Abstract
The works of Hannah Arendt discuss a range of themes such as totalitarianism and history, action and freedom, society and the public sphere, in ways that are in conflict with the usual academic division of labor. Although her background is in philosophy, Arendt is mostly known as a political theorist. As Philip Walsh explains in this book, she is also relevant to sociology. He rightly points out that Arendt shares with many sociologists a deep interest in topics such as suppression, alienation, labor, secularization, power, and technology. He is also correct in stressing that she shares the skepticism felt by sociologists towards moral philosophy and epistemic realism. Crucially, Walsh complains that sociologists usually pick out bits and pieces from Arendt’s theories that suit their own interests, while not comprehending her critique of the discipline itself. He suggests that if Arendt’s critique is taken seriously, it “can serve to strengthen the epistemological and ontological integrity of the discipline” (p. 1). Arendt can counter what Walsh sees as reductionist tendencies in how sociology discusses social phenomena. Sociology is usually regarded as a cure against reductionism, but it “has too often lost sight of the meaning that activities do possess in their own terms, however these are understood” (p. 5). The main claim, albeit somewhat obliquely formulated, appears to be that Arendt’s ontological understanding of action can help sociology avoid reducing human activities to something they are not.
In the first part of the book, Walsh reconstructs a social theory based on Arendt’s The Human Condition (1958), before proceeding to discuss her objections to sociology. He gives a survey of her triadic understanding of human activity, which she divides into labor, work, and action. Walsh underlines that Arendt does not suggest a classifying typology in the manner of Weber, but that she rather defines these categories as ontological, that is, as basic aspects of human existence. Her procedure shares characteristics with both Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology. While Kant wants to find deep structures presupposed by our experiences, Arendt seeks deep structures presupposed by our activities. Arendt shares Heidegger’s interest in ontology and language by regarding concepts as saturated with meaning. The distinction between labor and work is intended to bring to the foreground hidden meaning in language, thus disclosing basic ontological structures. Walsh reconstructs Arendt’s social theory by examining her idea of ‘the rise of the social’ which he interprets as “something more fundamental than simply a historical account of how human capacities have been exercised, or the changing relationship between institutional spheres” (p. 29). ‘The rise of the social’ is a process in which one particular ontological orientation – that of labor – has become ever more dominating at the expense of work and action. While labor creates consumer goods with no lasting value, work (or fabrication) is a ‘world-building’ activity which gives goods permanent value. Action is different than the other two by allowing human freedom: action makes new beginnings possible. Arendt describes action in terms of concepts such as natality and spontaneity, while considering freedom as an aspect of action, and not of human will (as the philosophical tradition overwhelmingly does). Freedom is only possible in a social space. According to Walsh, this social definition of freedom makes it possible for Arendt’s thought to “make significant contributions to a sociological understanding of both order and change within human societies” (pp. 38f). Sociology does not take into consideration the ontological distinctions between different human activities, but rather sees all activity as either labor or work. Consequently, sociology is unable to understand that action, not processes or forces, is the crux of human plurality. The point Walsh is driving at here is that action carries intrinsic (ontological) possibilities of new beginnings. As long as sociology puts too much emphasis on processes when explaining action, the distinctive quality of individual actions – their ability to create something new – disappears.
The first part of the book throws an interesting light upon Arendt, whose sociological relevance is indeed underestimated. But it is debatable to what extent Walsh manages to defend the view that a firmer ontological grounding is exactly what sociology needs. While it is true that sociologists often are more concerned with processes than individual actions, he does not quite manage to convince that a turn to ontology is the answer. A more action-oriented sociology could be achieved, say, by means of the intersubjective theories of action found in Hegel or the Frankfurt School, but such possibilities are not taken into consideration. It does not get much better in the second part of the book where Walsh addresses four subject matters within which he believes that Arendt might counter reductionist tendencies in contemporary sociology: reflexivity; power; knowledge; and consumption. When she denies that reflexivity is synonymous with thinking and claims that it is a historically changing characteristic of several mental activities (thinking, will, and judgment), Arendt offers a more differentiated model of agency than is common in sociology. By providing a social concept of power, Arendt avoids the sociological reduction of power to violence. Furthermore, she can contribute to sociology by pointing out that science has become a driving force in modernity due to changes in the ontological status of knowledge. Lastly, Arendt’s attempt to view consumption in the context of labor, and therefore as a fundamental (ontological) orientation, is highly relevant to cultural theories. Walsh presents a wide range of social theorists when making these points, amongst others Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Bell, Archer, Habermas, Bauman, Giddens, and Bourdieu. Unfortunately, these elaborations lack the same degree of conciseness as those of the first part of the book. The attempt to cover such a broad field also results in discussions that are too short.
His philosophical training obviously makes Walsh well-suited to discuss Arendt. However, while the book brings Arendt in the vicinity of sociology in a way that should be interesting for sociologists and other social scientists, the persuasiveness of its main argument will ultimately depend on the ontological temperament of the individual reader.