Cartel Economies and Urban Governance: The Interplay of Performative Politics,Social Embeddedness,and Land Control in Nairobi's Informal Settlements

Abstract

French

Land governance in Nairobi is shaped by hybrid systems that blur the boundaries between formality and informality, especially in informal settlements which houses over 60 per cent of the city's population. Land cartels have emerged as powerful intermediaries, controlling access to land and services through “informal” channels. This article examines how cartels operate, sustain authority, and influence urban development in Korogocho, one of Nairobi's largest informal settlements. Using a Critical Urban Political Ecology framework, the study reframes cartels as structurally embedded actors central to Nairobi's urban metabolism. Based on a systematic literature review, 45 interviews, six focus group discussions, participatory mapping, and field observation, we find that cartels exploit both state tools and community legitimacy. Their power is rooted in long-standing relationships, trust, and entanglements that cast them as protectors and gatekeepers. Both they and officials engage in performative politics to mask systemic failures. These findings challenge legality/illegality binaries and call for rethinking governance through embedded informality and political performance.

Keywords

Nairobi cartel economy informal settlements performative politics land tenure insecurity urban land governance

Introduction

According to the Center for Affordable Housing, Kenya has an accumulated housing deficit of 2.0 million housing units, growing by 200,000 units annually. This growing gap stems from demand for 250,000 housing units against an estimated supply of 50,000 units every year (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance, 2023). Widespread urban poverty forces many to live in informal settlements, where privately owned and public land is often controlled and occupied illegally by informal organisations that are locally called “land cartels.” These actors control land transactions without regulation, perpetuating corruption and exacerbating the housing crisis (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance, 2023). The rise of these land cartels and shadow land markets dates back before independence when Africans were confined to the outskirts of Nairobi in informal settlements and were not allowed to own land in the city (K'Akumu and Olima, 2007).

Nairobi is home to approximately five million people (County Government of Nairobi, 2023) of whom more than 60 per cent reside in informal settlements that occupy 5 per cent of residential land and only 1 per cent of the total area of the city (UN Habitat, 2023). The historical legacy of social and spatial exclusion in urban planning has deep roots in colonial and postcolonial governance structures. Nairobi exemplifies how discriminatory historical and current urban policies and practices cause spatial concentration of poverty and create informal settlements, thereby exacerbating marginalisation (Burugu, 2015). The illicit land market controlled by cartels has flourished in these neglected areas.

In this article, the term “land cartel” is used in an expanded, analytical sense to describe informal yet enduring arrangements among local elites that concentrate control over land transactions and land-use governance. While cartel conventionally refers to formal economic or business consortia, particularly in competition law where it denotes collusive agreements among firms to fix prices, limit output, or divide markets – thus undermining competition and triggering regulatory sanctions – the term has evolved in criminal studies to describe illicit, profit-driven syndicates sustained by corruption and extralegal networks. This criminal usage, derived from the Italian/Spanish cartello (a pact among producers), highlights the strategic coordination and shadow governance typical of such formations (Kleemans, 2013; Magaloni et al., 2020).

In Korogocho, residents use cartel in a looser, context-specific sense, often interchangeably with terms like “mafias,” “land grabbers,” or “government of thieves,” to describe brokers, developers, state-linked actors, and fixers who dominate land access and service provision (Fieldwork 2023–2024). While often seen as exploitative, these actors are also perceived as necessary substitutes for absent or ineffective state functions. This article adopts this emic usage, rooted in lived experience and local vocabulary, to foreground how these actors consolidate authority through informal rules, relational networks, and political access. These cartels are not formal institutions but operate in ways that resemble regulatory capture, elite collusion, or shadow governance, often in tension with democratic or legal norms. This article's conceptual framing, elaborated in the urban land governance and the cartel economy in Nairobi’s informal settlements section, draws on scholarship on informal institutions and hybrid political economies to illuminate how land cartels function as both self-interested actors and de facto service providers in Nairobi's informal settlements. Their presence prompts critical questions: How do land cartels form and sustain influence? Who are the key actors shaping land dynamics, particularly along Nairobi River's riparian zone, and how do performative politics and social embeddedness underpin their operations?

The paper is organised as follows: the urban land governance and the cartel economy in Nairobi’s informal settlements section presents the literature review, outlining the historical and contemporary dynamics of land governance in Nairobi's informal settlements. The towards a conceptual framework for urban land governance section discusses the conceptual framework, drawing from Critical Urban Political Ecology (CUPE) to theorise the concept of land cartels. The methodology section details the methodology, including the case study design, data collection techniques, and systematic literature review process. The results section presents the findings, focusing on the roles of performative politics and social embeddedness in sustaining land cartels. Finally, the discussion section presents the discussions and the final section concludes with reflections on the papeŕs contributions to CUPE.

Urban Land Governance and the Cartel Economy in Nairobi's Informal Settlements

Urban Land Markets in Kenya

Research reveals that (in)formal yet influential actors shape land governance across various contexts. In Zimbabwe, peri-urban elites and land barons exploit reforms and institutional gaps to dominate markets and incite conflicts (Bhanye et al., 2024; Mudapakati et al., 2024). In India, “development mafias” and corruption demonstrate how political patronage influences land access (Doshi and Ranganathan, 2017; Weinstein, 2008), while in politically unstable cities, trader associations strategically consolidate power (Bandauko and Arku, 2025). Nairobi's land cartels exhibit similar patterns, where shadow governance, informality, and state complicity shape urban land markets. Rapid urbanisation, growing informal settlements, and weak enforcement exacerbate these dynamics: over 60 per cent of Nairobi's population live in informal settlements which are expanding at 4.1 per cent annually. These inhabitants face eviction threats, poor infrastructure, limited formal housing, and exclusion from planning (Githira, 2016; Mundia and Aniya, 2006; UN Habitat, 2023).

This article approaches informality from both UN Habitat (2015) and Kenyan national policy definitions, highlighting the friction between international and domestic understandings. Kenya's legal instruments, including the National Slum Upgrading and Prevention Strategy (2024–2034), Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2016, and the ref: Government of Kenya, 2022, emphasise tenure insecurity and state-led regularisation. Meanwhile, UN-Habitat highlights vulnerability to speculative markets and environmental hazards. These definitional tensions influence how dominant actors and communities understand and manage informality in settlements like Korogocho. Interviews reveal that residents themselves define informality not only by the absence of legal regulations but by service-deficit and governance hybridity – where informal practices complement or substitute weak formal mechanisms. These competing frameworks have practical implications: they shape what kinds of interventions are seen as legitimate or effective and may result in fragmented or contradictory policy responses on the ground.

Land tenure in informal settlements remains highly fragmented, marked by overlapping claims and minimal coordination (Siakilo, 2014). Informal settlements function as affordable living areas for low-income residents who cannot access formal housing markets (Ono and Kidokoro, 2020; Ren et al., 2020). These spaces rely heavily on informal rental arrangements, often dominated by absentee landlords. This dynamic reinforces what Panek and Sobotova (2015) call “dead capital,” where land remains economically valuable but legally trapped. Yet, as Carrizosa (2022) notes, these settlements also sustain vibrant economic life. Nairobi's land market thus operates on a formality–informality continuum, with legal frameworks often circumvented across all income levels even in affluent neighbourhoods (Jimmy, 2024).

Ultimately, Nairobi's urban land economy is characterised not simply by administrative failure, but by systemic hybridity. Despite having legal tools such as zoning and titling, enforcement gaps have normalised practices such as bribery, unauthorised development, and informal transfers (Joireman, 2011; Kamunyori, 2016). Population density in the informal settlements is estimated to exceed 63,000 people per km² (Mundia and Aniya, 2006). Under these conditions land cartels exploit regulatory ambiguity to consolidate control. Sverdlik et al. (2025) argue that even substandard housing can yield high returns, making informal settlements central to urban capital accumulation. Informality in Nairobi must therefore be understood as an entrenched, adaptive governance modality, an “order in disorder” (Schroeder, 2021), that functions across socio-economic strata and embeds actors such as land cartels within both community systems and state structures.

In/Formality as Continuum: Formal Land Systems in the Shadow

Urban land governance in Nairobi's informal settlements is best understood through the concept of hybrid governance and institutional bricolage, where both state and non-state actors co-produce authority, regulate land access, and deliver services in areas more or less neglected by formal planning systems. Table 1 shows that actors such as village elders, chiefs, brokers, and community-based organisations perform roles typically associated with formal institutions, including land allocation, dispute resolution, and documentation of structures (Joireman, 2011; Kamunyori, 2016). These (in)formal systems are not ephemeral substitutes; rather, they are durable mechanisms rooted in colonial legacies and adapted through local social norms. Their longevity and legitimacy illustrate how informal governance has become institutionalised, especially in rapidly growing informal settlements.

Table 1.

Power Dynamics in Land Governance in Informal Settlements.

Actor/force	Nature of power	Primary practices and roles	Effect on residents	How literature characterises them	Parallel in affluent areas
Village elders	Customary, community-based, legitimised by tradition	Mediate disputes, allocate plots, organise communal tasks, maintain social norms	Trusted by many; offer accessible justice, though roles vary by village	Described as adaptive governance figures filling legal gaps (Cleaver, 2012; Kamunyori, 2016)	Traditional clan councils or landowner committees managing rural estates
Local chiefs	State-delegated, hybridised authority	Issue temporary occupation licences, record structures, resolve conflicts	Seen as both helpful and extractive; central to land recognition	Viewed as “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” (Joireman, 2011); key hybrid actors (Lund, 2006)	Local planning officers who selectively enforce zoning laws
Community organisations	Organised civic power, often linked to NGOs	Mobilise residents, document housing, push for services or tenure security	Build collective agency, support formalisation efforts	Seen as grassroots planners and intermediaries (Huchzermeyer, 2011; SDI Kenya, 2020)	Residents’ associations lobbying county assemblies for amenities
Religious leaders	Moral authority, informal mediator	Intervene in land disputes, promote peace, support vulnerable residents	Mixed trust; respected by some, questioned by others	Sometimes mediate urban conflict or uphold social order (Karanja, 2021)	Faith leaders advocating for ethical real estate development
Informal brokers/land cartels	Negotiated authority, often self-appointed	Facilitate land access or rentals, connect residents to chiefs or landlords	May ease processes but also charge fees or distort access	Identified as part of informal land networks (Pfingst and Kimari, 2021; Syagga et al., 2002)	Estate agents or middlemen charging facilitation bribes for title processes
Structure owners	Recognised in practice but without formal title	Allocate plots, enforce tenancy rules, gatekeep utilities, collect “infrastructure fees”	Exert landlord control; reinforce inequalities; act as power brokers	De facto land controllers; actors in “petty landlordism” (Lines and Makau, 2018)	High-end developers negotiating “expedited approvals” with authorities
Youth groups	Collective, enforcement-based	Impose protection fees, mobilise in favour/against development actors	Can threaten dissent or offer security; seen as both agents and resistors	Para institutional actors of informal control (Mutahi, 2011)	Private security contractors in gated communities control access
County officials	Formally appointed/elected but informally influential	Overlook illegal extensions, endorse zoning violations, engage in symbolic governance	Undermine planning laws; reinforce informal status quo	Actors of performative governance (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011)	Planners ignoring code violations in affluent suburbs for political favour
Residents’ committees	Established under upgrading programmes	Vet projects, manage NGO relationships, control community funds (often captured)	Shape inclusion/exclusion in development; can be co-opted	Community gatekeepers; intermediaries of participation (Cleaver, 2012)	HOAs determining contractor access and lobbying local authorities

Up to 70 per cent of land transactions in Nairobi take place through informal channels, often yielding significant economic returns. Structure owners in Kibera, for example, recover investments in under two years (Syagga et al., 2002). These practices exemplify Cleaver's (2012) concept of institutional bricolage, where diverse governance logic – customary, legal, and pragmatic – coalesce to meet urban needs. In settlements like Korogocho, local legitimacy often supersedes statutory regulation, producing a layered governance landscape. However, as intermediary actors like brokers and structure owners consolidate influence, contestations over legitimacy arise. Informal authority, once adaptive and responsive, becomes a mechanism for monopolisation and exclusion, especially when linked to powerful networks with coercive or extractive capacities.

Cartels in Nairobi exist parallel to the formal state-controlled system, but they are neither purely criminal syndicates¹ nor external disruptors. They are socially embedded networks composed of structure owners, brokers, youth groups, chiefs, civil servants, and occasionally professionals or academics (Maru et al., 2024). Operating at the intersection of informal governance and political patronage, these actors navigate both functional and coercive roles as shown in Figure 1. Some manipulate slum upgrading to extract rents or influence planning processes; others deliver vital services where the state is absent (Kamunyori, 2016; Kimari and Parish, 2020). Their flexibility is underscored by their fluidity within illicit markets, from land fraud to gold scams (Directorate of Criminal Investigations, 2024).

Figure 1.

How Land Cartels Interact with Other Actors.

Government officials frequently denounce these networks, yet simultaneously enable them through tacit complicity, a dynamic mirrored in the study of Corburn et al. (2022) of Mukuru. This form of performative politics, where leaders enact reformist gestures while preserving informal privileges, sustains the power of cartels. Table 2 shows that cartels align with local chiefs and county officers, exploiting weak regulatory oversight and blurring the boundaries between formal and informal systems. This is not unique to poor areas – elite developers in Kilimani² also use informal means to bypass planning controls (Jimmy, 2024), which shows that illegality is embedded across socio-economic strata.

Table 2.

Cartel Strategies and Parallels.⁴

Strategy	Description	Example in Korogocho	Common actors involved	Core traits/example functions	Affluent-area parallel
Co-production of order	Cartels and state actors jointly govern land access and dispute resolution.	Structure owners sit on county forums, allocating plots in exchange for political support.	Structure owners, local chiefs, county officials	Collaborative governance, power-brokering, negotiation over plot allocation and legitimacy	Developers fund “community outreach” events to secure planning approvals.
Performative politics	Public denunciations of cartels are paired with symbolic gestures (tree-planting, digitisation launches) that leave informal practices intact.	Rivers Commission launch with no follow-up; media-highlighted “cartel purges” that never materialise.	Politicians, county officials, media	Symbolism over substance, maintaining status quo while appearing reformist	Press releases on “crackdown” of over-height buildings, while inspectors still rubber-stamp them.
Embedded authority	Long-standing community ties legitimize cartel actors; historic tenure claims are institutionalised through upgrading programmes.	KSUP 2008 formalises claims of structure-owner descendants, embedding them in residents’ committees.	Elders, long-term residents, structure owners	Community legitimacy, conflict resolution, plot allocation	Legacy homeowners’ groups influence condo bylaws to favour long-term residents over new buyers.
Shadow revenue extraction	Informal fees at every transaction point – from plot access to service connections – create a predictable income stream for cartels.	Brokers charge KES 5,000 per plot access; youth collect KES 500 monthly “security levy.”	Brokers, youth groups, structure owners	Rent-seeking, fee inflation, coercive collection	Estate managers charge “expedited processing” fees of up to 10 per cent of project value.
Programme co-optation	Cartel actors infiltrate slum-upgrading or development committees to steer resources towards their interests and stall unwanted projects.	Committee members delay water-project approvals when not contracted by structure-owner networks.	Structure owners, residents’ committees, NGO liaisons	Obstruction, elite capture, selective participation	Local HOA committees block infrastructure upgrades unless contractors pay kickbacks.
Multi-scalar networking	Cartels operate through interlinked nodes – from village elders to national land agencies – ensuring influence over policy, planning, and local enforcement.	Chiefs coordinate with county officers to approve informal subdivisions; national land officials turn a blind eye to forged deeds.	Chiefs, brokers, national planners, land registry officials	High-level collusion, forgery, strategic tolerance	Developers lobby both city hall and national ministries to maintain favourable building regulations.
Coercive enforcement	Uses threats, violence, and intimidation to enforce control and compliance.	Youth groups forcibly evict tenants or seise plots for hire.	Rogue youth groups, enforcers, ex-security personnel	Violence, intimidation, forced evictions	Private security firms “muscle out” competitors in contract disputes in wealthy estates.
Service-oriented fixes	Offers informal services such as protection, dispute mediation, or access facilitation – often masking extractive motives.	Religious leaders help resolve land disputes or coordinate garbage collection.	Religious leaders, “fixers,” community gatekeepers	Mediation, service provision, local influence	Estate managers facilitate quick fixes for rule-bending homeowners for a fee.

These networks generate a parallel governance system. Structure owners extract monthly rents ranging from KES 1,000–5,000, brokers charge “connection fees” to facilitate plot access, and chiefs demand “recording fees” to document dwellings. Youth groups may collect “informal taxes” or offer protection in exchange for payment. Table 3 shows that though extralegal, this informal revenue stream creates predictability in land and service access, stabilising daily life in the absence of formal state services (Kamunyori, 2016; Kimari and Parish, 2020). However, such control also enables obstruction. In Korogocho and Kibera, structure owners and affiliated cartels have disrupted participatory forums and manipulated upgrading processes to maintain rent flows (Anyango, 2022; Burugu, 2015; Ipamba, 2019). Cartel dominance has also undermined tenure security; in Korogocho and Mathare, 55 per cent of land disputes involve cartel actors like brokers or structure owners (Vusha, 2018; Wahome, 2022). Even digital titling initiatives and community land claims are often co-opted by cartels to consolidate control, exploiting regulatory ambiguities and weak enforcement (Datta and Hoefsloot, 2024; Jimmy, 2024; Sverdlik et al., 2025).

Table 3.

Economic Flows Within Cartel-Controlled Zones.⁵

Actor/role	Type of economic flow	Estimated value/range	Function of payment
Structure owners	Rent collection	KES 1,000–5,000 per unit/month	Housing provision, informal tenancy
Brokers	Connection or facilitation fees	KES 500–10,000 (case dependent)	Securing plots, mediating access to land or housing
Chiefs/local leaders	Recording fees or permissions	KES 200–2,000 per plot	Informal documentation of land use or ownership
Youth groups	“Security” or protection fees	KES 50–500/week from businesses	Safety enforcement, eviction muscle
Political patrons	Project influence, loyalty payments	Variable/non-transparent	Blocking or enabling upgrading, informal land reallocations

Drawing from this evidence, we define land cartel economies as hybrid governance systems in which socially embedded actors (i.e. structure owners, brokers, chiefs, and politicians), co-produce access to land by leveraging informal legitimacy and selective engagement with state institutions. These cartels flourish in spaces of legal ambiguity, where informal practices are normalised and institutional complicity is routine. Their authority is sustained by performative politics and masked through public displays of legality and reform. This article situates them at the core of Nairobi's urban land economy as symptoms and agents of uneven urban governance. Recognising their embeddedness is essential to rethinking land reform strategies, particularly in high-density settlements like Korogocho, where informal power structures and state authority are deeply entangled.

Towards a Conceptual Framework for Urban Land Governance

This paper uses a CUPE framework to interrogate the role of land cartels in shaping Nairobi's informal urban land markets. CUPE enables a relational analysis of how power, capital, and governance coalesce in the production of urban space, treating cities as socio-ecological assemblages shaped by conflict and uneven development (Angelo and Wachsmuth, 2013). The approach situates informal land markets not as aberrations from official planning but as central sites through which urbanisation is negotiated, contested, and commodified. Gandy (2021) calls for an expanded CUPE that engages with agency, scale, and the symbolic practices of urban actors, thereby opening space to theorise land cartels as institutionalised, relational actors embedded within the metabolism of the city. Tzaninis et al. (2020) expand CUPE by incorporating peri-urban and marginal spaces, where urban expansion is often governed as much through informal power as by formal rules.

This article conceptualises land cartels as pivotal intermediaries in Nairobi's fragmented and hybrid land economy. Drawing on Simone's (2004) and Roy's (2005) theorisation of informality as both improvisational and strategic, it contends that cartels influence not only who accesses land but also how plots of land are defined, transacted, and regulated. Through their entanglement with state actors, these cartels actively shape planning outcomes, often evicting or displacing low-income residents under the guise of slum upgrading (Kimari, 2016; Yunda and Sletto, 2017). As Kimari and Parish (2020) and Leaf (1992) argue, informal markets often have their own internally coherent systems of governance and legitimacy but are rendered “illegal” only when they threaten elite or state interests. In informal settlements, cartels manage plot allocation, mediate land disputes, and control housing supply, thereby structuring the very foundations of urban development in contexts where formal mechanisms are weak, absent, or selectively applied.

Land cartels also derive power through the performative politics of urban governance, whereby both state and non-state actors engage in symbolic actions that sustain the illusion of legality and order. As Swyngedouw (2004) conceptualises, the city is produced through ongoing contestation between formal rules and informal practices. Public demolitions, infrastructure rollouts, and digitisation schemes function as spectacles of state authority, even as government actors collude with informal power brokers behind the scenes (Sergi and Storti, 2020). Roy (2005) critiques this duality, noting that the state's selective application of legality protects politically insulated actors while criminalising the urban poor. Cartels operate with dual legitimacy in this context: publicly denounced but privately engaged. They thrive within this duplicity, leveraging public performance to cloak private consolidation.

The social embeddedness of land cartels further complicates efforts to classify or regulate them. Rather than external disruptors, these actors are often deeply rooted in community histories, institutional arrangements, and everyday forms of negotiation. Drawing on the work of Kleemans (2013) and Jaspers (2020), the study understands illicit urban markets as entangled with formal governance. Cartels in Korogocho, many of whom evolved from former community leaders or youth organisers, maintain legitimacy through long-standing ties with residents, religious institutions, and chiefs (Burugu, 2015; Maru et al., 2024). They play active roles in service delivery – managing water access, enforcing informal tenancy rules, and coordinating land transactions. As Rigon (2016) and Wahome (2022) demonstrate, these actors are not passive beneficiaries of a broken system; they actively produce governance outcomes, shape urban infrastructure, and claim a central place in political negotiations, especially during slum upgrading processes. Their embeddedness blurs distinctions between legality and legitimacy, thereby frustrating traditional policy responses rooted in formalist logic.

The CUPE framework enables the conceptualisation of informal settlements as sites of contested authority, where cartels engage in performative politics to claim legitimacy while remaining deeply entangled in local and institutional networks. The article further draws on critiques of De Soto's (2000) property rights thesis to highlight the disjuncture between state imaginaries of order and the lived realities of residents and structure owners. Through this synthesis, the study contributes to a more relational and politically grounded understanding of how land is governed in Nairobi's informal settlements. In doing so, it advances a postcolonial urban critique, aligned with Roy (2005) and Mbembé and Nuttall (2004), that sees informality not as a deviation from modern urbanism but as a constitutive feature of it. Land cartels, as both coercive and facilitative actors, exemplify the complex interplay between regulation, resistance, and adaptation in the making of Nairobi's urban futures.

In sum, CUPE enables a grounded understanding of how land governance in Nairobi's informal settlements emerges through complex entanglements of power, space, and infrastructure. As recent scholarship on African spatial orders emphasises, territorial authority is not imposed from above but co-produced through contested negotiations, everyday practices, and infrastructural claims (Boeckler et al., 2018). This framework provides the conceptual foundation for analysing how land cartels function as informal but consequential producers of urban order.

Methodology

This study employs a mixed-methods approach to investigate land cartel economies and the role of structure owners in the informal settlement of Korogocho, Nairobi. This section begins by providing a detailed description of the study area, followed by an exploration of the research methods employed.

Study Area

Korogocho, located approximately 11 km northeast of Nairobi's Central Business District as shown in Figure 2 is one of the city's most densely populated informal settlements. In 2019, Korogocho had a population of 36,900 residents, living in 11,757 households across 0.9 km², resulting in a population density of approximately 42,401 persons per square kilometer³ (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Established between 1972 and 1978, Korogocho became a refuge for people displaced by earlier demolitions in Nairobi, particularly those forced to relocate under urban renewal programmes (The Weekly Review, 1977). The settlement's population is ethnically diverse, with Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and Kamba communities forming the largest groups. Despite the precariousness of its living conditions, Korogocho has developed into a self-sustaining community, with residents relying on informal economies such as street vending, recycling, and casual labour for their livelihoods (Ipamba, 2019).

Figure 2.

Map of Korogocho Informal Settlement.

Korogocho's land tenure system emerged in the late 1970s when the Nairobi City Council permitted settlers to occupy unalienated government land – then marked as sisal farm – informally. This prompted early inhabitants to erect semi-permanent shelters and, over time, convert these into rental properties for new migrants (Kamunyori, 2016; Muggah et al., 2012; UN Habitat, 2012). Over time, Korogocho's structure owners have become deeply embedded in local governance, a status formalised by the 2008 Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP). The KSUP acknowledged residents’ claims dating back to the 1970s and integrated them into decision-making processes to prevent unrest (Burugu, 2015; Mutua and Kiruhi, 2021). This shift followed the collapse of the 2001 upgrading effort, which failed due to conflicts over property rights and redistribution (UN Habitat, 2003).

The recognition of structure owners has entrenched them as both gatekeepers of the local economy and intermediaries between tenants, NGOs and government, even as tensions over land rights and development participation persist. As a result, structure owners have become key intermediaries in local governance, participating in residents’ committees and often resisting reforms that threaten their economic interests. Their increasing influence and resistance to reform has led to the formation of cartel-like networks, where owners control land, infrastructure, and political access, raising concerns about property consolidation and exclusionary outcomes (IFRA Nairobi, 2011; Mitullah and Nyakoe, 2014; UN Habitat, 2012). Their role has transformed from survival strategies to powerful governance mechanisms, with them often working alongside political actors to manipulate land allocations and rents, thereby entrenching social and economic disparities (Gathuthi et al., 2010).

Historically, the government's interventions in Korogocho's land tenure system have been driven by a need to address urban land shortages and provide services to the growing population. However, these initiatives have often disregarded the socio-political context of land occupation, exacerbating local tensions (Burugu, 2015). For example, the KSUP's prioritisation of structure owners, rather than formal landowners, led to the exclusion of residents with formal claims to land titles as in the Vision Peoples case, (Kenya Law, 2017) which brought attention to the conflicts between registered landowners and government interventions (Huchzermeyer, 2011). The prioritisation of structure owners over formal landowners underscores the importance of understanding both the historical and contemporary dynamics of structure ownership in informal settlements, as these are crucial for addressing land tenure insecurity and informing urban governance policies.

Originally a product of colonial land alienation and post-independence urban neglect, Korogocho is marked by marginalisation, with residents often feeling invisible to the state and acknowledged only during election seasons or when facing eviction. Often referring to themselves as “wanyonge” (the helpless or powerless) and “hustlers” (Chułek, 2019; Fieldwork, 2023–2024), Korogocho residents navigate these challenges through what Simone (2004) terms people as infrastructure. They create informal systems of mutual aid and governance to sustain daily life. This self-reliance is embodied in the concept of “Mtaa,” Swahili for neighbourhood or village. Mtaa reflects not just a physical space but the strong community bonds and collective identity that residents build, defend, and continuously improve. These bonds counter external narratives of deprivation and marginalisation (Chułek, 2019). The use of the term Mtaa over “slum” or “informal settlement” reveals a collective refusal to be defined solely by deprivation.

Methods

This study used a two-pronged research design combining a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) and primary qualitative case study research to explore the dynamics of land cartels and the governance of Korogocho. The SLR synthesised both historical and contemporary sources, including scholarly articles, policy documents, and grey literature, to build a comprehensive understanding of land governance and upgrading in informal settlements. The review was guided by three key search terms to capture relevant studies on urban cartels, informal settlements, and land governance in Kenya and the Global South, yielding seventy-one sources of literature. These were then screened against predefined inclusion criteria, including peer-reviewed status, methodological rigour, and relevance to the study's thematic focus. Following this, forty-three studies were selected and subjected to thematic synthesis, categorising them into key domains: land governance and tenure, slum upgrading, political economy, community engagement, and infrastructure provision. Table 4 summarises the distribution of the reviewed literature across these themes.

Table 4.

Thematic Categorisation of SLR Sources.

Thematic category	Representative sources	Number of sources
Land governance and tenure	Stellamaris (2019), Kameri-Mbote and Muriungi (2017), Vusha (2018), Wandaka (2019), Obala (2020), Wahome (2022)	10
Slum upgrading and participatory planning	Burugu (2015), Anyango (2022), Ipamba (2019), Achungo (2014), Muthama (2022), Mgele (2014), Mbathi (2012)	11
Political economy and informality	Rigon (2016), Kinyanjui (2023), Jimmy (2024), Mwangi (2018), Datta and Hoefsloot (2024), Woo and Jun (2020), Kothari (2021)	8
Community engagement and urban resilience	Weru et al. (2015), Musya (2023), Mitra et al. (2017), Muggah et al. (2012), Mitahi (2012), Ogweno (2023), Stacey (2019)	8
Infrastructure and service provision	Muchira (2017), Odongo and Ma (2021), Ochieng (2011), Wafula (2014), Osiol et al. (2017), Rodriguez Torres (2010), Adhiambo (2022), Chileshe (2019)	6

SLR: Systematic Literature Review.

Primary data collection took place in two phases between August 2023 and January 2024 and June 2024 to August 2024. The research employed purposive sampling and snowball techniques to identify participants, ensuring that key informants were selected based on their relevance to land governance and tenure issues within the settlement. A total of forty-five semi-structured interviews were conducted, targeting a range of participants: government officials (n = 7), civil society representatives (n = 5), informal settlement residents, including tenants, village elders, and youth leaders (n = 26), and private developers and structure owners (n = 7). Six focus group discussions were held (n = 6 groups; total participants = total FGD participants) with youth, women, elders, and displaced families to gather collective perspectives on land commodification. Six life-history interviews (n = 6) were carried out as distinct, in-depth narrative interviews with selected individuals; these life histories are reported separately from the forty-five semi-structured interviews. These interviews were complemented by extensive field observations to triangulate data and identify emerging themes. Ethical protocols were strictly followed, with all participants providing informed consent and assurances of confidentiality.

The data were analysed by Atlas.ti software. This qualitative analysis was guided by critical urban political ecology, focusing on power relations, governance structures, and socio-economic dynamics within Korogocho. The study's methodological approach also emphasised the importance of community participation, as outlined in participatory research models (Gurney et al., 2016), ensuring that the voices of marginalised groups, such as tenants and informal service providers, were adequately represented in the analysis. This approach to data collection and analysis allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the socio-political forces shaping land tenure, governance, and upgrading in the settlement.

Results

Our study highlights how land cartel economies in Nairobi's informal settlements represent hybrid governance systems that blur the lines between formality and informality. Far from being peripheral criminal actors, these networks are deeply embedded in daily urban life, functioning as de facto authorities over land access, services, dispute resolution, and community representation. The findings that follow illustrate how these dynamics unfold through five interrelated themes: co-produced urban order, performative politics, embedded authority and exclusion, normalised informality, and multi-level cartel influence.

Land Cartels as Co-Producers of Urban Order

Field data demonstrated that land cartels in Korogocho are entwined with formal governance structures; they function as co-governance actors and are deeply embedded in the urban landscape (Burugu 2015: 75). Participants identified cartels as composed of structure owners, youth groups, brokers, village elders, and often local chiefs (see Tables 2–4) – actors historically legitimised through customary and state systems. These cartels regulate access to land, mediate disputes, collect informal taxes, and often serve as intermediaries between the community and development actors.

This is the government or someone very powerful. They know the ‘who is who’ in the community. So, when they stand against you, even if you go to court, I doubt anything can be done … (Interview, Participant 18, September 2023)

This quote illustrates how land cartels command power that rivals the formal state by embedding themselves within community governance structures. Their historical trajectory – from state encouragement in the 1970s–1980s, through formal recognition in the 2008 KSUP programme, to their continued authority today – reflects a long-standing pattern of hybrid governance. Contrary to the misconception of cartels as purely criminal entities, participants described them as key providers of missing services and maintainers of order in the state's absence.

Some residents support them because they feel heard and supported by them and also [they] ‘get things done’. (Interview, Participant 10, June 2024)

However, perceptions differ significantly across stakeholder groups. While cartels’ governance role is acknowledged, concerns persist over their legitimacy, coercive power, and monopolistic tendencies. Table 5 categorises these concerns by stakeholder and offers representative quotes. The divergent perspectives seen in Table 5 confirm that cartels operate in a governance grey zone: their social embeddedness and community functions complicate attempts to categorise them simply as criminal, even as they exploit formal institutions for private gain.

Table 5.

Perceptions of Land Cartels Across Stakeholders.⁶

Stakeholder group	Perception of land cartels	Key insights
Government officials	- Threat to formal governance: Disruptive elements that exploit legal gaps and infiltrate formal institutions. - Corrupt influence: Issue fake titles, manipulate bureaucracy.	“They even have their own people inside county governments, issuing fake titles” (Interview, January, 2024) Officials report challenges enforcing laws where cartels operate.
Communities	- Ambivalent acceptance: Some residents view them as effective problem-solvers. - Feeling of exclusion: Others see them as self-interested actors who reallocate public benefits for private gain.	“Some residents support them because they ‘get things done.’”(Interview, September, 2023) “When reclaimed lands fall into cartel hands, it undermines community welfare.” (Interview, August, 2023) “Conflicts over land boundaries … exemplify the contested nature of their control” (Interview, January, 2024)
Civil society	Critical and watchful: Seen as informal networks exacerbating inequality and operating beyond legal oversight. Calls for reform: Urgent need for transparency and stronger regulatory frameworks.	“Cartels who have taken over the government … They are even sitting in Parliament” (Interview, July, 2023) NGOs stress the role of cartels in shaping land markets and reinforcing urban dysfunction.

Even with statutory frameworks and multiple agencies in place, weak enforcement and fragmented mandates, particularly between county and national government, create gaps that land cartels readily exploit (Interview, Participant 24, December 2023). They do not merely operate outside the law but actively intrude upon and derail formal initiatives: projects from which they stand to gain are co-opted, while those deemed unprofitable are subverted (Interview, Participant 24, December 2023). Moreover, a parallel set of informal norms often overrides legal titles, producing a de facto land regime in which residents recognise cartel authority over officially state-owned parcels (Interview, Participant 8, June 2024). Thus, land cartels both co-produce urban order and simultaneously destabilise, the formal institutions meant to govern Korogocho's land and development.

Performative Politics and the Reproduction of Illegality

Participants described a dual performance by the state and cartel actors: politicians publicly denounce land cartels but do little to dismantle them, while cartel actors stage displays of legitimacy, attending development meetings, sponsoring community projects, and presenting themselves as rightful representatives. A participant explained, “Politicians and media houses are just using us…” (FGD 5, November 2023). Public statements by officials over the past decade echo this contradiction: “They are here, they are everywhere, but you cannot see them” (The Standard, 2014); “We will start with reshuffling, and we will go on to purge them” (Reuters, 2016); and recent promises that digitisation will make cartels “history” (The Star, 2023).

The statements portray cartels as shadowy, elusive actors embedded in both formal and informal systems, making them difficult to confront. Over a decade, officials have issued bold but largely symbolic declarations, shifting from tough talk to technical fixes, without consistent action or evidence of success, a decade apart. Three interlinked problems emerge: (1) performative politics that prioritise declarations over lasting action; (2) shifting, inconsistent strategies (from punitive rhetoric to technical fixes) that underestimate the social embedding of cartels; and (3) systemic opacity, the “invisibility” of cartels, which indicates that solutions must extend beyond slogans or single interventions.

Korogocho residents expressed cynicism over such symbolic gestures. An example was the launch of the Nairobi Rivers Commission in Korogocho, which included tree planting and media spectacle but no tangible follow-up at the time.

Politicians and media houses are just using us. Nothing has changed since the launch … we still rely on our own contributions and volunteer work. (Focus Group Discussion 5, November 2023)

Residents expressed scepticism towards symbolic initiatives like the launch of the Nairobi Rivers Commission, which offered spectacle without follow-through. Similarly, land cartels use performative claims of legitimacy while privately steering land decisions to their advantage.

Embeddedness, Authority, and the Risk of Exclusion

The persistence of land cartels in Korogocho is closely tied to their deep social and institutional embeddedness. As documented in interviews as well as archival records, many of the structure owners who dominate the local land market trace their authority back to the 1970s and 1980s, when the state encouraged settlement but failed to formalise tenure. Their positions were further legitimised by the Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP) launched in 2008, which formally recognised structure owners’ claims to land to stabilise the area following previous upgrading failures and the post-election violence of 2007–2008.

Since then, land cartels have evolved into key figures in local governance, exercising control over land transactions, public space allocation, and participation in upgrading forums. Their embedded authority functions through networks of trust, coercion, political protection, and historic residency. As one participant stated:

The current landlords are children of the people who were brought here by the government when they were removed from near the CBD. But most remain squatters and have no titles. They lay claim and control the land. (Interview, Participant 15, September 2023)

Long-term structure owners now dominate residents’ committees and use their status to manipulate redevelopment for personal gain. This legacy has enabled structure owners to become both landlords and political intermediaries – roles that are difficult to challenge without threatening community stability. However, this same embeddedness has also produced exclusionary dynamics. Tenants, who now represent the majority of Korogocho's population, are increasingly marginalised in decision-making processes. Their vulnerability is heightened by land consolidation trends, often led by land cartels, anticipating redevelopment. The risk of displacement is growing as land consolidation increases in anticipation of redevelopment, reinforcing concerns about monopolistic gatekeeping by embedded elites.

If cartels perceive they won't benefit, they sabotage the project. (Interview, Participant 25, December 2023)

Politicians, aware of the electoral power of these communities, often tailor their strategies to secure votes rather than address systemic issues. Fear of backlash and losing support leads many to avoid controversial topics altogether.

Informal settlements are rich voting blocs … Most politicians will not touch the issue of land governance. (Interview Participant 8, August 2023)

When addressed, land governance issues are often tackled superficially to satisfy immediate concerns rather than implement long-term solutions. The focus remains on maintaining voter support through short-term, visible actions, perpetuating cartels, and superficial engagement with land governance issues.

Informality and the Normalisation of Shadow Markets

Land “cartels” in Nairobi do not lurk at the edges of the city's land market; they operate within an informal but normalised shadow land market that spans both low-income and affluent areas of Nairobi. In Korogocho, these actors provide informal services, enforce tenancy norms, and regulate access to infrastructure, functions often viewed by residents as necessary or even beneficial in the absence of effective state presence. Yet, this role blurs the boundary between legitimacy and exploitation. Chiefs and village elders, for instance, are formally recognised by the state but simultaneously implicated in rent-seeking and land grabbing. Their authority is reinforced through state delegation and informal governance practices.

When you build a structure without telling the village elder or the chief, in the next five minutes you will see them coming and demanding something [a bribe] … it's a longer chain than we can even imagine. (Interview Participant 17, September 2023)

In the affluent Kilimani area of Nairobi, a study by Jimmy demonstrates that developers use almost identical mechanisms, only scaled up and rebranded. “Developers here pay for ‘expedited processing,’ a series of under-the-table fees to planning inspectors, so their towers can rise floors above the official limit.” The study further confirms that planners publicly threaten the demolition of “illegal extensions” while privately approving them (Jimmy, 2024). Moreover, customary actors – village elders, and chiefs – embody “institutional bricolage” by blending statutory licences with customary norms. They resolve conflicts that formal courts cannot, yet they also extract rents as a resident notes:

They issue you a licence for your shack, but the minute you breathe, they want their cut—otherwise, you’re ‘illegal’. (Interview Participant 23, December 2023)

Additionally, attempts at slum upgrading are routinely captured. In Korogocho's 2008 Slum Upgrading Programme, structure-owners negotiated to keep plot shares: in Kilimani, Jimmy (2024) reports developers reserving “community units” in luxury condominiums, only to sublet them at a premium. In both contexts, the results confirm that informality is not a deviation from formal urbanism but a constitutive element of it, sustained by both regulatory failure and institutional complicity.

Cartels, Governance, and Nested Power Dynamics

Across Nairobi, land cartels constitute intricate, interwoven networks that span village committees, county authorities, and national land agencies. Participants consistently described how these cartels coordinate their interventions – from community “back-room” deal-making to high-level decisions about citywide zoning policies to ensuring that their influence shapes every stage of land governance. As one interviewee explains:

We have had different levels of cartels … It goes as high as you can imagine in the government. It's a controlled cartel. (Interview, Participant 17, September 2023)

Deploying bribes, legal manipulation, and co-opted bureaucrats cause cartels to quietly override formal checks on plot allocation, licencing, and building approvals. Cartel operatives embedded in county planning offices stamp illegal extensions or ignore unauthorised subdivisions, turning state institutions into instruments of shadow power rather than safeguards against it.

Chiefs hold a monopoly over public spaces. So when we approached them with our ideas, they denied us access. (Interview, Participant 5, August 2023)

Additionally, at the neighbourhood level, land cartels find their face in community elders and chiefs to exercise control over public spaces. They leverage their historical standing and official recognition to cement a hybrid authority that residents grudgingly accept as indispensable. Additionally, participants reported that land cartels are structured across multiple governance levels, from community-based groups to national land institutions. These networks oversee specific governance areas such as zoning, licencing, and plot allocation. In practice, however, they settle land disputes, impose “infrastructure fees,” and grant or withhold plot access, extracting rents at every turn. Their dual legitimacy, both customary and state-sanctioned, makes them powerful intermediaries capable of enforcing cartel dictates in the heart of communities.

In addition, even well-intentioned reform initiatives quickly fall under cartel sway, as hybrid authorities and complicit officials co-opt programmes for their benefit. From slum-upgrading schemes to environmental commissions, high-profile launches and media spectacles mask the absence of meaningful follow-through.

Our officials aren’t absent—they’re just covert. They profit more from informality than they ever would from transparent, regulated development. (Interview, Participant 1, August 2023)

It is evident that behind the scenes, the very actors tasked with reform divert resources, stall implementation, or repurpose benefits to shore up their patronage networks. In this performative governance paradigm, symbolic gestures replace substantive action, ensuring that the hybrid regime of formal and informal power remains unchallenged.

Urban Governance and Land Reform

The pervasiveness of land cartels and their symbiotic relationship with state actors reveal that informality in Nairobi's land markets is less an aberration than a politically engineered equilibrium. Participants voiced deep scepticism that conventional reform tools, such as titling programmes or regulatory crackdowns, could succeed without confronting the underlying incentives that bind cartels and officials together. As one community member explained:

Government officials can only make extra money by promoting the informal economy … they’re the ones behind the cartels. (Interview Participant 23, December 2023)

This sentiment highlights the political economy at the heart of urban governance: reform proposals that fail to dismantle rent-seeking networks will be co-opted or subverted. Indeed, the very committees and working groups intended to design and implement slum-upgrading or land-titling projects are often dominated by structure owners and cartel affiliates, systematically marginalising tenants, youth, and other vulnerable groups.

Moreover, when excluded from decision-making forums, land cartels deploy sabotage as a defensive strategy, derailing projects that threaten their interests. A surveyor working in government-led development projects in informal settlements in Nairobi recounted how well-meaning development initiatives were made to serve private agendas:

They sabotage development projects as a means to an end, and they are entangled in land ownership scandals. (Interview Participant 25, December 2023)

Tactics include manipulating public participation processes, blocking implementation through bureaucratic delays, and undermining legitimacy through misinformation or intimidation (Interview, Participant 25). Such sabotage is not random vandalism but a calculated response to protect lucrative informal charges and maintain control over land transactions. Public opposition to these practices is muted by fear of reprisal and eroded confidence in formal institutions, a dynamic illustrated by a community member:

Some people live in ‘shit’ houses not by choice, they could build better houses if they had land titles. (Interview, Participant 18, September 2023)

This sentiment underscores a paradox of informality: while it perpetuates insecurity and substandard living conditions, it also represents the only accessible pathway to land tenure and basic services for many residents. Consequently, any attempt to formalise land must reckon with the fact that informality currently delivers real, although imperfect, benefits to the urban poor.

Discussion

This section interprets the findings by framing land cartels as informal institutions embedded within formal governance structures, involving actors who are both unofficial and officially sanctioned. They sanction land access through coordinated, exclusionary practices and their authority emerges from social legitimacy, political ties, and institutional gaps. Framing them this way helps explain their role in co-producing urban order, sustaining illegality through performative politics, consolidating authority via embeddedness, normalising shadow markets, and operating across multiple scales. Each of these dynamics is explored in the subsections that follow.

Land Cartels as Co-Producers of Urban Order

The findings from Korogocho reinforce the conceptualisation of land cartels as embedded governance actors rather than mere criminal anomalies. These networks – composed of structure owners, brokers, youth groups, and state-aligned figures – operate within the gaps of formal governance, fulfilling roles typically reserved for state authorities. Their entrenchment in everyday urban life mirrors Cleaver's (2012) notion of institutional bricolage, whereby governance systems emerge organically from hybrid legalities and social necessity. Land cartels allocate plots, resolve disputes, regulate service access, and negotiate with NGOs and state agencies. They thrive within the co-produced governance landscape described by Kamunyori (2016) and Joireman (2011), reflecting the city's deeply hybrid land economy where over 70 per cent of transactions bypass formal channels.

As Boeckler et al. (2018) note, spatial order in African cities emerges through competing claims and fragmented sovereignties, rather than centralised control. In Korogocho, land cartels operate within this fragmented landscape, asserting territorial control through informal mechanisms that often intersect with formal governance structures. Far from undermining order, their practices constitute a situated form of spatial organisation under conditions of institutional plurality. Viewed through the lens of CUPE, these cartels are not peripheral actors but central agents in Nairobi's urban metabolism – intermediaries embedded within both community dynamics and state logics (Tzaninis et al., 2020). Their actions represent not anomalies but adaptive responses to a political economy shaped by contradictions, scarcity, and uneven state presence.

Performative Politics and the Reproduction of Illegality

A salient insight emerging from the data is the performative nature of state interaction with cartels. While political leaders publicly condemn cartels, fieldwork revealed that many officials benefit from these same informal economies. This dualism affirms Swyngedouw's (2004) view of cities as sites of symbolic statehood, where governance is enacted through performance rather than substantive intervention. The study observed how cartels participate in public meetings and slum-upgrading forums, presenting themselves as legitimate community representatives while resisting reforms threatening their interests. This duplicity is politically functional: it maintains a veneer of participation and legality while sustaining elite dominance over land and services. As Roy (2005) contends, the state produces informality selectively, using legality as a tool of control rather than inclusion.

This performative duality extends beyond informal settlements. As documented by Jimmy (2024), similar dynamics play out in elite neighbourhoods where developers exploit regulatory ambiguities to expand construction unlawfully, yet under the cover of reformist legal rhetoric. This widespread performativity – across income and space – suggests that illegality is not an aberration but a defining feature of Nairobi's urban governance. Government statements about fighting cartels, as seen in high-level media pronouncements from successive officials (The Standard, 2014; Wahome, 2022), serve more to reinforce state legitimacy than to address underlying structures of collusion and complicity.

Embeddedness, Authority, and the Risk of Exclusion

The social embeddedness of cartels in Korogocho is central to their stability and influence. Structure owners, many of whom have resided in the area since the 1970s, derive legitimacy not from legal title but from community history and political accommodation, especially after their claims were recognised in the 2008 KSUP programme. This recognition transformed them from informal actors into de facto authorities. However, this embeddedness has a double edge. While it enables predictable service delivery and conflict mediation, it also fosters exclusionary practices, particularly against tenants and newly arriving migrants. As wealthier individuals consolidate land in anticipation of redevelopment, the risk of displacement grows. This echoes Wahome's (2022) and Rigon's (2016) caution that embedded informal actors can evolve into monopolistic gatekeepers, hindering equitable development.

Field interviews reveal a growing marginalisation of renters, despite their numerical dominance in settlements like Korogocho. The collapse of the 2001 upgrading programme, triggered by structure owners’ resistance to redistribution, and the state's subsequent political accommodation in 2008 highlight how cartels gain legitimacy through both community ties and crisis management. This legitimacy, however, is rarely inclusive. In practice, upgrading programmes risk consolidating cartel control under the guise of community participation, unless mechanisms are established to ensure the representation of tenants, youth, and other non-owner groups.

Informality and the Normalisation of Shadow Markets

The study confirms that Nairobi's land economy does not merely tolerate informality, it requires it. The city's planning failures, regulatory gaps, and affordable housing crisis have created a demand for extra-legal mechanisms of survival. Cartels fill this vacuum, managing land access in a city where legal title remains unattainable for most. Informality here is not synonymous with disorder but constitutes an alternative logic of urbanisation, an “order in disorder” (Roy, 2005; Simone, 2004). As demonstrated in both Korogocho and upper-income areas like Kileleshwa (Jimmy, 2024), cartels operate across class and space, revealing that illegality is not marginal but systemic. Nairobi's formal and informal land markets are intertwined through patronage, strategic ambiguity, and regulatory failure.

Indeed, the illegalities observed in informal settlements mirror practices in formal developments, such as overbuilding or permit manipulation. This calls for a broader analytical lens, one that sees illegality as a continuum, rather than a fixed boundary between state and non-state actions. Land cartels, in this framing, do not exist outside governance; they are governance.

Cartels, Governance, and Nested Power Dynamics

The results reveal that cartels do not operate only at the community level. They are nested within broader networks of political patronage and bureaucratic complicity, extending into municipal and national institutions. As participants noted, land boards, chiefs, and even elected officials are implicated in these networks, blurring distinctions between informal authority and formal power. This reflects Lessing's (2020) concept of a “duopoly of violence,” where criminal and state actors co-produce governance.

Korogocho's cartels exemplify this entanglement. Chiefs, for instance, issue Temporary Occupation Licences and record land transactions, functioning as both regulators and enforcers. Their monopoly over public space reinforces their authority, even as they extract informal rents. Similarly, Residents’ Committees, initially established to facilitate upgrading, often act as cartel fronts. This underscores the need to avoid simplistic readings of community leadership as inherently progressive. Embeddedness confers legitimacy, but without checks, it can entrench inequality and coercion.

Implications for Urban Governance and Land Reform

The entrenchment of land cartels in Nairobi's informal settlements raises critical questions for land policy and urban reform. First, any effective intervention must reckon with the legitimacy and power of actors such as structure owners and local brokers. Ignoring them risks resistance while over-legitimising them risks exclusion and elite capture. Second, slum upgrading programmes must be accompanied by robust mechanisms of transparency, equity, and tenant protection, especially in areas with growing property consolidation. Third, the blurred boundaries between formality and informality suggest that policy should shift from binary enforcement to nuanced governance models that accommodate complexity without legitimising exploitation.

Conclusions

This article sheds light on the complex interplay of performative politics, social embeddedness, and urban land governance in perpetuating and reinforcing land cartels within informal settlements of Nairobi. We demonstrate how land Cartels in Korogocho initially arose to compensate for state neglect but quickly morphed into powerful cartels that wield influence via land grabbing, document forgery, zoning manipulation, and illicit real estate investment.

We establish that first, land cartels have emerged as essential co-producers of urban order – allocating plots, settling disputes, and negotiating developmental projects when formal institutions falter. This reframing challenges the notion of informality as residual: cartels perform roles akin to those of the state and cannot simply be “eradicated” without viable alternatives for land access, conflict arbitration, and infrastructure provision. Secondly, we find that performative politics is a deliberate strategy by which both cartels and state actors project legitimacy while perpetuating illegality. Despite public denunciations, covert cooperation remains. The rhetoric of reform becomes a smokescreen, reinforcing shadow-market dynamics rather than dismantling them. Thirdly, we establish that land cartels are deeply embedded at different levels of governance; they are rooted in customary legitimacy, state delegation, and community networks. This article demonstrates how these actors enforce “rules” through social contracts and coercion. Yet this embeddedness is double-edged: while it enables predictable service delivery, it also entrenches exclusion, marginalising tenants, youth, and newer migrants and replicating inequalities under the guise of community stewardship.

This article advances debates on urban land markets by showing that informality and illegality are central to Nairobi's governance regime. It challenges the conventional divisions of formal/informal and legal/illegal by demonstrating how land cartels co-produce urban order through their interactions with state actors and hybrid institutions. These findings extend CUPE by highlighting how performative politics and institutional bricolage sustain shadow markets despite public condemnation. This article further critiques policy approaches that focus on eradicating informality through top-down enforcement, advocating instead for governance models that recognise embedded actors, align incentives across governance levels and address the underlying logic of informality. CUPE's focus on scale, agency, and contestation offers a comprehensive understanding of land cartels as flexible assemblages responding to political and economic forces. The paper calls for land reform strategies that are sensitive to local histories, structural inequalities, and the contested nature of representation.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors extend their sincere gratitude to the residents of Korogocho for their invaluable contributions and insights. Versions of this article were presented at the European Conference on African Studies 2025 in Prague, Czech Republic, under the title Embedded Illegality or Adaptive Governance? Rethinking Urban Authority Through Nairobi's Land Cartels. We thank the conference participants for their constructive feedback.

Consent to Participate

Verbal consent was recorded before interviews began while written consent forms were filled and signed before interviews.

Consent for Publication

We obtained both verbal and written informed consent to publish the data obtained.

Ethical Considerations

The authors went through an extensive ethics review process conducted by the Center for Development Research at the University of Bonn.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) under the Development-Related Postgraduate Courses (EPOS) programme.

ORCID iDs

Valentine Opanga

Detlef Müller-Mahn

Notes

Author Biographies

Valentine Opanga is a doctoral researcher at the University of Bonn, specializing in the governance of urban green spaces in Nairobi's informal settlements. She holds a Master of Arts in environmental policy and a Bachelor of Arts in international studies from the University of Nairobi and has worked on international research projects with organizations like the World Bank and Oxfam.

Detlef Müller-Mahn is a professor of development geography at the University of Bonn, focusing on land use change and rural development in East Africa and the Middle East. He has served as the spokesperson for the Collaborative Research Center “Future Rural Africa” and authored numerous publications on political ecology and conservation.

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