Abstract
India is a growing space power, and launch is a key foundation for India's growth. Developing an indigenous launch capability was a top priority to ensure India could launch indigenously developed spacecraft that would help connect and educate all of India. India developed several versatile space launch vehicles that enable India to launch satellites for civil and eventually military purposes. India is also expanding their presence on the commercial space launch market. The purpose of this article was to review and discuss the history India's space launch vehicles. The article provides insights into the drivers of the development of each vehicle along with their successes and failures. The article concludes with a discussion of the future of India's governmental space launch vehicles and commercial space launch endeavors.
Introduction
From sending an orbiter to Mars or previously holding the record for most satellites launched on a single vehicle (104), India is expanding its presence in space and the space launch market. A powerful driver for India's space ambitions was developing indigenous space launch capabilities. In 1962, the father of India's space program Dr. Vikram Sarabhai worked with India's first Prime Minster Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru to begin entering space and using space technologies to lift India's large, poverty-stricken population out of poverty, as well as to ensure India had a seat in the exclusive political clubs.1,* Dr. Sarabhai believed that India should follow a self-sufficient model when building out its space program, which came from the Gandhian philosophy of national self-reliance and the desire to limit relying on other countries. 2 India also feared that any foreign technical assistance could be suddenly cut off if civilian space systems were diverted to military purposes. 3
Developing an indigenous launch capability was a top priority for Dr. Sarabhai; 1 that could help connect and educate all of India. India developed several versatile space launch vehicles that now enable India to launch domestically developed satellites for both civil and military purposes, and also to offer low-cost launch services on the international commercial space market. This article reviews India's space launch vehicle capabilities and discusses the history of each launch vehicle with insights into the vehicle's failures and successes. The article also discusses future Indian space launch vehicles that include government-developed vehicles being tested, and the emergence of India's commercial space launch industry.
Space Launch Vehicle
In 1968, Dr. Sarabhai initiated an extensive feasibility study into the possibility of developing an indigenous Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) to limit India's dependence on other countries for launching Indian spacecraft. Completed in 1970, the results defined the objective of placing a small, 40-kg satellite into low-Earth orbit (LEO).4(p.23) The study also set a timeline of 5 years to complete its first launch. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) was adamant about developing an indigenous launcher; however, it would be based on the smallest and simplest launching system the organization knew of: the American Scout small satellite launcher. The simplicity of the solid fuels was an attractive feature—before working on the SLV, Indian engineers worked with sounding rockets, which had been all solid propellant and thus familiar. The SLVs design called for the vehicle to be composed of 4 solid fuel stages with fins for aerodynamic stability.5(p.160) The vehicle was eventually named SLV-3 because it was the third version that was adopted in 1971; development 3 began in November 1973 after the Space Commission's approval.4(p.23,74) India wanted to have at least 2 flights for the SLV-3 to gain experience and establish reliability of operations before moving to the next phase of rocket development, and ultimately, there were 4.4(p.77)
While the SLV-3 was originally based off the Scout rocket, it evolved and became a much different rocket during design and development: scientists realized that while the solid fuel rocket motor could be scaled up, the other technologies were essentially new and required learning from experience.5(p.161) Ultimately, the SLV-3 would make use of low-thrust, pressure-fed, liquid fuel propulsion systems in the second and third stage.5(p.165) Eighty-five percent of SLV-3s components were developed in India—the development process helped ISRO understand the difficulties of developing a launch vehicle. 6 (p.165)
Delays of key supplies pushed back the SLV-3s first launch until August 10, 1979, when the rocket launched from Satish Dhawan Space Centre. At T-2, the ground control computer identified insufficient fuel in the second stage of the rocket, but ground control operators overrode the computer because they knew they had installed the correct level of fuel. A little after 5 min following launch, the rocket crashed into the Bay of Bengal due to a stuck valve in the second stage that resulted in Reaction Control System propellant draining away. The vehicle was lost.5(p.163),6(p.167–9) The failure resulted in the loss of the Rohini satellite, a technology demonstrator that tested Indian-made solar cells and satellite spin stabilization.6(p.169) ISRO corrected the problems and successfully launched a second vehicle on July 18, 1980, when India inserted into LEO the Rohini satellite RS-1, a spin stabilization demonstrator that was also equipped with a 1-km imagery sensor.4(p.76,77) India became the fifth country to develop a launch vehicle that could place a satellite into orbit.
The SLV-3 launched a third time on May 31, 1981, when ISRO tried to insert another Rohini satellite, RS-D1, into LEO. In addition to the spin stabilization mission, ISRO hoped that the imaging camera would deliver better quality imagery than the previous satellite for monitoring Earth resources. Unfortunately, the mission ended in failure. RS-D1 was inserted into an incorrect orbit by the SLV-3 and was operational for only 9 days. One of the 4 fins on the first stage did not respond to guidance commands, causing a spin that restricted the mission and the altitude.6(p.169) The error could not be corrected due to the nonperformance of a set of control thrusters resulting in a reduced altitude.4(p.77)
The SLV-3s fourth and final launch on April 17, 1983, included a simplified second-stage control system designed to improve reliability and use additional, indigenously developed sensors. The launch placed a 41.5-kg Rohini satellite into LEO.4(p.77) The Rohini satellite carried a smart sensor camera that could classify ground features such as water and vegetation with an on-board processor. During its 18-month mission, the sensor sent more than 5,000 pictures in visible and infrared bands, which ultimately helped ISRO determine the altitude and orbit necessary for capturing imagery from space. 7 (p.22) The camera could identify clouds blocking its view and then not capture images until the view was clear.6(p.171)
The SLV-3 enabled ISRO to learn a lot in technology development and project management, but India decided to move past the SLV-3 because it could launch only 41.5 kg into LEO.5(p.163) India wanted a launch vehicle that could place into orbit heavier spacecraft that could address India's socioeconomic problems. After the SLV-3s success, the Indian government came under pressure from the Indian bomb-for-security lobby that wanted to use the rocket technology for military purposes—the government agreed to such uses in July 1983 and set up the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program. 8 The project leader and about a dozen scientists from the SLV-3 program moved to the missile development program, resulting in using of the first stage of the SLV-3 rocket for the Agni ballistic missile, which successfully launched in 1989. 9
Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle
ISRO began developing, fabricating, and testing 2 new rockets to be used for space launch: the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) and the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV).4(p.81) The ASLV was essentially the SLV-3 with 2 strap-on boosters to help it launch up to 150 kg into LEO.5(p.163) ISRO wanted to immediately proceed to a much larger launch vehicle that could launch a 1-ton satellite into orbit, but this would take several years to develop. ISRO also needed to validate and further its technology development with strap-on boosters, bulbous payload fairing, canted nozzles, closed-loop guidance system, and overall mission management.4(p.113),6(p.198,199) Adding the boosters complicated the launch mission by requiring managing more systems, more stages/events during launch, and dealing with a new maximum dynamic pressure (Max Q, the pressure caused by a rocket's motion against the atmosphere when the rocket undergoes the maximum mechanical stress).
India viewed the ASLV as an intermediate rocket and required only 4 launches for proof of concept. With the increased payload capacity, the ASLV would launch 4 stretched Rohini satellites that would conduct various science experiments, such as detecting gamma rays or monitoring the ionosphere. The first launch failed on March 24, 1987, due to a non-ignition in the first-stage motor.4(p.116) On July 13, 1988, the second launch also failed. The rocket broke up in flight during the command to separate the strap-on booster's phase. ALSV was unusually long and thin, which resulted in the vehicle hitting Max Q when the strap-on boosters separated and the first stage ignited. This in turn prompted continually increasing the rocket's flight loads, which exceeded the ASLVs structural limits.4(p.116,117),6(p.199,200) Both launch failures occurred at the same time, leading ISRO to give the autopilot system more authority to adjust the sequencing of its maneuver based on real performance.
Before a third launch, the burn of the strap-on boosters needed to be slowed to reduce dynamic pressure and fins needed to be added to the core vehicle to increase stability.5(p.164) After 4 years of refining, the third ASLV launched on May 20, 1992, and was partially successful. The fourth stage encountered a problem that placed the stretched Rohini satellite into a lower orbit than intended, resulting in an operating life of only 56 days. However, the launch was deemed successful because it demonstrated that ISRO could indigenously design, develop, and launch complex rockets. This success allowed ISRO to proceed with the final designs of the PSLV and the Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), the design and developments of which had been concurrent.4(p.121) The ASLVs fourth and final launch occurred on May 5, 1994, and successfully placed a stretched Rohini satellite into its intended LEO.
The ASLVs 2 failed launches led to detailed analysis, enabling Indian scientists to better understand key rocket technologies, such as autopilot design, control–structure interaction, and clean stage separation. The failures also lead ISRO to better understand the more difficult atmospheric regimens of flight. 10 The ALSV program finished following the fourth launch and demonstrated ISROs ability to design a closed-loop guidance system that was required for all launch vehicles.4(p.121)
Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle
The PSLV is India's mainstay space launch vehicle. It was developed simultaneously to the ASLV during the 1980s, but India's goal with the PSLV was to launch a 1,000 kg remote sensing satellite into Sun Synchronous Orbit (SSO) at 900 km altitude, thereby eliminating India's reliance on the Soviet Union to launch its Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellites. The 4-stage PSLV would be nearly 10 times bigger and heavier than the ASLV and was comparable to the U.S. Delta Launch Vehicle or the Japanese N-II. It launched with 6 solid fuel, strap-on boosters, 2 of which would ignite on the pad, the others 30 s after launch. The PSLV uses a mixture of solid (first and third stage) and liquid (second and fourth stage) fuels.6(p.202) ISRO recognized that liquid propulsion systems were a must to meet the higher capacity needs of a more powerful launch vehicle,5(p.165) and in 1974, to fast track development, signed an agreement with the French Company Société Européenne de Propulsion (SEP) to transfer technology of the Viking engine (the first- and second-stage engine for the Ariane 4 launch vehicle) and pressure transducers in exchange for transducers and ISRO engineer services equivalent to 100 man years.5(p.165) The second-stage engine for the PSLV was an indigenously made Vikas engine based on the SEP Viking engine; the fourth-stage liquid engine was built indigenously and took 7 years to develop.
The PSLV first launched on September 20, 1993, but at the end of the second-stage firing, there was an unplanned 3-s pause before the third stage ignited, which caused a significant loss of launch velocity. Additionally, the small rocket that was designed to clear the second stage from the third and fourth stages, failed, which slightly nudged the rocket off course. The 846-kg remote sensing satellite was placed into a suborbital altitude of 340 km instead of the desired 817 km because it lacked sufficient thrust.6(p.205) The investigation concluded that while the flight failed, it validated practically all the PSLVs functions and was considered a 90% success. ISRO declared that the error was in the digital autopilot software in the guidance and control processor.4(p.173)
The PSLVs second launch successfully placed an 870-kg remote sensing satellite into polar orbit on October 15, 1994. The success led ISRO to begin launching IRS satellites on the PSLV instead of with a foreign launch provider. After the successful third launch on March 21, 1996, the PSLV was declared operational. The increased weight of the IRS satellites led to a detailed study in 1992 on how to increase the PSLVs payload capacity without significantly changing the vehicle. Minor changes were made for the fourth launch of the PSLV on September 29, 1997, enabling the vehicle to launch payloads of up to 1,250 kg.4(p.174) Launch 4 suffered a partial failure when the fourth stage had a small thrust shortfall that placed the remote sensing satellite into an orbit too low for the satellite to operate; however, ISRO used the satellite's station keeping fuel to thrust the satellite up to its proper orbit, enabling the mission.4(p.173)
ISRO continued to improve the PSLVs launch capacity, and also introduced the PSLV-CA, which is the PSLV core and no strap-on boosters that can launch a payload up to 1,350 kg.5(p.167) The PSLV-CA first launched on April 23, 2007, and all subsequential launches of the CA variant have been successful. On October 22, 2008, ISRO introduced and successfully launched the PSLV-XL, which features additional capacity of the strap-on boosters from 8.92 tons of fuel to 12 tons. These modifications increased thrust and hence launch capacity to 1,750 kg.5(p.167) On August 31, 2017, while launching the Indian regional navigation satellite system (IRNSS)-1H position, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellite, the PSLV-XL failed when the payload did not separate from the payload fairing. 11 Of its 50 launches, only 2 were complete failures.
While the PSLV was designed to launch the IRS satellites, it also launches other satellites into various orbits including geostationary orbit (GEO) for the IRNSS PNT and Kalpana meteorological satellites, Cislunar orbit for the Chandrayaan Moon mission, and a Mars orbit for the Mangalyaan Mars orbiter mission. It is also the key Indian launch vehicle in the commercial market—the first commercial launches were of South Korea's Kitsat-3 and Germany's TubeSat on May 26, 1999. Commercial launches for the PSLV have become more frequent, 1 of them launching a previously record-setting 104 satellites on February 15, 2017, all but 3 of which were foreign-owned. Although India is launching commercial satellites, most launches carry an Indian satellite that is either the primary or secondary payload. 12
Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle
Following the 1975 Satellite Instructional Television Experiment, which allowed India to use the NASA GEO communications satellite to broadcast education and health advice to Indian villages that were difficult to reach, India was motivated to develop an indigenous communication satellite program that became the Indian National Satellite System (INSAT) series of satellites. To launch such satellites, ISRO began the development of the GSLV in 1987. Launching the INSATs satellites on foreign rockets was considered expensive. ISRO believed that the indigenous GSLV could be more cost-effective and enable self-reliance for launching India's larger satellites.6(p.220)
The GSLV would be able to launch 2.5-ton satellites to GEO (the size of the INSAT series satellites at the time). India would need to purchase or develop the cryogenic engine that the GSLV required in the third stage; the cryogenic engine would be more powerful than any liquid fuel engine used on the PSLV. ISRO began development in 1986 on a small cryogenic engine to better understand the critical technologies necessary in developing a large-scale engine.4(p.176–8) ISRO recognized that mastering the technology needed to develop the engine would take up to 15 years and that importing an engine to supplement their research was the most expedient path forward.5(p.168),6(p.223)
ISRO had missed an opportunity to acquire cryogenic engine technology back in 1974 when India had signed the agreement with SEP for the Viking engine technology. ISRO had discussed the technology exchange for the HM-7 cryogenic engine that was being used for the third stage of the Ariane 4. However, SEPs nominal price exceeded what ISRO was willing to bear under the constraints of managing development of multiple launch vehicle technologies and limited manpower and finances. The missed opportunity would cost India decades of work while it developed a reliable cryogenic engine on its own.5(p.165)
In the mid-1980s, India reached out to Japan about using its LE-5 cryogenic engine, but Japan did not respond. The United States and France contacted ISRO in 1987 and 1988 about using the RL-10 and the HM-7 cryogenic engines for the GSLV third stage, but the costs were too high and the prospect of technology transfer problems from the United States too likely.5(p.169),7(p.34) The Soviet Union offered the KVD-1, a cryogenic engine intended as the landing engine for a Soviet manned Moon mission, but whose testing was limited.
Little was known about the KVD-1 engine. It was first tested in June 1967 with 5 more tests between 1974 and 1976; however, the Moon mission was canceled, and the Soviets were content using their existing engines.6(p.223) In June 1991, ISRO and the Soviet Union signed a formal technology agreement, whereby the Soviets would deliver 2 KDV-1 engines and their associated technologies by 1995. At this time, however, the Soviet Union was breaking up and the Missile Technology Control Regime prohibited transferring technology of a missile delivery system capable of carrying payloads of more than 500 kg beyond a distance of 300 km.5(p.169)
In May 1992, President Bush objected to the agreement and imposed sanctions on ISRO and the Soviet company responsible for developing the engine, Glavkosmos. President Bush's worry stemmed from India's previous transfer of the SLV-3 technology to its Defence Research and Development Organisation to develop the Agni ballistic missile. 13 The agreement needed to be renegotiated with the new Russia, and in January 1994, Russia agreed to transfer 2 engineering models and 7 ready to fly KVD-1s. Concurrently, ISRO began developing of its own cryogenic engine based off the KVD-1. The engineering models were delivered in 1997 and 2000. The first KVD-1 engine that would be used for the GSLV arrived in September 1998 and the others would be delivered in intervals of 6 months.4(p.187,188),5(p.170),6(p.223,224)
The first GSLV launch attempt occurred on March 28, 2001. Ignition took place, but the computer detected a leak and shut down the rocket. On April 18, 2001, it successfully launched the Geostationary Satellite (GSAT)-1, a communications satellite designed to reach rural communities in India, into a geostationary transfer orbit. The satellite depleted its fuel while raising its orbit and was placed into a 23-h orbit instead of a 24-h orbit.6(p.225–7) The GSLV series that used the KVD-1s were named GSLV Mk I; India would conduct 6 launches with the Russian engines, 2 of them failed: 1 from a strap-on booster malfunction that destroyed the satellite, and the other from snapping connectors that disabled vehicle control and ended up placing the satellite into an incorrect orbit. 14
The GSLV Mk II used the indigenously built third-stage cryogenic engine, the Cryogenic Upper Stage (CUS) that had been based on the KVD-1. ISROs goal with the CUS engine was to develop and fully qualify an indigenous engine that would be identical to the KVD-1 before ISRO began to improve it.4(p.176–8) The first launch attempt was in April 15, 2010, carrying GSAT-4. The first 2 stages launched as expected, but the CUS engine's fuel booster turbo pump failed. 15 A committee created to review the CUS engine failure recommended making the engine more robust, and on January 5, 2014, the Mk II successfully launched GSAT-14.5(p.170) The GSLV Mk II successfully launched another 5 times. Its launch on March 29, 2018, included improvements to the second-stage Vikas engines that resulted in a 6% increase in thrust for those engines. The December 19, 2018, launch incorporated the new Vikas engine as well as an improved third-stage CUS engine to launch its heaviest payload, a 2,250-kg GSAT 7A military communications satellite into GEO.16,17 The GSLV Mk II can launch up to 2,500 kg into GTO and 5,000 kg into LEO. 18 On August 12, 2021, ISRO attempted to launch a GEO imagery satellite using the GSLV Mk II, but the launch ended in failure when the third-stage CUS engine failed to ignite due to a technical anomaly. 19
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the international market place migrated toward launching heavier communication satellites capable of carrying more transponders. The trend produced satellites that weighed more than the planned GSLV Mk II could launch. In 2000, ISRO began examining the requirements to launch satellites between 4,000 and 4,500 kg to GEO.5(p.171) In April 2002, the Indian government approved the development of a much more powerful GSLV Mk III to meet the necessary launching requirements. 20 Developing the Mk III necessitated redesigning the rocket, making it fundamentally different from the Mk I and Mk II. The GSLV Mk III is a 3-stage space launch vehicle. The first is the ignition of 2 solid rocket boosters equipped with SC-200 engines (based on a Ukrainian RD-810 engine, that India purchased the designs for in 2005). 21 The second stage incorporates an updated version of the liquid fueled Vikas engine used on the PSLV. The third and final stage is powered by the indigenous C25 cryogenic engine, which incorporates improvements from the CUS engine that enables the GSLV Mk III to place up to 8,000 kg into LEO or 4,000 kg into GTO.5(p.171),22
On December 18, 2014, India successfully launched the Mk III into a suborbital trajectory and used a nonfunctioning third stage to test the launch vehicle performance during the critical atmospheric phase of the flight. The GSLV Mk III's second launch occurred on June 5, 2017, when ISRO successfully launched GSAT-19E into GTO and proved that the indigenously developed C25 engine was flight ready. There have been 2 additional launches of the GSLV Mk III, 1 that launched the Chandrayaan 2 Moon lander. All Mk III launches have succeeded. 23
ISRO plans to increase the Mk III's payload capacity to GTO from 4,000 to 6,000 kg by replacing the Vikas engine with the SC-200 engine and upgrading the C25 engine. The Mk III is also going to be India's first human-rated launch vehicle for the Gaganyaan human spaceflight program slated for its first crewed launch in 2023. 24
Reusable Launch Vehicle
ISRO continues its work on the Reusable Launch Vehicle–Technology Demonstration (RLV-TD) Program, which is similar to the U.S. X-37b and is designed to develop the essential technologies for a reusable launch vehicle. The launch vehicle is designed to be a 2-stage rocket with both stages being reusable, a first in space if successful. The first stage is a rocket booster that will separate from the second stage and then land at sea on a barge, similar to SpaceX's Falcon first stage. The second stage is the shuttle, which will reach orbit, release the satellite, and then return to Earth by landing at an airfield. 25
On May 22, 2016, the RLV-TD launched and successfully tested the shuttle's hypersonic flight, autonomous navigation and landing, return flight experiments, and scramjet propulsion. 26 The launch also validated the guidance and control, reusable thermal protection system, and re-entry mission management. 27 India is investing in a reusable launch vehicle because it believes that it will lower costs, improve reliability, reduce turn-around time, and create on-demand space access. 26 The RLV-TD was scheduled for a second test launch in June or July 2020, a year later than planned, when the vehicle would be carried to the height of 3 km by a helicopter and then the vehicle would glide and attempt to land on an airstrip. 28 However, due to COVID-19, the test was postponed to an unknown date. For the eventual third experimental launch, which has yet to be scheduled, ISRO proposed to launch a scaled-up version of the RLV-TD, which is intended to carry out an orbital re-entry and landing experiment for the shuttle, but it is unclear whether they will attempt to land the first-stage rocket. 29
Small Satellite Launch Vehicle
ISRO is developing a new rocket called the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) to meet smallsat launch demands. 30 The SSLV is a derivative of the PSLV and will be capable of launching satellites weighing up to 500 kg to LEO and 300 kg to SSO. The launch vehicle was expected to be operational in 2019, but encountered delays and is now scheduled to launch sometime in 2021.31–33 The rocket has 3 solid fueled stages using engines named solid stage (SS)-1, SS-2, and SS-3 for each stage. The vehicle is designed to enable launch on demand capabilities while also lowering launch costs and turnaround time. 34 ISROs ultimate goal for the SSLV is to make a rocket available for launch within 72 h. 35 The first launch of the SSLV will be a demonstration launch with the 142-kg Microsat-2A (EOS-02). 36 (p.9) In August 2019, India agreed that the SSLV will conduct a commercial launch for spaceflight, which, according to Federal Communications Commission filings, will be launching 4 BlackSky Global imagery satellites. 37
Future Government Space Launch Vehicles
ISRO announced several new launch vehicles that are currently in the development process. However, since these vehicles are still in the beginning stages of the development process, there is little publicly available information focusing on each vehicle. The first is the Nano Satellite Launch Vehicle. This vehicle will be a smaller version of the SSLV and will be the smallest launch ISRO launch vehicle. 38 ISRO is also developing the Heavy-lift Launch Vehicle (HLV), which encompasses 2 different HLV rockets, HLV-1 and HLV-2. HLV-1 is designed to launch 10 tons to LEO and 5 tons to GEO, whereas HLV-2 is designed to launch 20 tons to LEO and 8 tons to GEO. Both launch vehicles are designed to with reusable boosters. 39
ISRO is undertaking 2 technology development programs that can alter how India conducts space launches. The first is the Two-Stage-to-Orbit (TSTO) Vehicle, which uses a combination of an air-breathing engine and a standard space launch rocket engine to place a satellite into orbit. The first stage is a reusable jet that makes use of a scramjet engine and a disposable second stage that will place the spacecraft into orbit. TSTO intends to place satellites weighing up to 2 tons into LEO. 40 The second is the ADMIRE test vehicle project, which aims to demonstrate vertical landing capabilities at low costs. The ADMIRE test vehicle would be similar to SpaceX's Falcon 9 and has retractable landing legs and a reusable first stage.40,41
Commercial Industry
Throughout the previous 6 decades, India has been investing in its space program and increasing its capacity and capabilities to use space technology products and services for societal applications as well as to support commercial space activities. 42 Historically, ISRO would develop technologies and knowledge and then transfer those to small- and medium-scale enterprises, then converting these enterprises into vendors for ISRO missions while establishing a safety net of buybacks to ensure business survivability. Much of the hardware used for India's space program is contracted to these private companies.6(p.250) Previously, there was no framework in place that allowed commercial Indian space companies to be independent of ISRO and succeed on the commercial market because all work was predicated on government authorization for specific involvement with projects. 43
Previously, India relied on 2 government owned companies, Antrix Corporation and NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), to compete on the global commercial space launch market. Antrix, incorporated in September 1992, was previously responsible for providing launch services for customer satellites using the PSLV and the GSLV. 44 However, with the creation of NSIL in March 2019, Antrix now focuses on manufacturing space systems, including end-to-end services, and promoting the industry's role in the space sector. 45 India altered its production strategy of manufacturing its launch vehicles. NSIL intends to boost the commercializability of ISROs research and development activities by transferring technology ISRO develops to India's space industry, facilitating manufacture and production of the SSLV and PSLV with India's private sector, and marketing India's launch space-based services to potential global customers.36(p.95) As part of the Make-in-India initiative and the government's attempt to spur India's private space industry, a private company will build a PSLV end-to-end, which will be a first for India. 46
India is drafting a new space policy to increase private investments in its commercial space industry, thereby enabling India to compete independently on the global space market, and allowing the development of Indian commercial launch vehicles. 47 More Indian space companies will have the potential to thrive in the commercial market, carving out a niche, especially with the rise of smallsat launch demands.48,49
The opening of privatization in India has allowed for a few private launch companies to raise funds and begin developing a few space launch vehicles. 50 The first is Agnikul, which was formally incorporated in 2017. Agikul's Agnibaan launch vehicle is a transporter erector launcher that is fully mobile and will be able to launch from multiple launch sites across the world. The vehicle will be capable of launching 100 kg into a 700 km LEO orbit. 51 The rocket is powered by 7 three-dimensional (3D) printed Agnite engines, and the first launch is targeted for the end of 2022.51,52 The second commercial launch provider is Skyroot Aerospace. Skyroot aims to provide 3 different 3-stage space launch vehicles, the Vikram I, II, and III, all named after Dr. Vikram Sarabhai. The Vikram I, II, and III are small launch vehicle designed to launch 225, 410, and 580 kg—500 km to SSO, and 315, 520, and 720 kg to LEO, respectively. 53 The third-stage engines of the Vikram's comprise 3D printed components; the company had 2 successful engine tests in 2020 and is aiming to test launch its first rocket in December 2021.54,55 The final company worth noting is Bellatrix Aerospace, which is developing a small launch vehicle. The Bellatrix vehicle is being designed to launch 200 kg to LEO, and it is expected that the first launch will occur in 2023 or 2024. 56
Growing India's commercial space launch industry requires the Indian government to develop a long-term strategy that can enable the commercial industry to remain sustainable and competitive on the global launch market. The Indian commercial launch vehicles reviewed are all small satellite rockets that intend to compete for a market that is heavily saturated with other global competitors. For these companies to survive, there needs to be long-term and reliable customer that can provide a demand for a select number of Indian commercial launch vehicles. The Indian government can be that customer.
The increasing tensions and military confrontations along the Line of Actual Control between India and China should increase India's demand for military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance spacecraft to monitor the border. As India attempts to grow and develop its commercial satellite manufacturing industry, the Indian government can order smallsats to be launched on commercial vehicles that support its military operations. The Indian government can also create a demand for developing civil spacecraft that support the increased production and precision of India's agricultural or fishing sectors through remote sensing satellites.
One advantage for India's commercial space launch sector is the low production costs within India compared with other launching states. 57 Very affordable launch options will be available to the Indian commercial space industry, and if necessary, the Indian government can provide tax incentives to Indian companies that launch on Indian rockets or subsidies that support the Indian commercial space launch industry. The low development/launch costs should also attract global customers. However, 1 hurdle that Indian launch companies could face on the global market are other countries creating laws or incentives for their commercial space companies to utilize domestic space launch vehicles, such as the United States' International Traffic in Arms Regulations that restricts certain satellite technology from launching on a foreign space launch vehicle.
Conclusions
Despite early failures, its development of space launch capabilities set India on a course to join an elite club as a state that can successfully and reliably launch objects into space. The development of these rockets also enabled India to achieve Dr. Sarabhai's and Prime Minister Nehru's goal of using space technologies to connect and educate all of India—an extremely costly challenge without space technologies. Its indigenous launch capabilities provide India with independent access to space and the ability to pursue its space aspirations unconstrained. The nation is a growing space power with space launch key to its space program. Both in 2016 and 2018, India carried out 7 launches—the most it has launched within a 1-year time span. As India moves forward, expanding its space program, completing bringing to fruition its commercial space launch endeavors, the number of space launches will increase and create competition on the global space launch market.
Footnotes
About the Author
Author Disclosure Statement
No competing financial interests exist.
Funding Information
Funding for this work was obtained from the Department of Defense (HQ0034-14-D-0001).
