Orbiting Battlefields: The Transition from Peaceful Exploration to Armed Conflict in Space

INTRODUCTION

Outer space is the province of all mankind and is to be used for peaceful purposes and the welfare of all humanity. However, the militarization of outer space threatens international peace and security. The growing mistrust among the power states has led to integrating space-based assets into ground, air, and sea warfare. This kind of assimilation has both offensive and defensive purposes. In 2007, China successfully conducted an antisatellite (ASAT) missile test. It destroyed the Chinese weather satellite—FY-1C (COSPAR 1999-025A), a polar orbit satellite of the Fengyun series.^1,2 Although the outer space issues are not limited to space security, it also revolves around the canvas of spectrum, including rules of warfare, health, environment, and human rights.

The former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) opened the door for space exploration by launching Sputnik-1 in the Cold War, ³ and the United States achieved remarkable success by landing Apollo 11 on the moon. ⁴ The progress of space exploration is leaps and bounds, with increasing concentration on the use of space technology in warfare and increasing the probability of deploying weapons in outer space. For instance, in its Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Gulf War in 1991, the United States relied on satellites for communication, navigation, and information. ⁵ Hence, it is crystal clear that outer space may be used for military purposes.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

Nowadays, outer space is recognized as a highly militarized ground for most investors like the United States. Russia, China, France, India, Japan, and Israel are investing in developing a hit-to-kill system for ASAT or missile defense. ⁶ However, space power-dominating countries have already developed ASAT technology. The ASAT systems have been proven to manipulate, disrupt, restrict, deteriorate, or even eliminate objects in space. ⁶ The growing importance of space capabilities in contemporary military forces, especially in leading nuclear-armed states, is driving the development and potential deployment of such weaponry. Interfering with an adversary’s space capabilities is a consideration in military strategy, but it carries the risk of nuclear escalation and enduring threats that persist even after a conflict.

To date, ASAT tests have been carried out by four states: the United States, Russia, China, and India.^1,7 On account of this, powerful states are striving to safeguard their space assets. For instance, the United States has developed the U.S. Space Force (USSF) ⁸ as a new branch of its military, acknowledging space as a domain of warfare. Many states with active space programs recognize the importance of protecting their assets. In 2023, France intends to launch a small protective spacecraft equipped with cameras and potentially defensive armaments. ⁹

Additionally, they plan to introduce a new generation of Syracuse satellites by 2030, designed to identify and neutralize adversary space satellites. ⁹

Moreover, the advancement of ASAT technology, the proliferation of space weaponization initiatives, and the inability to prevent nations from leaving debris in outer space all exemplify the shortcomings in regulating activities in outer space. Although the ASAT can either be conventional or nuclear, the purpose is clear: either destroy or neutralize a satellite currently in orbit around the Earth. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) failed to prevent sophisticated weapons like ASAT from being deployed. Article 1 of the OST aims to permit all states and people to engage in peaceful space exploration (OST, 1963). Thus, the inability to prevent the development of ASAT technology carries significant and potentially grave repercussions for the world.

Article IV of the OST requires that,

However, it does not explicitly prohibit other weapons from being deployed to manufactured platforms in space. This oversight and failure of the OST has left the door open to interpretation and is being exploited by space powers in developing the policy and plans to dominate the space medium. Furthermore, the international space regime also failed to regulate and control the proliferation of debris by nations, which adds to the quantity of debris in outer orbit around the Earth. An estimated total of over 5,000 satellites have been placed in orbit around the Earth. Approximately 950 are currently operational, while around 2,300 are categorized as “inactive” satellites incapable of being maneuvered or repositioned. ¹⁰

OUTER SPACE AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

On 20 September 1963, John F. Kennedy, the president of the United States, stated to the 18th United Nations (UN) General Assembly.

The term space is indefinite and has never been formalized in the international legal framework. It is the universe’s region between celestial bodies, specifically outside Earth’s atmosphere. Since air law had never established an exact definition of airspace with defined boundaries, there was no apparent solution. ¹² It also raises the question of whether Westphalian notion of state sovereignty applies to outer space. In this regard, U.S. air law experts argued that state sovereignty did not cover space. ¹³ This viewpoint triumphed out, and the legal status of space based on it is still acknowledged in the case of reconnaissance satellites. The United States was the first to advocate for the legality of observing other countries from space. The suggestion by President Eisenhower for an Open Skies policy to permit the United States and the Soviet Union to monitor each other’s territories to prevent a surprise assault was the first official move toward legitimizing remote sensing for reconnaissance. ¹⁴

Furthermore, outer space, by international law, is not subject to the sovereignty of any state, in contrast to airspace, which is subject to the territorial sovereignty of the underlying state. ¹⁵

The legal framework governing outer space and its resources remains a contentious issue in international law. The 1967 OST designates outer space as the “province of all mankind,” but it stops short of incorporating the common heritage of mankind (CHM) principle. This concept, formalized in the 1979 Moon Agreement, asserts that celestial resources should be managed collectively and distributed equitably under an international system. However, the agreement has gained little traction, with only 18 states ratifying it, none of them major spacefaring nations. Meanwhile, countries such as the United States, Luxembourg, and the United Arab Emirates have enacted laws permitting private entities to extract and use space resources, signaling a legal stance favoring commercial appropriation. This divergence highlights a fundamental disagreement: CHM advocates argue for international oversight to prevent monopolization, while critics claim that such a framework stifles private investment and innovation. The lack of global consensus on CHM’s applicability has created legal uncertainty, complicating efforts to establish a binding regulatory regime. Importantly, the OST’s declaration of outer space as the “province of all mankind” does not equate to CHM. While the OST guarantees open, nonsovereign access to space, it neither mandates resource-sharing nor prohibits commercial exploitation. By contrast, the Moon Agreement explicitly endorses CHM, but its limited adoption has prevented it from becoming a widely accepted norm in international law.

The outer space is also considered the CHM. It was endorsed by the UN General Assembly through various resolutions and treaties and asserted that all nations collectively own the natural resources found in both the deep seabed and outer space and should be distributed relatively for the collective benefit of humanity. Precisely, the CHM principle outlined in the Treaty Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (commonly known as The Moon Treaty) of 1979 aligns with the fair distribution of resources in outer space, the prohibition of resource appropriation where they are found (especially in the context of space mining), and the creation of a worldwide framework for overseeing commercial endeavors in space. ¹⁶ The CHM principle was established with the understanding that it is crucial to strategize for the future exploration and utilization of these critical areas. This planning aims to secure a fair allocation of their natural resources and prevent conflicts among nations, as has occurred during past eras of exploration. The proponents of the CHP argue that this concept confers a special status upon a territory, defining it as a shared heritage known as “Res Communis humanitatis.” ¹⁷ This means it is a collective legacy that no nation can claim ownership of but from which all nations can derive advantages and benefits. This concept is rooted in the idea that certain regions are universally shared and should be treated as such. The initial principle is that no nation can assert ownership or control over the territory or its resources. ¹⁸ The CHM additionally asserts that these shared areas should exclusively serve peaceful objectives and be overseen and administered by an international entity.

Finally, CHM conceptualizes the equitable distribution of the benefits of using shared resources because they are located in a common area. ¹⁹ Other criteria differ among CHM definitions. These include environmental protection and a ban on exploitation or colonization prevention. Surprisingly, the Moon Agreement did not clarify the specific meaning of CHM. For instance, Article 11 of the Treaty, which calls for creating an international framework to manage the utilization of lunar resources, lacks a clear definition of the exact scope of the CHM. Therefore, the importance of CHM can be understood by examining its application in other contexts, such as the High Seas, where the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Antarctic Treaty explicitly define and apply this principle. The High Seas and Antarctica are examples of global commons, often referred to as “Res Communis,” and are highly relevant to the concept of the CHM. ²⁰ It is essential to grasp the meaning of CHM by examining the Moon Agreement’s negotiation history, especially given the numerous drafts proposed by different nations. This is important for comprehending how states have formulated the application of the CHM to celestial bodies like the moon and how they intend to do so moving forward. The reluctance of wealthier nations to embrace CHM, as opposed to less developed countries, holds significance in understanding the implications attached to this principle.

PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE

Outer space must be used for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of humanity. The concept of “peaceful purposes” has been at the heart of all political debate. There has been considerable scholarly discussion about the scope and importance of utilizing outer space for peaceful purposes. The OST has placed a strict obligation that outer space must be “carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind.” ²¹ It also promotes the demonization of outer space by powerful states. However, most of the equipment used for military space operations serves similar military and civilian uses of space technology, which are equally important. Technically speaking, there is also no distinction between military missiles and commercial space launch vehicles, contributing to the challenges brought on by the dual-use satellite phenomenon. The technologies needed for civilian usage are frequently comparable to or identical to those used to create advanced weapons. ²² The term “dual-use satellite” is now widely used in the space industry, which raises more complex legal questions.

Moreover, the boiling point of the Treaty is that it did not ban the exploration of military capabilities in space, which left loopholes for countries to begin weaponization of space programs. “Major Douglas Anderson states, Most analysts consider paragraph IV to be simply a modest disarmament provision. The fact that the Treaty permits the stationing of land-based Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), despite their flight trajectory passing through space, is evidence that the Treaty’s authors solely intended Article IV (1) to outlaw orbiting nuclear-type weapons.” ²³ In 1981, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on “The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” that reaffirms the fundamental principles of the OST and advocates for a ban on the weaponization of space.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

Outer space is considered the province of all mankind according to OST and belongs to no state. The protection of outer space as a shared global resource is not only in the interest of current generations but also for future generations’ well-being. Therefore, regulation is one of the most complex issues, and it requires international cooperation and consensus due to its global nature. Whereas existing frameworks and treaties govern some aspects of space activities, there is room for improvement and adaptation to address emerging challenges. Indeed, it needs a comprehensive international framework or Treaty that covers all aspects of space activities, including space debris management, resource utilization, cybersecurity, and the peaceful use of outer space. The OST, reflecting three significant resolutions from the 1960s, supports the position that ground rules in exploring and using outer space must be observed, particularly in the absence of space law rules. The issue of weaponization of space is one of the most critical challenges. It requires the efforts of the world community to be directed at the regulations of all weaponization of space programs, the establishment of monitoring systems of weaponization of space programs, the limit on the number of weapons any nation should be able to deploy into space, enforcement mechanisms for a new weaponization of space treaty, and the methods for resolving any weaponization of space-related disputes. Although the “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” aims to fill the gap of previous legal instruments. It is hoped that soon, it will become a binding instrument and eradicate the possibility of weaponization of outer space. The transition from peaceful exploration to armed conflict in space represents one of those critical and deeply troubling developments in humanity’s engagement with the cosmos. Initially considered the ultimate frontier for scientific discovery and international cooperation, space has now evolved as a new domain for strategic competition; it reflects terrestrial geopolitical tensions. This spirit of cooperation among pioneers of the early era of space exploration, such as the Apollo moon landings, the construction of space stations, and interplanetary missions, is increasingly being shadowed by the growing wave of space militarization. Major powers have started considering space not merely as a scientific or commercial arena but the next battlefield—goaded by technological superiority and national security imperatives. All this is well put in evidence by the development of ASAT weapons, the creation of military branches specific to space, and the deployment of offensive and defensive-capable systems in orbit. For such an endeavor, countries such as the United States, Russia, and China have dominated a new frontier, each hoping to attain or maintain supremacy within this domain. Countries such as the United States, which has gone ahead and created the USSF, Russia’s Aerospace Forces, and China’s SSF have shown just how serious they are taking the issue that space is the new domain in which potential conflict can arise.

This shift toward the more militarized view of space creates several different kinds of risks. The development of space-based weaponry, whether used to destroy other satellites, interfere with enemy communication, or orbitally launch strikes, could create new arms races along the lines of nuclear and conventional weaponry, increasing not only the probability of conflict but also diverting resources from peaceful exploration and scientific advancement. Moreover, space weaponization would most probably lead to tension in the “established security dynamics” on Earth, since nations must act with preemption on the potential threat that may happen from a space asset. Misunderstandings and miscalculations are highly probable when the stakes are too high and things around issues related to space develop at such a pace. This conundrum even deepens because of the current inadequacy of international space law. Although seminal, the OST of 1967 is a document designed for another era and does not encompass the current complexities related to space activities, in particular from a military perspective. The treaty bans the placement in space of WMD and bars the Moon and other celestial bodies from being used for peaceful purposes; it does not, however, ban the use of conventional weapons located in orbit or that of force in space. This legal ambiguity creates a dangerous vacuum, where actions that could potentially lead to a conflict are not explicitly made illegal under international law, thereby reducing the threshold for their use. There is therefore an increasing necessity for the adaptation, improvement, and widening of existing international treaties and agreements. New legal regimes need to be negotiated that will make it explicitly clear that the weaponization of space is banned and that such technologies deployed in space are subject to regulation. The latter may also include confidence-building measures at the international level to ensure transparency and trust between the countries engaged in space activities. For example, this could be in the form of sharing information on space activity, conducting joint missions, and holding regular diplomatic dialogues concerning space security. Such measures would mitigate inadvertent escalation and misinterpretation of activities in space. Besides the legal and diplomatic line of work, greater active encouragement for peaceful uses in space is called for. International cooperation on issues such as satellite-based disaster management, environmental monitoring, and scientific research needs to be encouraged so that they strengthen the conception of space as a global common. By focusing on these peaceful applications, the international community can help counter the narrative that space is primarily a domain for military competition. Thereafter, it will be a critical step to develop norms and best practices on responsible behavior in space. These can be the guidelines for responsible debris management, since space debris is potentially harmful both for military and civilian satellites. At the same time, it provides measures that will help avoid harmful interference with objects in outer space. Such norms would create conditions for the long-term sustainability of space activities so that space remains accessible and safe for future generations.

It is in this framework that multilateral commitment is necessary; the UN and other international organizations would take the central role in facilitating discussions on space security. These discussions should include all stakeholders, as the number of nations becoming involved in space activities, as well as private companies, is rising. It would help guarantee that any new agreements or norms truly incorporate inclusive interests and concerns of a wide array of actors, not merely the major powers. Finally, there is a need for increased investment in space diplomacy to prevent conflicts. Governments must build coalitions, promote dialogues among spacefaring nations, mediate disputes that arise in connection with space activities, and devise mechanisms for the nonviolent resolution of conflicts. In this way, the international community can also invest in diplomacy to reduce the chances of conflict in space: ensuring this final frontier remains a place for peaceful exploration and cooperation, and is not made a new theater of war. All these are fully required to ensure that space remains peaceful in nature, free from an arms race that could eventually lead to armed conflict.

AUTHORS’ CONTRIBUTIONS

T.Q.: Contributed to the conceptualization and structure of the article, providing significant input into the research methodology, content, and legal analysis. S.A.S.: Assisted in the literature review, contributed to the drafting of sections related to legal frameworks, and provided critical revisions. A.A.S.: Led the research design, authored key sections of the article, and also provided revisions and feedback on the entire article. S.S.: Contributed to the review of relevant literature, assisted in the methodology section, and provided final revisions to the article, ensuring its coherence and clarity.