Calling forth the change-makers

Abstract

Reflexivity theory can contribute in important ways to our understanding of how societies contend with climate change. Avoiding the catastrophic effects of “dangerous climate change” will require substantial change, yet emissions continue to rise. Social scientific research on climate change mitigation is dominated by a relatively small number of macro-theoretical frameworks, plus a rather large and disparate empirical literature on individual cognitions, attitudes and behaviors. We apply Archer’s reflexivity theory to a survey sample drawn from Alberta, Canada, showing that unique predispositions toward reflexivity offer strong predictors of willingness to engage in climate-related mitigative behaviors.

Keywords

Attitudes and behavior climate change environmental sociology reflexivity structural transitions

Introduction

Archer’s (1995, 2003, 2007, 2010b) theory of reflexivity and its role in institutional change has immediate relevance for understanding social responses to today’s more vexing problems, yet has not been applied extensively to the study of those problems. One particularly acute problem to which such attention might be directed is global climate change. Avoiding the catastrophic effects of anthropogenic climate change will require substantial societal shifts (IPCC, 2013), yet despite decades of mitigation efforts, emissions continue to rise. Important gaps remain in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the social dimensions of climate change, which Reflexivity Theory is well positioned to fill. One such gap is articulated by Walkate and Mythen (2010: 56), “there remains a palpable need for greater recognition of the diversity of social subjects and an empirical fleshing out of how people construct and negotiate risks under discrete conditions.” We review recent scholarship, and present the findings of a study that operationalizes several aspects of Reflexivity Theory. We then apply Reflexivity Theory to dispositions toward climate change, using a survey of residents of Alberta, Canada. Our results contribute to climate change scholarship and Reflexivity Theory alike, suggesting: (a) a robust differentiation between three forms of reflexivity disposition; (b) an equally robust and distinctive differentiation between reflexive dispositions toward climate change; and (c) a strong association between Meta-Reflexivity and willingness to engage in climate-related mitigative behaviors.

Empirical analysis of climate change cognitions, attitudes and behaviors

A large majority of publics across the world are concerned about climate change, independent of national wealth and CO₂ emissions levels (Kvaloy et al., 2012). Concern has vacillated over time, however. Although early research found at least 96% of respondents across six countries expressing the belief that global warming is the result of human activities (Dunlap, 1998), the proportion of respondents agreeing with this statement a decade later was noticeably lower (Downing and Ballantyne, 2007; Maibach et al., 2009), although recent surveys suggest an upswing, particularly in the US (Kirshenbaum, 2015). Moreover, many do not consider climate change to represent a personal risk, often viewing anticipated hazards as remote (Leiserowitz, 2006; Scannell and Gifford, 2012; Whitmarsh, 2008). These trends pose serious challenges for mitigation (Ivanova and Tranter, 2008; Liu and Sibley, 2011; Zahran et al., 2007).

Variations in concern have been attributed to personal experience with climate-related impacts such as rising temperature (Joireman et al., 2010) and floods (Harvatt et al., 2011), expressing the “availability heuristic” (Kahneman et al., 1982), and amounting to the Giddens’ Paradox (Giddens, 2009): prospects for mitigation are slim given that only a small minority will experience directly climate change impacts before we are beyond the “tipping point.” Also, McCright and Dunlap (2011b) highlight the influence of US media coverage on the views of climate skeptics (see also Feldman et al., 2012; Weber and Stern, 2011). Perhaps the most oft-noted differences in climate change beliefs and behavior, emphasized in both quantitative and qualitative research, include personal attributes such as gender, age, education and income, with women, younger people and those with higher education and income generally (but not consistently) expressing higher levels of concern and pro-environmental behavior. Several studies show higher levels of concern among women (Clements, 2013; McCright, 2010; Stedman et al., 2004; but see Kellstedt et al., 2008). Education, race and income have also been found to be significant predictors (e.g. Ivanova and Tranter, 2008; Laidley, 2011, 2013). Other studies emphasize social psychological factors – particularly political ideology, partisan identity and ecological worldviews (Dietz et al., 1998; Schwom et al., 2010; Sherkat and Ellison, 2007; Stedman et al., 2004; Stern et al., 1999). Evidence increasingly attributes differences in climate change concern to political ideology, with consistent findings that higher concern is expressed by left-leaning individuals, whereas lower concern, and greater skepticism, are associated with conservative political ideologies (Davidson and Haan, 2012; Guber, 2013; Ivanova and Tranter, 2008; Kvaloy et al., 2012). This gap increased notably during the first decade of the 21st century in the US (McCright and Dunlap, 2011b; also, Eurobarometer, 2008; Leiserowitz, 2006; Zahran et al., 2007). McCright and Dunlap (2011a) show that conservative white males in America express the greatest level of skepticism.

The values-beliefs-norms theory (Stern et al., 1999) offers a more theoretically developed framework for evaluating environmental attitudes and behaviors, postulating that behavior is an outcome of personal values, belief that these values are under threat, and perceived personal efficacy. Variations of this model have been supported (e.g. Adger et al., 2009; Dietz et al., 2007; Markowitz and Bowerman, 2012; Oreg and Katz-Gerro, 2006; Stern et al., 1999). Cordano et al.’s (2010) Theory of Reasoned Action similarly indicates the predictive power of beliefs about the consequences of behavior, and perceived social normative pressure.

Although research on cognitions, attitudes and behaviors has generated useful insights, we believe Reflexivity Theory can offer useful advances to this scholarship. Whereas previous work has focused on the notable contributions of socio-structural factors such as education and political ideology to climate change concern and behavior, Reflexivity Theory offers a new lens, focused on individual processes of reflexivity. People with very similar life histories and geographies respond to stimuli, including climate change, in widely divergent ways. We do not agree on the nature of the problems we face, their seriousness, nor appropriate responses, and these differences may well be independent of the socio-structural dimensions that have been the focus of previous research. These differences matter in important and empirically specifiable ways to trajectories of social change – we simply do not all think alike – a premise we consider apropos to the study of climate change reflexivity.

Reflexivity and socio-ecological relations: theoretical backdrop

Contemporary sociological discussions of reflexivity are dominated by Beck, Giddens, Bourdieu and Archer. Beck’s Reflexive Modernization describes the tendency for modernity to undergo institutional transformation in response to the emergence of crises generated by modernity (e.g. Adam et al., 2004; Beck, 2010; Beck et al., 1994). Specifically, mounting confrontations with uncertainty and crisis – what Akram and Hogan (2015) call breaches – induce society-wide reflexivity. The solidarity fostered by the collective reflexive processing of human-induced dangers confronts institutions of modernity, leading to their transformation into new forms able to accommodate the needs of an emerging reflexive modernity (Beck, 2009). Giddens’ work is closely associated with Beck’s, particularly their depiction of an extended reflexivity associated with increased turbulence of institutions in modern societies. Where Beck offers an image of reflexivity being more or less forced upon individuals to contend with risk and uncertainty, Giddens offers a more emancipatory view, asserting that with access to emerging knowledge, individuals have developed the capacity both to elevate themselves above their structural contexts, while simultaneously developing an enhanced capacity to influence those structures in an increasingly interconnected, complex system (Giddens, 1991, 2004).

Bourdieu offers a much higher degree of scrutiny of contingent social relations, with decidedly less optimistic conclusions. Although Bourdieu acknowledges the reflexive capacity of individuals, this capacity takes a distant back seat to pre-conscious actions that constitute embodiments of one’s habitus – the values, expectations and lifestyles associated with particular social groups (Bourdieu, 1998, 1990) – which becomes the primary modus operandi of human action. Such tendencies are far more likely to support institutional reproduction than transformation. The imprint of Bourdieu’s work is prominent in social practice theory, adherents to which have paid extensive empirical attention to how individual practices are shaped by cultural contexts (e.g. Shove, 2010; Shove et al., 2012).

Archer differs from Beck, Giddens and Bourdieu foremost with a central focus on individual reflexive agents, and their diversity: Although differing social contexts may well reinforce different forms of reflexivity, reflexivity itself is a basic albeit differentiated capacity that all individuals espouse. We are individual, intelligent and emotional beings, and thus we are neither rational actors (Archer, 2007), nor victims of structural circumstance (Archer, 2003). Our highly differentiated individual actions are defined by our unique dispositions for reflexivity: the means by which we each engage in internal conversations to consciously formulate and implement personal projects given our situation, and ultimately “make our way through the world” (Archer, 2007: 5). Our reflexive processing is differentiated by our singular constellations of concerns and values, which render us radically heterogeneous. Archer’s Reflexivity Theory emphasizes that, “as human beings, we do not just adapt passively to social conditions but actively create life strategies, and reflexively evaluate what is ethically important for us” (Kuusela, 2012: 94). Reflexivity encompasses three main “moments”: (a) defining one’s concerns (Problem Formulation); (b) developing courses of action (Project Development); and (c) establishing practices in pursuit of those projects (Project Implementation).

Expressions of reflexivity in turn mediate the role that social and cultural structures play (Archer, 2007). Individuals deliberate about situational obstructions and facilitations they confront, and change their projects accordingly. According to Archer, the pursuit of personal projects entails attempts to exercise one’s causal powers through social interaction, in turn activating causal powers in the natural, practical and social orders. The emergent outcomes are the feedstock for social change – when agents confront structures that reinforce the pursuit of their projects, social interaction consists of negative feedbacks that serve to reproduce existing social orders, contributing to morphostasis, a stable and consistent set of ideological structures (Archer, 1995). When agents confront structures incongruent with their personal projects, their efforts at project implementation through social interaction constitute positive feedbacks with the potential to induce structural transformation, or morphogenesis (Archer, 1995). Morphogenesis is most likely when individuals become mobilized collectively in ways capable of challenging the pre-existing cultural and structural elite (Archer, 1995). In her words, Reflexivity Theory: “(i) is an explanatory framework for examining the interplay between structure and agency and their outcomes, and (ii) it is a tool kit for developing the analytical histories of emergence of particular social formations, institutional structures, and organizational forms” (Archer, 2010a: 274).

Elaboration is provided by Archer’s (2007) typology of four unique modes of reflexivity to which individuals may be disposed, including Fractured, Communicative, Autonomous and Meta-Reflexivity. Fractured Reflexivity describes an inability to engage cognitively in reflexive processing. Communicative Reflexivity describes a tendency to seek external reinforcement from friends and relatives for one’s internal conversations, and voluntarily renounce upward mobility, refusing to plan for the future in exchange for tranquility of social interaction. Individuals expressing Communicative Reflexivity prefer to do things “the way they have always been done.” Communicative Reflexivity according to Archer (2010a) has been harder to support since the close of the 20th century, because negotiating our social environments increasingly requires critical reflection.

Autonomous Reflexivity describes a propensity for independence and personal success. Individuals expressing Autonomous Reflexivity prioritize upward mobility, even when doing so requires repudiating normative pressures and customs. Autonomous Reflexivity is not likely to support attempts to change social structures; such individuals prefer to negotiate the socio-structural environment, taking advantage of structural enablements and avoiding constraints. Meta-Reflexivity, finally, expresses a tendency to pursue strongly held values, often through collective action. Individuals expressing Meta-Reflexivity spend a great deal of energy on inner dialogue, guided by value-oriented problematization of circumstances. Meta-Reflexives are not bound by norms or customs; instead they are evaluated vis-à-vis their congruence with strongly held values. Meta-Reflexives are willing to pay the price of contesting predominant normative systems when deemed in conflict with personal values. In the aggregate, Archer argues, as do we, that Meta-Reflexives are crucial to morphogenesis.

Archer has been critiqued for over-emphasizing our individualized powers of reflexivity, consequently paying little heed to pre-reflexive practices that are shaped by social contexts (e.g. Akram and Hogan, 2015; Farrugia, 2013; Sayer, 2010). In contradistinction, “the world is [and can only be] made intelligible through practical engagement, and knowledge of it is constituted by embodied capacities to act within it” (Farrugia, 2013: 294). Situational predispositions and reflexivity thus coincide: “reflexivity does not replace habit and the taken-for-granted…it must operate in relation to them” (Akram and Hogan, 2015: 620). Unquestionably, many practices that produce greenhouse gas emissions are non-reflexive forms of agency. Yet as asserted by Beck, Akram and Hogan and others, the very contemplation of “breaches” such as climate change constitutes reflexivity. Attention to reflexivity does not deny the persistence and outcomes of social practices governed by habitus. However, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that our collective ability to confront dilemmas like climate change rests in large part on the means by which individuals in vastly differing circumstances problematize such concerns, and pursue projects intended to create change, or not.

These debates strike at the heart of sociology, contending as they do with that most fundamental of relation between structures and agents. What is missing is a breadth and depth of empirical research to inform such debates. Empirical examinations of reflexivity, and of Archer’s typology in particular, are limited. Archer’s (2007, 2010b) efforts in this regard include small-sample, qualitative research that has been useful for theory building. Archer has provided a useful typology for the empirical study of individual-level reflexive processing, but its confirmation as a lens for understanding individual actions and their effect on social structures requires application at a larger scale. The means by which, for example, variations in reflexive dispositions toward climate change emerge, how those variations are expressed, and the outcomes for structural change, remain unexplored. We can nonetheless develop several postulates on the basis of Archer’s work, beginning with consideration of plausible responses to climate change. First, individuals disposed to Communicative Reflexivity would not likely spend a great deal of time in personal contemplation of if and how climate change constitutes a problem. Communicative Reflexivity would likely encourage individuals to support prevailing social norms, and a disinclination to engage in pro-active politics. In which case, this may describe a large proportion of individuals in contemporary societies who are unlikely to engage in climate change mitigation behaviors until the norms espoused within their social networks support such actions. On the other hand, we might expect these individuals to readily comply with such norms once they do emerge, even if doing so compromises them personally in some way.

Autonomous Reflexivity might encourage a more discriminating formulation of climate change as a problem, and of willingness to engage in or resist mitigative action, depending upon the extent to which they perceive personal benefit in doing so. In those cases in which reduction of personal greenhouse gas emissions involves a personal cost, one would expect that Autonomous Reflexivity would support a tendency to resist engagement in climate change mitigative behavior. On the other hand, as opportunities for prestige and economic gain emerge in the form of, for example, new low-carbon technologies, Autonomous Reflexives may turn out to be important resources supporting transition. Finally, Meta-Reflexivity would likely foster conceptualizations of climate change as an urgent social problem that demands substantial change in institutional structures. In which case, Meta-Reflexives would be more likely to formulate and implement projects intended to address climate change in a substantive manner, most likely partaking in organized efforts to pursue those ends.

Research questions and methods

Our research questions are as follows:

Can Archer’s reflexivity typology be identified through quantitative measurement in a general population survey?

Do we observe an analogous typology of reflexivity domains expressed specifically with respect to climate change?

Is there a relationship between general measures of Meta-Reflexivity and climate change reflexivity?

Do either or both of these predict adoption of climate change mitigative behaviors better than, or at least independently of, key predictors identified in previous research?

We conducted a telephone survey of residents of Alberta, Canada, which at the time was home to 10% of Canada’s population, and the source of 35% of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions (Environment Canada, 2011). A significant proportion of those emissions comes from the oilsands, a large-scale non-conventional oil production enterprise that has sparked considerable controversy. At the same time, the oilsands are a large part of the reason that Alberta was – until the recent drop in oil prices – the richest province in Canada, with the lowest provincial unemployment rate and highest median incomes in the nation. According to one report, 146 000 Albertans were directly employed by the energy industry at the time of our study, 75% of whom were male.¹ The number of jobs indirectly related to this industry was four times this amount, constituting roughly 40% of the total employed workforce (Statistics Canada, 2006). Likewise, although the energy industry as a whole represented 23.4% of Provincial GDP in 2010,² we can be confident that the actual contribution of the energy industry has been higher for the same reason, because a large proportion of the remainder of the economy is related indirectly to this industry.

There were a total of 1022 respondents, sampled by random-digit dialing. Because the survey was conducted using random digit dialing, a conventional “response rate” per se is impossible to calculate, as many of the numbers reached were not in service (i.e., were not matched to a household or business). Further, many of the numbers that were reached were out of scope (i.e., were a business, a government agency, or other institution, rather than a ‘person’). Among those eligible individuals reached, our response rate was 13.8% (1022 completed surveys, divided by the number of completions + the number of refusals (6395). A total of 311 respondents resided in urban areas – Edmonton or Calgary. Because our analysis in this paper is nested in a larger study about rural vulnerability, rural residents were oversampled, with the remaining 711 respondents selected based on their residence in one of four rural communities. Geographic differences in our findings were minimal, however, so place of residence is not included in our presentation of the data, nor are the data weighted to account for the disproportionately rural sample (Online appendix).

Description of variables

Reflexivity domains

We began with survey statements intended to express Archer’s three reflexivity domains: Meta-Reflexive, Autonomous Reflexive and Communicative Reflexive. The survey items asked respondents to indicate their agreement with statements such as “I believe in looking out for number 1,” rated on a 5-point (strongly agree to strongly disagree) scale. These items were distilled from statements found in Archer’s writings, discussed between the authors, and subjected to feedback from other scholars knowledgeable about reflexivity theory. After implementation, exploratory factor analysis was conducted to discover underlying dimensions, and scales were created. More information on these subdomains and their creation is provided below.

Climate change reflexivity

Second, we explored whether reflexivity was expressed specifically for climate change, using agree/disagree statements such as “I feel good when I take action to mitigate climate change.” Our development of a Climate Change Reflexivity Scale was informed through reflexivity-theory-guided analysis of personal open-ended interviews about climate change with a small sample of local environmental leaders from the same four communities as the survey (see Davidson, 2012).

Climate change mitigation behaviors

We examined mitigative behavior as a potential outcome of reflexivity, measured via the question “Please indicate which of the following things you have done in response to your concern about climate change,” including eleven items such as “talked to others” or “lowered your thermostat.” Each of these behaviors was measured dichotomously (as a “yes/no” response). We created an aggregated dependent variable consisting of the summed responses to the items divided by the total number of possible behaviors: i.e. what proportion of the behaviors had the respondent engaged in?

Other predictors of behavior

Finally, we included five categories of survey items commonly highlighted in other studies as predictors of climate change-related behaviors:

Overall perceived threat

Respondents were asked to indicate on a 3-point scale how serious a threat climate change poses to: plants/animals; people in other countries; people in Canada; one’s community; one’s self and family; and the entire world. Perceived threat did not differ across these object levels (respondents were not concerned at one level and unconcerned at another), therefore a summed scale was created from all of them.

Beliefs regarding climate change impacts

Respondents were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale how strongly they agree or disagree with items including negative (e.g. threats to food supplies) and positive (e.g. more pleasant weather) projected impacts.

Perceived risk

Respondents were also asked to indicate on a 5-point scale (from strongly agree to disagree) their perceptions of the likelihood, severity, controllability and acceptability of the projected impacts of climate change. Each of these domains becomes an independent predictor variable.

Worldviews

We then included items representing expressions of Ecological and Economic Worldviews, derived from Stedman et al. (2004), and work by Dunlap et al. (2000) differentiating the Human Exemptionalist and New Ecological Paradigms. Respondents were asked to indicate their (dis)agreement with these items on a 5-point scale.

Socio-demographic attributes

Several socio-demographic attributes were added, including gender, education, income, occupation in a natural resource-based industry, children present at home and political views.

Results

Sample attributes

Slightly over half of our respondents (54%) were female, over two-thirds (69%) were married, and 41% had children at home. 23% of respondents had a university degree; 12% had a master’s degree or higher. Reflecting the relatively wealthy status of Alberta, 78% had a personal income above $50 000. Over one third (37%) were directly employed in the natural-resources, agriculture, or tourism sectors. A larger proportion of the sample identified as very conservative (13%) than as very liberal (8%) on a 7-point scale; over 60% were in the moderate categories (3–5). Compared to provincial averages, this sample has a higher rate of education, higher personal income and higher likelihood to be employed in a natural-resource based industry.

Domains of reflexivity

Initial factor analysis utilizing a varimax rotation with maximum likelihood extraction produced three factors in reasonable alignment with Archer’s three reflexivity domains, explaining 52.9% of the variation. The Meta-Reflexivity subdomain, our primary interest, included three items, such as “I have an ethical responsibility to be part of the solution”; the Autonomous Reflexivity subdomain is measured with three items such as “People generally get what they deserve,” and the Communicative Reflexivity subdomain included two items such as “I prefer to go with the flow.” While recognizing potential reliability problems with scales comprising few items, the reliability scores were reasonably solid³ (especially for three item scales, as alpha levels tend to increase as the number of items increases) for the Meta Reflexivity (alpha = 0.663) and Autonomous (alpha = 0.582) subdomains. Each of these summed scales is retained for further analysis. The two item Communicative subdomain had a very poor alpha and is not used as a predictor variable. The Meta-Reflexivity scale also had a reasonably high mean of 3.92 (nearly “agree” on average) on a five-point scale, much higher than the means for the Communicative (2.85) and Autonomous scales (2.86).

We then sought to understand whether reflexivity domains would be expressed specifically with respect to climate change. Here, factor analysis of our climate change reflexivity items produced three factors, including one representing a cluster of three items suggesting a “Climate Catastrophe” problem formulation, requiring top-down solutions (example item: “If our national and world leaders aren’t on board, we are not going to be able to deal with climate change”), with the highest Chronbach alpha reliability of .731. A second factor representing a more modest problem formulation with reliance on small-scale solution mechanisms, named “Small-scale Mitigation,” included three items (e.g., “Encouraging changes in personal behaviors is the most effective way to mitigate climate change”) and a Chronbach alpha reliability of 0.640. Our third factor, comprised of two items, represented the lowest ascription to a catastrophic problem formulation combined with high confidence in social response, named “Solution Confidence,” (e.g., “I am confident that people can work together to deal with climate change”) with a Chronbach alpha reliability of 0.590.

Next we explored the empirical relationship between disposition for Meta-Reflexivity and our three climate change reflexivity factors (Table 1). The general Meta-Reflexive disposition had a positive association with all three climate change reflexivity factors, with the strongest positive association with the “Climate Catastrophe” scale (0.333, p < 0.001), and a reasonably strong positive association with the “Small-scale Mitigation” scale (0.248, p < 0.001). The association with the “Solution Confidence” scale was weakest (0.087, p < 0.01).

Table 1.

Bivariate correlations between general and climate-based reflexivity categories.

	Meta	Auto	Catastrophe	Small-scale	Confidence
Meta	1
Auto	−0.129**	1
Catastrophe	0.333***	−0.181***	1
Small-scale	0.248***	−0.018	0.337***	1
Confidence	0.087*	0.329***	0.104**	0.227***	1

Predicting climate change mitigative behaviors

We explore the elements that predict climate change mitigative behaviors with emphasis on the degree to which our indicators of reflexivity contribute independently from measures commonly used in previous research (Table 2). The regression analysis unfolds with a series of stepwise equations, progressively adding additional items in the following order: (a) overall perceived threat; (b) climate change beliefs; (c) perceived risk; (d) ecological and economic worldviews; (e) socio-demographic attributes; (f) climate change reflexivity and (g) general reflexivity. Our strategy for the order of entry was to assess the marginal contribution to prediction and understanding of the reflexivity subdomains and climate reflexivity scales. We have substantial missing data for some items, especially the socio-demographic attributes, such as presence of children at home, political views, education and most notably, income. Our original regression analysis, therefore, saw a concomitant decline in working N in the regression model (cases with missing data were excluded listwise from the analysis): from the 1020 cases down to 564. As a result, we conducted a multiple imputation for missing data (Harel and Zhou, 2007; Yuan, 2010) where values are substituted for missing values. Multiple imputation “replaces each missing value with a set of plausible values that represent the uncertainty about the right value to impute, by…represent[ing] a random sample of missing values” (Yuan, 2010:1). Fifty imputations were conducted, and the results combined [averaged] for the regression analysis. We present our ordinary least squares (OLS) regression tables using both the original and the new data set. Substantively, results differed very little between the two; the subsequent presentation of results is based on the data set created with the multiple imputations to reduce the problem of missing values.

Table 2.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) model predicting summed scale of reported behaviors.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7
(50 Imputations)	Beta	SE	Beta	SE	Beta	SE	Beta	SE	Beta	SE	Beta	SE	Beta	SE
(Constant) (B)	0.209	0.003	0.024	0.005	0.099	0.006	−0.015	0.008	−0.163	0.010	−0.257	0.010	−0.404	0.010
Overall Threat	0.427***	0.001	0.182***	0.002	0.099*	0.002	0.089*	0.002	0.093**	0.002	0.048	0.002	0.043	0.002
Climate impacts negative			0.360***	0.001	0.234***	0.002	0.167***	0.002	0.171***	0.002	0.126***	0.002	0.116***	0.002
Climate impacts positive			0.008	0.001	0.030	0.001	0.051	0.002	0.058*	0.001	0.037	0.001	0.039	0.001
Likelihood					−0.043	0.001	0.034	0.001	0.027	0.001	0.018	0.001	0.006	0.001
Severity					0.145***	0.001	0.122***	0.001	0.107***	0.001	0.095*	0.001	0.104**	0.001
Controllability					0.068*	0.001	0.084**	0.001	0.073**	0.001	0.043	0.001	0.036	0.001
Acceptability					−0.110***	0.001	−0.091***	0.001	−0.088**	0.001	−0.055	0.001	−0.046	0.001
Ecological Worldview							0.169***	0.001	0.178***	0.011	0.141***	0.001	0.112***	0.001
Economic Worldview							−0.040	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.001
Education								0.001	0.082	0.001	0.095**	0.001	0.071**	0.001
Political Views								0.001	0.082	0.001	0.070**	0.001	0.066**	0.001
Employed in Natural resource industry (self)									0.010	0.002	0.012	0.002	0.010	0.002
Employed in Natural resource industry (HH)									0.041	0.002	0.044	0.002	0.045	0.002
Income									0.023	0.001	0.025	0.001	0.010	0.001
Children Living at Home									−0.006	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.002
Climate Change Reflexivity “Catastrophe”											0.130***	0.001	0.100***	0.001
Climate Change Reflexivity “Small-scale Mitigation”											0.122***	0.001	0.097***	0.001
Climate Change Reflexivity “Solution Confidence”											0.054*	0.001	0.046	0.001
General Reflexivity Scale Meta-reflexivity													0.205***	0.001
General Reflexivity Scale Autonomous Reflexivity													−0.039	0.001
Df (residual)	52120		52121		52121		52121		51619		51616		51614
F	11647.2		5864.1		2917.4		2517.3		1630.0		1536.0		1621.9
R² (adj)	0.183		0.252		0.281		0.303		0.321		0.349		0.386
Change in R² (adj)	n/a		0.069		0.029		0.022		0.018		0.028		0.037

***Significant at 0.001; **significant at 0.01; *significant at 0.05.

The first model, including perceived threat items, explains 18% of the variation in behavioral outcomes (adjusted R² = 0.183). The perceived threat scale is significant at p < 0.001, with greater perceived threat associated with increased behavioral response. Adding climate change beliefs (Model 2) regarding impacts adds 9% of explained variation (adjusted R² = 0.252). Interestingly, while anticipating negative impacts appears mutually exclusive of anticipating positive impacts, expectations of positive impacts are no less likely to support climate change mitigative behavior. In contrast, the negative expected impacts item is strongly (p < 0.001) and positively associated with behavior. Adding perceived risk domains (likelihood, severity, controllability and acceptability) in Model 3 increases predictive power to 0.281. Variables that were significant in the prior model remain so, although the impact of the overall threat variable is substantially reduced and three of the four risk domains are also significant predictors of behavior: perceived severity and controllability positively so; perceived acceptability negatively so. In Model 4, Worldview items are added. Ecological Worldview items independently predict climate change mitigative behavior; Economic Worldview items do not. We again see a modest increase in the adjusted R²: 0.303. The variables statistically significant in prior models remain so. The addition of socio-demographic variables (Model 5) increases the R² to 0.321. Both educational attainment and political views are significantly related to behavioral response (p < 0.01): higher education and liberal political orientation are each associated with greater willingness to engage in the listed behaviors.

In Models 6 and 7, we turn to our reflexivity variables. The climate change reflexivity subdomains (Model 6) increases the R² to 0.349. All three climate change reflexivity subdomains affect behavior significantly, with the strongest prediction coming from the “small-scale mitigation” factor: those believing that these mitigative actions are workable solutions are – quite reasonably – more willing to engage in them. Perceived threat of climate change is no longer significant. Finally, with the addition of the Reflexivity Theory-derived Meta and Autonomous Reflexivity subdomains in Model 7, we see a robust improvement in the explained behavioral variation, 38.6%. The Meta-Reflexivity subdomain becomes the single most powerful predictor of action, and all other previously significant predictors remain so, suggesting additive, rather than replicative prediction.

Discussion and conclusions

This study offers several contributions to climate change scholarship, and Reflexivity Theory. First, Meta-Reflexivity is the single most powerful predictor of mitigative behavior, in comparison to more common empirical measures of climate change concern and action such as perceived threat, gender and political ideology. This work also provides a valuable test of Archer’s Reflexivity Theory in two respects: a large sample quantitative exploration of Archer’s reflexivity typology, and an exploration of expressions of reflexivity in the specific context of a key crisis defining modernity. In response to our first research question – can Archer’s Reflexivity typology be validated empirically using quantitative measures and a large sample – results were strongest for Meta-Reflexivity, in terms of scale coherence and means, suggesting a prevalence of Meta-Reflexive dispositions in this population. Autonomous Reflexivity also demonstrated strong reliability. That mean scores for Meta-Reflexivity were higher than for Autonomous Reflexivity counters theoretical expectations. The stronger reliability findings for Meta-Reflexivity and Autonomous Reflexivity in comparison to Communicative Reflexivity are supported by Reflexivity Theory, which postulates that modern societies do not offer reinforcement for Communicative Reflexivity.

In our development of a Climate Change Reflexivity scale, the highest reliability was for a Climate Catastrophe disposition, characterized by the expectation that climate change will have catastrophic impacts, will not “fix itself,” and personal behavior changes alone are likely to have limited effect. The Small-scale Solutions disposition offers a more modest problem formulation and cautious degree of confidence in the ability to create change, combined with a strong affinity for individual- and community-level response strategies. Finally, the two-item Solution Confidence disposition is defined by low expectations of catastrophic consequences and high confidence that human ingenuity will step up to the task.

Interesting patterns of reflexive processing found between Archer’s Reflexivity subdomains and Climate Change Reflexivity warrant further inquiry. First, the finding that a disposition for Meta-Reflexivity lends itself to reflexivity toward climate change implies a degree of continuity, and may suggest relatively more support for Archer’s depiction of reflexive dispositions as relatively individually-derived, rather than Beck’s and others’ implication that reflexivity is induced by crisis moments, but more research would certainly be required to substantiate this. Second, a Meta-Reflexive disposition does not necessarily foster a common set of solution strategies. Some Meta-Reflexives were more inclined toward Climate Change Catastrophe, and others toward Small-scale Solutions, offering further evidence that our reflexive dispositions are indeed highly heterogeneous. They were not, however, mutually exclusive, suggesting that preference for one does not imply lack of support for alternatives. Associations between Autonomous Reflexivity and either of our climate change reflexivity factors are much weaker, resonating with Archer’s Reflexivity Theory – Autonomous Reflexives focused on the pursuit of personal gain are unlikely to invest reflexive energies into concerns perceived to have no bearing on those pursuits. Finally, despite the fact that Meta-reflexivity was the strongest predictor of engagement in mitigative behaviors, there remains a large gap between expressed affiliation with Meta-Reflexivity and action. This would come as no surprise to environmental attitude and behavior researchers who consistently point to a “value-action gap” (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002), but it does invite a refreshing reconsideration of conceptualizations of reflexivity. Many scholarly discussions tend to presume that reflexivity implies action, but reflexive processing is equally likely to be associated with inaction. One of the unique contributions of Archer’s articulation that has largely not been taken up elsewhere is the differentiation of reflexivity into three moments: problem formulation, project planning and implementation. The persistent gaps observed between reflexive problem formulation and practice are important areas for future research; they may suggest the particular salience of structural barriers to changes in consumptive practices, highlighting the importance Archer places on pre-requisite collective mobilization capable of challenging existing structural and cultural orders before morphogenesis can occur.

Finally, as this study exemplifies, one key element missing in Reflexivity Theory is the environment – the biophysical underpinnings of social institutions – and the unique means by which they induce reflexivity in people, directly through experience, as well as indirectly through cognition, as is the focus here. Those biophysical underpinnings may induce reflexivity not only of our place in the social world, but of our place in the natural world, and by extension impose certain imperatives on trajectories of social change. Rapid shifts in environmental conditions have implications for social institutions, but the nature of those implications emerges via interaction with the social sphere. The absence of a pro-active, collective response to climate change today, for example, will drastically contract the availability of resources (natural, financial) available to support future social structures, thus eliminating the likelihood for morphogenetic trajectories that require higher levels of resources.

The current study offers neither conclusive nor comprehensive empirical support for Archer’s Reflexivity Theory and its application to climate change. Certain methodological limitations are worthy of note. First, we note the relatively low response rate and the specialized regional nature of the work: Alberta is a fairly unique place with respect to climate change and it would be interesting to replicate the work in other types of populations. Second is the reliance on reported rather than observed behaviors, a well-recognized limitation of survey research. Third, social interaction and emergent structural outcomes – important components of Morphogenesis – were largely unexplored here, owing to the limitations of the methods employed, and should be a priority in future research. Social interaction is an important input into problem formulation and project development, but even more importantly as the venue in which agents pursue projects. Relationships between reflexivity and social interaction are dialectical; one’s social networks may offer support or sanction for specific reflexive dispositions, and draw more attention to some social problems than others. At the same time, reflexive individuals are a continuous source of influence in public discourses and the trajectories of change within social networks, which can induce higher-scale institutional change.

In regard to structural outcomes, we have reached a nexus at which the character of emerging social interactions will have monumental influence over our responses to climate change. A “business-as-usual” future trajectory, supported by elite beneficiaries of our fossil fuel-based economy, would inevitably lead to declines in the capacity of the earth to support complex social systems. Recent work draws attention to processes favoring morphostasis, such as Norgaard’s (2011) work highlighting the extent to which inaction is supported through hegemonic discourses that espouse the “social organization of denial” (see also Dunlap and McCright, 2011). Our prospects for avoiding such a trajectory are defined by institutional disruptions that constitute morphogenesis, which are ultimately rooted in the heterogeneous reflexive responses among individuals who do not make up the elite beneficiaries of our fossil fuel economy. As stated by Donati (2011:25), “emergent effects (structural elaborations) are not produced directly…but come into existence through the intervening factor of social reflexivity, which depends on the personal reflexivity of the actors.” What will be the outcomes for relations of power, distribution of resources, shifts in discourses, of social interactions among Meta-Reflexives vying for transformation, Autonomous Reflexives resisting such transformation and Communicatives attempting to abide by social norms? A low-carbon transition would require the concerted efforts of Climate Change Meta-Reflexives engaged within several different institutions and regional contexts, and their ability to overcome structural barriers. Future research questions then become, Where can we observe successful climate change Meta-Reflexive activities? Where do we see vacuums in such activities? Does a prevalence of Meta-Reflexivity within certain social milieus result in shifts in substantial outcomes in the form of climate change mitigation? What makes change-makers tick? How do they conceive of climate change differently than others? Today we have a robust body of research on the forces of stasis and inaction preventing effective responses to global warming; we now urgently need to draw more sociological attention to the forces of reflexive change.

Footnotes

Notes

Funding

Financial Support for the research was provided by a grant from the Foothills Research Institute of Alberta.

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