Colliding Worlds: The Objective Nature of Climate Science and the (Somewhat) Subjective Nature of Climate Policy

Introduction

In 1959 C.P. Snow gave his famous Rede Lecture in which he argued there are two distinct cultures of western intellectual thought, broadly defined at the time as the sciences and humanities. He argued that the two disciplines, although complementary pursuits of human knowledge, exist in vastly different spaces. ¹ Over succeeding decades, significant work has been done to bridge the divide between these two disciplines. Nonetheless, that divide continues today. This is certainly true when looking at the current state of climate policy in relation to climate science in the United States.

Much of climate policy is driven by objective evidence. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provides a forum for the creation of the best science regarding the causes and impacts of climate change. Through this forum, some of the most comprehensive scientific work has been conducted over the decades to better understand the dynamics of climate change, and importantly, the role of human activity in both observed and projected climate change. ² This work is defined by the scientific method whereby hypotheses are developed and then tested and validated in ways that increase understanding about an observed phenomenon, in this case an overall warming planet. The hallmark of this process is peer review, a system in which the findings and conclusions obtained in research are replicated by others following the methodologies identified in the original work. The end results of this process provide a clearer understanding of what is actually happening. While clearer, the understanding is far from complete. There is still a great deal of uncertainty in climate science, particularly when attempting to discern cause and effect and future impacts.

The IPCC also offers a forum for the development of policy proposals aimed at incorporating the best science into human responses. For example, the IPCC often provides a special publication with new comprehensive assessments for policy makers to help to digest the vast scientific findings into a framework for human decision making. ³ The foundation for the endeavors of the IPCC is, to the degree possible, objective evidence, which then forms the basis upon which risks are described in the context of climate change. It is therefore common in the field of climate policy to think about risk in objective terms. ⁴

While the concept of risk is most often connected to objective assessments, particularly in the context of climate policy, it can also take on subjective characteristics. Indeed, much of climate policy is developed through a framework of uncertainty, meaning that not all of the variables affecting climate change are known. As a simple example, no one can state with certainty that future storms or dry periods will occur; and inevitably when they do occur, no one will be able to state definitively that their occurrence was entirely caused by a warming planet. The inherent uncertainty of the future disconnects, in important ways, climate policy from climate science. The science has, and will continue to, increase our understanding of observed climate change over time. Furthermore, that increasing understanding will help to limit the amount of uncertainty about such things as the existence of climate change and the role of humans in those observed climate changes, even if it never leads to a definitive understanding of a dynamic climate system. But that objectively based assessment will not mirror the approach of climate policy, which must, by its very nature, make definitive choices in the face of uncertainty.

Risk and Uncertainty: Key Differences

The concept of risk contains both objective and subjective elements. For example, risk perception is a term often used to describe a measure of risk that incorporates both objective and subjective factors. ⁵ There is the objective basis that supports the underlying concept of risk. But there is also a subjective basis of risk that accepts, whole or in‐part, the objective basis of risk, and then filters that objective basis through a human‐based lens that can alter how the underlying risk is perceived by humans. Tversky and Kahneman provided important insights into this process of ingesting objective risks through a human lens. ⁶ Using objective information as a baseline, humans tend to ingest that information through a conceptual framework based on personal experiences, knowledge level, and the prevailing norms, habits, and other characteristics that exist at the individual and group level. Through this conceptual framework, a person or group may perceive a risk differently than what the objective factors might suggest. One who grows up habituated to the presence of chlorine bleach and drain cleaners in their household without any ill effects may be apt to discount the objective dangers inherent in these products. The products themselves are dangerous, and even deadly, to humans. But experience living with these substances without a bad outcome can alter how an individual or group perceives the risk.

Climate policy, as opposed to climate science, contains both objective and subjective risk orientations. Certainly the basis for climate policy action is the objective information uncovered by climate science. But how that objective information is digested and incorporated into a policy‐making process often moves the policy considerations from a purely objective risk‐based framework to a more subjective‐based framework defined by uncertainty, and the inherent uncertainty in climate change, as well as the uncertainty in how humans interpret the science of climate change, all factor into climate policy. Exploring the uncertainty of climate change in the form of risk perception is useful in seeing the fundamental distinction between climate science and climate policy.

Climate policy is a public function that, in many ways, attempts to alter existing policy. A clear example is the need to reconsider assumptions about coastal development and living in an era of climate change. Climate science has shown that for many coastal regions, sea level rise is occurring, and this is certainly the case in decadal observations in the United States. ⁷ Thus, any new climate policy on this front must confront preexisting policies that do not incorporate the potential for climate‐induced sea level rise. Since climate policy will undoubtedly attempt to create new policy directions, it will conflict with existing, sometimes long‐standing, policies that have become embedded in the prevailing norms, habits, and characteristics of society. Because these policies are not new, they can create a kind of path dependence that reinforces preconceived notions and expectations for those impacted by the policy. ⁸

The inherent uncertainty in climate change will make it hard to achieve public acceptance of new policy proposals when that acceptance requires a level of certainty that cannot be obtained in climate policy. For example, even if the current science strongly suggests future storms will be more powerful, frequent, and destructive in a warming world, it cannot predict exactly when (and likely exactly where) those future superstorms will occur. An anecdotal analogy is that of a smoker who knows all of the risk factors associated with heart and lung complications due to smoking. The smoker may acknowledge and even understand the science behind smoking cigarettes and the associated medical issues. But even with this knowledge, the smoker is unwilling to accept a doctor's recommendation to quit smoking because the doctor cannot state definitively when the smoker will suffer a clear trauma directly caused by the smoking. There is simply a degree of uncertainty in that kind of forecasting, even when the risk factors are well known and the objective medical tests can confirm the existence of those risk factors. Climate science is often attacked from this impossible standard of certainty, particularly about the future. Climate policy develops from this starting point, and thus must embrace uncertainty as a foundation of its policy‐making process.

Understanding the Collision between Climate Science and Climate Policy

It is critical to understand the fundamental difference between climate science and climate policy as described in this article. Unlike climate science, which is appropriately judged through the lens of the scientific method and peer review, climate policy must overcome the burden of uncertainty by making definitive choices in the face of uncertainty. This includes the first‐order problem of attempting to hold climate policy to the standards of climate science—in other words, expecting climate policy to adhere to only objectively known facts. If climate policy is to be meaningful, then it cannot be limited to reactive positions, developed only in response to an observed phenomenon and limited in scope to addressing only that observed phenomenon. Indeed, as all legitimate work in the climate change field has noted, public policy must be proactive in its approach if it is to aid in preventing worst‐case scenarios of global climate change. ⁹ A proactive approach requires policy action in the face of uncertainty; for example, developing and initiating policy in anticipation of unknown future impacts, and, potentially, preventing future impacts from occurring. A disaster averted is a disaster that never existed; for example, preventing a storm surge from impacting a coastline by policy that proactively restricts development of barrier islands. ¹⁰ Some refer to this method of decision making under uncertainty as the precautionary principle, ¹¹ which itself has been controversial in its development and implementation because it is subject to multiple definitions and interpretations. ¹²

This brings us to a foundation of the colliding worlds of climate science and climate policy: seeing climate change as a super‐wicked problem and accepting the difference between the science and the needed policy approach. Rittel and Webber coined the phrase wicked problems, in policy parlance, as problems that have no definitive or objective policy solution. ¹³ Levin et al. applied this phrase to climate change, noting it is, from a policy standpoint, a super‐wicked problem because it is highly resistant to a policy resolution. ¹⁴ The reasons have to do with the following characteristics of climate change: fundamental free‐rider attributes, a political tendency to give greater weight to immediate interests, significant discounting of climate change impacts (even when accepted), and a general path dependency that delays behavioral changes from both the public and political institutions.

From a policy standpoint, climate change does not present simple solutions for the reasons already described; it requires a level of public support that is incredibly hard to come by for this particular type of problem. It is more likely that the public will be supportive of short‐term remedial policy changes when specific climate tragedies occur. ¹⁵ But that is far from a programmatic and proactive approach to the problem of climate change.

As C.P. Snow noted in his famous Rede Lecture in 1959, there are fundamental differences between the natural sciences and the social sciences. One can imagine the climate scientist, steeped in facts and figures, acting like a well‐meaning doctor, declaring that we must act now to avoid a future tragedy. For the doctor, the tragedy is an early death precipitated by smoking. For the climate scientist, it is a keen observation of today's environment coupled with the insight of what the future might look like based on a business‐as‐usual approach. They are both right to warn of the future based on what they know today. But climate policy does not move with the same sense of urgency. Policy development is almost always intimately tied to the political process. As such, in places like the United States, it is affected by public sentiment, and, as noted, public sentiment is closely tied to public perception. It is unlikely that climate policy can be developed in a proactive manner that fundamentally alters existing public perceptions, for example, by sharply changing the direction of existing policy. Moving from a development‐friendly coastal policy to a development‐restrictive coastal policy in one fell swoop is unlikely to receive broad public support, particularly if there are costs incurred by the public in the process. Rather, climate policy will likely have to move in a more staged approach, spending time trying to understand how the public perceives the problem of climate change, and through this process, find policy windows based on public support that, over time, can lead to new policy paths.

One process climate policy can use to deal with inherent uncertainty is to develop heuristics that will help to fill in the gaps about the future. Heuristics, or human decision‐making rules, are important ways to aid in policy development in the face of uncertainty. ¹⁶ They have been used by humans as a way of dealing with inherent uncertainty, and they provide a valuable tool for policy development in which important variables are unknown.

Consider a coastal community concerned with future sea‐level rise and flooding based on projections of potential climate change. The projections are not certain, but the community wants to ensure they protect coastal areas to the extent practicable, and to be ready for the coastal impacts of climate change should they come. In this case the community can develop a policy that restricts development based on the current state of knowledge about anticipated sea level rise. This may include a development setback from the shoreline that can be updated based on both the anticipation today, and what is observed tomorrow. This allows for a “low regrets” policy approach. ¹⁷ The heuristic here is to incorporate the understanding that sea level rise will occur, and that human expectations will adapt to that expectation over time. Expectations will change based on observations over time. This is just one example of how the inherent uncertainty of climate policy can be dealt with by a heuristics approach to fill the gaps, and how climate policy can be enacted and evolve in the face of uncertainty.

Conclusion

Climate science is a critical foundation for the development and implementation of climate policy. It is the objective foundation—the information bedrock—for human understanding of climate change. The foundations provided by climate science are based on a rigorous process to ensure the accuracy and validity of the results. The implications of the evolving body of climate science developed over decades of intense research calls for human action. The choices humans make based on this information is what may be termed climate policy.

Climate policy, while relying on the foundations built by climate science, operates in a fundamentally different way. Climate policy must imbue the political, economic, and social conditions it confronts. It must be filtered through the norms, beliefs, and values of individuals, groups, and societies. While climate science helps to establish an objective basis for a call to action, the more subjective aspects of human society define the scope and extent of the policy response. For climate policy, no subjective aspect likely has more weight than the inherent uncertainty that exists in climate science, specifically the uncertainty surrounding how bad things will get and how soon they will occur (and even when specific bad events will occur).

But climate policy does not have to cede its need for proactive policy development in the face of uncertainty. It can develop important human decision‐making tools—heuristics—to aid policy choices in the face of uncertainty. These rules of thumb can fill in gaps created by uncertainty, allowing proactive policy development to occur even when aspects of the future are unknown. If done well, they will allow for least restrictive actions where there is the greatest uncertainty, and then provide for more restrictive actions when new information helps to reduce that uncertainty.

Importantly, those charged with developing and implementing climate policy have greater latitude in defining and shaping their actions. Whether based on a precautionary approach or some other method, policy makers are charged with action, even in the face of great uncertainty. In this way, policy must be enacted even when not all of the facts are in. Alternatively, scientists seek a level of certainty that generally removes the option of making significant policy prescriptions in the face of uncertainty. Science is about refinement of understanding over time. Policy is about making choices with the best information we have today. They operate in different spheres of influence and expectation.

Understanding that climate policy must include a level of uncertainty in its planning is critical to seeing how policy must develop in light of that uncertainty. Science will continue to reduce our uncertainty about climate change over time. But this does not mean climate policy must follow the guidelines of climate science, that policy can only be developed when we are objectively certain about something. Conflating the purposes of science and policy betrays the operational truth about proactive policy development. The world is uncertain, and climate change is making our future more uncertain, at least when compared to the past. The need for proactive policy development has never been more important. Understanding some fundamental differences between climate science and climate policy is a critical first step.