LiacosP.J., Dilemmas of Dying, Medicolegal News7(i):4 (Fall 1979) [hereinafter referred to as Dilemmas of Dying].
2.
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 432 (Mass. 1977).
3.
Id. at 434.
4.
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
5.
See AnnasG.J., Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision Making for the Terminally Ill Incompetent, American Journal of Law & Medicine4(4):k (Winter 1979) [hereinafter referred to as Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz]: GlantzL. and SwazeyJ., Decisions Not to Treat: The Saikewicz Case And Its Aftermath, Forum on Medicine2(1): 22 (January 1979).
6.
Of course not all lawyer reactions were reasonable interpretations of ambiguities in the case. See Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz, note 5 supra, at 387, n.5; AnnasG.J., Where Are the Health Lawyers When We Need Them?Medicolegal News6(2):3 (Summer 1978).
7.
BaronC.H., Medical Paternalism and the Rule of the Law: A Reply to Dr. Relman, American Journal of Law & Medicine4(4):337 (Winter 1979).
8.
In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. 1978).
9.
Dilemmas of Dying, note 1 supra, at 7.
10.
Dilemmas of Dying, note 1 supra, at 6. At another point, Justice Liacos states: “For anyone to advise hospitals that a DNR … could not be instituted and that a person who was terminally ill had to be resuscitated time and time again absent legal and judicial determination is an entirely misleading interpretation of the Saikewicz opinion.”
11.
Dilemmas of Dying, note 1 supra, at 6.
12.
In the Matter of Earle N. Spring (Mass. App, Ct. F–79–570, November 1979) shows the errors that doctors, families, and even reviewing courts can make in applying the substituted judgment test.
