Abstract
Introduction
As wildfires, floods, droughts, hurricanes, ocean level rising, loss of biodiversity, and other such phenomena intensify, a heightened sense of urgency to address the ongoing climate emergency seems to have taken hold across the world. Many of the major carbon-emitting countries have set a target date to reach net zero carbon (that is, emissions minus removals) to limit the rise in average global temperature to 1.5°C, or 2°C in the worst-case scenario. Though the EU has committed to achieving net zero carbon by 2050, and the United States is in the process of working out ways to make a similar commitment, their proposed initiatives alone will not succeed in limiting the rise in average global temperatures.
Carbon Emissions Rising in China and India
The real challenge to attaining widespread decarbonization lies in bringing down emissions in developing nations, particularly China and India. China alone presently accounts for around 25 percent of worldwide emissions while the United States and European Union together account for 20 percent. India's share is only around 7 percent, but that could rise sharply by 2035 if the country's energy demands increase as anticipated. (International Energy Agency, 2021). Both countries are heavily dependent on coal for energy, China deriving nearly 60 percent and India over 50 percent of their energy needs from coal (Maizland, 2021). During the decade from 2009 to 2019, China and India significantly increased their emissions, respectively by 31.1 percent and 37.4 percent, though China's have plateaued over the past few years. (Wang & Zhou, 2020). Both countries have hewed to the fossil fuel-driven growth model adopted by the industrialized West, while seeking to maximize GDP growth. Though energy efficiency has also risen, it has lagged GDP growth, resulting in higher overall emission levels.
The sharp increase in manufacturing outsourcing has led to the offshoring of emissions especially over the past three decades, sometimes to the tune of 3 million tons (MT) a year, though it has now declined to less than 2 MT per year on average (Plumer, 2017). Post-pandemic, this is likely to rise again along with carbon attributable to freight, which is responsible for about 5 percent of total emissions, and could grow sharply by 2050 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015). The proposal to impose a carbon tariff on imports from countries whose policies to decarbonize are deemed insufficient (European Commission, 2021), needs to be debated more widely. Such a “border adjustment mechanism” would penalize the flow of emissions, while those most responsible for the stock of emissions (and much of the 1°C rise over preindustrial levels) face no such impost.
According to Richie (2019), the United States and the European Union together are responsible for just under 50 percent of CO2 emissions over the past two centuries, while a little over 16 percent is attributable to China and India combined. There are varying estimates of how long CO2 remains in the atmosphere, the most optimistic being that its concentration drops by 50 percent in 30 years, in part, due to absorption by oceans. However, since oceans are likely to release most of the absorbed gas back into the atmosphere, the half-life of CO2 could be in the hundreds of years. Worse, increased accumulation will only extend the period for which carbon dioxide persists and contributes to further warming (Baez, 2015; Inman, 2008).
Coal Use in China and India
China's policy makers expect the country's use of coal will peak in 2030 and decline thereafter. However, coal-based electricity generation, which was to be capped at 1,100 GW, has reached nearly 1,200 GW, with another 186 GW of planned additions. Since coal-fired plants have lives of around 30 years, and many older stations are also being upgraded, China appears to be locking in massive amounts of coal for power generation until 2050 and beyond (Standaert, 2021).
In addition to electricity generation, coal is heavily used in the manufacture of steel, cement, and aluminum whose carbon output is locked in at about 25 percent of China's total emissions, with steel production alone accounting for 30 percent of the coal used (Myllyvirta, 2021). Unless coal-free technologies to manufacture steel and cement are developed, these emissions are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The widespread use of coal for cooking and heating in rural areas can only be reduced over an extended period. Even the spike in electric vehicle (EV) sales may have a dark side. With coal being such a big part of China's energy mix, EV charging stations are likely to be dependent on coal-based power, which will lead to an increase in carbon emissions.
India's carbon emissions are a little over one-fourth of China's (Timperley, 2019). With plans to grow the economy rapidly in the coming decades, India's emissions look set to rise by over 50 percent from present levels by 2030, and that even after taking into account the ongoing commitments to rapidly grow renewable energy capacities (Climate Tracker, 2020). Coal presently provides over 70 percent of India's electricity needs, and it looks likely that coal will continue to be vital to the country's power supply for at least the next 20 years. With hydro and nuclear generating less than 10 percent of its electricity demand, India is even more dependent on coal than China for electricity, despite its growing renewable energy sources.
Renewable Energy
Renewable capacity in China has, to be sure, increased in leaps and bounds reaching a total of 281 GW in wind power and 253 GW in solar, more than the installed capacity in the rest of the world combined (Xu & Stanway, 2021). The intermittency of renewable energy supplies, however, has resulted in less than 20 percent of available capacity being used (Chatsko, 2018). Among the other reasons for the low load factors specific to China are the location of renewable plants far from demand centers, the lack of storage capacity for intermittent wind and solar generation, the grid's inability to handle swings in supply and demand, and the desire on the part of some local authorities to continue the use of coal power generated within their respective regions (Tyrrell, 2018). Social factors such as high employment in coal-related industries (around five million in China and one million in India) increase the difficulty of transitioning away from coal (Zhang et al., 2018).
India has added considerable renewable capacity, primarily wind and solar, which have seen double digit growth every year for the past five years (Lu et al., 2020), and now constitute a quarter of its generation capacity. India's renewable energy usage (as opposed to capacity available) has faltered for reasons similar to those bedeviling China (International Energy Agency, 2021). In addition, part of the renewable power has been used to supply rural areas that had lacked electricity. Though the cost of renewable energy in certain locations is almost on par with coal-derived electricity (International Energy Agency, 2021), the shuttering of coal-fired plants has not proceeded as expected. In fact, an addition of nearly 60 GW capacity of coal power stations is in the pipeline. The installation of a significant portion of wind and solar power has been driven by individual states with the help of private investors (Jorgensen, Mishra, & Sarangi, 2015). Ramping up domestic investment and attracting large amounts of foreign capital might require guarantees for their return on investment, a difficult undertaking, particularly given India's history with energy investment from abroad.
Net Zero Carbon and Energy Security
A major conundrum facing both Asian giants is that curbing the use of fossil fuels, particularly coal, could jeopardize energy security and affect economic growth and employment. If coal is to be replaced in the energy mix, new technologies are needed, such as innovations in renewable energy and electricity storage at a scale matching coal power, decarbonized production of steel and cement, efficient methods to heat and cool buildings, and large-scale removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.
Political factors (both international and domestic) are at least as important as technological solutions to the climate crisis. Both China and India have signaled that they view emission reduction as being subsumed within energy security (Wu, 2018). They have also worked with other countries to hold accountable those most responsible for the original emissions accumulation by assuming greater responsibility in addressing climate change. However, partly to assuage the concerns of island nations most threatened by warming, and also to tackle the impact of warming at home, China and India have committed to mitigation initiatives. China's standing, and India's desire to be seen, as a world power, have kept them at the negotiating table, but energy security, economic growth, and political stability remain their paramount concerns.
Conclusion
It is imperative that countries like China and India be provided with the necessary support to facilitate drastic cuts in carbon without compromising security, stability, and prosperity. Rich nations have fallen short of delivering the $100 billion per year promised in the Paris Agreement to developing countries. About $80 billion was transferred in 2018 (Shankleman, 2020) mostly in the form of loans, translating to a net disbursement of $30 billion. The US commitment of a little under $6 billion is woefully inadequate (McDonnell, 2021). Foreign aid to compensate for past emissions is unpopular in most Western capitals, the focus being almost solely on today's flow, rather than responsibility for the stock of emissions. The funds needed by developing nations could exceed $500 billion per year by 2050.
Both the United States and European Union are working with India to support its efforts both in terms of financial resources as well as new technologies (Busby et al., 2021). China, whose energy needs are about four times that of India's, is in a different category from its Asian neighbor. A leader in a variety of cutting-edge technologies, China is viewed by many developed nations as a rival. Working with China to help it deal with carbon emissions would require a delicate balancing act between competition and cooperation in the international community. It is, therefore, critical for all parties (countries and institutions) concerned, to separate the issue of global leadership from that of ensuring the well-being of the planet as a whole.