A Contextual Comparison of Violence Depicted in Television and Netflix Series

Abstract

This study compared violence depicted in seven Netflix “original” Turkish series and seven Turkish television (TV) series, which have the highest prime-time ratings in Turkey in terms of intensity and context through the message system analysis, which George Gerbner and colleagues developed as part of the Cultural Indicators Project. The findings indicated that TV series contained twice as much violence as Netflix series in terms of duration and number of scenes, that violent depictions on both platforms were severe, that violence was mostly perpetrated by men against men who did not know each other although the violence between the sexes statistically differed, that lethal weapons were used more intensely in TV violence, and that the resulting deaths were portrayed more on TV than on Netflix. In other words, TV, which is subject to a control mechanism, uses violence more intensely as an ideological tool than Netflix, which is not subject to any control mechanisms.

Introduction

After more than half a century, television* (TV) still maintains its central role in individuals' lives. The data of the European Commission reveal that, although media usage habits have changed radically in recent years, TV still remains the most widely used mass media tool in Europe, as in the rest of the world. In 2021, 82% of Europeans 15 years of age and older reported watching TV regularly every day (Stoll 2020). Similarly, recent research indicates that, in Turkey, 27.3% of the people watch TV ∼2–3 h during weekdays, despite the gradual decrease in viewing time since 2006. Yet, with 3.5-h of average TV viewing, Turkey is one of the countries with the highest TV viewing time (RTÜK 2018). Consequently, it can be argued that TV still maintains its stronghold in culture and society.

However, it is impossible to deny that TV as a medium and institution has changed drastically in the age of digitization and convergence (Dhoest and Simons 2016). Thanks to this change, viewers are no longer obliged to consume the content offered by TV at scheduled times, and thus have gained the freedom to watch the program they like on any mass media device any time. This sense of freedom has spread so quickly that the option to watch videos on demand (Netflix, Amazon, YouTube, etc.) enables two-thirds of the viewers throughout the world to have more control on TV viewing today (Nielsen 2016).

Especially since 2013, Netflix has increased the number of its users more than four times, reaching 207.64 million users in the first quarter of 2021, and became the leading video streaming service with the most subscribers (Stoll 2021). Announcing the number of its subscribers in Turkey for the first time in early 2021, Netflix stated that it has 3 million members, reaching an estimate of 10 million members when considered that they are family accounts (İçözü 2020).

This rapid rise of Netflix brought with it much controversy. For instance, Osur (2016: 140) points out that, Netflix, designed to entertain diverse cultures, tends to overemphasize gender, stereotypes, and the universal language of violence. Similarly, Zeitchik (2019) from The Washington Post, highlights in his article “Does Netflix have a killer problem?” that Netflix uses violence extensively among its other strategies to keep its users on the stream, which raises concerns of some media violence experts.

Indeed, the first three of Netflix's top 10 most binged productions in 2018, all of which are TV series, contain extreme violence and more than half of the rest include considerable violence, indicating that Netflix does not use violence by coincidence (Saras 2021). As a result, it is of utmost importance to analyze the relationship between Netflix and the depiction of violence (Horeck and Ruskin 2019, p. 146).

However, it seems that the limited number of studies investigating violence displayed on Netflix are not comprehensive enough. While most of these studies (Blank 2020; Greensmith and Froese 2021; Horeck and Ruskin 2019; Jenney and Cortens 2018; Patrick 2021; Rajiva and Patrick 2019), analyzed only a single TV series, deal with violence only in the context of sexual violence from a feminist perspective, the remaining two studies (Belor and Peters 2020; Cano 2015) focused on the reception of violence displayed on Netflix by viewers.

Only one study (Krongard and Vogel 2020), based on Gerbner's cultivation analysis examined the intensity of violence displayed on Netflix, and the question is whether a viewer who has been heavily exposed to such scenes of violence is affected by the mean world syndrome. In other words, there are no studies investigating the nature of violence displayed on Netflix in general.

On the other hand, violence on TV still remains a major social and academic concern (Fernandez-Villanueva et al. 2006). In addition, TV continues to expand its violent content transnationally through digital platforms such as Netflix (Coulthard et al. 2018). Studies conducted in various countries on violent TV content can confirm the aforementioned concern. In their study investigating the prevalence and context of violence in prime-time TV programs by using a random, representative sample of 23 broadcast, independent, and cable channels in the United States, Smith and colleagues (2002) revealed that the audience are likely to be exposed to depictions of violence in approximately every two of three programs regardless of the time of the day.

Similarly, in her study carried out as part of the Cultural Indicators Project (CIP), Signorielli (2003) analyzed the content of 1127 programs broadcast on U.S. TVs during the prime-time between 1993 and 2001. The findings revealed that violence did not differ significantly in intensity during the 9 years included in the sample, that violence was used intensively in 6 of the 10 programs, and that these results were similar to those in the 1970s and 1980s.

Another remarkable finding was that perpetrators of violence did not regret their actions and were not punished. The abovementioned steady increase also applies to the guns displayed on TV. In their study in which they investigated how frequently guns were used in 33 TV series broadcast during prime-time between 2000 and 2018, Jamieson and Romer (2021) found that the number of guns used in the TV series increased steadily over the years. They also found out that the positive relationship between the quantity of gun violence on TV and real killings by firearms, particularly among youth supports the idea that entertainment media contributes to the normative acceptability of guns for violent purposes.

Joyce and Martinez (2017) examined the representation of domestic violence displayed in prime-time telenovelas (TV series) on two Brazilian TV channels through content analysis. They pointed out that violence was glamorized, and that it was portrayed only as a woman's problem, not as a family problem related to power.

Miller and colleagues (2019) examined the depictions of women in 532 narconovelas (stories related to drug cartels and the narco culture) broadcast on various national TV channels in Colombia through content analysis. They found that almost all the acts of violence between the sexes in narconovelas were perpetrated by men against women, and this violence against women was glamorized.

Çelik and Van Het Hof (2021) examined 24 TV series broadcast on 7 national channels in Turkey through message system analysis and cultivation analysis developed as a part of the CIP. The message system analysis, which is the first step, revealed that violence was used extensively in 20 of the 24 series. Afterward, a survey was conducted with 404 participants to measure the effect of exposure to these depictions of violence displayed on TV on the perceptions of viewers about the existence of violence in the real world. Based on the data obtained, cultivation analysis was carried out. The study revealed that heavy viewers are more likely to believe that they live in a dangerous world than light viewers of TV.

However, there are no studies comparing the violence on Netflix with the one on TV. In this sense, it is significant to analyze the violence displayed on TV and Netflix separately; however, it is equally crucial to reveal how the violence displayed on both platforms differ in terms of intensity and context for an objective evaluation of public debates. As of 2018, Netflix usage (76%) surpassed the use of cable and satellite TV for the first time in the United States (Meek 2019).

In addition, due to the quarantine required by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected the whole world, 16 million new viewers worldwide subscribed to Netflix in only the first 3 months of 2020 (Thomas 2020). Therefore, in addition to the use of TV, this rapid increase in the use of Netflix makes it questionable what kind of differences viewers who are/will be moving from the world of TV to the world of Netflix will encounter. In this context, this study aims to reveal the contextual similarities/differences between the nature of the violence displayed in the 7 Turkish Netflix “original” series and the 1 displayed in the 7 Turkish TV series with the highest ratings on Turkish TVs.

Convergence of content from TV to Netflix

We live in a world of stories (Gerbner 1990). The vast majority of what we know and believe we know is based on stories rather than our own individual experiences (Morgan and Shanahan 1997, 5; Morgan 2014, 19). Although these stories once came from families, schools, churches, neighbors, or anyone capable of telling stories, today the only tool to fulfil this function is TV and it has become the central storyteller of today's societies (Gerbner 1990).

These stories were consumed collectively from a period called by different names such as “era of scarcity” (Ellis 2000), “network era” (Lotz 2007) or “TV I era” (Rogers et al. 2002), during which viewers could only consume the content offered to them (Dhoest and Simons 2016) to the multichannel transition era (Lotz 2007), when they embraced the “freedom” to choose one among many channels. However, in today's world, where watching video on demand has become widespread, viewers are liberated from the obligation to watch the stories told on TV at the scheduled time and have the freedom to choose them from a library of programs (Lotz 2018, p. 35), especially with digitization and one of its most important outputs, convergence (Dhoest and Simons 2016).

Nevertheless, this freedom has created sharply fragmented audiences (Morgan et al. 2015: 686–687), which, thus, has increased the intensity of people's exposure to TV stories (Signorielli et al. 2009). Now, people have become able to access these stories not only on TV, but also on any device whenever and wherever they want. Morgan and colleagues (2015, p. 686–687) highlight that, much as the way we consume stories specific to TV has changed, we tend to forget that important aspects of their content have not.

What happens is that the stories told have become more formulaic and homogeneous in some fundamental ways, whether consumed in an interactive, selective, or virtual environment. Moreover, the content of messages is more important than the technology through which they are conveyed (Shanahan and Morgan 1999), and the main point is not to overlook the essence of general collective stories exposing everyone to a fundamentally coherent set of concepts about life and the world (Gerbner 1990, p. 256).

Undoubtedly, today's expanded technological media environment offers content-specific programs dealing with just about any topic related to life (weddings, courts, food, pets, etc.) as well as traditional fictional stories. Even though the messages conveyed through TV might seem so diverse at first glance (so many different themes, so many different types of programs conveying these themes, and so many different types of people transmitting them), a systematic analysis of these messages shows a marked consistency in general (Shrum 2017, p. 1). In other words, some common messages and lessons about gender, power, class, race, violence, victimization, and much more still remain (Katz 2009).

As of the 1980s, many suggested that TV came to an end with the advent of cable TV, VCR technology, especially with Netflix in the 2000s (Butler 2018; Morrison 2014); however, whether watching through cable or internet-based services (Netflix, Amazon, YouTube, etc.), both acts are inherently watching TV (Katz 2009; Morgan et al. 2015).

Indeed, this argument is supported by the fact that Netflix, aiming to save its viewers who cannot decide which program to watch from losing their time and motivation, has started to test “Direct” in France, which symbolizes the transition to linear broadcast just like in traditional TV (Grewal 2020).

Discussions on Content

Although the way we consume the content specific to TV has changed over time, another aspect that accompanies the permanence of the abovementioned messages and lessons is the social concern about the violence that TV contains. These concerns, increasing with the spread of TV especially after the 1950s, accelerated the studies in this field (Ferguson and Savage 2012; Murray 2008). In contrast to the studies asserting that negative effects of TV violence on individuals are exaggerated (Coyne 2007; Felson 1996; Ferguson and Kilburn 2009; Ferguson and Savage 2012; Grimes et al. 2008; Gunter 2008; Haridakis 2006; Hobgen 1998; Potter 2002; Salwen and Dupange 2001; Savage 2004; Trend 2007), it is essentially a problem of “pollution.”

Just as factories become desensitized to the harm they cause to humans and the environment, TV advertisers and broadcasters do not consider the cost to society of the programs they support (Hamilton 1998, p. 3). In this context, contrary to the studies mentioned above, many others have proven that exposure to TV violence causes several harmful effects on a large audience. These effects are generally grouped under the titles of “aggression,” “desensitization,” and “fear” (Hamilton 1998; Wilson et al. 1998).

The very first studies on TV violence were carried out with the support of government (Wilson et al. 1998, p. 14), and the effect of such violence on triggering aggressive behavior has been supported by various theories such as Social Learning (Bandura 1977), Social Development (Huesmann 1986), and Priming Effects (Berkowitz and Rogers 1986). As a result, as Signorielli and colleagues (2019) stated, many studies based on these basic theories have proven that there is a direct, causal relationship between exposure to TV violence and aggressive behavior. Studies carried out recently (Burdick 2014; Degado et al. 2009; Martins and Wilson 2012; Meyers 2002; Onyekosor 2014; Oyereo and Oyesomi 2014; Riddle 2010; Zhang et al. 2013) are only a few of them.

Although early studies carried out later proved that “prolonged” exposure to TV violence can also cause desensitization (Bhatti and Hassan 2014; Linz et al. 1988; Mrug et al. 2015), Gerbner suggested, using Cultivation Theory as part of the CIP that the social reality conceptualization of people watching TV heavily is similar to TV's depiction of reality (Gerbner 1980), which separates his research from effect (aggression and desensitization) studies. In other words, Gerbner was not concerned with the influence of TV, but with its role leading to “cultivation” (Signorielli et al. 2019).

The cultivation caused by the violence depicted on TV stems from the fact that TV contains much more intense violence than any mass communication mediums ever before. Therefore, if the risks of watching TV are to be figured out, it is necessary to determine the intensity of the violence depicted on TV (Smith et al. 2002). In this sense, the most detailed program-based analysis of TV content so far has been carried out by Gerbner and colleagues at the Annenberg School of Communications in Pennsylvania as part of the CIP (Gunter 1981). This project, led by Gerbner, recorded TV content for over 30 years and the data acquired from the project established the backbone of cultivation theory afterward, which is one of the three most widely used theories in mass communication studies (Bryant and Miron 2004).

At the end of the 1960s, when the violence in the United States reached its peak, the government requested from Gerbner to provide a credible analysis of TV violence, which was the beginning of the so-called media research project (Gerbner 1992). The project involved three organically related components: Institutional process analysis, focusing on how TV messages are produced and disseminated; message system analysis, examining what messages are transmitted by TV; and cultivation analysis, studying how prolonged exposure to TV messages affects audience's comprehension of the real world (Shrum 2017).

Research conducted within the scope of the project asserted that heavy viewers can suffer from a kind of mood disorder called “mean world syndrome” over time. In other words, these individuals perceive the world as a worse place than light viewers; they continue their lives with suspicion and anxiety, tending to exaggerate the likelihood of both violent crime events and their being victims of violent crimes (Gerbner 1992).

The main source enabling Gerbner to make this conclusion was the data obtained from the message system analysis. Within the scope of the project, dramatic programs broadcast in annual sample-weeks of prime-time and weekend daytime as of 1967 were analyzed by trained analysts who code many aspects of TV content (Gerbner and Gross 1976). Accordingly, when examined within periods of 10 years, it was discovered that the intensity of violence portrayed in prime-time TV increased steadily. In 1974, violent programs had a share of 58% among all programs, with a rise to 73% in 1984, and to 75% in 1994 (Gerbner 1998). A more recent study by Signorielli (2003) found that, although these rates declined relatively in the early 2000s, violence is still predominantly used in prime-time TV.

At this point, as mentioned above, if watching Netflix is inherently watching TV and, as Potter (1999, p. 56) puts it, should the United States lead the world in the prevalence of TV violence, the first question to be asked in terms of this study regarding Turkey is:

RQ1: Does the violence depicted on TV and Netflix vary in intensity?

Although the CIP mainly focused on the nature and function of the violence depicted on TV, it covered violence broadly from the beginning. Thus, violence has been studied as an indicator of the distribution of power in the TV world, as well as offering serious implications for affirming and maintaining minority status in the real world (Signorielli et al. 2009). In this sense, certain groups (women, minorities, elders) are portrayed as victims on TV more frequently (Morgan 2014). In stories told on TV, regardless of race, age, or socioeconomic class, women are portrayed as victims more than men (Gerbner and Gross 1976). The question that should be asked at this point is:

RQ2: Is there a difference in the violence between the sexes on TV and Netflix?

The CIP team also evaluated the violence portrayed on TV in the context of severity. Although it may seem less threatening than serious violence, humorous acts of violence, which are of serious consequences, are also clearly formulated as malicious (Signorielli 2003). Indeed, humorous violence can lead to aggressive behavior (Baron 1978), as well as desensitization (Bandura 1990; Krongard and Vogel 2020). So, the question to ask is:

RQ3: Does the nature of the violence depicted on TV and Netflix differ contextually?

Whether serious or humorous, it is inevitable that some acts of violence portrayed on TV will result in death and, according to Gerbner (1980), the symbolic function of dying is a part of mean world syndrome. In this sense, the question that should be answered is:

RQ4: Is there a difference between TV and Netflix in the context of violent acts' resulting in death?

The main factor causing death is usually the instruments of violence and the type of weapon used while perpetrating violence can affect the audience's production or imitation of violence. It might be easier particularly for preschool and primary school-aged children to imitate violence committed naturally (for instance, by using one's own body parts) as these parts of body are “weapons” that are already at their disposal (Smith et al. 2002). Therefore, it is of significance to analyze the weapons used in the scenes on both platforms. The question to be asked at this point is:

RQ5: Is there a difference between TV and Netflix as regards weapons that are used in acts of violence?

Method

In this study, to answer the abovementioned questions, Turkish TV series broadcast on TV and Turkish Netflix “original” series were examined through message system analysis, which is originally a content analysis, developed by George Gerbner as a part of the CIP in the context of violence. Content analysis is a common empirical method modeled on the scientific method and its procedure is simple. A component of the TV text (a program or genre) is selected based on the phenomenon to be investigated, and the number of occurrences of the characters and their actions in this component are counted (Butler 2018, p. 499).

Content analysis cannot measure the effects of media, yet it may be extremely useful when there is evidence of an increase or decrease in specific sorts of psychological effects associated with the frequency of violent portrayals (Gunter and Harrison 2005, p. 4). Message system analysis, originally a content analysis, is the preliminary stage of cultivation analysis allowing us to comprehend what kind of effects the TV violence has on people.

There are three reasons for including TV series in the analysis. One of these reasons is the worldwide popularity of TV series produced in Turkey. Turkey (Kişin 2020), ranking the second after America, exports TV series to 175 countries as of 2019 with an annual income of 350 million dollars. Today, these TV series are watched by over 700 million people throughout the world, especially in the Middle East, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and South America (Topal 2020). Therefore, considering that different nations may have different consequences that may arise from the cultural, social, political, institutional, and other differences, the analysis of TV series produced in Turkey, in which intercultural acceptance is so strong as a program type, will be a prototype of the studies in which intercultural comparisons can be made in the future.

Second, virtually all TV channels in Turkey broadcast TV series during the prime-time. Finally, according to the 2018 data of RTÜK, the TV audience in Turkey prefers to watch TV series with an average monthly viewing rate of 15 days, ranking after the news among all the program types.

Sample

The universe of the study consists of the TV series broadcast on Turkish TV channels and the “original” series produced by Turkish production companies for Netflix with Turkish subtitles and/or dubbing at international level and, therefore, whose broadcasting rights belong only to Netflix. All seven Netflix Turkish original series, broadcast from December 14, 2018, when the first Netflix original content was released, to May 2021, were included in the sample.

The sampling included the TV series receiving the highest ratings on the day they aired for 16 weeks, according to TİAK (2020) data, from September 2020, when almost all the TV series started their new seasons, until the end of December. For instance, if the TV series X, broadcast on Monday, ranked first in the ratings during 9 out of 16 weeks, it was included in the sample. In this way, 7 series corresponding to 7 days of the week were determined as samples.

The study abided by Netflix's broadcast policy while determining which episodes of the TV series would be analyzed as well. As Netflix offers its content to its subscribers seasonally rather than weekly, it was impossible to determine a sample based on weeks.

It would be sensible to use the first episodes of each series as a sample; however, the first episodes, called pilot episodes, generally involve the introduction of the plot and characters, and therefore the conflicts between the characters are not fully revealed. Thus, the study also included the later episodes of the series in the sample where such conflicts were relatively apparent, which would be more appropriate for the purpose of the study in the context of violence. Accordingly, the fifth episodes of the first seasons of the Netflix series, each of which has 8–10 episodes, and also the fifth episodes of the TV series were included in the sample.

Definition of Violence

The most widely used definition of physical violence was developed by Gerbner (Potter 1999, p. 67). In this sense, violence refers to “overt expression of physical force against self or other, compelling action against one's will on pain of being hurt or killed, or actually hurting or killing.” (Gerbner 1980, p. 67). The study did not include empty threats, which were not convincing, verbal abuse, or insults, in the category of violence. However, violence occurring humorously, accidentally, and naturally (intentional dramatic acts that always victimize certain characters) was coded as violence (Gerbner et al. 1980, p. 11–12).

Coding Scheme

Three basic criteria were determined regarding the intensity of violence on TV and Netflix. These are “total number of violent acts,” “total duration of violent acts,” and “total number of violent scenes” (Gunter and Harrison 2005). Moreover, to reveal the contextual differences between the violence appearing on TV and Netflix, the acts of violence in the TV series were first coded into the chart created by Gerbner and colleagues (1994), after which these coded data were recorded in SPSS 26. In addition, to find out which group's violence intensifies, all characters were classified in terms of gender and socioeconomic class (low-middle-high), each of which was also sorted into four age groups: child–adolescent (0–18), young adult (19–30), settled adult (31–60), and old (60+) (Gerbner et al. 1994).

Coder Training and Reliability

The coding was conducted by two coders. At first, the second coder who was a communication PhD student was trained by the first coder, and then they coded the pilot episode of “Hakan Muhafız” together as part of the training. Afterward, one episode from TV and one from Netflix (Kuzey Yıldızı Episode 5 and Hakan Muhafız Episode 5) taken as representation of the research sample were coded independently by the 2 coders based on 14 codes. Cohen's kappa is the most commonly preferred measure of interrater reliability for 2 coders (McHugh 2012, 277; Warrens 2015, 1). Intercoder reliability was calculated based on 14 codes. Out of 14 codes, there was an agreement of 12 between the 2 coders, which corresponded to 0.86 according to Cohen's kappa.

Findings

Chi-square analysis (p < 0.05) was used to reveal the differences in terms of intensity and context of the violence depicted on TV and Netflix (Smith et al. 2002). However, before that, to illustrate the distribution of violence among the groups, the population that constituted the content of both platforms were described in general terms.

In this sense, although male characters dominated TV shows on both platforms, Netflix displayed a more egalitarian image in terms of gender representation than TV. On Netflix, 39 (40%) of the 99 characters were women and 60 (60%) were men. On TV, 69 (30%) of 225 characters were female, while 156 (70%) were male.

Gerbner and colleagues (1981) underline that TV displays a fairly stable image, especially when it comes to age. In this sense, the most depicted age group on both TV (68%) and Netflix (72%) was the “settled adult”. While “young adult” ranked second on both platforms, the least depicted age group was “old”. Both TV and Netflix were dominated by the “middle class” as well as men and adults. While “upper class” followed them on both platforms, the least depicted group was the “lower class.”

In relation to the data, although violence was experienced among all socioeconomic classes on both TV and Netflix, it was predominantly experienced among the “middle classes” on both platforms. The struggles between the members of this group were 42% on TV and 44% on Netflix. However, on both platforms, the “lower classes” were more likely to be exposed to violence than they were to commit violence. In contrast, the “upper classes” were perpetrators rather than victims of violence on both platforms.

In addition, the social ages of those involved in depictions of violence were similar on TV and Netflix. Since “settled adults” dominated the population on both platforms, the characters in this group were the most violent and the most exposed to violence, which was similar to previous studies (Gerbner et al. 1980; Williams et al. 1982) “Child–adolescent” ranked second after adults in terms of the ones most exposed to violence on TV, whereas on Netflix this group was “young adults”. On the other hand, “old” was not associated with any dimension of violence on either platform.

As is seen in Table 1, the total duration of the TV series on TV was more than three times that of the TV shows on Netflix. For this reason, to ensure consistency, data were analyzed and compared using arithmetic means.

Table 1.

Television Series and Duration

Name of TV series	Duration (minutes)	Name of Netflix series	Duration (minutes)
Bir Zamanlar Çukurova	154	Hakan: Muhafız	45
Kırmızı Oda	155	Atiye	46
Arıza	147	Aşk 101	41
Kuzey Yıldızı	130	Bir Başkadır	44
Uyanış Büyük Selçuklu	132	50 m²	44
Eşkiya Dünyaya Hükümdar Olmaz	143	Fatma	47
Kuruluş Osmanlı	154	Masum	45
Total	986		312

Source: Official sites of TIAK and Netflix.

TV, television.

RQ1: Intensity of Violence

The chi-square test was performed to determine whether the violence depicted on TV and Netflix differed in intensity as regards both number of scenes, x2 (1, N = 592) = 9.4, p = 0.002 (p < 0.05), and duration of violence, X2 (1, N = 77,880) = 178,927, p = 0.001 (p < 0.05), and a statistically significant difference was determined.

As is seen in Table 2, TV contained more violence than Netflix in terms of both duration of violence and number of scenes. The percentage of the violence scenes on TV were about two times that of the violence scenes on Netflix. In other words, violence was depicted in 1 of every 5 scenes on TV, whereas it was portrayed in 1 out of every 10 scenes on Netflix. In terms of duration of violence, 3 min of every 1 h viewed on TV and 1 min of every 1 h on Netflix was filled with violence.

Table 2.

Number and Duration of Depictions of Violence

TV	N	%	Netflix	N	%
Number of scenes	381	100	Number of scenes	211	100
Number of violence scenes	84	22.05	Number of violence scenes	25	11.84
Total duration (seconds)	59.160	100	Total duration (seconds)	18.720	100
Duration of violence (seconds)	2.896	4.90	Duration of violence (seconds)	191	1.02

RQ2: Violence Between Sexes

Violent TV programming is coded as masculine and designed to cater especially to men (Fiske 1987). Studies conducted in various countries on this subject (Coyne and Archer 2004; Gunter et al. 1999; McCann and Sheehan 1985; Miller et al. 2019; Mustonen and Pulkkinen 1993) indicate that female characters are much less likely to use violence than male characters. Consistent with previous studies (Çelik 2019; Kaya and Özdemir 2020; Signorielli 2003; Smith et al. 2002), the study revealed that the struggle for dominance took place among men both on TV and on Netflix.

However, as is seen in Table 3 violence between sexes differed significantly on TV and Netflix, x2 (1, N = 109) = 4.89, p = 0.002 (p < 0.05). Even if the percentages of scenes of violence by men against women on both platforms were remarkably close to each other, the percentage of scenes of violence by women against men on Netflix was four times more than on TV. In other words, while the rate of violence against women by men was higher on TV (Gunter et al. 1999), it was vice versa on Netflix. In addition, 12 of 69 female characters on TV were subjected to violence, whereas this number was 4 of 39 female characters on Netflix. In other words, while 1 out of 6 women on TV was exposed to violence, this number was 1 out of 10 women on Netflix.

Table 3.

Acts of Violence Between Sexes by Scenes

TV	N	%	Netflix	N	%
Man to man	52	69.33	Man to man	12	52.17
Man to woman	15	20.00	Man to woman	4	17.39
Woman to woman	3	4.00	Woman to woman	1	4.35
Woman to man	5	6.67	Woman to man	6	26.09
Total	75	100	Total	23	100

RQ3: Severity of Violence

The humorous depictions of violence did not vary regarding TV and Netflix %2 (1, N = 480) = 0.63, p = 0.042 (p > 0.05). All the 45 acts of violence portrayed on Netflix and almost all the 435 acts of violence depicted on TV were “severe”. However, the most striking point here is the nature of violence between the sexes. While all acts of violence perpetrated by men against women were severe both on TV and Netflix, four out of five acts of violence perpetrated by women against men on TV were humorous. However, all acts of violence perpetrated by women against men on Netflix were severe, and three of the six acts of violence perpetrated by women against men were in response to violence against them.

RQ4: Result of Violence

Whether it is humorous or severe, another point to be considered is to what extent characters exposed to violence are affected by this violence (Wilson et al. 1998, p. 13). Indeed, since depictions of violence are designed to activate empathy and sympathy mechanisms, the effect of violence on the victim enables those who watch it to realize the consequences of violence (Smith et al. 2002). In this sense, the results of these acts of violence, almost all of which were severe, differed significantly in terms of TV and Netflix. x2 (1, N = 480) = 6.85, p = 0.00 (p < 0.05). On TV, 103 of 435 depictions of violence resulted in death, whereas only 3 of 45 acts of violence on Netflix led to it. In other words, 1 out of every 4 depictions of violence on TV and 1 out of every 15 depictions of violence on Netflix led to death.

Another remarkable point is the gender of the victims and offenders. All of the victims on Netflix were men, and 2 of the 3 male victims were killed by female characters. However, 9 of the 103 victims on TV were women, and all of them were killed by male characters.

RQ5: Criminal Instrument

Similar to previous studies (Jamieson and Romer 2021; Smith et al. 2002), the study revealed that the reason why the rate of TV violence resulting in death was so high was the intense use of the criminal instrument used in the acts of violence. The frequency of use of criminal instruments in the depictions of violence also differed in terms of TV and Netflix, x2 (1, N = 480) = 4.39, p = 0.03 (p < 0.05). In the violent scenes on Netflix, human limbs (slapping, punching, kicking, headbutting, and pushing) were predominantly used (93%), whereas other crime instruments (guns, knives, swords) were used more intensely (33%) in TV violence.

Discussion

In this study, the phenomenon of violence depicted in both TV and Netflix series were subjected to Gerbner's message system analysis developed as part of the CIP in terms of intensity and context. Although TV depicts a more violent world compared with Netflix, according to Butler (2018), the main challenge for any content analysis is to establish the significance or meaning of its statistical data.

At this point, it is the cultivation analysis that fulfils the abovementioned task. From childhood, people overexposed to the violent ideological stories of TV established through institutional processes eventually internalize the “realities” of the TV world (Gerbner 1990; Morgan and Shanahan 1997) and they adopt more exaggerated beliefs that they live in a dangerous world when compared with light viewers (Gerbner et al. 1994). Many studies conducted in various countries other than the U.S. (Çelik and Deren Van Het Hof 2021; Cohen and Weimann 2000; Hetsroni and Tukachinsky 2006; Klinkenberg 2015; Özer 2004; Özer and Geresimova 2010; Van den Bulck 2004) proved this influence of TV.

The first question that comes to mind at this point is why violence is still depicted so intensely on TV. According to Gerbner (2003), the answer to this question cannot simply be explained by the popularity of violence, because the rating of violence is not as high as one might assume.

In addition, contrary to the claims by media industry that TV violence is appealing to viewers (Mustonen 1997), some studies (Diener and DeFour 1978; Diener and Woody 1981) revealed that images of violence “partially” delight viewers; other studies (Bahk 2000; Sparks et al. 2005; Weaver 2011; Weaver and Wilson 2009) revealed that violence does not bring any pleasure to the audience at all. In this case, the argument that “we provide what the audience wants,” put forward by the media industry, loses its credibility. Moreover, there is no free market or a “complaint and suggestion” box by which the audience can express their wishes (Gerbner 2003).

For producers, violence is a part of life. In addition, they argue that every story about life is based on a conflict, and violence is a tool of this conflict. Some screenwriters suggest that TV violence is not harmful, and that, on the contrary, they aim to show the harmful aspects of violence to people with images of violence (Baldwin and Lewis 1972); on the other hand, writers, directors, content producers, network managers, and advertisers continue to blame each other in this regard (Thoman, 2020).

According to Gerbner (1992), in such an ambiguous environment, the only thing that makes sense is the ideological function of violence. While this violence, which is less costly than in real life, symbolizes the threat to the established order, it also shows how these threats are fought, how order is established, and what will happen to those who violate it. In summary, this violence, which helps the sovereign maintain the status quo by displaying his power, is nothing but the basic mechanism of social control (Morgan 2014).

Netflix, which can be called as an individual viewing act, is not subject to any control mechanism. However, although TV viewed collectively is subject to the control of RTÜK, imposing various sanctions on broadcasting organizations in line with the complaints of the TV viewers, it depicts much more intense violence than Netflix, which supports Gerbner's argument. At this point, considering that the TV audience can also be Netflix viewers, and that these viewers may be exposed to the total violence scenes on both platforms, as Morgan and colleagues (2015, p. 686–687) stated, the cultivation role of TV should also be tested on platforms such as Netflix.

Ultimately, if TV violence is to be defined as a pollution problem, as stated at the beginning of the study, then policies to combat media violence may be parallel to those designed to reduce harms associated with pollution. Such policies include zoning (e.g., broadcasting violent programs during dayparts when children are less likely to watch TV) and taxing (e.g., charging a 25% tax on content with violence).

Another attempt to create a policy solution in this area is to provide information about violent content. For instance, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has successfully encouraged companies to reduce their toxic emissions through the annual publication of pollution figures making pollution data on industrial plants public. The release of the data attracted the attention of investors, corporate and government officials, which led to a massive reduction in the number of those who harmed the environment (Hamilton 1998, p. 3).

However, according to Trend (2007), the most important thing is to take a proactive stance by developing critical media literacy as parents without waiting for official institutions to take action. It is worth reminding once again that TV fulfils its role of influencing and cultivation even during childhood. Despite all these attempts, it will disturb us to see that most of the TV/Netflix programs base their stories on violence, and that the issue of violence on screen does not show any signs of improvement (Butler 2018). Yet, there is still one thing viewers can do: Choose not to watch violent programs.

Conclusion

This study, which compared the violence displayed on TV and Netflix in terms of intensity and context, revealed that TV contained proportionally much more violence than Netflix, both in terms of number and duration of scenes. In addition, the intense use of crime instruments on TV has led to an increase in the death rate of violent acts displayed on TV. In other words, when compared with Netflix, TV presented a more brutal world depiction. The study also focused on violence between the sexes.

Gerbner (1980) highlights that a vast part of the prime-time world, which is dominated by men and masculine values, is woven around male power issues. Indeed, on both platforms, violence was perpetrated predominantly among men. When it comes to violence between the opposite sexes, while the hegemony of men on women maintained on TV, violence on Netflix was predominantly perpetrated by women against men.

This may mean a revolt against male violence on TV, which has been around for a long time. However, almost all the acts of violence perpetrated against men by women on TV were “humorous” violence, which pacifies women. On the other hand, all the acts of violence that were inflicted on women by men were “severe”, which reminds us the nature of the TV violence showing what will happen to those who “exceed their limits,” as Morgan (2014: 24) puts it.

At this point, given that the TV audience can also be Netflix viewers and that these viewers are likely be exposed to the depictions of violence on both platforms, as Morgan and colleagues (2015, 686–687) stated, the cultivation role of TV needs to be tested on other platforms such as Netflix. Thus, future cultivation studies can reveal whether there is a relationship between exposure to depictions of violence between sexes on TV as well as Netflix and violence against women, which already exists as a social problem.

Footnotes

Author Biography

H.C.Ç., who graduated from Akdeniz University, Department of Communication doctorate program in 2018, focuses on new media, TV, and cinema fields. He is a library officer at the Mediterranean University Communication Faculty.

Author Disclosure Statement

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding Information

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

References

Bahk

. (2000). College students' responses to content-specific advisories regarding television and movies. Psychol Rep. 87, 111–114.

Baldwin

, Lewis

. (1972). Violence in television: The industry looks at itself. In GA Comstock and EA Rubinstein (Eds.). Television and social behaviour: Reports and papers: Vol. 1:Media contentandcontrol. (Government Printing Office, Washington, DC) pp. 290–373.

Bandura

. (1977). Social Learning Theory. (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ).

Bandura

. (1990). Selective activation and disengagement of moral control. J Soc Issues. 46, 27–46.

Baron

. (1978). The influence of hostile and nonhostile humour upon physical aggression. Personal Soc Psychol Bull. 4, 77–80.

Belor

, Peters

. (2020). Critical legal spectatorship and the affect of violence: A cultural legal reading of Netflix's The Punisher. Law Human. 14, 160–186.

Berkowitz

, Rogers

. (1986). A priming effect analysis of media influences. In Perspectives on Media Effects, Bryant and D. Zillmann, ed. (HiHsdale, NJ: Erlbaum) pp. 57–32.

Bhatti

, Hassan

AAU

. (2014). Psychological effects of tv news violence on youth: A case study of the students of Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan. Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS). 34, 295–309.

Blank

. (2020). Gendered violence and structures of power. Reclaiming the victim narrative in the Netflix show Marvel's Jessica Jones. In: Spaces Between: Gender, Diversity, and Identity in Comics. Nina E and Heindl V, eds. (Springer, Wiesbaden) pp. 17–34.

10.

Bryant

, Miron

. (2004). Theory and research in mass communication. J Commun. 54, 662–704.

11.

Burdick

. (2014). The merits, limitations, and modifications of applying Bandura's social learning theory to understanding African American children's exposure to violence. American International Journal of Social Science. 3, 183–190.

12.

Butler

. (2018). Television Visual Storytelling and Screen Culture. (Routledge, New York).

13.

Cano

. (2015). The war on drugs: An audience study of the Netflix original series

Narcos

. 24. Undergraduate Student Research Awards. http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/infolitusra/24 (accessed April 20, 2021).

14.

Cohen

, Weimann

. (2000). Cultivation revisited: Some genres have some effects on some viewers. Commun Rep J. 13, 99–114.

15.

Çelik

. (2019). The cultivation role of television in terms of violence, life in general, personality traits and the perception of old age. Published Doctoral Dissertation [in Turkish]. Akdeniz Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü: Antalya.

16.

Çelik

, Van Het Hof

. (2021). The cultivation role of television in terms of violence, life in general, personality traits and the perception of old age. BecmHUK MocKOBCKoro yHUBepcumema. (Cepıuı 10:/KypııaıııcmıiKa) pp. 148–167.

17.

Coulthard

, Horeck

, Klinger

. (2018). Broken bodies/inquiring minds: Women in contemporary transnational tv crime drama. Television New Media. 19, 507–514.

18.

Coyne

. (2007). Does media violence cause violent crime?. Eur J Crim Policy Res. 13, 205–211.

19.

Coyne

, Archer

. (2004). Indirect aggression in the media: A content analysis of British television programs. Aggress Behav. 30, 254–271.

20.

Delgado

, Rodríguez-Pérez

, Vaes

, et al. (2009). Priming effects of violence on infrahumanization. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations. 12, 699–714.

21.

Dhoest

, Simons

. (2016). Still ‘watching’ TV?. The consumption of tv fiction by engaged audiences. Media Commun. 4, 176–184.

22.

Diener

, DeFour

. (1978). Does television violence enhance program popularity?. J Pers Soc Psychol. 36, 333–341.

23.

Diener

, Woody

. (1981). Television violence, conflict, realism, and action: A study in viewer liking. Commun Res. 8, 281–306.

24.

Ellis

. (2000). Seeing Things: Television in the Age of Uncertainty. (Tauris & Co Ltd., London: I.B.).

25.

Felson

. (1996). Mass media effects on violent behavior. Ann Rev Sociol. 22, 103–128.

26.

Ferguson

, Kilburn

. (2009). The public health risks of media violence: A meta-analytic review. J Pediatr. 154, 759–763.

27.

Ferguson

, Savage

. (2012). Have recent studies addressed methodological issues raised by five decades of television violence research?. A critical review. Aggress Violent Behav. 17, 129–139.

28.

Fernandez-Villanueva

, Dommguez-Bilbao

, Revilla-Castro

, Anagnostou

. (2006). Broadcasting of violence on Spanish television: A quantitative panorama. Aggress Behav. 32, 137–145.

29.

Fiske

. (1987). Television Culture. (Methuen, London).

30.

Gerbner

. (1980). Death in prime time: Notes on the symbolic functions of dying in the mass media. Ann Am Acad Polit Soc Sci. 447, 64–70.

31.

Gerbner

. (1990). Epilogue: Advancing on the path of righteousness (maybe). Nancy S, Michael M, eds. In: Cultivation Analysis: New Directions in Media Effects Research. (Sage, Newbury Park, CA) pp. 249–262.

32.

Gerbner

. (1992). Violence and terror in and by the media. Marc R, Bernard D, eds. In: Crisis and Democracy: Mass communication and the disruption of social order. (Sage Publications, CA).

33.

Gerbner

. (1998). Introduction: Why the cultural environment movement?. Gazette. 60, 133–138.

34.

Gerbner

. (2003). Television violence: At a time of turmoil and terror. In: Gender, Race, and Class inMedia. Gail D, Jean M, eds. (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA) pp. 339–348.

35.

Gerbner

, Gross

. (1976). Living with television: The violence profile. J Commun. 26, 172–199.

36.

Gerbner

, Gross

, Morgan

, Signorielli

. (1980). The mainstreaming of America: Violence Profile No.11. J Commun. 30, 10–29.

37.

Gerbner

, Gross

, Morgan

, Signorelli

. (1981). Aging with television commercials: Images on television commercials and dramatic programming. http://web.asc.upenn.edu/gerbner/archive.aspx?sectionID=39&packageID=168 (accessed September 26, 2021).

38.

Gerbner

, Gross

, Morgan

, Signorielli

. (1994). Growing up with television: The cultivation perspective. In: Media Effects. Jennings B, Dolf Z, eds. (Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ).

39.

Greensmith

, Froese

. (2021). Fantasies of the good life responding to rape culture in 13 Reasons Why. Girlhood Stud. 14, 85–100.

40.

Grewal

. (2020). Direct: Une nouvelle fonctionnalite testee en France. https://about.netflix.com/fr/news/direct-new-feature-tested-in-france (accessed: May 10, 2021).

41.

Grimes

, Anderson

, Bergen

. (2008). Media violence and aggression: Science and ideology. (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA).

42.

Gunter

. (1981). Measuring television violence: A review and suggestions for a new analytical perspective. Curr Psychol Rev. 1, 91–112.

43.

Gunter

. (2008). Media violence: Is there a case for causality?. Am Behav Sci. 51, 1061–1122.

44.

Gunter

, Harrison

. (2005). Violence on Television: An Analysis of Amount, Nature, Location and Origin of Violence in British Programmes. (Routledge, New York).

45.

Gunter

, Harrison

, Arundel

, Osborn

. (1999). Female victimization on television: Extent, nature and context of on-screen portrayals. Communications. 24, 387–405.

46.

Hamilton

. (1998). Media violence and public policy. In: Television Violence and Public Policy. James H, ed. (The University of Michigan Press, Michigan).

47.

Haridakis

. (2006). Men, women, and televised violence: Predicting viewer aggression in male and female television viewers. Commun Q. 54, 227–255.

48.

Hetsroni

, Tukachinsky

. (2006). Television-world estimates, real-world estimates, and television viewing: A new scheme for cultivation. J Commun. 56, 133–156.

49.

Hobgen

. (1998). Factors moderating the effect of televised aggression on viewer behavior. Commun Res. 25, 220–247.

50.

Horeck

, Ruskin

. (2019). Streaming sexual violence: Binge-watching Netflix's 13 Reasons Why. J Evid Recep Stud. 16, 143–166.

51.

Huesmann

. (1986). Psychological processes promoting the relation between exposure to media violence and aggressive behavior by the viewer. J Soc Issues. 42, 125–139.

52.

İçözü

. (2020). Announcing that it has more than 3 million members in Turkey, Netflix Turkey will open an Istanbul office. https://webrazzi.com/2020/12/03/turkiye-de-3-milyondan-fazla-uyesi-oldugunu-aciklayan-netflix-turkiye-istanbul-ofisi-acacak/#:~:text=T%C3%BCrkiye'de%203%20milyon%20%C3%BCyenin,de%20ofis%20a%C3%A7ma%20karar%C4%B1%20ald%C4%B1. (accessed September 28, 2021).

53.

Jamieson

, Romer

. (2021). The association between the rise of gun violence in popular US primetime television dramas and homicides attributable to firearms, 2000–2018. PLoS oOne. 16, e0247780.

54.

Jenney

, Cortens

. (2018). Toxic masculinity and mental health in young women: An analysis of 13 Reasons Why. Affilia. 33, 410–417.

55.

Joyce

, Martinez

. (2017). From social merchandising to social spectacle: Portrayals of domestic violence in TV Globo's prime-time telenovelas. Int J Commun. 220–236.

56.

Katz

. (2009). The end of television?. Ann Am Acad Polit Soc Sci. 625, 6–18.

57.

Kaya

, Özdemir

. (2020). A content analysis of violence in Turkish primetime television shows. Dusunen Adam J Psychiatry Neurol Sci. 4, 351–357.

58.

Kişin

. (2020). İzzet Pinto: “Turkish serials are a brand [in Turkish].” https://www.marketingturkiye.com.tr/soylesiler/izzet-pinto-turk-dizileri-bir-marka/ (accesed September 29, 2021).

59.

Klinkenberg

. (2015). Exploration of the “Mean World Syndrome”. in Dutch older persons. Stud Undergrad Res E-J. 1, 1–4.

60.

Krongard

, Vogel

. (2020). Online original tv series: Examining portrayals of violence in popular binge-watched programs and social reality perceptions. Psychol Popular Media Cult. 9, 155–164.

61.

Linz

, Donnerstein

, Penrod

. (1988). Effects of long-term exposure to violent and sexually degrading depictions of women. J Personal Soc Psychol. 55, 758–766.

62.

Lotz

. (2007). The Television Will Be Revolutionized. (New York University Press, New York).

63.

Lotz

. (2018). Television in the contemporary media environment. In: Television: Visual Storytelling and Screen Culture. Jeremy GB, ed. ( Routledge, New York) pp. 34–44.

64.

Martins

, Wilson

. (2012). Social aggression on television and its relationship to children's aggression in the classroom. Human Communication Research. 38, 48–71.

65.

McCann

, Sheehan

. (1985). Violence content in Australian television. Aust Psychol. 20, 33–42.

66.

McHugh

. (2012). Interrater reliability: The kappa statistic. Biochemia Mmedica. 22, 276–282.

67.

Meek

. (2019). Netflix usage surpassed cable and satellite TV for the first time in 2018. https://bgr.com/business/netflix-vs-cable-2018-statistics/ (accessed: September 28, 2021).

68.

Meyers

. (2002). Television and Video Game Violence: Age Differences and the Combined Effects of Passive and Interactive Violent Media. Published Doctoral Dissertation. (Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College, Louisiana).

69.

Miller

, Barrios

, Arroyave

. (2019). Prime-time narcos: The mafia and gender in Colombian television. FeministMedia Stud. 19, 348–363.

70.

Morgan

. (2014). Against the Media [in Turkish]. (Ayrıntı Yayınları, İstanbul).

71.

Morgan

, Shanahan

. (1997). Two decades of cultivation research: An appraisal and meta-analysis. Ann Int Commun Assoc J. 20, 1–45.

72.

Morgan

, Signorielli

, Shanahan

. (2015). Yesterday's new cultivation, tomorrow. Mass Commun Soc. 18, 674–699.

73.

Morrison

. (2014). Online streaming services are becoming a threat to broadcast television. https://www.adweek.com/performance-marketing/online-streaming-vs-broadcast-television/ (accessed April 04, 2021).

74.

Mrug

, Madan

, Cook

, Wright

. (2015). Emotional and physiological desensitization to real-life and movie violence. Journal of Yyouth and Aadolescence. 44, 1092–1108.

75.

Murray

. (2008). Media violence: The effect are both real and strong. Am Behav Sci. 51, 1212–1230.

76.

Mustonen

. (1997). Nature of screen violence and its relation to program popularity. Aggress Behav. 23, 281–292.

77.

Mustonen

, Pulkkinen

. (1993). Aggression in television programs in Finland. Aggress Behav. 19, 175–183.

78.

Nielsen (2016). Remote control: VOD puts global consumers in the viewing driver's seat. Nielsen insights, https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2016/remote-control-vod-puts-global-consumers-in-the-viewing-drivers-seat.html (accessed September 10, 2021).

79.

Onyekosor

. (2014). Television violence and the propensity for violent behaviour among youths in tertiary Institutions in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. New Media and Mass Communication. 21, 50–55.

80.

Osur

. (2016). Netflix and the Development of the Internet Television Network. Published Doctoral Dissertation. (Syracuse University, NY).

81.

Oyero

, Oyesomi

. (2014). Perceived influence of television cartoons on Nigerian children's social behaviour. Estudos em Comunicação. 17, 91–116.

82.

Özer

. (2004). Cultivation Theory: Examination of the Cultural Functions of Television [in Turkish]. Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları; No. 1578, İletişim Bilimleri Fakültesi Yayınları, No. 58.

83.

Özer

, Geresimova

. (2010). Cultivation Theory: Research on the Educational Role of Television in Turkey and Russia [in Turkish]. In: The Culture of Violence in the Media. Ömer Ö, ed. (Literatürk, Konya).

84.

Patrick

. (2021). You get to stop him! Gendered violence and interactive witnessing in Netflix's Kimmy vs The Reverend. Critical Studies in Television: The International Journal of Television Studies. 16, 30–46.

85.

Potter

. (1999). On Mmedia Vviolence. (Sage, CA).

86.

Potter

. (2002). The Eeleven Mmyths of Mmedia Vviolence. (Sage, CA).

87.

Rajiva

, Patrick

. (2019). This is What a feminist looks like”: Dead girls and murderous boys on season 1 of Netflix's You. Television New Media. 22, 281–298.

88.

Riddle

. (2010). Always on my mind: Exploring how frequent, recent, and vivid television portrayals are used in the formation of social reality judgments. Media Psychology. 13, 155–179.

89.

Rogers

, Epstein

, Reeves

. (2002). The Sopranos and HBO brand equity. The art of commerce in the age of digital reproduction. In: This Thing of Ours: Investigating The Sopranos. David L, ed. (Columbia University Press, New York) pp. 42–60.

90.

RTÜK (2018). Television viewing trends research [in Turkish]. https://www.rtuk.gov.tr/rtuk-kamuoyuarastirmalari/3890/5776/televizyonizlemeeğilimleriarastirmasi.2018.html (acessed: April 02, 2019).

91.

Salwen

, Dupange

. (2001). Third person perception of television violence: The role of self-perceived knowledge. Media Psychol. 3, 211–236.

92.

Saras

. (2021). Netflix's session with murder. https://www.mediummagazine.nl/netflixs-obsession-with-murder/ (accessed April 04, 2021).

93.

Savage

. (2004). Does viewing violent media really cause criminal violence?. A methodological review. Aggress Violent Behav. 10, 99–128.

94.

Shanahan

, Morgan

. (1999). Television and Its Viewers: Cultivation Theory and Research. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).

95.

Shrum

. (2017). Cultivation Theory: Effects and Underlying Processes. In: The International Encyclopedia of Media Effects, 4 Volume Set. Rössler P, ed. (J. Wiley & Sons, New York) pp. 1–12.

96.

Signorielli

. (2003). Prime-time violence 1993–2001: Has the picture really changed?. J Broadcast Elect Media. 47, 36–57.

97.

Signorielli

, Morgan

, Shanahan

. (2009). Cultivation Analysis: Research and Practice. In: An Integrated Approach to Communication Theory and Research. Stack DW, Salwen MB, Eichhorn KC, eds. (Routledge, New York) pp. 113–125.

98.

Signorielli

, Morgan

, Shanahan

. (2019). The violence profile: Five decades of cultural indicators research. Mass Commun Soc. 22, 1–28.

99.

Smith

, Nathanson

, Wilson

. (2002). Prime-time television: Assessing violence during the most popular viewing hours. J Commun. 52, 84–111.

100.

Sparks

, Sherry

, Lubsen

. (2005). The appeal of media violence in a full-length motion picture: An experimental investigation. Commun Rep. 18, 21–30.

101.

Stoll

. (2020). Media usage in Europe-statistics & facts. https://www.statista.com/topics/4039/media-usage-in-europe/ (accessed April 23, 2021).

102.

Stoll

. (2021). Number of Netflix paid subscribers worldwide from 1st quarter 2013 to 1st quarter 2021 (in millions). https://www.statista.com/statistics/250934/quarterly-number-of-netflix-streaming-subscribers-worldwide/#:~:text=Netflix%20had%20207.64%20million%20paid,Netflix's%20total%20global%20subscriber%20base (accessed April 23, 2021).

103.

Thoman

. (2020). What parents can do about media viplence. http://www.medialit.org/reading-room/what-parents-can-do-about-media-violence (accessed May 10, 2021).

104.

Thomas Zoe. (2020). Netflix gets 16 million new sign-ups thanks to lockdown. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-52376022 (accessed September 28, 2021).

105.

Topal

. (2020). Turkish TV series kept Latinos at home during the pandemic [in Turkish]. Available at: https://www.itohaber.com/haber/guncel/212522/latinleri_pandemide_turk_dizileri_evde_tuttu.html (accessed September 29, 2021).

106.

TİAK (2020). Tablolar. http://tiak.com.tr/tablolar (accessed April 24, 2021).

107.

Trend

. (2007). The Myth of Media Violence: A Critical Introduction. (Blackwell: Malden, MA).

108.

Van den Bulck

. (2004). Research note: The relationship between television fiction and fear of crime: An empirical comparison of three causal explanations. Eur J Commun. 19, 239–248.

109.

Warrens

. (2015). Five ways to look at Cohen's kappa. Journal of Psychology & Psychotherapy. 5, 1.

110.

Weaver

. (2011). A meta-analytical review of selective exposure to and the enjoyment of media violence. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media. 55, 232–250.

111.

Weaver

, Wilson

. (2009). The role of graphic and sanitized violence in the enjoyment of television dramas. Hum Commun Res. 35, 442–463.

112.

Williams

, Zabrack

, Joy

. (1982). The portroyal of aggression on North American television. J Appl Soc Psychol. 12, 360–380.

113.

Wilson

, Donnerste

, Linz

, et al. (1998). Content Analysis of Entertainment Television: The Importance of Context. In: Television Violence and Public Policy. James H, ed. (The University of Michigan Press, Michigan). pp. 13–53.

114.

Zeitchik

. (2019). Does Netflix have a killer problem? The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/03/21/does-netflix-have-killerproblem/?utm_term=.8cea59195c7e. (accessed April 04, 2021).

115.

Zhang

, Zhang

, Wang

. (2013). Is aggressive trait responsible for violence? Priming effects of aggressive words and violent movies. Psychology. 4, 96.