The Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program: An Enabler of the Third Offset Strategy

Abstract

The US Department of Defense (DOD) established programs to defend against chemical and biological weapons 100 years ago because military leaders understood that the operational capability of the US military is diminished when service member health is compromised. These threats to operational readiness can be from an overt attack using chemical and biological threats but may also arise from natural exposures. In the current era of rapidly emerging technologies, adversaries are not only rediscovering chemical and biological weapons; they are also displaying an increased propensity to employ them to cause strategic instability among deployed forces or nations undergoing conflict. The United States's investments in its Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) can be a critical enabler of the third offset strategy, which is a DOD initiative that seeks to maximize force capability to offset emerging threats. To realize this vision, the CBDP must make fundamental changes in acquiring and employing effective technologies so that enemy use of chemical and biological agents against US assets is no longer a viable option. Maximization of US force health status will provide a strategic advantage over theater opponents more vulnerable to operational degradation from chemical and biological threats.

The first offset strategy was a policy of nuclear deterrence, espoused by President Eisenhower in the 1950s, that provided the United States an affordable means to counter the Soviet Union for over 2 decades.¹ The first offset is estimated to have saved the Department of Defense (DOD) approximately $70 billion (in 2016 dollars) and prevented untold casualties due to the avoidance of conventional warfare.

As the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with the United States in the 1970s, the second offset strategy focused on the tools necessary for precision global strikes, such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, location, stealth, and communications. Although never employed against the Soviet Union, the US investment in precision global strike capability led to a decisive advantage over Iraqi forces in Operation Desert Storm. Defense leaders are crafting a third offset strategy because 3 decades of US military advantage is fading with advancements in worldwide commercial technology and accelerating industrial espionage.²

Initiated in 2014, the third offset strategy seeks changes in technology and organizational constructs that would allow the United States to maintain its military advantage.³ Defense leaders are concerned that, absent change, the US military risks a decreased ability to project power and an increased likelihood of operational over-match.³ US military concerns are based on 3 factors: (1) the increased pace of adversary technology development, (2) the rampant cyber-theft of industrial intellectual property, and (3) the erosion of defense modernization efforts due to the overextension of forces. The DOD must seek what military leaders describe as a “strategy-based, technologically oriented” solution set to restore the primacy of US forces in warfare.⁴

Efforts to craft the third offset strategy encompass several simultaneous lines of effort. The Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO), established in 2012 by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, is focused on identifying game-changing capabilities that can be fielded in the next 10 years through repurposing commercial technologies and accelerating mature military technologies in the development pipeline⁴—for example: developing swarming autonomous vehicles, integrating advanced navigation into small-diameter bombs to increase targeting capabilities, and repurposing aircraft as launch pads for multiple conventional payloads.⁵

The Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program (LRRDPP) is a complementary effort to the SCO focused on capabilities across space, air, land, and sea to be fielded in the longer term (20-30 years). The concepts considered in the LRRDPP include human-machine collaboration and combat teaming as well as autonomous deep learning systems that can process massive amounts of data, self-learn, and cue analysts to potential emerging threats.⁶

Recognizing that the key to the third offset's success is a healthy relationship between the DOD and private industry, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter established the Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental (DIUx), with a mission to “strengthen existing relationships and build new ones, scout for breakthrough and emerging technologies and serve as local point of presence for the DOD.”⁷ The DOD also leverages In-Q-Tel, the venture capital arm of the intelligence community, to identify commercial solutions to the DOD's most daunting problems.⁸ The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has long served as the DOD's technological hedge against technology surprise from our adversaries. Toward this end, in 2014 DARPA created the outward-looking Biological Technologies Office to stay ahead of the shifting technology curve by making critical, early investments in the increasingly dynamic intersection of biology and the physical sciences. These are just a few examples of how the DOD is seeking cooperative relationships with industry to brainstorm, develop technologies, and invigorate the DOD's organic research and development enterprise.

Chemical and Biological Defense

Notably absent from the third offset is a coordinated investment in sustaining the human health of the military force, which, if it were to be affected, could have unanticipated and negative outcomes for mission readiness.⁹ It is increasingly likely that military assets will need to operate in environments that are hazardous to human health for prolonged periods of time. The use of chemical weapons is experiencing a resurgence that may be eroding the norms against their use in conflicts. The repetitive use of chlorine gas by Iraqi insurgents and chemical weapons by the Syrian regime are evidence that chemical warfare is no longer a tactic of the past.¹⁰ During the time ISIL had control over major technology centers, it acquired and employed sulfur mustard, further demonstrating the chemical threat proliferation among non-state actors.¹¹ Further, as biotechnologies continue to evolve and become more accessible to a wider range of actors, the potential emerging biothreat space has widened.

Overt use of chemical and biological agents is not the only contribution to the threat space, because naturally occurring disease outbreaks have come to the forefront of discussions on military preparedness. The 2009 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats recognized that a naturally occurring disease (such as a pandemic influenza) poses a credible threat to national security similar to an overt military attack through incapacitation of military personnel.¹² An undetected pandemic influenza will dramatically reduce the operational capability of a fighter base or naval port in a matter of days. Naturally occurring outbreaks are on the rise, fueled by rapid global transportation and increased contact between humans and wildlife and domestic animals. Just in the past few years, the world has experienced outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (2003), H1N1 pandemic influenza (2009-10), Ebola (2014), and Zika (2016). These situations demonstrate that a pathogen does not recognize lines drawn on a map and that Mother Nature can effectively cripple military operations just as effectively as an overt attack.

The US military finds itself increasingly tied to prolonged regional conflicts and peacekeeping operations that require sustained presence in hostile regions in close proximity to our adversaries. Prolonged co-location in contested regions means disease will be shared by friend and foe. Mastering the ability to operate in a hazardous environment will afford the United States a competitive advantage. It is worth noting that endemic illnesses may disproportionately affect US forces who lack innate immunity that local populations have acquired, which further supports the assertion that health protection should remain a priority. Should US forces be successful in sustaining a healthy workforce in a compromised environment, it follows that less prepared and less well equipped adversaries would be compelled to expend disproportionate resources to maintain parity with US forces, thus creating a desirable offset.

The US military's mastery in detecting, responding, and restoring capability in the face of a hazardous chemical or biological environment could remove the asymmetric advantage offered by attack with chemical and biological agents. The force that is able to maintain mission readiness with ease will dominate, because the susceptible force will be unable to maintain vigilance or project their will without massive resupply. This health readiness would offer a competitive edge that would directly contribute to the third offset objectives and must be factored into current planning.

A Role for Chemical and Biological Defense

DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) was established by congressional legislation (Public Law 103-160) in 1993, with the mission to “enable the warfighter to deter, prevent, protect, mitigate, respond and recover from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) threats and effects as part of a layered and integrated defense.”¹³ The $1.2 billion CBDP portfolio spans the full breadth of chemical and biological defense for the joint services and specialized units as well as some interagency and international partners.¹⁴ The portfolio includes items such as individual and collective protective equipment (eg, suits, shelters), medical countermeasures (eg, vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostic devices), sensors, decontamination materials, hazard prediction, and warning and reporting systems. Together these items constitute a “system of systems” intended to provide a layered defense against chemical and biological attacks. Chemical and biological defense equipment is currently deployed around the globe with US forces. Some is used regularly for ongoing defensive operations and monitoring of critical assets, while others are pre-positioned for use in the event of an attack. Together, the chemical and biological defense system of systems provides the capability that is the foundation of our nation's defense against chemical and biological attacks. However, without a concerted effort to modernize the chemical and biological defense equipment set in an affordable manner that is responsive and adaptable to the evolving threat, the nation will be at risk.

Increased emphasis in the framework of the third offset strategy is needed on sustaining warfighter health and performance while operating in potentially hazardous environments. This emphasis would drive new technology development that would improve situational awareness, increase risk assessment accuracy, and inform force projection decisions and mission planning, thereby deterring adversaries from using chemical and biological agents. The CBDP has the mission, expertise, and infrastructure to contribute to the third offset strategy, but the community must be reinvigorated to mitigate emerging threats, and it is in need of a unifying purpose. A focus on the third offset strategy offers an opportunity for the CBDP to pivot toward a priority of the DOD that will help to galvanize the community and synchronize efforts from early science and technology (S&T) through acquisition. While achievable, there are fundamental challenges in the CBDP community that must be addressed in order for it to have any meaningful role in DOD's innovation initiatives.

Current US investments in chemical and biological defense are reactive and considered a contingency capability, generating attention only when there is an event. The anthrax mail system attacks of 2001, the Syrian chemical weapons crisis of 2014, and the global response to the West African Ebola outbreak in 2014 are examples of such events.¹⁵

The CBDP has many opportunities to improve the processes and speed with which capabilities are developed and fielded to the end user. The focus should be on the burdens in technology development across the CBDP enterprise that are barriers to revolutionary gains in capability. Overcoming these barriers will enable the CBDP to contribute significantly to the third offset strategy. The current challenges facing the CBDP fall into 3 categories: (1) strategy and long-range planning, (2) industry engagement, and (3) technology development. A description of these challenges and recommendations to resolve are provided below.

Strategy and Long-Range Planning

The CBDP lacks a cohesive technology development strategy and long-range planning aligned to current national and DOD priorities. The current CBDP strategy (drafted in 2012) is outdated, and stakeholders, such as the services and combatant commanders, requirements generators, science and technology professionals, advanced developers, and CBDP oversight do not share a common vision for chemical and biological defense needs.¹⁶ This weakens the power of the enterprise, introduces inefficiencies, and externally projects a negative image of the program. The CBDP must work hard to maintain relevance and demonstrate value, especially when competing for attention with current operations, major defense acquisition programs, and priority departmental initiatives (eg, cybersecurity). If the CBDP is to succeed and flourish in the current fiscal environment, unity of purpose must take precedence over the parochial interests of the components. The following recommendations provide an opportunity for the CBDP to draw together the CBDP community around a common vision and align planning efforts with national and DOD strategies and policies:

1. Revise the CBDP strategy. The CBDP leadership should prioritize the development of a revised program strategy. To achieve this end, a task force should be chartered with representation from each of the stakeholders to craft a revised program strategy. Equitable representation on the task force will be critical to obtain buy-in and adoption of the finalized strategy. The strategy should consider emergent and convergent technologies that widen the chemical and biological defense aperture for potential threats. Consideration should also be given to what role other federal agencies should have in a coordinated strategy akin to the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) efforts that act to coordinate the medical countermeasures investments of DOD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). It should nest with the current relevant national and DOD policies, strategy, and guidance documents. The strategy should address the role of the CBDP in the context of the broader mission space of countering weapons of mass destruction and also clarify the role of the CBDP in the development of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection, detection, and medical and decontamination capabilities. Lastly, the strategy should be completed in advance of the next budget development cycle.

2. Build an enterprise technology roadmap. The CBDP should formalize the development of an enterprise technology roadmap to ensure that technology and infrastructure investments will meet the short-term and long-term goals of the DOD. The technology roadmap should build on the work already conducted in the enterprise and be modeled after the DOD Long-Range Research and Development Program Plan previously mentioned, which considers the impact of technologies in the 20- to 30-year time range. The roadmap should portray the integrated technology development activities across the enterprise from early S&T to advanced development and testing over the next 20 to 30 years in a digitally accessible format. It should be updated regularly and serve as the guiding tool to inform S&T focus areas, program development, and the budget build. A releasable version of the roadmap should be shared with industry and academia at regular intervals.

3. Establish a long-range planning team. The CBDP should form a net assessment cell to help inform the technology roadmap and the development of the strategy. Modeled after DOD's Office of Net Assessment, this cell should convene on an ad hoc basis to identify emerging or future threats and opportunities in chemical and biological defense or other important strategic tasks from the CBDP leadership. The cell should be a small team of strategic thinkers that pulls together a mix of technical, operational, and programmatic experts from multiple disciplines as needed to address a given task. A primary task should be a fresh look at adversary methods for use of chemical or biological agents, as well as motives and decision points behind the initiation of an offensive program. Evaluating the problem space through the eyes of the enemy could help to elucidate novel approaches to detecting, protecting, and responding to chemical or biological attacks. This is a capability-based approach built on input from threat assessments, as opposed to a straight threat-based approach.

Improve Industry Engagement

In recognizing the central role of private industry, Adam Jay Harrison said, “The rapid, inexorable migration of the technological state-of-the-art to the civilian marketplace requires DOD to fundamentally rethink its relationship with industry or risk falling hopelessly behind adversaries better prepared to accommodate the new military-technology landscape.”¹⁷ Historically, conferences, industry forums, and one-on-one meetings were the traditional venues in which the CBDP interacted with academia and industry. Precipitated by the General Services Administration scandal, increased scrutiny on conference attendance coupled with budget cuts have significantly curtailed participation, complicating collaboration with key stakeholders.¹⁸ As the DOD gradually eases restrictions on conference-related travel, the CBDP should embrace a proactive approach that balances the use of social media, distance communication tools, targeted workshops, and direct engagement to strengthen the bond across industry, academia, and government. The completion of the CBDP strategy and enterprise technology roadmap are prerequisites for any meaningful conversation, because the CBDP must be able to communicate what it needs and when in order to stimulate innovation or capitalize on technologies already in the pipeline. The following recommendations provide a pathway for increased engagement with industry.

1. Build an engagement campaign. The CBDP needs to increase its level of engagement with the traditional CBDP industrial base and expand that dialogue to academia and other industries that have potential research or technology applications in chemical and biological defense. To this end, the CBDP should develop and formalize an engagement campaign that seeks to raise awareness of CBDP's strategic objectives and technology needs, obtain feedback on the CBDP enterprise technology roadmap, and identify opportunities for co-investment in technology, infrastructure, and manufacturing, as appropriate. A coordinated engagement strategy with industry will ensure consistency of message and minimize duplication.

2. Maintain an enterprise techwatch. The CBDP needs to deepen its understanding of traditional and nontraditional industries that may have technology applicable to chemical and biological defense. To facilitate this awareness, the CBDP should commission a “techwatch” to identify industries and associated companies that intersect with CBDP enterprise technology. An understanding of the industry landscape will help to direct engagement activities as well as elucidate areas that have little or no industry presence. The market surveys produced by the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center and Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (www.WMDdetectorSelector.com) would serve as a useful starting point; however, other sources such as federally funded research and development centers, university affiliated research centers, and academia should be considered. The “techwatch” should continually seek to identify technologies that have the potential to be repurposed for chemical and biological defense. Not only does repurposing reduce development time and costs, but, for technologies that have civilian and military application, the production and sustainment costs are spread across a greater customer base, reducing cost and time to field a capability. The assessment should also provide insight into the bioeconomy and articulate opportunities that could be pursued with companies developing bioproducts for which countermeasures or biosecurity designs could be included.

3. Conduct technology reviews. To complement the comprehensive baseline market research assessment, the CBDP should resource and co-administer an expansion of structured processes for evaluating potential technologies. Consolidated technology assessments should include requirements, technical, and programmatic experts. The combined viewpoints of these communities of professionals ensures that science is sound, a development pathway is viable, and the technology is operationally appropriate. The goal should not be to supplant standard methods for acquiring technology but rather to augment the procurement process by providing a means to assess technology maturity and applicability to prescribed mission needs that goes beyond the typical marketing pitch.

4. Build a chemical and biological defense test bed consortium. CBDP needs to arrange and formalize a consortium of test beds to evaluate emerging technologies across the range of chemical and biological defense sectors (ie, information technology, detection, protection, and medical). Harmonization of test bed activities would serve to standardize test events, streamline efforts to avoid redundancies, and ensure that test and evaluation data were effectively disseminated across multiple stakeholders. A harmonized test bed consortium should expand opportunities for bundled open test events to entice commercial and foreign partners with lower cost access to tests achieved through economy of scale. The consortium construct should be overseen and resourced by the CBDP and led by the DOD labs with the appropriate expertise and infrastructure. The test bed should inform program managers in the CBDP via formal reports on the maturity, strengths, limitations, and development and production risks associated with a given technology. The CBDP should leverage the lessons learned from previous test bed efforts to optimize the organization and processes of the consortium.

Technology Development and Adoption

General Omar Bradley once stated, “If we continue to develop our technology without wisdom or prudence, our servant may prove to be our executioner.”¹⁹ The ability of the CBDP to find, mature, and field revolutionary capabilities that will contribute to the third offset strategy depends on having a robust innovation pipeline. Presently the pipeline is not full. Budget cuts, inefficient processes, and misalignment across research and acquisition contribute to the scarcity of innovation. Improvements are under way, but they are likely to yield only incremental gains. Finding opportunities to shape and harvest innovation in academia and the commercial marketplace can help to propel the CBDP forward at a greater pace—one that yields truly revolutionary capability and maintains a competitive edge against our adversaries.

The current state of technology development underscores the need for a renewed emphasis on modernization informed by an enterprise-wide technology roadmap that articulates the direction of the program. However, a roadmap alone will not suffice. There are strong barriers to doing business with the CBDP that must be addressed. Because chemical and biological defense is a niche industry, it can be unattractive to companies because it procures equipment infrequently and often these technologies have a limited market in the civilian sectors. These attributes can serve as disincentives for commercial companies to enter the chemical and biological defense market and can drive existing companies out.

Aside from the market structure, contracting with the government generally can be a significant detractor from doing business with the DOD. Commercial companies are focused on maximizing profit and maintaining a competitive edge against their competitors. Typically, contracts based on Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) restrict the level of profit a company can make and can impose restrictions on the rights to intellectual property generated under the contract. Also, FAR-based contracts require companies to be compliant with DOD accounting regulations and permit the DOD to audit their accounting systems. While these rules and regulations are important for ensuring the appropriate use of taxpayer funds, they are also barriers to doing business with the federal government.²⁰

According to the 2016 Annual Report to Congress, there are risks to the CBDP industrial base. The report attributes these risks to availability of raw materials, life cycle sustainment costs, and uncertain operational tempo.²¹ Together, these factors portray a program that is stagnant. Thus, the incentive for new entrants to attempt to penetrate the CBDP market is minimal, and companies already in the CBDP market are less likely to innovate with their internal research and development funds. The CBDP needs to attract companies, stimulate innovation, and find ways to make it profitable to operate across all of the chemical and biological defense market sectors. The following recommendations are intended to facilitate this transformation and bolster the technology pipeline.

1. Explore new investment models. The CBDP should explore alternative investment models to stimulate innovation, acquire technology, and attract new entrants into the market. Across the spectrum of S&T through advanced development, the CBDP employs the typical procurement practices used throughout the acquisition community to engage with academia and private industry. These include broad area announcements, requests for information, and requests for proposals, typically followed by contracts and, in some cases, grants or cooperative agreements. However, these traditional approaches are limiting. The CBDP should evaluate the feasibility of using government-sponsored venture capital activities, accelerators, and prize awards.

Government-sponsored venture capital activities are modeled after venture capital firms, except that their primary aim is to enhance government capabilities versus building business value.²² They serve as a conduit between the technical needs of government and segments of the commercial industry that are robust sources of innovation and, in most cases, have never done business with the federal government. The first entity of its kind, In-Q-Tel was established in 1999 by the CIA as a means to drive innovation and gain access to technologies needed to support the intelligence community.⁸ Since then, other government-sponsored venture capital activities have been established, such as OnPoint Technologies, Red Planet, and DeVenCi. As part of the Defense Innovation Initiative, the DOD is partnering with In-Q-Tel to identify and cultivate technologies in support of the third offset strategy.⁴ Accordingly, the CBDP should assess the feasibility of working with In-Q-Tel or an equivalent entity to address its challenging technology needs.

A slightly different approach for scouting private industry and harvesting innovation is the one used by the National Security Technology Accelerator (NSTXL). In this case, the DOD funds a not-for-profit consortium of national security–related companies (∼250 members and growing).²³ The management of NSTXL aligns the DOD needs with the consortium member capabilities. Assuming there is a match of need and capability, the consortium allocates resources to the member to build a prototype system. Following the successful evaluation of a given prototype, the DOD can choose to acquire that technology or the member can commercialize it, or both.²³ The CBDP should consider establishing a chemical and biological defense accelerator.

The use of prize awards to solve unique technological challenges dates back to the early 1700s with the British government's Longitudinal Prize, which sought methods to determine longitude at sea.²² The advantage of a prize award is that the contestants use their own labor and funding to try and solve a technological challenge. Only when the objective has been met does the prize sponsor have to provide funding.²⁴ Prize awards also encourage risk taking and, as a form of crowd sourcing, bring to bear many creative minds on a given problem.²⁴ DARPA has successfully used prize awards in areas such as robotics, autonomous vehicles, and social networking. Prize awards are not new to the CDBP, but they are underutilized. The processing cost of a standard DOD award approval can exceed the value of the award itself, which likely serves as a disincentive to using this approach. The CBDP should assess the barriers to using prize awards and establish a legally sufficient process for executing them.

2. Leverage other transactional authority. The CBDP should take greater advantage of the other transactional authorities (OTA) granted to the DOD. An OTA refers to the authority granted under US Code for an agency to enter into agreements other than contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements.²⁵ These non-FAR-based agreements provide the DOD with much greater flexibility in negotiating terms with commercial companies. Specifically, OTA agreements often provide companies with greater protection of intellectual property rights and alleviate the need for accounting system audits and the provision of detailed cost data. The risk in using OTAs is that the government has less control and fewer mechanisms to monitor the performance of the contractor. OTAs are often the vehicle used to establish government venture capital activities, as is the case for the NSTXL mentioned above. The CBDP is pursuing OTAs for medical countermeasure development (ie, http://www.ncbdconsortium.org/) as a mechanism to incentivize greater participation from the biotech and pharmaceutical industry.²⁶ The CBDP should consider expanding the use of OTAs to include nonmedical-related technologies in S&T and advanced development. While OTAs are not a replacement for FAR-based contracts, their use will provide greater flexibility for the CBDP to acquire innovative technologies.

3. Coordinate interagency investments to lower costs. The CBDP should centrally coordinate where interagency overlaps exist and seek to formalize cost-sharing programs where appropriate. The total life cycle cost of developing, fielding, and decommissioning a technology can stress an agency's budget, making multiple sustained investments impossible. Aligned portfolios that allow joint investments, while difficult to establish, offer the opportunity to share the cost burden. Interagency efforts have been successful in the medical countermeasures field in aligning budgetary investments among the DOD, DHS, and HHS through PHEMCE. Existing efforts under PHEMCE include “tech watch” and “industry day” events that enable companies involved in the development of medical countermeasures to present early-stage technical innovations and engage in 2-way dialogue with various agencies. Using the PHEMCE model, but expanding it to include nonmedical defense programs, could also create a forum for joint funding announcements and their associated applications from industry components. Creating a centralized interagency proposal submission with commensurate opportunities for interagency cost sharing would also act to minimize the burden on the private sector, foster awareness and collaboration, offer the benefit of economy of scale, and promote interoperability.

4. Continued emphasis on prototypes and technology demonstrations. The DOD has recognized that creating prototypes is a valuable tool in managing, developing, demonstrating, and evaluating emerging and operational capabilities. The CBDP should continue this trend and expand the use of advanced technology demonstrations to test the technical feasibility of a capability, explore its operational value, and reduce the acquisition timelines for fielding new technologies.

Conclusion

In a world in which the national security environment is constantly evolving, the third offset strategy is the DOD's hedge against a changing threat and will ensure the DOD's ability to project power anywhere in the world. Although it is only in its early phases, the third offset strategy is on a trajectory to transform the way in which the DOD fosters innovation and acquires technology. Indeed, artificial intelligence, human/computer combat teaming, and cybersecurity are all important threat areas. Because the warfighter is a human being, the health and performance of the force must be part of the DOD's long-range research and development planning. Advances in medicine, synthetic biology, and bioengineering are fundamentally altering society's ability to manipulate the human genome, degrade human performance, and alter the virulence of microorganisms. Biological and chemical entities will be explored for their capability to alter human decision making and physical performance. While the DOD will exercise adherence to high ethical standards in this arena, our adversaries will continue to pursue the use of emerging technology to create their own asymmetric advantages.

Consequently, now is the time to reexamine our ability to prevent, detect, and react to chemical and biological threats and build warfighter resilience. The CBDP is positioned to provide the capabilities needed to protect the warfighter at home and abroad from the threat of chemical and biological agents. However, fundamental enterprise-wide changes are needed in the CBDP in order to contribute meaningfully. The CBDP needs to revise its current strategy, synchronize its long-range planning, engage more broadly and deeply with industry, and transform how it acquires technology. The proposed changes in the CBDP will help to modernize the force with revolutionary capabilities and make a contribution to the third offset strategy that will address the chemical and biological threat of tomorrow.

References

Martinage

. Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; October 27, 2014. http://csbaonline.org/research/publications/toward-a-new-offset-strategy-exploiting-u-s-long-term-advantages-to-restore. Accessed March 2, 2017.

Work

. The third U.S. offset strategy and its implications for partners and allies. Speech delivered January 28, 2015, Washington, DC. http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies. Accessed March 2, 2017.

Hagel

. Reagan National Defense Forum. Speech delivered November 15, 2014, Simi Valley, CA. www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606635. Accessed March 2, 2017.

Work

. Reagan Defense Forum: the third offset strategy. Speech delivered November 7, 2015, Simi Valley, CA. http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/628246/reagan-defense-forum-the-third-offset-strategy. Accessed March 2, 2017.

Carter

. Remarks previewing the FY 2017 defense budget. Speech delivered February 2, 2016, Washington, DC. http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/648466/remarks-prev%20iewing-the-fy-2017-defense-budget. Accessed March 2, 2017.

Work

. CNAS Defense Forum. Speech delivered December 14, 2015, Washington, DC. http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/634214/cnas-defense-forum. Accessed March 2, 2017.

US Department of Defense. Defense Innovation Unit Experimental. Mission & Vision. http://www.diux.mil/. Accessed March 2, 2017.

In-Q-Tel. About In-Q-Tel. https://www.iqt.org/about-iqt/. Accessed March 2, 2017.

Technology and innovation enablers for superiority in 2030, The Defense Science Board, October 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a608507.pdf.

10.

Plumer

. Everything you need to know about Syria's chemical weapons. Washington Post September 5, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/05/everything-you-need-to-know-about-syrias-chemical-weapons/. Accessed March 2, 2017.

11.

Herridge

. Top intel official confirms ISIS made, used chemical weapons. FoxNews February 9, 2016. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/02/09/top-intel-official-confirms-isis-made-used-chemical-weapons.html. Accessed March 2, 2017.

12.

National Security Council. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. November 2009. http://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Natl-Strategy-for-Countering-BioThreats.pdf. Accessed March 2, 2017.

13.

US Department of Defense. Chemical and Biological Defense Program. 2014 Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Annual Report to Congress. March 2014. http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/docs/home/Final%202014%20DoD%20CBDP%20ARC_signed%2021%20Mar%202014.pdf.

14.

US Department of Defense, Comptroller. Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President's Budget Submission, Chemical and Biological Defense Program. February 2015. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_MasterJustificationBook_Chemical_Biological_Defense_Program_PB_2016.pdf. Accessed March 2, 2017.

15.

Hayden

. Biodefence since 9/11: the price of protection. Nature, 2011; 477:150-152. http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110907/full/477150a.html. Accessed March 2, 2017.

16.

US Department of Defense. Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) Strategic Plan. June 15, 2012:1-22.

17.

Harrison

. DOD 2.0: high tech is eating the Pentagon. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 2016; 142(2):60-65.

18.

Cohen

, Bash

. GSA exec takes the fifth on Las Vegas spending scandal. CNN April 17, 2012. http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/16/politics/gsa-hearing/index.html. Accessed March 2, 2017.

19.

Bradley

. Armistice Day speech, November 11, 1948. In: Collected Writings of General Omar N. Bradley. Volume 1. Madison: University of Wisconsin; 1945.

20.

Thompson

. Five reasons why Silicon Valley won't partner with the Pentagon. Forbes April 27, 2015. http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2015/04/27/five-reasons-why-silicon-valley-wont-partner-with-the-pentagon/#4600376b4071. Accessed March 2, 2017.

21.

US Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program. 2016. Annual Report to Congress. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/NCB/16-F-1214_2016_Annual_Report_toCongress_DOD_Chemical_and_Biological_Defense_Program.pdf.

22.

Webb

, Guo

, Lewis

, Egel

. Venture Capital and Strategic Investment for Developing Government Mission Capabilities. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation; 2014. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR176/RAND_RR176.pdf. Accessed March 2, 2017.

23.

National Security Technology Accelerator. http://www.nstxl.org/about.php#process. Accessed March 2, 2017.

24.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Problem solving approaches at NASA: challenges, prize competitions, and crowdsourcing. NASA website. Undated. https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/NASA-Solve-FS.pdf. Accessed March 2, 2017.

25.

Defense Acquisition University. “Other Transaction” Authority (OTA) for Prototype Projects. May 7, 2015. https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=37941.

26.

Intent to award: medical countermeasure systems other transaction agreement. FedBizOps.gov February 11, 2016. https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=67f35027093c8dac702ce82c97760de9&tab=core&_cview=0. Accessed March 2, 2017.