Abstract
The general picture of gambling in France presents something of a paradox: it is a country with a culture of gambling that stretches back hundreds of years, yet strong restrictions remain in place for many parts of the industry. Understanding this paradox may require addressing others, but, perhaps, an initial response may rely on the concept of French cultural exception. 1
As a civil law system, France places a greater emphasis on statutes, as found within various codes, over case law. The idea of stare decisis does not come into play as each case is decided on an individual basis, according to how it relates to the codified law and how judges choose to interpret it. Additionally, France adheres to the principle of dualism regarding its court system. The judicial system is divided into a judiciary body, combining civil and criminal courts which apply to private individuals or entities, and an administrative body of various administrative courts regulating the exercise of administrative powers as they define the principle of operation of the state, public agencies, or local authorities. The former body is headed by the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation), the latter by the Council of State (Conseil d'État). 2 Moreover, it is considered that certain areas of law serve the common good and protect the general interest. As such, they fall within administrative law matters by their very nature, as long as they imply the exercise of powers that exceed what could be expected from a private operator. 3 On one hand, this explains why bureaucracy is perceived as a “force of realization of the general interest” 4 and how the concept of public service may be described as an “interest in disinterestedness.” 5 On the other hand, it makes it harder to figure out how the gambling industry, whose interests are far from being disinterested—if only in regard to commercial involvement—may fall within this legal characterization.
To enhance the confusion, the prohibition of gambling can be considered a general principle under French law. 6 The French Homeland Security Code (HSC) defines gambling as “any operation made available to the public, regardless of its designation, for the purpose of causing the hope of a gain whose realization depends, even partially, on chance and in consideration for which the operator requires a financial contribution from participants.” 7 This definition is often broken down into four criteria: a prohibited gambling offer is regarded as any game (1) that is offered to the public, (2) that presents a chance of gain for the players, (3) whose outcome partially results from chance, (4) that requires a financial contribution from the player, regardless of the actual designation and nature of such game, and whether a later reimbursement of the financial contribution is possible or not. However, it is important to note that various exceptions and specific regimes do exist. From the state-owned gambling operator to traditional cockfighting, to the countless online offers, the study of French gambling law is that of a series of exemptions and exceptions detailed therein. In fact, the heterogenous framework of gambling, and every related regime, seems to disperse the coherence of the public policies pursued in their regulation.
Yet, in a model of strong state monopolies regulating lotteries, scratch card games, and even sports wagering, land-based casinos seem to stand as one of these exceptions within exemptions as they rely on private operators to manage a public service. By focusing on this very specific area of the gambling industry, this study questions the validity of its model of regulation in regard to competition law and the rising concerns of the European and international markets. Indeed, the legitimacy of this model has been increasingly challenged by outside providers looking to penetrate the European market, and questions on the limits of gambling offers have reappeared in several court cases brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 8 Although gambling has formed an exception to the unified internal market, 9 in light of the controversial nature of the activity as well as the national interests involved, the restrictions outside providers face are not consistent with those of national operators.
France ranks second in the European Union with 200 casinos operating within its territory 10 that generate €2.292 billion in revenue. 11 Nevertheless, high taxes and excessive regulation make it difficult for licensed land-based casinos to stay in business. But “in the wake of European unification, convergence has also taken place at the level of gambling policies.” 12 In 2010, France was pressed by the European Union to open its gambling markets in accordance with the free market policy. The French government conceded the introduction of the French Gambling Act, allowing some online sports betting and online poker, but still continuing to exercise strong state control on the providers. However, it is very likely that things are about to change. The National Assembly Committee of Control and Evaluation of Public Policy, 13 along with the Court of Auditors 14 have acknowledge the necessity to unify the legal regimes, reintroduce consistency in the public policies pursued, and open markets to competition.
Thus, one question arises: how can the ambivalent regime of regulation of land-based casinos in France accommodate the prerogatives of public powers with respect for competition law?
The prerogatives of public power granted by the administrative law regime place the land-based casino in an uncommon situation which, if it seems irreconcilable with the imperatives normally governing the competition law, allows it to modulate its principles to reintroduce competition into what should be called a “public business law.”
The Prerogatives Granted Under the Administrative Law Regime
Questionable status of public service assigned to land-based casinos
A foreign lawyer moving in French legal circles today will quickly realize how significant the distinction between private and public “functions” is in the daily running of French legal affairs. It lies “at the very heart of the foundation of post-revolutionary French law and the values it reflects,” 15 notably in considering that the private sector principles cannot provide a complete and efficient model for the protection of public interests since economic principles are not the only ones at stake. In this, the French administrative law differs considerably from a common law perspective in which the notion of “public service” has no specific legal connotation other than standing as a part of “political morality” to provide “an ideal of conduct for civil servants and ministers, as well as their homologues in local government and non-governmental bodies.” 16 The French administrative law is first and foremost about enabling the proper functioning of the administration in its principal activity of serving the public, rather than the control of the administration. As they say: “whatever the new solutions and changes in the future, French administrative law must not lose its soul: the public service,” 17 as if the notion had merged with the Republican myth and principles that drive French administrative law and society. Understanding this conceptual distinction makes the differences in procedure and analysis become all the more explicable.
However, when it comes to giving a proper definition of “public service,” one may face major difficulty. There is no legal definition existing in French administrative law as the concept itself remains elusive. One can easily grasp the main idea, focusing on its relationship with the general interest, but it seems that restraining the “public service” to its sole purpose does not encompass the entirety of the notion. Indeed, the idea of the public service represents a cultural concept lying in legal structures and philosophy. Nevertheless, this uncertainty provides an incredible flexibility to the concept. At least, it can be said that the public service is an activity, carried out by the state (extended to local government and public corporations), based on a “legal structure by which a need of public interest is satisfied” 18 (a contract). This analysis has three crucial elements. First, one has to identify the institutions which decide it ought to be undertaken (the state or another public body), and those who are involved in providing the service (the civil service, or private persons). Then, one must consider the purpose for which an activity is undertaken (the public interest). And finally, the mechanism by which this is undertaken: the use of public power (la puissance publique).
This being explained, it seems that some activities can easily be identified as public services such as law enforcement, justice, or basic healthcare. However, the French public services are a very broad category of activities that encompass: schools, public transportation, electricity distribution, sanitation, museums, libraries … and, more surprisingly, land-based casinos. In fact, the nature of land-based casinos in France results from cultural legacy as well as political interest into maintaining an administrative regime regarding its regulation.
It is important to note that land-based casinos were not first referred to as, or even considered to be, a public service. From a prohibition status vigorously maintained by Christian values since the Middle Ages, gambling received an original moral justification in France as it was perceived as a means to fund public utilities. 19 In the seventeenth century, King Louis XIV was the first to perceive the economic and political interest he would have in regulating gambling activities, especially toward the nobility and bourgeoisie. By installing a policy of tolerance towards the richest part of the population—even though gambling was practiced by the poorer classes as well—he allowed gambling to enter French culture as what it has been able to preserve with most pride: as luxury and entertainment. 20 Thus, the first clubs and casinos to open legally in Paris financed hospitals, conservatories, and museums of the capital, 21 creating a link between gambling activities and general interest benefits. After the French Revolution, which tried and failed to reinstate a prohibition status, the emperor Napoleon I was the first, in 1806, to regulate land-based casinos by defining in great detail the geographic settings in which the operation of a casino could be considered. 22 His decree has been substantially extended and the law states now that, besides the general prohibition of casinos in Paris, 23 licenses can only be granted by cities hosting significant seaside, thermal, or climatic resorts, as well as touristic cities of more than 500,000 inhabitants that are equipped with a national theatre, orchestra, or opera, and that contribute more than 40% of the financing of the concerned cultural institution. 24
From this cultural legacy, French casinos are considered not as a part of any commercial activity, but as a powerful means to promote tourism in those areas, resulting in achieving a general interest goal. In Ville de Royan, 25 the Council of State ruled that the casino activities were contributing to the touristic development of the city of Royan by the extent and diversity of the cultural services provided such as theatre, ballroom, orchestra, restaurant; and that, by doing so, the activity can be considered a public service delegation. The interesting part of this analysis relies on the fact that the Council of State focused on the cultural aspect of a casino more than its principal gambling activity to justify its nature of public service. This can be explained by the fact that culture attracts tourism, an activity in which France has been a leader since the 1960s and that currently contributes 9.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) by attracting 82.9 million annual visitors. 26 However, in the decision Ville de Paris, 27 the Council of State refused to consider that the restaurant l'Orée du Bois, located inside the Bois de Boulogne, exercised a public service activity. It judged that “if the activity of the restaurant (…) contributes to the reception of tourists in the capital and thus contributes to the influence and development of its tourist appeal, this circumstance alone, taking into account the operating conditions of the establishment and its own interest, is not sufficient to confer the nature of public service.” 28
These decisions raised several questions: was managing a casino a public service delegation only when it provided other cultural activities? What should be the operating conditions of the establishment and its own interest? What if the casino did not participate in the touristic development of the city in which it is located? This criterion, based on the nature of the activity, did not seem satisfying.
In 2012, the Council of State changed its analysis by ruling that managing a gambling activity was not a public service by itself, but that the mandatory contract between the city and the manager was indeed a delegation of public service achieving a general interest. 29 The judges chose to abandon the nature of the activity as a criterion and focused on the contract between the manager and the city that reflected two main elements: the relationship with the state or its bodies, and the use of public power. However, it is interesting and important to note that the Council of State did not define or explain the relationship between the gambling activity and the general interest. Besides, it is a common rule to deduct the regime from the nature of the activity you are considering, not otherwise. This approach shows that this criterion may be as inconsistent as the previous one since the court is failing to address the relationship between casino activity and the general interest. Indeed, stating that the regulation of any activity is of public interest would not give it the status of public service by itself. It appears that the Council of State is trying to keep the land-based casinos under an administrative law regime for political reasons which allows the state and its bodies to regulate their activity with much more involvement of public power than in any other commercial activity. What is really at stake by identifying a casino activity as a public service are the public powers involved and the contract that allows them to do so: the public service delegation contract.
Originality of the public service delegation contract
The French administration can enter into both administrative contracts and private law contracts. To make a contract “administrative” in character, two basic criteria must exist: “the contract relates to a public service and the contract reserves exceptional powers to the administration.” 30 Despite their apparent simplicity, these criteria give rise to complex case law which need not be explained here. However, two main categories of “administrative” contracts can be distinguished: the public procurement (le marché public) and the concession (la concession).
The public service delegation contract is defined as “a public service concession that concerns a public service and is concluded by a local authority (…).” 31 This means that the delegation grants the operation of a public service to an individual, often a private person, who is responsible for running the service within the framework settled by the public authority granting the delegation, and the delegate is paid for the service typically out of revenue received from the users of the service. The delegate must also preserve the set of values induced by the general interest. These are set out in the Rolland principles: continuity, 32 adaptability, 33 and equality, 34 to which neutrality 35 and secularity 36 are usually added. Besides, the terms of the contracts are mentioned by the new French Public Procurement Code 37 or by the laws which set out a number of standard terms and conditions which bind the different administrative authorities in making contracts. 38 All the same, there is also significant room for terms to be determined by negotiation. For example, the land-based casinos must pay a maximum tax of 15% on their gross revenues according to specifications agreed between the municipality and the operator of the casino; and a transfer of 10% from the direct debit operated by the state. 39 However, the public interest as expressed in the principle of the adaptability of the public service requires that the administration should be able to review the needs of the public service and to adapt the terms of existing contracts accordingly. This unilateral and unpredictable power is mitigated by the requirement that the contractual equilibrium should be maintained and that any change imposed by the administration should be compensated appropriately.
This contract, applied to land-based casinos, is an original framework of regulation. Indeed, in addition to being limited geographically and fitting the need of a public interest, the delegation is a prerequisite for any license application process engaged with the Ministry of Interior. Besides, the contract can only be granted by a city which expresses the need to build and/or manage a casino, which means that the contractor does not have the initiative of a commercial enterprise. Thus, it is important to note that the casino is the only concession where the buildings do not return automatically to the administration at the end of the contract if any have to be built.
All these specificities create unbalanced advantages or constraints compared to the ordinary law system so that casino activity, like many other public services, has often been exempted from competition law. However, the confusion of interests at stake (touristic or tax interest of the city and commercial interest of the operators) shows that the application of some principles from competition law was necessary to ensure the respect of the principle of equality guaranteed by the French Constitution. 40
The Guarantees Conceded to Competition Law
Conciliation of divergent interests in market accessibility
The purpose of competition law is arguably to regulate economic markets in order to ensure that no monopolistic situation or significant advantage would prevent the development of an economic sector. 41 In a country where equality is established as a constitutional principle, this has a special resonance by promoting a free entrepreneurship and equal market access environment for both entrepreneurs and consumers. 42 Indeed, “an interesting characteristic of the French legislation is that consumer protection is understood not only in terms of preventing gambling-related problems, but also as a democratization of offer, contributing to market balance and equal access to games.” 43 The 2010 law even mentions being written to “ensure a balanced and equitable development of different types of games to prevent any economic destabilization” 44 to justify state-controlled gambling provisions.
Beyond these principles, reality is quite different. Competitive inequality arises from the uneven geographical distribution of casinos, but primarily from the initiative of the commercial activity, and the granting of anti-competitive benefits (semi-monopolies). However, “public competition law enjoys a special position in the interpretation of competition law.” 45 What matters in the current context is to understand the balance which maintains internally the peculiarities of administrative law while, apparently, lining up on the position of European pressures to open the markets. To achieve this, the Council of State had to overcome a number of obstacles, both ideological and legal. In the end, the triumph of the market ideology has gradually collided with the opposition of the administrative law to address those issues by maintaining a welfare state context in order to extend the power of the administration. 46 This new context has given greater weight to the challenge of the existence of an administrative right as a protective right of the public authorities and multiple changes occurred in recent years, especially in public procurement.
The new French Public Procurement Code provides a series of provisions detailing the procedure for the awarding of public contracts (including public service delegations), which must comply with the requirement of competition to be considered legal. Different types of procedures exist, the most common of which is the call for tender used to delegate a public service such as the management of a casino. A call for tender is the procedure with which the public authority selects the most economically advantageous offer without negotiation on the basis of objective criteria previously made known to the applicants. A call for tender can be open or restricted, as chosen by the authority responsible for the contract. In the case of restricted calls for tender only approved applicants can submit their bid after their application has been selected. The selection of application depends on various criteria including cost-in-use, the technical value of the bid, its innovative character, its environmental performance, etc. Any other criteria can be used if justified by the object of the contract. If only one criterion must be determined, this criterion must be the price. The determined criteria are specified in the call for competition notice or, if this is not the case, in the contract documents.
Depending on the amount or the nature of the contract, publication modalities must be respected to inform any persons that would be interested and give them a reasonable amount of time to prepare their applications. Those guarantees to competitive entry in the selection process have been reinforced and extended to the European market, so that European competitors could have more opportunities to enter the French market. 47 As a matter of fact, the introduction of a local preference criterion in a public procurement process is prohibited as it would constitute a breach of European Union rules. Indeed, the European Court of Justice held that the Treaty prohibits not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result. However, following the Council of State's jurisprudence, an obligation to establish a local subsidiary may nevertheless constitute a condition for its award, if it is justified by the object of the contract or its execution conditions. A candidate who is committed to implement a subsidiary in case of award of contract shall be considered to meet this requirement, in the same way as a candidate already established. 48 Finally, it is also important to note that the president of the administrative court can be appealed to before or after the award of the contract (for instance if the contracting authority did not comply with publicity obligations). In response, the president can order the postponement of the signing of the contract until the end of the procedure, and request that the call for tender be conducted again or substitute the wrongly dismissed candidate.
However, all those guarantees conceded to competition law might be merely smoke and mirrors. In 2017, 17 casino groups were operating casinos in France, 49 the vast majority being well known to the different authorities for operating in this industry for years. Accordingly, the contracting authority has every interest to select a group that is already well installed in the market place and has been licensed previously. 50 A real competition exerted between casinos is necessary, but unfortunately, too often this competition tends to be lacking. Another difficulty may be that casino groups often own the buildings in which their dedicated subsidiaries operate the casino's business. 51 However, they are the only delegate of a public service that does not see their property returning to the community after the end of the contract. Normally, a property necessary for the performance of a public service automatically belongs to the community at the end of the contract. 52 This situation greatly benefits the outgoing delegates who impose themselves all the more easily during the call for tender. Indeed, it is unlikely that a competitor will rent them the building.
In brief, French legislation has introduced just enough competition to give the illusion of a fair allocation of casino contracts. However, this remains a very closed market, not inclined to evolution, relying on heavy procedures, poorly adapted to the rapid evolution of the market, making the French gaming sector unattractive and uncompetitive on an international level. In fact, the opening of the markets has been through a back door, concerning online gambling, rather than a major reform of land-based casinos, which is nevertheless necessary.
Progressive opening of the gaming market
“Within the European Union, the concepts of market and competition have become key concepts in the political construction process […] to play on the ideological potentialities conveyed by a matrix market competition at the service of the consumer, as much as it is at the course of industrial development and social progress.” 53 With such a similar policy, one could assume that France would be a leader in the integration of European laws in its own legislation. Well, one could not be more wrong, as the French regularly resist the opening of their economic markets, acting with what could be considered a protectionist attitude. Indeed, after pressure from the European Union to end its restrictive gaming laws, it was with reluctance that the French government passed the Gambling Act 54 which disbanded the government monopoly that existed in regard to online gambling sites. A long-awaited evolution since “35 companies applied for licenses and became the first non-government entities to offer online poker, sports betting, and horse racing betting,” 55 even if this opening was constrained as the Gambling Act called for excessive taxes on both poker and sports betting. 56
However, this slight shift toward more competition allowed progress in perspectives towards the regulation of the gambling market. The state constructed a policy of recommitment in this matter. In the case of casinos, for example, the administrative departments of municipalities and regional authorities in public financing control have a competence to set the general framework of the percentage of taxation. The logic is understandable and cannot suffer criticism: the recipient of public levies on the gross gambling revenues controls the declared monthly operations. But “the latest reforms demonstrate a form of recentralization of these operations and the structure of the levies to the detriment of the municipalities concerned. Consequently, they do not seem to be moving in the direction of a regulatory state.” 57 A similar example can be found in the Decree of May 2012 58 which provides that any change in the capital stock of a casino operating company must be preceded by a declaration to the Ministry of the Interior. In terms of the administrative police powers, such information seems necessary to increase transparency and reduce the risks associated with the exploitation of an obviously sensitive activity. In terms of regulation, it is really surprising because, once again, the provision tends to confirm that the role of the state evolves. The municipality does not intervene here, the state is positioned as an actor of the exploitation process and not as a third party to the casino's public service delegation contract as it was previously.
A report from the Court of Auditors 59 suggested the introduction of a national regulation that would certainly modify the conditions under which the normative production in this sector of activity takes place. The regulation itself would be entrusted to an independent administrative authority, and the conception of the specific norms related to competition in regard to this regulation would be entrusted to either the legislature or a ministry.
A future reform could be an opportunity for the legislature to expressly clarify the nature of the activity of managing casinos and to define a clearer course of action in terms of regulation as a means to promote free competition without diminishing the control of the state over a risky activity.
Conclusion
Finding an answer to the several paradoxes that represent compliance of land-based casinos in France would require rejecting the constant inconsistencies of a system in search of a policy that could reconcile its own contradictions. While logic would suggest that the management of land-based casinos should concern exclusively private operators (binding mostly by private law without renouncing a responsible regulation of the public authorities), land-based casinos fall under an administrative law regime based on the attribution of a public service delegation contract. This French specificity protects a market that is struggling to reinvent itself and is lacking the dynamism of a competitive market as competition is indeed strictly limited. However, the new worldwide expansion of the gambling industry has forced the French legislature to reconsider the existing national habits and to come up with some innovative measures to ensure more coherence and competition. The development of a public business law regime is a key to anticipating the legal evolutions necessary to adapt to the booming market of the gambling industry.
Footnotes
1
French cultural exception is a political concept introduced on an economic ground to treat culture differently from other commercial products since its values, identity, and meanings go beyond its strictly commercial value. France has been especially notable in pursuing the policy of cultural exception and the concept extends as a cultural attitude itself in regards to its stance in general public matters that differs from the rest of the world. It tends to justify the political and legal peculiarities of France resulting from a specific historical or cultural legacy.
2
The Constitutional Council's (Conseil Constitutionnel) first mission is to ensure that referenda and the election of the president and Parliament are fair. If called to action through petitions by the president, the prime minister, the president of the National Assembly or the Senate, or by a vote of 60 senators or Assembly members, it will also review new regulations about to be implemented in regard to the Constitution. However, it does review the decisions of lower courts for constitutionality as well through a very specific procedure implemented in 2008.
3
It gives the state, national agencies, and local authorities a body of special rights, privileges, and prerogatives as against ordinary citizens. In other words, it puts the executive above the regular laws in order to serve the general interest. That notion both justifies the more extensive powers of public bodies and constrains the actions both of those bodies and their employees.
4
5
Id.
6
Art. L. 322-2-1, French Homeland Security Code: adding that “such exception shall also apply to games whose functioning relies on the player's skills.”
7
Art. L. 322-2 and Art. L. 322-2-1, French Homeland Security Code.
8
The European Union is a unified trade and monetary body of 28 member countries, including France which was a founding country. It eliminates all border controls between members. That allows the free flow of goods and people, except for random spot checks for crime and drugs. The EU transmits state-of-the-art technologies to its members. The areas that benefit are environmental protection, research and development, and energy. Public contracts are open to bidders from any member country. Any product manufactured in one country can be sold to any other member without tariffs or duties.
9
In which goods and services can be freely exchanged between member states; Art. 49 on the freedom of establishment and Art.e56 on the free movement of services of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU).
10
11
12
Virve Marionneau, Justifications of National Gambling Policies in France and Finland, 32
13
14
15
16
17
G. Braibant, From simplicity to complexity, 40 years of administrative law (1953–1993) (in French), 45 E.D.C.E. 409, at 420 (1994).
18
Conclusions Corneille, CE Apr. 7, 1916, Astruc, RDP 1916.364.
19
20
Jean-Louis Harouel, From King Francis Ist to online gambling, history of gambling in France (in French), 139
21
Id.
22
Imperial Decree Authorizing Gambling Activities in Thermal or Climatic Resorts (June 24, 1806).
23
With the notable exception of the casino of Enghien-les-Bains located within the 100km prohibition around Paris.
24
Act Regulating Gaming in Gambling Houses and Casinos in Seaside Resort, Thermal and Spa Areas (June 15, 1907); Act No. 88-13 amending the same subject matter through the general topic of the Ssate's decentralization (Jan. 5, 1988).
25
CE, Mar. 25, 1966, Ville de Royan, No. 46504 46707.
26
Ludovic Marin, 2017, A Record Year for Tourism in France (in French),
27
CE, 12 mars 1999, Ville de Paris, No. 186085.
28
Id.
29
CE, Mar. 19, 2012, No. 341562.
30
31
Art. L. 1121-3, (New) French Public Procurement Code.
32
Continuity in the provision of the service follows from the necessity of the activity in the public interest. If it is indeed in the public interest, the public is entitled to expect that the service will be made available.
33
Adaptability requires that the public authority must be able to change the specification of a service as the needs of the public interest change.
34
Equality of users is an aspect of the general constitutional principle of equality before the public service. If an activity is done for the good of the whole public, then all relevant categories of the public must have equal access to that service and be equally treated by it.
35
Neutrality reflects the way a liberal state does not seek to impose its ideas of the good life on citizens, rather it facilitates the choice of a diversity of lifestyle. The state must respect religious beliefs and political opinions without discriminates among its citizens. This principle is substantially linked to the constitutional principle of equality. See note 36, infra.
36
Art. 1 of the French Constitution of 1958: “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organized on a decentralized basis. Statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts as well as to position of professional and social responsibility.” The “equality regardless of religion” has been recognized since 1905 when the Law on the Separation of the Church and State came into effect. This text returned all religions to the private sector and established state secularism in the public sphere. The French State does not favor any one religion and guarantees their peaceful coexistence in respect of the laws and principles of the Republic.
37
Implemented on April 1, 2019.
38
A casino delegation cannot be granted for a period that exceeds 20 years.
39
Art. L. 2333-54, General Code on Local Authorities.
40
Michel De Villiers, Principle of Equality in French Constitutional Precedents (in French), 37(217)
41
42
See infra.
43
Marionneau, supra note 12, at 305.
44
Art. 3, Act No. 2010-476 relating to the introduction of competition and sector regulation of gambling and online gambling, referred to as “the French Gambling Act” (May 12, 2010).
45
46
47
Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU on public procurements; Directive 2014/23/EU on concessions.
48
CE, Société Martin-Fourquin, Jan. 14, 1998, No. 168688.
49
Christophe Parlierse, A report from the Parliament asks for a reform of gambling (in French),
50
The licensing process is based on every casino operated. A group must go through it every time they obtain a new contract.
51
52
CE, Commune de Douai, Dec. 21, 2012, No. 342788.
53
54
Act No. 2010-476 relating to the introduction of competition and sector regulation of gambling and online gambling, referred to as “the French Gambling Act” (May 12, 2010).
55
Wesley Burns, How Online Gambling Is Regulated in France, GamblingSites.org (Mar. 2015), <
>.
56
“All poker pots are taxed 2% in addition to the rake poker sites normally take out of pots. To this day, players pay upwards of 7.5% in total rake (compared to an industry average of 4–5%) on every pot. Sports betting was hit with an 8.5% tax on all bets placed. Both sports betting and poker suffer from these taxes. Players complain that the higher tax rates result in a higher-than-normal rake in poker and less likelihood of making money with sports betting. Several poker sites have even left the market due to the onerous tax laws. To top it all off, the Gambling Act doesn't allow player pools to be shared across national borders. This means French players are cut off from the international poker scene.” Id.
57
Jean-Baptiste Vila, Positive steps towards a reform regarding gambling regulation (in French), 20 AJDA 1155 (June 12, 2017).
58
Official Degree No. 2012-685, OJ No. 8267 (May 8, 2012).
59
See