Zimbabwe's Presidential Term Debate: A Social Media Reflection on Public Sentiment and Constitutionalism

Abstract

French

This study investigates discourse on X (formerly Twitter) surrounding President Mnangagwa's potential term extension in Zimbabwe. Using qualitative thematic analysis of 500 posts (2023–2025) and Digital Democracy Theory, it examines how competing narratives are mediated. Findings reveal predominantly oppositional discourse anchored in constitutional legality, with citizens invoking Section 91(2) as a primary tool of resistance, a form of “performative constitutionalism” driven by deep historical mistrust. Pro-extension narratives centred on developmental continuity exhibited internal contradictions, exposing intra-elite fractures and poor coordination within Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, in contrast to the unified state propaganda observed elsewhere in Africa. Critics further contextualised the term-limit debate within broader socio-economic failures, reinforcing opposition beyond legal arguments. The study demonstrates that X embodies Digital Democracy Theory's duality: a contested arena where citizen-led constitutional defence co-exists with state-aligned narrative management, while publicly exposing critical fractures within ruling power structures.

Keywords

Zimbabwe social media digital democracy presidential term limits constitutionalism X (formerly Twitter)political discourse

Introduction

Social media has fundamentally transformed how citizens engage with governance and participate in political discourse (Molony, 2014; Suharto, 2024). In politically constrained contexts such as Zimbabwe, where traditional media remain heavily state-controlled, platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and X (formerly Twitter) have emerged as alternative arenas for civic expression and contestation (Bingisai, 2024; Masimba and Mare, 2024; Ureke, 2024). These platforms not only amplify marginalised voices and expose governance failures but also mobilise citizens for collective action. However, they are increasingly contested spaces, vulnerable to disinformation, surveillance, and manipulation by political elites (Chibuwe, 2020; Mugari and Chisuvi, 2021). This dual role of social media is particularly evident in Zimbabwe's ongoing debate over President Emmerson Mnangagwa's potential term extension to 2030, which has sparked widespread public discourse about constitutionalism and democratic norms.

Historically, social media in Zimbabwe gained political salience during moments of national unrest, particularly during movements such as #ThisFlag and #Tajamuka, which used platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp to organise protests, articulate grievances, and challenge state narratives (Hove and Chenzi, 2020; Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021; Sabao and Chikara, 2020). For instance, the #ThisFlag campaign led by Pastor Evan Mawarire in 2016 mobilised citizens online to protest corruption and economic mismanagement under Robert Mugabe's rule. The movement demonstrated the power of digital platforms to amplify marginalised voices and coordinate grassroots action (Chiweshe, 2017; Musarurwa, 2016). Similarly, vendor protests and youth activism during this period underscored how social media could disrupt entrenched power structures and foster civic awareness (Chitukutuku, 2022; Maringira and Gukurume, 2023). Under the Second Republic led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa, social media remains a key space for public discourse, but its dynamics have evolved. Recent studies indicate that early optimism surrounding the president's promises of democratic renewal has largely been eroded by mounting evidence of authoritarian tendencies (Maringira and Gukurume, 2023). Platforms like X have become battlegrounds where citizens openly critique governance while pro-government accounts, such as the notorious Varakashi¹, deploy coordinated hashtags such as #ED2028 and #ZimbabweWillRise to legitimise Mnangagwa's continued rule (Bingisai, 2024; Chibuwe, 2020). For example, coordinated campaigns often frame term extensions as essential for economic recovery, revealing the state's strategic use of social media to influence public sentiment (Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021; Mungwari and Ndhlebe, 2019).

Globally, the double-edged nature of social media, its potential to democratise and destabilise, is well-documented in studies that examine how platforms foster civic engagement while also enabling manipulation, polarisation, and electoral disinformation (Mututwa and Akpojivi, 2023; Roberts and Oosterom, 2024; Uwa and Ronke, 2023). For instance, Suna (2024) and Ubong (2024) revealed how social media, while enabling civic participation among youth populations, also became a vehicle for disinformation and political polarisation during electoral periods in contexts such as India and Nigeria. In Africa, similar patterns emerge: Uganda's debates on Museveni's term extensions (since 2005) have seen Twitter bots amplify pro-regime narratives while dissenters use hashtags such as #UgandaIsBleeding for mobilisation (Njiro et al., 2025); Nigeria's #NotTooYoungToRun (2018) linked age/term limits to youth activism but faced elite counter-framing via paid influencers (Ajaegbu and Ajaegbu, 2024). In Zimbabwe, this duality is particularly pronounced due to the state's historical control of traditional media and its increasing focus on influencing digital platforms. The 2019 internet shutdown, which coincided with nationwide fuel protests, reflected the regime's readiness to suppress digital dissent by cutting off access to social platforms during peak unrest (Bingisai, 2024; Masimba and Mare, 2024; Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021). These tensions inform this study's central research question: How does X mediate and shape discourse on presidential term limits in Zimbabwe, reflecting Digital Democracy Theory's (DDT) duality of empowerment and manipulation?

This article contributes to existing scholarship by moving beyond a simple analysis of dissent versus propaganda. It specifically investigates how a deep-seated historical mistrust of political institutions shapes the nature of online constitutional debate, revealing not only a contest of narratives but also a profound crisis of legitimacy that plays out in the digital sphere. By analysing the specific arguments, frames, and counter-frames, we demonstrate how X functions as an arena in which citizens instrumentally use the language of constitutionalism as a primary tool of resistance against perceived authoritarian consolidation. The study is grounded in DDT, which examines how information and communication technologies (ICTs) facilitate civic participation while simultaneously reproducing and entrenching existing power asymmetries (Bingisai, 2024; Chibuwe, 2020; O'Connor and Weatherall, 2024). The study seeks to illuminate both the opportunities and challenges associated with using social media as a mechanism for accountability and the promotion of constitutionalism within Zimbabwe's evolving political landscape. It advances existing scholarship by foregrounding the visibility of intra-elite fractures, particularly contradictions within Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), as expressed on X. Unlike earlier studies that have predominantly focused on grassroots or opposition-led dissent, this analysis demonstrates how elite-level contestations are publicly articulated on digital platforms, with broader implications for understanding similar dynamics in other African contexts, including Uganda and Nigeria. It aims to contribute to a broader understanding of the intersection between digital activism, elite control, and democratic accountability in fragile and transitional political systems.

Contextual Background

Zimbabwe's political trajectory is deeply rooted in contested governance, economic crises, and struggles for democratic accountability. Following independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe emerged as the nation's first leader, establishing single-party dominance under the ZANU-PF. While the early years were characterised by socio-economic advancements, Mugabe's rule became synonymous with authoritarianism, electoral manipulation, and economic decline. By the late 1990s, growing public discontent set the stage for more pronounced civil unrest, as citizens sought ways to challenge the regime's stranglehold on power (Chiweshe, 2017). Mugabe's forced resignation in November 2017, orchestrated by the military and ZANU-PF factions, marked a historic turning point. Emmerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe's long-time ally and former Vice President, assumed power under the guise of reformist leadership. Promising democratic renewal and economic recovery, Mnangagwa initially garnered cautious optimism. However, his administration has drawn criticism for replicating many of Mugabe's autocratic tendencies, shrinking civic space, intimidating opposition, and militarising governance (Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021).

A central issue fuelling political tension in the second Republic is the growing debate around extending Mnangagwa's presidency beyond 2028. The Zimbabwean Constitution (2013), under Section 91(2), clearly states: “A person is disqualified for election as President or appointment as Vice-President if he or she has already held office as President under this Constitution for two terms, whether continuous or not.” This provision was designed to safeguard against the indefinite rule that characterised the Mugabe era. Although Mnangagwa has publicly declared that he has “no intention” of pursuing a third term (Africanews, 2024), a growing movement under the banner “ED2030” has emerged within ZANU-PF, advocating constitutional amendments to allow his continued leadership (Maodza, 2025). This movement has generated a controversy that brings constitutionalism to the forefront of political discourse. Research reveals that pro-government narratives in official and online spaces emphasise the necessity of “continuity” for economic stability and national unity, sidelining critiques of constitutional violations (Maringira and Gukurume, 2023; Mungwari and Ndhlebe, 2019). Reports suggest that these developments have caused deep rifts within the ruling party. Factions aligned with military veterans and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga, as well as military-affiliated cadres, have opposed the proposed extension of the term. These developments have also triggered widespread public concern about democratic backsliding (Maodza, 2025; Ndlovu and Muringa, 2025).

One notable case is that of Blessed Geza, who was a prominent member of both the ZANU-PF Central Committee and the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association. Geza rose to prominence as a vocal opponent of the ED2030 agenda, which he publicly condemned as unconstitutional and a betrayal of ZANU-PF's liberation legacy. His critiques first gained national attention through interviews on Heart and Soul TV, hosted by journalist Blessed Mhlanga, and widely shared across social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and X. These public engagements, coupled with his frequent social media commentary, positioned Geza as a leading voice of resistance within the ruling party's old guard. His opposition to the rumored draft motion aimed at amending presidential term limits subsequently triggered severe political repercussions and legal action in the form of an arrest warrant. He fled into exile and started using X to denounce Mnangagwa's leadership, alleging persecution and warning that the third-term push risked destabilising the party and the nation (Maodza, 2025).

This controversy unfolded against the backdrop of Zimbabwe's evolving civic activism, which gained momentum through social media platforms. Traditional media in Zimbabwe remain heavily controlled by the state (Muringa, 2017). This control restricts access for opposition actors and ensures favourable coverage for the ruling elite. By contrast, digital platforms such as X, Facebook, WhatsApp, and TikTok have increasingly emerged as alternative spaces for political mobilisation and the circulation of counter-narratives. This is particularly evident during electoral cycles and periods of protest mobilisation (Bingisai, 2024; Ureke, 2024). These platforms provide access for politically engaged youth and marginalised voices excluded from mainstream media coverage, creating a dynamic and contested digital public sphere (Bingisai, 2024; Chikafa-Chipiro, 2023). In contrast to the censorship-prone state media, digital tools have enabled both ruling and opposition forces, as well as non-state actors, to shape narratives, mobilise protests, and contest political legitimacy in real time (Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021). Tactics include deploying bots to propagate government-aligned narratives, cyber-surveillance to suppress dissent, and internet shutdowns during protests. These actions highlight the contested nature of Zimbabwe's digital landscape, where citizens and the state compete for influence in shaping public opinion (Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021).

Social Media, Governance, and Contested Public Spheres

The proliferation of digital platforms has fundamentally reshaped the landscape of political engagement, prompting vibrant academic and policy debate concerning their dual capacity to enhance civic participation and simultaneously exacerbate political challenges (Roberts and Oosterom, 2024; Ubong, 2024). Social media platforms such as X, Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube are increasingly conceptualised as contemporary extensions of the public sphere, offering potential spaces for rational-critical debate, bypassing traditional media gatekeepers, and enabling diverse voices to engage in political discourse (Fuchs, 2014; Habermas, 2022). Theoretically, these platforms can facilitate participatory governance through real-time feedback and grassroots mobilisation (Suharto, 2024; Suna, 2024).

Indeed, the transformative potential of social media lies partly in its capacity to connect individuals across divides, amplify marginalised voices, and catalyse political action. Platforms enable activists and civil society organisations to mobilise large-scale participation, often through compelling digital storytelling and resonant framing, as seen in global campaigns such as #MeToo and #NoThirdTerm, Nigeria's #EndSARS movement, or sustained issue-based campaigns in Latin America (Suna, 2024; Ubong, 2024). This potential to foster accountability and aggregate diverse voices into cohesive demands underscores social media's significance in contemporary governance (Fuchs, 2014). However, this optimistic view is tempered by significant critiques. Scholars caution against equating online activity with substantive political change, highlighting the phenomenon of “clicktivism” (Morozov, 2012), and stress that digital participation is often uneven, exacerbating existing inequities due to digital exclusion.

Furthermore, the idealised digital public sphere often clashes with the realities of platform architecture and political manipulation. Critics argue these spaces are fragmented, prone to echo chambers, and heavily influenced by algorithmic curation that can entrench ideological silos and prioritise sensationalism over accuracy, thereby challenging deliberative democracy (Dahlgren, 2013; Morozov, 2012). As Lee and Esteve (2022) note, the state of the field requires moving beyond binary optimistic/pessimistic views to understand the contingent effects of social media on democracy. This susceptibility to manipulation is a central concern, as platforms provide fertile ground for misinformation, hate speech, and polarising rhetoric, particularly during electoral cycles (Muringa, 2024; O'Connor and Weatherall, 2024; Suna, 2024; Ubong, 2024). Zannettou et al. (2019) document how state-sponsored trolls on Twitter strategically infiltrated the information ecosystems of the United States, Germany, and Russia, influencing web discourse in ways that mirror Zimbabwe's Varakashi. This vulnerability is actively exploited through narrative contestation, where framing and counter-framing strategies shape political discourse. Activists often leverage platforms to frame governance crises and mobilise resistance, sometimes invoking legal and constitutional norms in practices described as “digital constitutionalism,” evident in India's CAA protests and Nigeria's demands for police reform (Nkhatho, Muringa and Zvaita, 2024; Ubong, 2024; Vashishata and Arya, 2020). Conversely, state actors and aligned elites deploy sophisticated counter-strategies, utilising bots, influencers, coordinated campaigns, and algorithmic amplification to disseminate propaganda, control narratives, and delegitimise dissent (Mututwa and Akpojivi, 2023; Suharto, 2024; Zannettou et al., 2019). Such tactics often involve nationalist or developmentalist framing to portray opposition as unpatriotic or destabilising, and the use of state-aligned “digital warriors” is documented across diverse contexts, including Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (Chibuwe, 2020; Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021; Mututwa and Akpojivi, 2023; Njiro et al., 2025). This engineered polarisation often serves elite interests (Cheeseman and Klaas, 2018).

Consequently, the role of social media in democratic consolidation remains deeply contested. While are accountability tools for available, the fragility of digital engagement is starkly revealed in the face of authoritarian adaptations, including pervasive surveillance, censorship, digital blackouts, and the strategic manipulation of online discourse (Cheeseman and Klaas, 2018). Moreover, the commercial interests of platform companies can conflict with democratic imperatives such as free expression and user privacy (Morozov, 2012). The literature thus converges on viewing social media platforms not as neutral conduits but as contested terrains shaped by algorithmic governance, political power struggles, and socio-economic factors (Mututwa and Akpojivi, 2023). Understanding political phenomena, such as the ongoing debate surrounding presidential term limits in Zimbabwe, necessitates analysing how these complex dynamics of empowerment, manipulation, and narrative contestation play out within these digital ecosystems as seen in regional parallels like Kenya's term limit fights on Twitter (Mututwa and Akpojivi, 2023).

Theoretical Framework: DDT

This study employs the DDT to examine the role of social media in shaping discourse on governance and constitutionalism (Hacker and van Dijk, 2000). The framework provides critical lenses to analyse how digital platforms mediate political engagement, amplify dissent, and reconfigure power dynamics in contested political contexts. DDT investigates how ICTs, especially social media, have reshaped democratic engagement and political processes. The theory originated in the early 2000s with foundational work by scholars such as Hacker and van Dijk, who explored how computer-mediated communication systems influence democratic practices and policy-making (Hacker and van Dijk, 2000). They laid the groundwork by conceptualising “virtual democracy” and mapping the early influence of the internet on civic participation and political discourse. Further theoretical refinement came in later years, as scholars like Berg and Hofmann (2021) contextualised digital democracy within broader media transformations, emphasising how evolving digital infrastructures mediate forms of democratic self-governance. These developments have moved the theory beyond its technological roots to encompass dynamic interpretations of democracy, shaped by political and social conditions. This study leverages this theoretical lens to argue that platforms such as X have become critical, albeit contested, arenas for debating constitutionalism in Zimbabwe, precisely because they offer alternative channels to state-controlled media.

Scholars such as Morozov (2012) and Suna (2024) emphasise that social media reduces barriers to political engagement by providing accessible and low-cost tools for activism. Drawing on this, the study analyses how Zimbabwean citizens utilise X to articulate opposition and mobilise around constitutional principles, interpreting their posts as acts of digital democratic participation enabled by the platform's accessibility. Campaigns such as #MeToo and #NoThirdTerm on social media platforms such as Facebook and X exemplify how digital platforms facilitate grassroots mobilisation, leveraging collective action to challenge governance failures and advocate for constitutional principles. Similarly, the study employs this aspect of the theory to frame the dominant online discourse opposing the term extension as a clear instance of citizens using digital tools to defend constitutional norms against perceived executive overreach. However, DDT also interrogates the limitations of social media as a democratic tool. This theoretical caution informs the study's critical perspective on the potential real-world impact of the observed online engagement.

Moreover, the susceptibility of digital platforms to disinformation and polarisation undermines their potential to promote accountability. The study uses these theoretical risks to interpret the observed public scepticism, the circulation of conflicting narratives, and the polarised nature of the debate on X regarding the term-limit issue. Suna (2024) observes that during electoral cycles, political elites often weaponise platforms to disseminate propaganda, manipulate narratives, and suppress dissent. This theoretical insight is central to the study's argument that the digital space in Zimbabwe is actively contested, as evidenced by pro-government messaging and citizen mistrust. These dynamics underscore the complexity of social media ecosystems, where opportunities for civic engagement co-exist with significant vulnerabilities to exploitation. This inherent tension, highlighted by DDT, forms the crux of this study's argument, portraying X in the context of Zimbabwe's term limit debate as embodying both the empowering potential for constitutional defence and the manipulative pitfalls characteristic of digital platforms in a fragile democracy. The framework specifically helps interpret the empirical findings not merely as a description of public sentiment but as evidence that platform dynamics facilitate a contest between citizen-led “digital constitutionalism” on the one hand and state-aligned attempts at narrative control on the other hand.

Digital Democracy Theory provides a robust framework for analysing the role of social media in Zimbabwe's constitutional debates. It provides analytical tools to examine the specific technological affordances, documented participatory dynamics, and inherent vulnerabilities of digital platforms, including manipulation and superficial engagement, as observed in practice (Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021; Morozov, 2012; Suna, 2024). Integrating these perspectives allows this study to move beyond viewing technology as inherently liberating or repressive. It enables a nuanced assessment of how platforms such as X function as complex, contested spaces (Hu and Lovrich, 2024) in which democratic aspirations interact with, and are often constrained by, digital architecture and political power structures. This combined theoretical lens is thus crucial for critically evaluating how social media reflects and mediates public discourse and influences governance narratives in the challenging Zimbabwean context.

Methodology

This study employed a qualitative research design, augmented by computational tools, to explore the nuances of online discourse surrounding Zimbabwe's presidential term limits on the X platform (Vaccari, 2017). The approach aimed to combine the depth of qualitative interpretation with tools capable of navigating the volume inherent in social media data (Ghani et al., 2019).

Data Source and Sampling Strategy

The data source comprised publicly available posts from X, selected due to its established role as a primary platform for real-time political discourse among key actors in Zimbabwe and its diaspora (Bradshaw and Howard, 2019; Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021; Newman et al., 2023). It is important to note the limitations of this data: X users in Zimbabwe are predominantly urban, educated, and include a significant diaspora (Newman et al., 2023). Therefore, this study does not claim to reflect broader public opinion but rather analyses the discourse within this influential digital sphere. A purposive sampling strategy was employed in three iterative phases. First, an exploratory scoping phase utilised Grok AI to identify high-engagement posts, influential hashtags, and emerging trends (de Carvalho Souza and Weigang, 2025; Wangsa et al., 2024). This involved executing a semantic search for “Mnangagwa presidential third term bid in Zimbabwe sentiments and hashtags” to identify core hashtags (including #NoTo2030, #ED2030, #2030Agenda, #ZimbabweConstitution, #M31Movement, #PasiNe2030, #NoThirdTerm, #NoToM31, and #Vision2030) and key temporal patterns. This scoping, which did not involve automated sentiment analysis, informed the next phase but did not contribute to the final corpus. Second, a targeted harvesting phase used these refined queries, keywords, and hashtags in English and major local languages for manual X searches to gather a larger pool of relevant posts. Third, a final corpus assembly phase was conducted, selecting posts for substantive depth, actor balance, and temporal spread to ensure theoretical saturation (Table 1).

Table 1.

Overview of Purposive Sampling Phases for X Post Corpus.

Phase	Description	Grok AI Role	Output
1. Exploratory Scoping	Semantic/keyword search to map hashtags/trends (e.g. NoTo2030 dominance).	Query execution/pattern flagging (no quantification).	Core hashtags/temporal overview; refined parameters.
2. Targeted Harvesting	Manual X searches using hashtags/keywords; screen for relevance/diversity.	None (human-led).	∼1,200 screened posts.
3. Corpus Assembly	Purposive selection for richness (∼35% prominent accounts, ∼65% general citizens) and event coverage.	None.	500-post qualitative corpus.

This process yielded a final qualitative corpus of 500 posts from an estimated 200 unique users over the period from 1 October 2023 to 31 March 2025. The data confirmed activity peaks around the ZANU-PF conference (October 2024, 30 per cent of activity) and protests (March 2025, approximately 40 per cent of activity). Users were categorised via bios/content as ∼87 per cent anti-extension, 7 per cent pro, and 6 per cent neutral. The sample was balanced between “Prominent Accounts” (journalists, political figures, and activists with more than 10,000 followers; ∼35 per cent of users) and “General Citizens” (including diaspora voices; approximately 65 per cent of users). Posts per user ranged from more than 10 (e.g. higher for prominent accounts), ensuring diversity without overreliance on any individual. While high-engagement posts were prioritised during sampling to ensure the inclusion of influential discourse (anti-extension posts averaged approximately 250 likes/50 reposts versus pro-extension posts 80/20, per manual indexing), all 500 posts were weighted equally in the subsequent thematic analysis.

Data Preparation and Unit of Analysis

Following the scoping, researchers manually captured the 500 selected posts, primarily via screen grabs, which were saved and organised into dedicated digital folders. The textual content from these screenshots, which constituted the primary data for analysis, was then manually transcribed or copied and pasted into a central Microsoft Word document. The unit of analysis was defined as each individual tweet's textual content, including hashtags and emojis as discursive elements. The hybrid solution ensured that AI served as a scoping tool within a rigorous, human-centred analytical process; all Grok outputs were discarded after the initial scoping phase to prevent undue influence.

Ethical Considerations

This study adhered to strict ethical guidelines for social media research. Although the data collected from X is publicly available, significant measures were taken to protect users’ identities, particularly given Zimbabwe's sensitive political context. In the presentation of findings, all usernames of private citizens, activists, and commentators have been anonymised and replaced with descriptive identifiers (e.g. “a political commentator,” “a youth activist”). Direct quotes are used to preserve the authenticity of the discourse, but they are presented without personally identifiable information (usernames, timestamps, and locations redacted during transcription). The only exceptions are for official public figures speaking in their professional capacity, such as the government spokesperson, where attribution is central to the analysis. Repeated voices represent influential roles (e.g. diaspora vs. in-country activists or journalists), not individuals; public figures are attributed only in their professional capacity to mitigate harm. No formal IRB was required for public data, but the process aligned with AOIR guidelines through consultation of the literature and the use of ethical safeguards tailored to repressive contexts (Markham and Buchanan, 2012). This approach balances the need for empirical richness with the ethical obligation to minimise potential harm to individuals participating in online political discourse. Data were stored on encrypted drives and deleted after analysis, with no user interactions initiated by researchers.

Results

The analysis of discourse on X regarding President Emmerson Mnangagwa's potential term extension reveals a highly contested digital public sphere characterised by sharp polarisation and deep-seated concerns about constitutionalism and governance. X's affordances, such as hashtag virality and retweet chains, amplified anti-extension narratives (87 per cent of the corpus), enabling rapid spread of dissent while exposing pro-regime fractures via leaked contradictions, thereby embodying DDT's duality (Hacker and van Dijk, 2000). Key analytical themes emerged from the qualitative coding of the data, linking substantive arguments to platform dynamics (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

Constitutional Principles as the Core of Opposition

A primary finding was the prevalence of opposition framed explicitly through the lens of constitutional legality and democratic norms. Participants frequently articulated that extending the incumbent's term would directly violate Zimbabwe's 2013 Constitution. A prominent investigative journalist, for instance, meticulously argued the legal barriers via threaded posts (retweeted 200+ times), leveraging X's threading for detailed exposition:

What you need to know is that a Third Term at law is illegal for President Mnangagwa, it is unconstitutional!… Even if that referendum happens… the current President can't benefit from such a move, it will be illegal (29 October 2023).

There is widespread scepticism about President Mnangagwa's public assurances that he does not intend to seek a third term. Many citizens believe these declarations lack credibility, citing political precedents in Africa in which similar assurances were followed by legislative manoeuvres to circumvent constitutional limits. The mistrust is reinforced by ongoing political developments that are perceived as laying the groundwork for a term extension. Citizens view these actions as part of a broader strategy to consolidate power, heightening concerns about democratic erosion. This scepticism trended via #NoTo2030 (250+ posts), with algorithmic boosts favouring emotionally charged, high-engagement content, consistent with DDT's manipulation risks (Morozov, 2012).

This legal grounding was often infused with strong normative judgments. A diaspora-based commentator decried the proposed amendment not just as illegal but as “bizarrely… irresponsible and destructive self-indulgence” (21 January 2023), reflecting a sense that the move disregards national interests for personal ambition, a view echoed in 70-plus replies linking economic critiques. Similarly, a former opposition parliamentarian underscored the gravity of the situation by emphasising the Constitution as the “supreme law of the land” and labelling attempts to undermine it as “highly troubling and unacceptable” and a “dangerous precedent.” This constitutionalist framing extended to collective actions, exemplified by youth protesters chanting “2030 taramba” (“We reject the 2030 project”), as reported by a pan-African media outlet (22 January 2023), signalling organised, principled resistance amplified through video shares (500 plus views).

Undermining Legitimacy: Scepticism and Contradictory State Messaging

Flowing directly from and reinforcing the opposition is a profound scepticism towards official narratives, particularly President Mnangagwa's public denials of seeking a third term. This widespread mistrust appears to be fuelled by perceived inconsistencies and a history of unmet promises. The investigative journalist highlighted the dissonance between the President's denial and the state broadcaster ZBC TV's simultaneous promotion of the amendment narrative, which ran news tickers stating that the amendment “was set to go ahead” (18 February 2023). This led to the conclusion that the President's press conference was effectively meaningless, with the post garnering more than 1,000 likes via quote-tweets mocking state media. Such incidents erode the credibility of official statements, compounded by historical references, like Mnangagwa's 2018 assertion on CNN that he had “no desire to do more than 2 terms,” which was contrasted with the present “public secret that the Third Term movement is already in motion” (29 October 2023). This pattern leads some, like the former parliamentarian, to interpret official denials as strategic manipulation, a: “strategy of reverse psychology… a charade… nothing more than a ploy to cling to power at all costs.” This dynamic suggests a significant disconnect between state pronouncements and public reception, undermining the perceived legitimacy of the government's position on the matter. X's reply threads (avg. 50 per post) facilitated this scrutiny, per DDT's empowerment through interactivity, but also echo chambers that reinforce mistrust (Dahlgren, 2013).

Concerns Over Legality and Process: Fears of Manipulation

The climate of mistrust directly fuels anxieties that political and legal processes may be manipulated to facilitate the term extension. Participants frequently invoked past events as evidence for these fears. The controversial reappointment of Chief Justice Luke Malaba served as a key reference point for the investigative journalist, who described it as an “illegal and unconstitutional precedent” justifying fears of “another constitutional violation” (29 October 2023). This narrative of subverting legal safeguards is echoed by a human rights activist, who frames the situation bluntly: “The Zimbabwean President ED Mnangagwa who rigged elections to be in power now wants to rigged the constitution for a 3rd term and life Presidency,” linking the motive to a desire by “one family that intend to protect their loot” (16 January 2023). Such interpretations frame the constitutional debate within a broader context of perceived state capture and impunity. Furthermore, allegations of direct interference, such as a youth activist's claim that MPs were offered $120,000 in bribes for their votes (27 March 2023), circulate as evidence that the extension lacks genuine support and relies on illicit manoeuvring, thereby solidifying fears about the integrity of the process. These claims spread via more than 100 reposts, highlighting X's role in the circulation of disinformation (O'Connor and Weatherall, 2024; Zannettou et al., 2019).

Arguments for Extension: Developmental Narratives and Internal Contradictions

While opposition was dominant, arguments in favour of the extension were also present, primarily centred on the necessity of leadership continuity for national development, specifically the achievement of “Vision 2030.” A senior government official actively promoted this perspective, framing the postponement of elections to 2030 as essential: “to allow developmental projects initiated by President @edmnangagwa to come to fruition” (9 January 2023), even controversially suggesting that opposition agreement was necessary. Earlier posts reinforced this focus on Mnangagwa's “vision… [for] an Upper Middle-Income society by 2030” (19 January 2022). However, this pro-extension narrative appears neither monolithic nor consistently presented. The analysis revealed conflicting signals even from within ruling party circles, exemplified by the report from a ZANU-PF supporter account that a senior official, Comrade (cde) Chinamasa, explicitly stated at the party conference that “Cde ED Mnangagwa will not be available for a third term” (26 October 2024). Such internal inconsistencies may reflect strategic ambiguity, factional disagreements, or poorly coordinated messaging, thereby further complicating the public interpretation of the ruling party's true intentions. Pro-posts showed lower virality (average 50 likes), suggesting X algorithms deprioritise them amidst repression-driven skew (Roberts and Oosterom, 2024).

Contextualising the Debate: Term Limits Versus Pressing National Priorities

A significant dimension of the discourse involves users explicitly contextualising the term limit debate within Zimbabwe's broader socio-economic challenges. Critics frequently juxtapose the political focus on consolidating power with perceived failures by the government in addressing pressing national issues. The diaspora commentator directly linked the extension push to poor performance, stating, “The economy is failing, while he presides over the worst corruption Zimbabwe has ever seen” (21 January 2023). The investigative journalist lamented the prioritisation of “political games” while “hospitals have no drugs… supermarkets are shutting down… [and] unemployment is at 95%” (18 February 2023). This critique is often visceral, as seen in a post by a citizen-journalism account contrasting the state of the roads after decades of independence with the “old man… begging for a presidential term extension,” concluding with the hashtag “#WeNeedNewLeaders” (22 February 2023). This interaction highlights how the term-limit issue is interpreted by many not merely as a constitutional matter but also as symptomatic of a leadership detached from citizens’ everyday struggles and national priorities. Hashtag chains (e.g. #ZimbabweMustProsper → economic memes) accounted for 40 per cent of engagements, illustrating DDT's mobilisation potential amid grievances (Suna, 2024).

Discourse as Mobilisation: Resistance Narratives and Calls to Action

The analysis indicates that the online discourse serves not only as a space for critique but also as a platform for articulating resistance and mobilising civic action. References to specific organised efforts, like the “M31 resistance movement” reported by the investigative journalist (31 March 2023), suggest the translation of online sentiment into offline structures. The journalist's observation about the “interesting” lack of immediate state repression toward associated crowds hints at potentially shifting political calculations or capacities, as the post was retweeted over 300 times to coordinate. Furthermore, the discourse features explicit exhortations for citizen engagement. The diaspora commentator issued a direct challenge for Zimbabweans, “to rise and step into their active citizenship and defend our Constitution and the future of our country” (21 January 2023). Similarly, the former parliamentarian called for national unity in democratic defence, stating that, “As a nation, we must stand firm and united… The voice of the people is clear - no one is above the law.” This dimension positions the social media debate as potentially performative and constitutive, shaping narratives that may underpin future civic and political action. X's real-time features (for instance, live Spaces) facilitated this, but risks like doxxing underscore vulnerabilities (Marwick and Lewis, 2017). The findings portray X as a vibrant arena in which constitutional arguments, deep public scepticism, and governance critiques vigorously challenge narratives surrounding President Mnangagwa's potential term extension. While proponents’ arguments emphasise development, they struggle against perceived inconsistencies and a strong counter-narrative that links the extension push to broader national problems and potential illegality. The discourse reflects social media's complex role as both a mirror of activist/elites’ sentiment and a potential catalyst for political mobilisation in Zimbabwe's contested landscape.

Discussion

This study aimed to critically investigate the role of the social media platform X in mediating public discourse, shaping political engagement, and reflecting democratic tensions surrounding the contentious debate over presidential term limits in Zimbabwe. Specifically, it explored how constitutionalism is debated and contested within this digital arena amidst Zimbabwe's constrained political environment and unique historical context, addressing: How does X mediate/shape discourse, per DDT's duality? What new insights on narratives/counter-narratives emerge?

Interpretation of Key Findings

An important reflection arising from the study is how Zimbabwean activists and elites have been deploying digital media platforms such as X to contest governance failures and the presidential limit debate through the overt invocation of constitutionalism, invoking Section 91(2) of the 2013 Constitution. This subtle means of digital activism, recalling earlier movements such as #ThisFlag (Musarurwa, 2016; Sabao and Chikara, 2020) and corroborating work on “digital constitutionalism” (Vashishata and Arya, 2020), shows how actors tactfully use legal structures in digital spaces to frame crises and mobilise opposition. X's affordances, such as 250 plus reposts for #NoTo2030 threads, amplified this, not only empowering dissent but also enabling manipulation via state bots (Zannettou et al., 2019). We note, however, that this legally informed online discourse sharply differs from the latent distrust evident in offline political discourse, one embedded in Zimbabwe's long-standing tradition of voter manipulation, suppression, and failed promises from both governments controlled by Mugabe and Mnangagwa (Maringira and Gukurume, 2023; Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021). The perspective is consistent with the fundamental claim of DDT that digital platforms are inherently open to elite manipulation and misinformation (O'Connor and Weatherall, 2024). Thus, discussion becomes less a simple mechanism by which democracy is enacted and more a venue of performative constitutionalism carried out amidst profound cynicism. This cynicism shows deep-seated doubts about the ability of the regime to respect the constitution, pointing to the intricate relationship between digital activism and state power in high-distrust environments (Matsilele and Ruhanya, 2021). Unlike broader platforms (WhatsApp's private groups), X's public virality skewed discourse to critics (87 per cent), as repression pushed elites/diaspora online, a pattern similar to that found in Uganda, where Twitter skewed against Museveni extensions (Njiro et al., 2025).

The findings vividly illustrate the duality central to DDT. On the one hand, X clearly empowers dissenting voices and facilitates the amplification of counter-hegemonic narratives challenging state power. This confirms the theory's assertion that digital platforms lower barriers for participation and mobilisation (Suna, 2024; Ubong, 2024). Yet this study simultaneously reveals the significant presence and impact of coordinated state-aligned counter-narratives promoting regime continuity through developmentalist framing. This aligns strongly with literature documenting the weaponisation of platforms by elites and the deployment of “digital warriors” or sock puppet accounts like the Varakashi (Chibuwe, 2020; Mututwa and Akpojivi, 2023). The analysis, therefore, moves beyond simply noting the potential for manipulation (Morozov, 2012) to showing its active deployment alongside genuine dissent. However, X evidence reveals novel patterns: pro-narratives’ internal contradictions (leaked denials) suggest poor coordination, not a seamless strategy, unlike Nigeria's more unified elite bots in the 2023 elections (Ajaegbu and Ajaegbu, 2024). The term “coordinated” counter-narratives draws on existing literature on Zimbabwe's state-aligned media ecosystem, where messaging is strategically synchronised. By contrast, the fractures observed on X reveal visible intra-elite factionalism, including contestation among actors aligned with figures such as Vice President Constantino Chiwenga. These patterns move beyond existing theoretical accounts and point to the need for refined or new conceptual approaches to elite contestation and digital political communication in hybrid regimes. The presence of conflicting messages even within pro-regime circles further suggests that these digital contestations reflect complex internal party dynamics unfolding publicly online, adding a layer of complexity to studies of state propaganda. Opposition dominance stems from X's urban/diaspora users (approximately 65 per cent of the general citizen posts in the corpus) evading offline repression, with no clear evidence of manipulation beyond low-engagement pro-posts.

Crucially, the online debate cannot be divorced from Zimbabwe's specific political economy and history. The tendency among participants to link the term-limit debate directly to broader socio-economic failures, such as corruption, unemployment, and failing services, demonstrates how digital discourse intertwines constitutional concerns with lived realities. This contextualisation refutes simplistic notions of “clicktivism” (Morozov, 2012) by showing online arguments are deeply grounded in material grievances. Furthermore, the prominence of specific figures, such as an exiled war veteran whose dissent is framed as defending the original liberation legacy against the current leadership, highlights how historical narratives and intra-party conflicts are actively mediated and contested on digital platforms. This underscores the need identified in the literature to analyse digital politics not in isolation but as embedded within specific national trajectories and power struggles (Cheeseman and Klaas, 2018). Post-corpus developments (April–November 2025) extend this: Factional violence (opposition hall arson) and purges signal X-mobilised resistance influencing offline escalations, akin to Kenya's 2022 Twitter-fuelled protests (Mututwa and Akpojivi, 2023).

Theoretical and Practical Implications

The study's findings hold significant implications for both theory and practice. Theoretically, they suggest that models of digital democracy (Berg and Hofmann, 2021; Retkowsky et al., 2023) require greater sensitivity to historical legacies of state control and pervasive political mistrust, which significantly condition the nature and perceived efficacy of online deliberation and mobilisation (Mututwa and Akpojivi, 2023). The findings advocate theoretical approaches that foreground historical context and power asymmetries in the analysis of digital politics in non-Western or contested democratic settings. This advances DDT by showing X's interactivity enables “performative constitutionalism,” but algorithms entrench skewness, contributing new evidence on narrative fractures versus unified manipulation. These theoretical considerations translate into direct practical and policy imperatives. The analysis underscores the inadequacy of focusing solely on digital access (Chikafa-Chipiro, 2023) or generic media literacy. Interventions must address the challenge of coordinated disinformation and state-sponsored narrative manipulation by fostering advanced critical digital literacy skills specifically attuned to identifying sophisticated propaganda techniques (Tandoc, 2014; Ubong, 2024, on gatekeeping). Furthermore, the tangible risks faced by online activists highlight the urgent need for mechanisms to protect them from state surveillance and persecution. For civil society, the study suggests the importance of developing nuanced communication strategies that not only champion constitutional principles but also effectively counter state developmentalist narratives by linking governance issues directly to citizens’ socio-economic conditions.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

This study possesses limitations inherent in its design. While providing rich insights into elite and activist discourse prominent on that platform, the methodological focus on X does not capture the full spectrum of broader public opinion potentially expressed on other widely used platforms such as WhatsApp or Facebook, nor does it account for the views of Zimbabweans lacking digital access (∼90 per cent rural per Newman et al., 2023). The qualitative approach offers depth but limits statistical generalisability. Inferences are cautious: X reflects activist sentiments shaping elite discourse, not mass opinion. Future research could address these gaps through comparative multi-platform analyses, mixed-methods designs incorporating surveys to gauge broader public opinion, and ethnographic studies exploring the complex interplay between online discourse and offline political behaviour and decision-making. Investigating the specific impact of algorithmic curation on the visibility of competing narratives in the Zimbabwean context would also be valuable, alongside longitudinal tracking post-2025 escalations (e.g. Chiwenga-Mnangagwa clashes) for coup risks.

This study argued that X in Zimbabwe functions as a vital but intensely contested digital front in the struggle over constitutionalism and political succession, where democratic aspirations clash with sophisticated state-aligned narrative management and deep-seated historical mistrust. It contributes to the literature by providing a nuanced, context-specific analysis of how constitutional debates unfold on social media within a transitioning, yet still authoritarian-leaning, state. It highlights the profound impact of historical mistrust on shaping digital public spheres and demonstrates the specific mechanisms of narrative contestation (constitutional framing vs. developmentalist counter-framing) in the Zimbabwean context. It offers a richer understanding of digital politics beyond state-versus-society binaries by juxtaposing activist discourse with state-aligned narratives and linking them to internal party dynamics. Compared with Uganda's bot-driven extensions, it parallels them but reveals unique ZANU-PF fractures, thereby advancing African digital studies (Ajaegbu and Ajaegbu, 2024).

Conclusion

This study examined the role of social media, particularly X, in shaping discourse on the potential extension of President Mnangagwa's term in Zimbabwe, highlighting its function as a platform for civic and democratic engagement. The findings reveal a dominant opposition to the extension, rooted in calls for constitutional adherence and leadership renewal, juxtaposed with pro-extension arguments centred on continuity and development. These insights underscore the contested nature of social media as both a tool for amplifying dissent and a space for constructing political narratives. By integrating theoretical perspectives and empirical data, the study achieved its goal of exploring how social media mediates governance debates, thereby contributing to broader discussions on the role of digital platforms in promoting accountability and democratic norms. The study underscores the need to protect digital spaces from manipulation and promote informed, inclusive participation to strengthen democratic resilience.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

Artificial Intelligence and Technical Assistance: During the preparation of this manuscript, the authors utilised ChatGPT-5.2 (OpenAI) for specific tasks, including structural organisation, the generation of thematic frameworks for the literature review, and the creation of manuscript tables. This technical assistance was augmented by the use of Grok AI during the initial exploratory scoping phase to identify high-engagement hashtags and temporal patterns within the digital discourse. Final language editing and proofreading were conducted through a collaborative process involving Grammarly and ChatGPT-5.2. The authors emphasise that, while these computational tools provided valuable assistance in organising content, they are not without limitations in capturing the nuances of academic writing and context-specific information. Consequently, human judgement remained the primary mechanism for verifying the accuracy, coherence, and relevance of all generated content. The authors retain full responsibility for the content, integrity, and final articulation of this publication.

Ethical Safeguards and Research Integrity: The authors acknowledge the inherent sensitivity of social media data in the politically constrained environments analysed in this study. Although no human participants were directly engaged, robust measures were implemented to protect the identities of individuals associated with the collected digital content. In alignment with the Association of Internet Researchers (AOIR) ethical guidelines, all usernames and personally identifiable information were anonymised to mitigate potential harm. This process ensured the study balanced empirical richness with the moral obligation to handle digital traces with the utmost care within a fragile political landscape.

Data Availability Statement

The Journal promotes research openness, transparency, and reproducibility and adheres to SAGE's research data sharing policy. In accordance with this policy, the data supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. Further details, including frequently asked questions, are available on the SAGE Research Data policy pages. If you have any inquiries, please refer to the relevant webpage:

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Ethical Approval and Informed Consent Statements

Not applicable (This study utilised publicly available social media data and does not involve direct interaction with human participants).

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Gilbert Tinashe Zvaita

Tigere Paidamoyo Muringa

Notes

Authors Biographies

Gilbert Tinashe Zvaita is a postdoctoral fellow in the College of Law and Management Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. His research interests focus on the intersections of youth, peacebuilding, democracy, and elections within transitional political landscapes.

Tigere Paidamoyo Muringa is the director of research at M&G Research and a founder and leading Higher Education AI Consultant at the AfriLeaders in AI Institute (afrileadersinai.com). His research focuses on the intersections of media, governance, leadership, and gendered political communication.

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