Abstract
The first part of the article provides an overview of the efforts, initiatives, and contributions led by the Muslim World to confront the threats of violent extremism. I explore these efforts by highlighting contemporary key initiatives in two major categories: (1) global cooperation and (2) national strategies. The second part of the article provides an analysis of what is required to support the Muslim World in its efforts in countering violent extremism and what is the best approach to integrate these efforts into the wider global commitment to defeat violent extremism. These initiatives need continued support, and I argue that non-Muslim nations must continue to consider the Muslim World a strategic partner in the global efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism.
In Search of the Muslim World
The effects of terrorism reach across continents, and harm and inflict pain on the whole world. Let us not forget that the Islamic world is both the accused and the victim of terrorism.
—bin Bayyah (2014, 66)
The rise of the so-called Islamic State, also known as “ISIS,” “ISIL,” or “Daesh,” in 2011 generated a serious debate about relationships between Islamic radicalization, Islam, and Muslims (The Telegraph 2015; Hamid 2015) and how that dynamic affects the complex reality of global security in confronting Daesh’s threat in comparison to other Islamic radical groups such as al-Qaeda (Wood 2015). This ongoing debate led to a broad, yet very direct, question: Where is the Muslim World in all of this?
This question is based on an equivocal perception that the Muslim World is not doing enough to counter Daesh or openly confront Islamic radicalization. There is a perception that Muslims are hesitant to openly and clearly condemn radicalization (Schneier 2015). It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to highlight and explore the significant efforts, major initiatives, and considerable contributions by the Muslim World in the global fight against violent extremism in all of its forms. I unpack these efforts using two major categories.
The first category is “global cooperation,” which I use to explore the international partnerships, affiliations, and alliances that have been formed to counter violent extremism. I highlight several key affiliations that showcase the serious commitment that the Muslim World has made to the international community in the fight against violent extremism.
The second category I use is “national strategies,” which provides an overview of some of the pioneering efforts within the Muslim World to develop the strategic, legal, community, and law enforcement infrastructures required to facilitate preventative and comprehensive interventions in countering violent extremism (CVE). These strategies are aimed at the grassroots level and seek to build collaborations of community leaders with religious scholars, families, women, teachers, communication experts, and civil society as a whole. Here again, I highlight key contemporary initiatives.
The final section of the article provides an analysis of what is required to support the Muslim World in its CVE efforts and how these efforts can be best integrated into the wider global commitment to defeat violent extremism. The security challenge of violent extremism is constantly changing, and so too is the thinking behind it. There is still much work that can be done, and there are many opportunities to advance global efforts to counter violent extremism.
Global Cooperation
One of the strategies adopted by some Muslim countries for confronting and dealing with violent extremism is joining global multilateral efforts such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh (GCCD), and most recently the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT). These partnerships provide a platform for practical engagement with the international community and allow the Muslim countries to be active in the global effort to confront violent extremism.
The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
The GCTF is an informal and nonbinding multilateral forum that includes thirty founding members from twenty-nine countries and the European Union (EU). Its main objective is to promote effective global cooperation in the development of good practices to counter terrorism and to support the implementation of the United Nations (UN) Counterterrorism Strategy (GCTF 2011). The GCTF is based on “cochairing,” which aims to foster closer cooperation and diverse collaboration. The United States and Turkey cochaired the GCTF, initially, when it was launched in September 2011. As of this writing, Morocco and the Netherlands serve as cochairs. 1
Member countries within the GCTF form six working groups, each of which is cochaired by a Muslim country. Four working groups focus on technical themes: Egypt is the cochair, with the United States, of the Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group; the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the cochair, with the UK, of the Countering Violent Extremism Working Group; Indonesia is the cochair, with Australia, of the Detention and Reintegration Working Group; and Morocco is the cochair, with the Netherlands, of the Foreign Terrorists Fighters Working Group. The remaining two working groups focus on regional themes: Algeria is the cochair, with Canada, of the Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group; and Turkey is the cochair, with the EU, of the Horn of Africa Region Capacity Building Working Group. 2 In addition to the Muslim countries that cochair the six working groups, the GCTF includes five other Muslim member countries: Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. 3
The Global Coalition to Counter Daesh (GCCD)
The GCCD, launched in September 2014, is a broad coalition that aims to defeat terrorist organization. 4 The GCCD consists of sixty-six members. Members include countries and international organizations; Muslim countries make up twenty of the member countries, in addition to the Arab League. 5 The GCCD is based on four lines of effort to degrade Daesh: (1) financing and economic infrastructure, (2) foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), (3) stabilization of liberated areas, and (4) counternarrative and countermessaging. For example, the GCCD disrupts and prevents Daesh from raising, moving, and using funds by preventing them from using the international financial system. This is achieved by outing Daesh’s senior leaders, facilitators, and financiers; freezing their assets domestically and regionally; and through existing UN Security Council resolutions and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 6
Another way the GCCD is degrading Daesh is by tackling the threat posed by FTFs through the Counter-Daesh Coalition Working Group on Foreign Terrorist Fighters, co-led by the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United States. This group is working with coalition partners to implement the obligations and recommendations of the UN Security Council. 7
Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT)
The IMAFT was formed in December 2015 as an Islamic initiative led by Saudi Arabia and includes thirty-four Muslim countries 8 whose goal is to provide an Islamic response to the growing threat of Daesh and to counter all forms of terrorism, violent extremism, and extremism in the Muslim World (Browning and Irish 2015). The IMAFT affirms the principles and objectives of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which calls for member states to cooperate to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and reject all justifications and excuses for terrorism. 9 While the IMAFT was founded on military cooperation, it is not limited to it. The purpose of the Islamic coalition is to provide a comprehensive and holistic approach to defeating terrorism and violent extremism by using multiple methods, including countermessaging; counterideology; and promoting preventative measures that take into consideration conditions conducive to terrorism, violent extremism, and extremism.
National Strategies
Some Muslim countries have developed and implemented national strategies to deal with violent extremism based on their specific challenges, levels of threats, and local considerations. Such countries include Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE, to name a few. These different strategies provide an insight into the direct steps that governments have taken and allows us to further understand the efforts made by some Muslim countries to advance the fight against violent extremism.
There are two major baskets of “national strategies” that are worth noting here. First is the “multi-axiom strategy,” which approaches violent extremism from multiple angles and confronts it at the grassroots level to prevent extremism. The UAE, for example, has used this strategy. The multi-axiom strategy aims at pre-empting the root causes of violent extremism by combining three complementary approaches: security diplomacy, legislative infrastructure, and culture of moderation.
Second is the “de-radicalization strategy,” which is based on the development and implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programs for detained violent extremists. Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia have all applied this approach. The de-radicalization strategy aims to treat former violent extremists by providing a variety of programs that use reeducation, religious and psychological counselling, and family support for reintegration.
The multi-axiom strategy
Security diplomacy
The UAE took the lead in initiating security diplomacy initiatives as part of its contribution to the global efforts to counter violent extremism. One example of the security diplomacy axiom is the launch of the Contact Group on Countering Extremism at the United Nations Security Council in February 2015. 10 The core objective of this diplomatic initiative is to foster a constructive dialogue at the international level about extremism in order to develop and disseminate concrete solutions for and best practices in preventing violent extremism nationally.
A second example is the two important international centers for CVE that Abu Dhabi hosts: Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism; and the Sawab Center. Hedayah is an independent international think and do tank that aims to advance good practices to deal with extremism through research and analysis, capacity building programs, and facilitating dialogue and communication. Hedayah was launched during the third ministerial meeting of the GCTF that took place in Abu Dhabi in December 2012. Hedayah’s international steering board consists of twelve members, including Algeria, Australia, Canada, Egypt, the EU, Indonesia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Turkey, the UAE, the UK, and the United States.
The Sawab Center is a digital communications hub that aims to degrade Daesh’s propaganda and recruitment efforts through direct online countermessaging. It was established in July 2015 as a joint initiative led by the UAE and the United States as part of their collaboration within the GCCD.
Legislative infrastructure
This axiom provides the legal advancement necessary for CVE. For example, the UAE has enacted Federal Law No. 7 of the year 2014, which was issued in August of the same year; this law provides the legal definitions of “terrorist acts” and expands on the previous Federal Decree No. 1 of the year 2004 on Combating Terror Crimes. In November of the same year, the UAE Cabinet approved a list of designated and affiliated terrorist organizations and groups 11 in an attempt to raise awareness among the public and increase transparency about these affiliations. An “antidiscrimination law” 12 was issued following a decree by UAE President His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan in July 2015; this law criminalizes any acts of discrimination against individuals or groups on the basis of religion, caste, doctrine, race, color, or ethnic origin.
Culture of moderation
The UAE launched several initiatives that aim to promote a culture of moderation across all sectors of society. For example, the UAE established “the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies” in March 2014 in Abu Dhabi; this forum gathers scholars and researchers on an annual basis to discuss all challenges and issues related to violent extremism within Muslim societies and to develop effective initiatives to counter violent extremism. It also provides an opportunity for mainstream Muslim scholars and researchers to discuss moderation and combating sectarianism and discrimination as a means to enhance the “Islamic-Islamic dialogue.” One of the forum’s recommendations was to establish the Muslim Council of Elders (MCE), which will “work together to promote peace, to discourage infighting and to address the sources of conflict, divisiveness and fragmentation in Muslim communities.” 13 These initiatives pave the way for the provision of an “alternative narrative” that establishes authentic, positive, and effective messaging that targets Muslim youth and sets the stage for a genuine debate and exchange of thoughts on the true nature of Islam compared to the distorted perception created by violent extremist groups.
One significant outcome of the forum is the Marrakesh Declaration. 14 This declaration was made during a conference hosted by His Majesty King Muhammad VI of Morocco in January 2016. It is based on the historic revival of the objectives and aims of the Charter of Medina, which was declared by Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) and provides insights about the rights of religious minorities in Muslim lands, both in theory and practice. The Marrakesh Declaration aims to contribute to the broader intellectual, cultural, and legal discourse surrounding contractual citizenship and the protection of minorities within Muslim societies.
The UAE’s efforts exemplify the importance of considering a multitude of factors in preventing and countering violent extremism. A chronological summary of the key initiatives led by the UAE and capturing the multi-axiom approach is provided in Table 1.
Chronological Overview of UAE Efforts in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
SOURCE: Based on an internal report produced in 2014 by Lilah El Sayed, Research Associate at Hedayah.
The “de-radicalization strategy”
Several Muslim countries have developed rehabilitation and reintegration programs to address the challenge that comes with detained or returned violent extremists. These programs vary in their scope, approach, and effectiveness; “some have a more formally structured rehabilitation program, with dedicated resources, staff, and after-care plans, as in Saudi Arabia. Other programs take the form of looser policy initiatives, as seen in Bangladesh and Morocco, while still others facilitate a de-radicalization process once the decision to pursue that course has already been made by a group or individual, as is the case in Egypt” (Fink and El-Said 2011, 4).
These different programs show the various ways in which reeducation, religious discourse, psychological counseling, and family and financial support are being applied in an effort to de-radicalize populations. It is difficult to establish the effectiveness of these programs or determine their degree of success (El-Said 2012), but they remain important for understanding and appreciating the Muslim World’s national strategies in the fight against violent extremism.
Saudi Arabia, for instance, has formed an “advisory committee” within its Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for rehabilitation and reintegration. The advisory committee led to the establishment of the Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Counseling and Advice. 42 The advisory committee comprises four subcommittees: the religious subcommittee, the psychological and social subcommittee, the security subcommittee, and the media subcommittee. Each subcommittee plays an integral role in the de-radicalization and rehabilitation of security prisoners. The religious subcommittee provides counseling through approximately 150 clerics and scholars who engage in dialogue and debate with prisoners. The psychological and social subcommittee comprises approximately fifty mental health specialists and social scientists responsible for assessing and diagnosing prisoners’ psychological problems and behavior. The security subcommittee evaluates potential security risks among the prisoners and makes recommendations on their release. It also monitors prisoners after their release. The media subcommittee produces the educational materials used in the counseling sessions and religious classes for prisoners. It also produces materials that are used in Saudi schools and mosques (El-Said 2012).
The efforts of the Saudi center are being amplified and supported by the “Assakina campaign,” 43 which was formed by a group of Saudi Islamic scholars affiliated with the Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Counseling and Advice and focuses on theological discourse and scholarly debates with violent extremist groups in order to de-legitimize their ideological narrative. The “Assakina” approach is simple and direct: scholars deconstruct the arguments that the violent extremist groups put forward in an attempt to expose their inconsistency and inherent contradictions and to establish a moderate mainstream narrative based on scholarly evidence and supported counterarguments. There is also the “Amman message,” 44 which was originally launched in 2004 by King Abdullah II and was issued by 180 Muslim scholars who advocate for and promote a tolerant interpretation of Islam, as a direct response to violent extremists misconceptions (Fink and El- Saied 2011). This initiative was part of the Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, which published several reports and led various initiatives on Islamic tolerance and moderation. Morocco has also directly engaged at the theological and philosophical level with the radical narrative of violent extremist groups. For example, Morocco established the Al-Muhammadiyah Foundation, 45 which plays a key role in the rehabilitation and reintegration efforts in prisons through direct religious discourse.
Other Muslim countries, such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia, have also attempted to counter violent extremism by developing rehabilitation programs that are based on bringing together Muslim scholars, with the support of the police, to counter violent extremism teachings in prisons (El-Said 2012). These programs approach each violent extremist on an individual level through counseling, education, and providing financial support to the families of the convicted violent extremists (Fink and El-Said 2011).
Violent Extremism and the Muslim World: Toward Further Understanding
Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do.
46
—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
The Arab Spring began in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, in the form of a civil revolution against the ruling regime; it was followed by several revolutions, protests, and demonstrations in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and many other Arab countries (Dabashi 2012). The Arab Spring also resulted in the overwhelming success of political Islamic movements, which assumed power in three major countries: Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (Beaumont 2011).
All these movements have roots in, and ideological affiliations to, the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, which is considered to be the spark that produced all contemporary political Islamic groups (Zahid 2012). The unprecedented rise of Islam as a political and societal force has raised serious questions about its nature and influence compared to traditional secular forces such as the nationalists, socialists, and liberals.
This crucial turning point for the Middle East specifically and the Muslim World broadly triggered political and ideological debates between two major movements within Muslim societies. The advocates of Islamism are part of a fundamentalist Islamic revivalist movement generally characterized by moral conservatism, the literal interpretation of the Quran, and their attempt to implement Islamic values in all aspects of life; advocates of secularism believe that religious considerations should be excluded from civic affairs and public education.
These debates, in the context of current developments—epitomized by the dramatic shift in society that took place during the Arab Spring, followed by the rise of Islamic radicalization—will not only affect the local region but also the rest of the world politically, economically, and ideologically. This article, then, is a contribution to scholarly efforts to conceptualize and anticipate the future of political, cultural, and societal trends and movements in the Muslim World (see, for example, Aljabri 1994; Ibn Sunitan 2004; Moussalli 2004).
It is necessary to understand the complex reality of the political and ideological debates on Islamism and secularism in the Muslim World in order to initiate CVE strategies. It also helps to predict and portray the role that these debates will have and have had in shaping future political ideologies and, hence, the strategies needed to defeat violent extremism. Other countries can learn from the strategic initiatives led by the Muslim World, especially in the arena of religious discourse and the construction of alternative narratives.
The quest for identity among Muslim youth is a central element in why youth are attracted to violent extremism (Friedman 2016). Scholars, religious leaders, and educators can help to steer these young people away from extremism not only by condemning it, but by providing an alternative vision of a promising future that can galvanize the masses and release the collective imagination; in other words, inspire an Islamic Renaissance.
During the first-ever Countering Violent Extremism Communications Exposition (Global CVE Expo), which took place in December 2014 in Abu Dhabi and was organized by Hedayah in partnership with the GCTF, several practical initiatives and communications prototypes emerged from one of its unique activities, the “CVE Hackathon,” which aimed to find innovative ways to counter Daesh messaging, specifically online (Hedayah 2014).
The prototypes that received the highest votes from both the attending audience and the online participants from across the globe had one common idea: mainstream, moderate, and progressive Islam is the true antidote to radical Islam. Muslims, more than any other group, have the ability to confront the misconceptions and misleading narratives created by violent extremist groups. However, this is not a challenge for the Muslim World alone; it is a challenge for the international community as well. Therefore, it is imperative that the initiatives led by the Muslim World be supported locally and globally and that these efforts be combined with other CVE efforts across the world.
Footnotes
Notes
Maqsoud Kruse has served as the executive director of Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, since it was established in December 2012. Based in Abu Dhabi, Hedayah is an independent international think and do tank focused on countering violent extremism (CVE) in all of its forms and manifestations by conducting research and analysis, developing capacity-building programs, and initiating dialogue and communication.