and research projects, such as grassroots resilience and “resistance,” neighborhood emergency preparedness, listening tours of coastal communities, and monitoring emergency management outcomes before and after climate-related disasters. Yet, even among early adapters, there was a consensus that much of this work was recent.

EJ groups are now developing a sophistication around climate vulnerability as well as insight into the limitations of current institutions that provide adaptive solutions. This holds especially true around national and state funders of defensive infrastructure, hazard mitigation, and social adaptation programming such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Army Corps of Engineers with which long-standing EJ organizations had minimal contact earlier.

The groups now strategically rely on a variety of remedies to climate injustices. Direct advocacy in regional planning, infrastructure investments, climate adaptation finance, and climate education and awareness campaigns beyond traditional litigation activities have expanded the knowledge base and technical capacity of local environmental organizations. Publicized examples of environmental groups that have added climate adaptation into their topical portfolios, such as WE ACT's climate planning, Catalyst Miami's involvement in the City of Miami's “Forever Bond” financing, and GCCLP's disaster recovery and mitigation trainings and housing advocacy. ⁹ In content and process, then, EJ now envelopes climate justice. The practical and scholarly field of climate justice is past its infancy.

In sum, there was little to no program activity around climate adaptation a decade ago, whereas dozens of campaigns, trainings, workshops, and interactions with local and state officials are detected weekly across the country today. Climate justice has become a growing component—if not the largest—in EJ organizations. It is also the singular focus of several new organizations, including groups that focus on a specific effect from climate change—for example, heatwaves or drought—that have surfaced. ¹⁰

Political context

Ten years ago, respondents noted that national discussions about climate change were informed by a key political backdrop; the Republican Party's refusal to accept climate science's evidence of global warming and its causes within its formal platform, and its leadership's proposals to rein in the EPA and other environmental institutions. Several respondents linked this political context to the continued obfuscation of climate change in political messaging, which in turn was viewed as contributing to a persistent confusion or “lack of understanding of the magnitude of threat” from climate change in the public.

Climate denial muddied the popular awareness around environmentally related science, regulations, and overall policy. A few national nonenvironmental organizations were even reported as being reluctant to take on environmental issues because of direct support from fossil fuel interests or fear of entering the political fray. Some groups particularly noted attempts by politically conservative groups, advocates, and funders to appropriate civil rights language through the funding of proxy groups and studies depicting the financial costs to households in marginalized communities of greenhouse gas regulation. ¹¹

The election of Joseph Biden as President put many new wheels in motion, not the least of which were executive orders related to EJ and climate change. ¹² Included in these orders were the recent Presidential executive orders that focus on climate within the affirmation of EJ organizations. ¹³ Further federal focus on the general consequences of climate change support the urgency of the issue as well. ¹⁴ The change in administration signifies a massive change in political tone in the United States with regard to climate policy; current political polling and the recent presidential election results reflect this evolution. ¹⁵

Emergency management's overlap with climate change action has also begun to influence politicians in places with traditionally conservative and denialist views on climate change but where hazards are increasingly taking a toll. Often without mentioning “climate change” and rarely mentioning its human causes, this group of politicians is increasingly viewing anti-climate action as a political third rail. ¹⁶ Climate proponents in the U.S. Congress have consequently proposed bold actions in both chambers. ¹⁷ State legislators and governors and the councils and mayors of large cities are following suit, forcing several previous denialists into the climate adaptation policy conversation.

More critical than the birddogging of the climate right has been the dramatic rise in political savvy and clout among the EJ movement. The expanding capacity to broker deals with senior politicians, forge legislation, and even determine the fate of political appointments has put the movement's leaders squarely in positions of power. ¹⁸ The political waters regarding both climate migration and adaptation, although still slightly murky due to ongoing climate denialism and misinformation campaigns, are clearing. Consequently, this challenge has also diminished since the study's last data collection.

Policy context

Ten years ago, advocacy and programming around climate had been shaped by an almost exclusive focus on addressing climate change's causes (namely, reducing greenhouse gas emissions) rather than its effects. Several respondents described the focus on mitigation over adaptation as being reasonable scientifically and politically. It also aligned with the historical approach of environmentalism in the United States of reacting to an environmental harm: “…our legal wheelhouse is better at stopping stuff rather than promoting the right investments.”

By focusing on mitigation, a few respondents suggested that national environmental groups avoided dealing with the complexities of crisis and disaster vulnerabilities—and avoided having the difficult conversations about adaptation with communities in which they had little experience or knowledge. As one prominent EJ leader noted: “There's a reason why there is a dearth of adaptation projects. It's the most difficult.”

Several respondents referred to the cap-and-trade bill failure as a significant turning point in the general discussion around the environment and marginalized communities. Building support for the Clean Power Plan required national environmental organizations' outreach to different constituencies such as communities of color—described as “coming up as a huge part of the electorate in next few decades.” One respondent from a national environmental group described this pivot in the relationship as “partnerships: built on “[doing] a better job rallying them, elevating their concerns related to climate change, and making those voices heard.”

Today, questions remain about the balance between mitigation and adaptation in the new policy space. ¹⁹ EJ groups have advocated for a balance that maximizes benefits in their communities. The specific policies that are enacted in either approach may also come up against long-standing divisions, such as cap-and-trade bills to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change or partnerships with greenhouse gas emitters to fund adaptation strategies in lieu of holding them accountable for damages. ²⁰ However, there are increasing opportunities for co-benefits between both mitigation and adaptation as well as clearer evidence for how they benefit low-income households and communities of color.

Governmental context

Another theme is the lack of coordination between different governmental entities across the federal government and between the federal, state, and local levels. This issue was notable at the baseline in that it (1) was a product of the context in which climate mitigation and adaptation are viewed as distinct policy areas and (2) produced a program and funding disparity for local governments and advocacy groups. Respondents noted historical disparities in how agencies approached marginalized communities and interacted with the groups that advocate on their behalf.

For example, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had been historically familiar with local community organizing and development groups based on its legal, program, and resource mandates, and EPA's EJ programs and its Office of Civil Rights also bridged EPA's technical regulatory mandate with its obligations under Civil Rights Act's Title VI. In contrast, a few respondents noted the consideration of disparate vulnerability and equity as “very new to FEMA.”

One respondent noted that the divergent funding and compartmentalization of governmental programs influenced local advocacy groups as well. Information and knowledge were bounded. Organizations working on climate- or disaster-related action were similarly restricted except in the few cases (such as post-Katrina New Orleans) where local EJ communities were involved in emergency planning.

Despite the Trump Administration's attempts, there were initiatives that required better coordination between federal agencies and with state and local governments. Most notable among these were the equity officers in agencies such as FEMA. ²¹ Streamlining hazard mitigation funds and ensuring that selection criteria included social vulnerability also was a rare departure from policy in support of climate justice. ²²

However, the overall challenge for EJ activists had not substantially changed over the past decade until the January 2021 Presidential executive order, which establishes the interagency National Climate Task Force and several White House Interagency Councils. ²³ With the also newly established White House EJ Advisory Council, agencies were explicitly charged with addressing climate justice through efforts such as Justice40, but the effect on existing bureaucracies is a work in progress.

Resource constraints

Respondents noted that the pot of financial resources for any EJ activity was simply too small a decade ago, both public and philanthropic. The more endowed national environmental organizations were reluctant to subgrant, divert, or share their program funds or donation revenue with local partners. A few organizational representatives noted the role of specific foundations in bridging the silos between social equity issues and the “different world” of environmental concerns. Yet, with a focus on climate mitigation advocacy, funders had largely steered away from EJ in general, and climate adaptation justice in particular. ²⁴

EJ groups faced a particularly challenging funding pool because of their commitment to remaining grassroots and locally focused. ²⁵ They often competed for funding against other local advocacy groups and were hampered by not having legal nonprofit incorporation or requiring fiduciary intermediaries. Consequently, as one respondent noted, this scenario led to a “mismatch” between “what's going on in those communities and who's doing the work.”

One respondent noted that resource constraints played out in mundane ways, such as the lack of formal meeting spaces. Gaps in tools for imagining future environmental scenarios, community and infrastructure development, and other climate adaptation and disaster mitigation planning were also difficult causes around which local groups could rarely fundraise. The consequence of this parsimoniousness led to continuous EJ staffing gaps, constraints to scientific knowledge and professional and legal expertise, and in operational and organizational challenges.

Two recent phenomena are helping counter the challenge of limited financial resources. The first is the expanded public commitment by prominent members of U.S. philanthropy to support climate justice groups, especially those led by or created for communities of color. ²⁶ Environmental and climate justice activists are also becoming more vocal than ever before about being overlooked by funders, even increasingly calling for major donors to put their money where their mouths are. ²⁷ Consequently, a few funders have also committed to providing multiyear operating funds although these continue to allude many environmental grassroots groups. ²⁸ Changes in civil-sector resources may also spillover into public-sector funding, particularly for local climate planning and implementation efforts.

Knowledge and capacity constraints

Respondents also noted technical capacity and access to adequate and appropriate knowledge sources as a significant constraint. In some cases—particularly related to specific technical climate subjects (such as climate change models), demographic data (as explained by one respondent, e.g., the size of rural disabled populations in specific regions), and methodical analysis (such as disparate impact)—the information was either too complex or too difficult and costly to obtain. Only a handful of local EJ groups were repeatedly brought up as having some technical capacity and partnering with larger groups. ²⁹

Several respondents at both the national and local levels reported coming to the issue of environmentally vulnerable populations and environmental policy as community organizers and not necessarily as “experts on the issues,” as one organizer for a national environmental organization noted: “…we're aware of a big problem about our capacity to do research. We have a lot of people, but we're limited.” The resource gaps in some smaller local groups, then, were even more apparent. Furthermore, they impeded the ability of some organizations to explain environmental problems and translate solutions to their constituents who are likely to be less familiar with the technical information than they are.

In some cases, small EJ groups were able to gain allies in local universities that provided modeling, laboratory testing, and health assessments at nominal cost or pro bono. Others formed coalitions on specific program activities with other like-minded small groups. In the few cases of early climate projects, some smaller organizations hired outside expertise or consultants despite having limited funds.

Other patterns in EJ organizations' growth have reshaped this constraint. The increasing specialization of some EJ groups into specific environmental media (e.g., water, air, and land use) means that their organizations' technical knowledge base is also deepening. In many cases, the focus on energy justice, water justice, disaster justice and, of course, climate justice has led to EJ leaders becoming field experts. EJ organizations focused on specific racial groups are also expanding the field's demographic data bandwidth.

Furthermore, new networks and coalitions of EJ groups focusing on climate have sprung up. Informal networks of EJ groups that started working on climate have percolated in the past 5 years, often put in touch with each other through previous EJ networks or through new climate justice funders. ³⁰ Climate justice coalitions such as the U.S. Climate Action Network, the Climate Justice Alliance, and the EJ Leadership Forum on Climate Change have been building channels for communication, reflection, and shared advocacy nationally for the past decade. Several state and regional EJ alliances have taken on climate justice as a coalition-building theme and been successful legislatively, including the California Environmental Justice Alliance.

Finally, the sources of knowledge and entities that could supplement environmental and climate justice organizations' capacity have also emerged: the scientists, social scientists, environmental engineers, planners, and related scholars. These resources bring the intellectual capital to study climate justice issues and their historical precedent in racial discrimination and current environmental disparities but are also directly working with justice organizations in their advocacy campaigns.

In several cases, the scholars have formed coalitions as well, such as the Historically Black Colleges and Universities Climate Change Consortium. ³¹ Their scholarly institutions and professional exchanges are also attempting to open climate adaptation conversations more inclusively to a wider audience, and to foreground climate justice as a key focus of scholarship and policy making. ³² Community science groups have helped fill the need for environmental monitoring and data collection while embedding technical knowledge in communities. ³³

Collectively, all these resources have helped fill the technical capacity gaps in EJ organizations for the past decade due to financial resources that had restricted if not prohibited the organizations from engaging further in climate activities.

Persistence of marginalization and lack of diversity

The past lack of demographic diversity—particularly racial—among the more powerful national environmental organizations presented and continues to present a challenge in consolidating EJ into those wielding power in climate action. A similar concern was noted regarding the community of emergency management and climate adaptation professionals by the handful of respondents familiar with these organizations.

Despite the acknowledgement from the broader environmental advocacy sphere of this problem for the past decade (and especially after the failed 2009 cap-and-trade legislation), virtually all respondents mentioned this continuing underlying gap; one respondent working with a large national environmental group laughed: “For a movement that supports biodiversity as one of its bases and protection of every creature, we haven't done a good job in being diverse in our ranks and valuing that diversity in our ranks.”

Lack of diversity among the large environmental groups played out in more ways than representation. Local vulnerable human communities were described by many in these groups as a departure from their traditional environment-wide focus and skill sets. Consequently, many local groups noted that the large groups' homogeneity kept them from considering the interplay of environmental concerns with place-based social or economic outcomes—that is, that the lack of staffing diversity perpetuated a gap in mission and program. As one respondent succinctly noted: “Equity issues are not just about who is affected by climate change effects and how, but also regarding who gets to work on policies and activities for building resilience.”

Today, large environmental groups are more vocal about racial disparities and structural racism even beyond those related to the environment and have vocalized support for anti-racist organizations since the George Floyd murder. ³⁴ This consciousness, supplemented by the groups' awareness of past policy defeats because of gaps in coalitions, led to brokered commitments by the white leaders of the large environmental groups to support racial and economic justice in environmental policies, and to integrate EJ leaders and organizations in policymaking more explicitly. ³⁵

The acknowledgement of the value that local justice organizations bring to the climate advocacy movement still stands in contrast with the overall lack of racial diversity among the groups' staff and leadership. ³⁶ Although recent hires suggest that change is starting, the nature of this hiring with regard to advocacy, programming, communications, and leadership functions as opposed to internal operations such as diversity officers is unclear. ³⁷ As such, the challenge of marginalization described a decade ago continues to be a concern.

Intersectionality

A final theme that emerged in the interviews was less straightforward as the others but described as critical to understanding the state of climate justice advocacy: the multiple ways in which environmental conditions intersect with other issues in the lived experiences of vulnerable communities. Variously termed “intersectionality” or “equitable development,” respondents emphasized how policies and programs needed to be placed within a greater context of disinvestment, persistent social, political, and economic disadvantages, and “preexisting deficits of both a physical and social nature.” As one EJ respondent noted:

Trying to disentangle those institutions, practices, policies that place communities at a disadvantage is hard during normal times… Before we even get to resilience, we have to deal with moving beyond survival mode.

Distinctions between discrete environmental issues were portrayed as ultimately being moot for residents that deal with a myriad of social and economic challenges. Respondents took pains to note that this did not mean that members of communities were not interested or worried about environmental crises. Rather, those crises needed to be contextualized among multiple community concerns and, in turn, appropriately messaged to communities. In this light, EJ group's constituents viewed climate vulnerability as another layer in a historical pattern of intentional disparity. The consequences of acknowledging and addressing this context appropriately and ethically, however, had led to prioritizing the most impending crisis with whatever resources are available.

The question of intersecting social challenges has, arguably, undergone significant change in the past decade. Previously, the effects of global climate change were described as a small distinct component in the lived experiences of low-income individuals and households of color if they were detectable at all. One intervention that has altered this perception is the growth of the global climate justice movement, particularly in developing nations. Consequently, groups such as the Climate Justice Resilience Fund have successfully argued that multilateral and bilateral development aid be targeted to the most vulnerable communities. ³⁸ This advocacy resulted in the Global Commission on Adaptation's centering of local actions for vulnerable populations. ³⁹ For many U.S. advocates, the challenges of low-income nations within the international community mirrored those in their communities.

The second significant force that has pushed EJ organizers to fully embrace climate activism has been the growth of the youth climate movement, represented especially by the Sunrise Movement. ⁴⁰ The centering of intersectional justice by these youth leaders elevated the importance of social justice in environmental policy, partially feeding into the creation of the Green New Deal. Their advocacy simultaneously ensured a seat at the table for alternative advocates, including EJ groups, in national climate policymaking. ⁴¹

Today, then, the same lived experiences that were described as reasons for de-prioritizing climate activity have become the basis of arguments for the urgency of climate justice. In perceiving social vulnerabilities as integral components—and often the causes of—disparate climate exposures, the EJ movement has compellingly argued that institutional changes must be addressed simultaneous to environmental regulations. ⁴²