Get Up,Get Out,and Git Sumthin’

Abstract

Does class position influence Blacks’ beliefs about the causes of poverty and racial inequality? Prior research has established that Blacks are more structural in orientation than Whites. However, existing studies have not adequately assessed the role that class position plays in shaping intraracial attitudinal differences among Blacks. Both multivariate and trend analyses of nearly four decades of data from the Houston Area Survey indicate that privileged Blacks often sharply differ from disadvantaged Blacks and privileged Whites across a range of racially specific and racially neutral individualistic and structural attributions. The results of this study directly concern ideological tensions within the Black community over whether racism and/or personal merit most strongly influences a Black person’s prospects for success.

Keywords

beliefs about inequality African Americans middle class stratification ideology

Attitudes about inequality have remained an important topic of scholarly interest for nearly four decades. Researchers across various fields of study have examined a wide range of attributions and determinants driving Americans’ beliefs about why some people live affluent lifestyles while others find themselves among the downtrodden (Feagin, 1975; Hochschild, 1995; Huber & Form, 1973; Hughes & Tuch, 2000; Hunt, 1996, 2004, 2007; Hwang, Fitzpatrick, & Helms, 1998; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lee, Jones, & Lewis, 1990; Robinson, 2009; Smith, 1985; Smith & Stone, 1989; Wilson, 1996). This line of research has produced significant findings. In particular, studies have consistently shown that racial group membership and socioeconomic position strongly influence levels of commitment to individualism and structuralism—two seemingly contrasting sets of explanations for why some people “make it” in America while others do not.

However, there are still meaningful gaps in our knowledge of the links between race, class, and beliefs about inequality. For instance, although it is widely known that Blacks are more structural in orientation than Whites (Feagin, 1975; Hochschild, 1995; Huber & Form, 1973; Hughes & Tuch, 2000; Hunt, 1996, 2004, 2007; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lee, Jones, & Lewis, 1990; Robinson, 2009; Wilson, 1996), we still know very little about the role that class position plays in shaping Blacks’ beliefs about inequality. This limitation directly concerns the “new Black middle class” (Landry, 1987; Wilson, 1978) because few surveys include African American samples that are large enough for utilizing research methods that can more rigorously test for class-based intraracial differences in commitments to causal attributions.

This article furthers our understanding of how class position shapes Blacks’ beliefs about inequality. It contributes to literature in four important ways. First, we analyze a large and socioeconomically diverse sample of residents of Houston, Texas—a city that is widely recognized as one of the “best cities for Blacks” in the United States (Brown, 2007). This long-standing assertion is not without scientific merit: Black Houstonians report higher average levels of socioeconomic attainment than Blacks nationally (Davis & Smith, 2008; Klineberg, 2010, 2005).

Second, our research methods allow us to undertake a more precise analysis of the race and class determinants of beliefs about inequality than has been previously attained. More specifically, we compare and contrast Black and White Houstonians’ beliefs across a range of discrete socioeconomic indicators. This allows us to test for class-based attitudinal variation among Blacks, as well as differences between Blacks and Whites who are similarly socioeconomically situated. Third, we scrutinize levels of commitment to both individualistic and structural attributions for inequality.¹ Significantly, however, we move beyond existing studies by also analyzing attributions for racial inequality. This inclusive approach permits for determining whether, for example, higher status Blacks’ explanations for the inequalities facing poor people meaningfully change when addressing the inequalities facing Black people.

Finally, although we are broadly concerned with the intersections between race, class, and beliefs about inequality, our methodological and interpretive analysis focuses on higher status Blacks—or those whom we refer to as “privileged” relative to other African Americans. The “new Black middle class” has more than doubled in size since the 1960s (Cose, 1993; Farley & Allen, 1989; Hacker, 2003; Landry, 1987; Landry & Marsh, 2011; Patillo-McCoy, 1999; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997). The recent growth of this racialized stratum has raised concerns over whether privileged Blacks’ beliefs have undergone meaningful transformation during the post–civil rights era (Cosby & Poussaint, 2007, Cose, 2011; Dyson, 2005; Hunt, 2007; Robinson, 2010). Consequently, we supplement our cross-sectional analysis with trend data. This allows us to track privileged Blacks’ levels of commitment to racially specific (e.g., explanations for inequalities facing Black people) and racially neutral (e.g., explanations for inequalities facing poor people) individualistic and structural attributions over four decades.

Taken together, these contributions allow us to present one of the most comprehensive analyses to date of the race and class determinants of beliefs about poverty and racial inequality. We aim to shed much-needed light on how, for African Americans especially, the combined effects of racial group membership and socioeconomic position strongly influence attitudes about “who gets what and why” in the contemporary United States (Kluegel & Smith, 1986).

Individualism, Structuralism, and Explanations for Inequality

Americans advance a variety of competing and/or complementary explanations for inequality. The most popular of these attributions reinforce the dominant American ideology—a widely supported constellation of beliefs that provides a framework for rationalizing the connection between the individual and opportunity in society (Feagin, 1975; Huber & Form, 1973; Hunt, 1996, 2004; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Robinson, 2009; Shelton & Wilson, 2006). For instance, the dominant ideology is rooted in the belief that fairness and the equality of opportunity permeate across the American social landscape (Huber & Form, 1973; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Robinson, 2009). It promulgates that opportunities for achievement are abundant and available to nearly everyone irrespective of their race, family of origin, gender, or age.

The belief that the American stratification system is open and egalitarian establishes a foundation for individualism—the idea that people are responsible for their own socioeconomic fate on the basis of their personal attributes, choices, and merits (Emerson & Smith, 2000; Feagin, 1975; Huber & Form, 1973; Hunt, 1996, 2007, Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Robinson, 2009; Shelton & Emerson, 2012; Smith, 1985). If opportunities are plentiful and accessible, then it is believed that individuals must be held accountable for achieving their American dreams. For several decades now, both nationally representative and local area studies have shown that most Americans attribute poverty to individual-level factors. For example, up to 60% of Americans believe that “poor people lack proper money-management skills,” “lack talent and ability,” “do not put forth enough effort,” and are “personally irresponsible” (Feagin, 1975; Hughes & Tuch, 2000; Hunt, 2007; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Robinson, 2009; Smith, 1985; Smith & Stone, 1989).²

However, many Americans believe that factors beyond a person’s control strongly influence his or her prospects for success. This idea, which is known as structuralism, posits that the American social “system”—or the way that our society’s institutions, patterns of relationships, and dynamics of status are organized—constrains opportunities for some people while simultaneously enhancing them for others (Emerson & Smith, 2000; Feagin, 1975; Huber & Form, 1973; Hunt, 1996, 2007; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Shelton & Emerson, 2010; Smith, 1985; Robinson, 2009). Most national and local studies³ show that up to 45% of Americans attribute poverty to “low wages in some businesses and industries,” “failure of industry to provide enough jobs,” and “failure of society to provide good schools for many Americans” (Feagin, 1975; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Robinson, 2009; Smith, 1985; Smith & Stone, 1989).

Significantly, however, there is evidence that regional considerations influence commitments to individualism and structuralism (Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lee, Jones, & Lewis, 1990; Shelton & Wilson, 2006; Wilson, 1996). Most notably, Hunt’s (1996, 2004) analyses show that a majority of Southern Californians attribute poverty to the aforementioned structural explanations, whereas a minority attribute poverty to the most popular individualistic explanations. He accredits this unexpected finding to the possibility that commitments to structuralism can intensify during difficult political, economic, and social times (Kluegel & Smith, 1986).

Notwithstanding regional differences and/or trying periods of turmoil, scholars generally agree that Americans’ support for structuralism is neither as widespread nor deeply rooted as their support for individualism. Moreover, findings from the previously cited nationally representative and local area studies show that those Americans who support structuralism also tend to support individualism. Structural beliefs typically operate in a “layered” (Hunt, 1996) or “compartmentalized” (Wilson, 1996) fashion whereby they complement one’s commitment to individualism. In the minds of many Americans, individualism and structuralism are not ideologically opposed but rather coexist in the sense that “people must hurdle barriers beyond their control through hard work and merit.”

Higher Status Blacks’ Explanations for Inequality

As previously mentioned, existing studies have established that race and class strongly influence beliefs about inequality. More specifically, (a) Blacks are more structural in orientation than Whites, and (b) higher status Americans are less structural in orientation than lower status Americans (Feagin, 1975; Huber & Form, 1973; Hunt, 1996, 2004; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Smith, 1985). Although these findings are persistent and robust, they are unclear with respect to results and expectations for higher status Blacks: What role does a privileged class position play in shaping Blacks’ beliefs about poverty?

To date, only Hunt (1996) has examined higher status Blacks’ commitments to racially neutral (e.g., explanations for inequalities facing poor people) individualistic and structural attributions. His results show that whereas Blacks with higher incomes are less likely to “blame” the poor for their predicament, they do not meaningfully differ from other Blacks in their attention to structural factors.

A related yet distinct line of research furthers our understanding of higher status Blacks’ commitments to racially specific (e.g., explanations for inequalities facing Black people) individualistic and structural attributions. These studies examine the extent to which privileged Blacks differ from disadvantaged Blacks in explaining why African Americans—as a collective group—continue to lag behind Whites across various socioeconomic spheres (Grimes, Jenkins, & Reavis, 1996; Handy, 1984; Hochschild, 1995; Hunt, 2007; Hwang, Fitzpatrick, & Helms, 1998; Shelton & Wilson, 2006; Sigelman & Welch, 1991). For instance, findings from both national and local studies⁴ show that higher status Blacks are less likely to attribute contemporary racial inequality to individualistic factors such as African Americans are “lazy,” “give up too easily,” “do not have enough ability,” or “do not try hard enough” (Handy, 1984; Hwang, Fitzpatrick, & Helms, 1998; Shelton & Wilson, 2006; Sigelman & Welch, 1991).

However, results from other studies show differently (Sigelman & Welch, 1991; Smith & Seltzer, 1992). Most notably, findings from a recent Pew Research Center (2007) poll indicate that a majority of Blacks with at least a college degree and those earning at least $75,000 a year believe that “Blacks who can’t get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own condition.”

This finding sets the tone for one of the most important recent developments in the analysis of African American political and social attitudes: Blacks’ declining commitment to racially specific structural attributions. Hunt’s (2007) examination of several decades of General Social Survey data not only shows that African Americans are growing less structural in orientation over time, but some higher status Blacks are less likely to attribute racial inequality specifically to racial “discrimination.” This finding is buttressed by further results from the Pew (2007) poll: Most better educated and higher income earning African Americans do not believe that “racial discrimination is the main reason why many Black people can’t get ahead these days.”

Yet it would be unwise to presume that higher status Blacks are generally less structural in orientation than lower status Blacks. Ironically, Hunt (2007) and the Pew (2007) poll provide strong support for the long-standing conclusion that higher status Blacks are more “racially conscious” than lower status Blacks (Cose, 1993; Dawson, 1994, 2001; Hwang, Fitzpatrick, & Helms, 1998; Lacy, 2007; Pattillo, 2003; Shelton & Wilson, 2009; Sigelman &Welch, 1991). More specifically, better educated Blacks are more likely to attribute contemporary racial inequality to racially specific structural attributions such as “racial discrimination” and the belief that “most Blacks don’t have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty” (Hunt, 2007). Furthermore, nearly 80% of better educated and higher income earning Blacks believes that African Americans are “frequently” discriminated against when they “apply for a job” or “try to rent an apartment or find a house” (Pew, 2007). These fascinating findings—which often vary across surveys, individual items, and predictors—attest to the profoundly nuanced and sometimes contradictory role that a privileged class position can play in shaping African Americans’ explanations for inequalities facing Black people.

In sum, this article helps to clarify the race and class determinants of beliefs about poverty and racial inequality. We assess the extent to which socioeconomic variation shapes commitments to racially specific and racially neutral individualistic and structural attributions. Our investigation provides new insights on how a privileged class position promotes attitudinal similarities and differences across and within a local area sample of Black and White Houstonians.

Data and Research Methods

We examine 17 years of pooled data from the Houston Area Survey (HAS). The HAS is a random-digit-dialed, computer-assisted telephone survey that has been conducted annually since 1982. See www.houstonareasurvey.org for further details.

The aggregated yearly data files that we examine are not consecutive but rather are spread out over several decades. As with most annual surveys, time and financial constrains prohibit all survey items from being included every year. Nevertheless, we examine all available data in tracking Houstonians’ beliefs about inequality across the following time periods: the early 1980s, the late 1980s, the early 1990s, the late 1990s, the early 2000s, the late 2000s, and the early 2010s.⁵

African Americans compose 22.6% of the total sample size. This distribution mirrors that of the City of Houston (www.census.gov). Whites compose 77.4% because Latinos, Asians, and “others” are omitted from the present study (this approach preserves our attention to privileged Blacks’ beliefs about poverty and racial inequality).

Dependent variables

We examine levels of commitment to three distinct types of causal attributions: (a) racially neutral individualistic beliefs about poverty, (b) racially neutral structural beliefs about poverty, and (c) racially specific individualistic versus structural beliefs about racial inequality. The survey items contained within the first two categories closely correspond to those examined in previous studies by Feagin (1975), Kluegel and Smith (1986), Hunt (1996, 2004), Smith (1985), and Robinson (2009). Whereas they are very similar in content and phrasing, the answer possibilities slightly differ in that they are binary rather than ordinal. Respondents were simply asked whether they “agree” or “disagree” with the proposed statement about poor people. Both the racially neutral individualistic and structural items are coded so as to assess the extent to which study participants “agree” with the proposed statement.

As for the latter category, beliefs about racial inequality are examined by way of an interesting set of survey items in which respondents were asked to decide between attributing the inequalities facing Black people to racially specific individualistic or structural causes. The final item in this grouping gauges whether study participants blame African Americans for “problems within the Black community.” This item is similar to Kluegel and Smith’s (1986) question regarding the culture of poverty—the notion that poor people themselves are responsible for their predicament because they remain committed to cultural values that limit their socioeconomic progress (Lewis, 1959, 1968; Massey & Denton, 1993; Steinberg, 1981). Each of the items within this category is coded so that positive scores signal a stronger commitment to structuralism, whereas negative scores signal a stronger commitment to individualism. Table 1 presents detailed information for all dependent variables including survey questions/statements, answer possibilities, codes, and percentage distributions by race.

Table 1.

Survey Questions/Statements, Answer Possibilities, Codes, and Percentage Distributions by Race for (a) Racially Neutral Individualistic Beliefs About Inequality, (b) Racially Neutral Structural Beliefs About Inequality, and (c) Racially Specific Individualistic Versus Structural Beliefs About Racial Inequality

Dependent variables	Blacks	Whites	t Value
(a) Racially Neutral Individualistic Beliefs About Poverty
1. An important reason that there are poor people in this country is that most of the poor just don’t have the motivation or willpower to pull themselves up out of poverty.
Agree (1)	47.5%	55.9%	3.52****
Disagree (0)	52.5%	44.1%
2. An important reason that there are poor people in this country that most of the poor don’t use their money wisely.
Agree (1)	51.3%	56.4%	1.45
Disagree (0)	48.7%	43.6%
(b) Racially Neutral Structural Beliefs About Poverty
3. An important reason that there are poor people in this country is that most of the poor don’t have a chance for the education it takes to rise out of poverty.
Agree (1)	60.5%	42.6%	−5.31****
Disagree (0)	39.5%	57.4%
4. An important reason that there are poor people in this country is that there are simply not enough jobs for all who want to work.
Agree (1)	64.7%	35.9%	−8.76****
Disagree (0)	35.3%	64.1%
(c) Racially Specific Individualistic vs. Structural Beliefs About Racial Inequality
5. Blacks and other minorities have the same opportunities as Whites in the U.S. today.
Agree (0)	27.6%	59.1%	−21.49****
Disagree (1)	72.4%	40.9%
6. Black Americans generally have worse jobs, income, and housing than other Americans. Is that mainly because:
They don’t try hard enough (0)	13.1%	45.4%	−9.97****
Both (volunteered, 1)	22.5%	34.3%
Of continuing discrimination (2)	64.4%	20.3%
7. Overall, do you feel that the problems facing Black Americans today are mainly the result of:
Problems within the Black community (0)	31.1%	40.4%	−5.24****
Both (volunteered, 1)	33.5%	33.0%
Attitudes and inequalities in the larger society (2)	35.4%	26.6%

Note: t values assess differences between Blacks and Whites on the variable overall, not the individual answer possibilities.

****

p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Independent variables

The seven dependent variables are separately regressed on four groups of independent variables: (a) racial group membership, (b) socioeconomic indicators, (c) sociodemographic characteristics, and (d) Race × Class interaction terms that allow us to compare and contrast socioeconomic effects among Blacks and Whites. Our coding scheme for race (Black = 0, White = 1) places class effects among African Americans at the forefront of our analysis; Blacks are the reference group in the models with Race × Class interaction terms. (We also include a product term for Race × the Year our respondents participated in the HAS. This aids our goal of monitoring changes in Blacks’ beliefs over the decades.)

The socioeconomic indicators include measures for total household income and education. Our coding scheme for these measures is especially critical: Income and education are examined as a series of dummy variables so as to highlight socioeconomic effects at discrete levels of the American class structure. Although the income codes periodically changed to keep up with inflation, we are able to utilize established cutoff points for aggregating data across HAS years (Klineberg, 2010). These thresholds, which parallel those of the U.S. Census, allow us to capture the distribution of respondents in each year with incomes in the “lowest category,” “second lowest category,” “middle category,” “second highest category,” and “highest category.”⁶ Education is coded “less than a high school degree,” “high school degree,” “some college,” “college degree,” and “graduate degree.” On the basis of this coding scheme, we consider “privileged” respondents to be those who (a) have an income in at least the “second highest category” and/or (b) have at least a “college degree.” Table 2 presents detailed information for all independent variables including codes and percentage distributions by race.

Table 2.

Codes and Percentage Distributions by Race for All Independent Variables

Independent variables	Blacks	Whites	t Value
SES Indicators
Income^a
Lowest category^b (less than $25,000)	33.7%	14.5%	−15.92****
Second lowest category ($25,001 to $50,000)	38.4%	31.1%	−6.43****
Middle category ($50,001 to $75,000)	15.2%	21.4%	5.13****
Second highest category ($75,001 to $100,000)	8.0%	20.5%	14.15****
Highest category (at least $100,000)	4.7%	12.5%	11.13****
Education
Less than high school^c	12.7%	5.7%	−11.11****
Completed high school	28.7%	20.5%	−9.19****
Some/junior college	33.5%	30.5%	−3.13****
Completed college	18.0%	30.9%	15.85****
Graduate/advanced degree	7.1%	12.4%	10.12****
Sociodemographics
Gender (women = 1, men = 0)	58.9%	52.7%	−6.27****
Age^d	(41.42)	(45.86)	13.34****
Year respondent participated in the HAS^d	(1997.21)	(1995.62)	−9.41****

Note: Means appear in parentheses.

Income data presented are for the late 1990s thru the early 2010s.

Reference category for income.

Reference category for education.

Analyzed as a continuous variable in the multivariate models.

****

p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Findings

Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for all predictor and outcome variables. These preliminary results show that Blacks and Whites sharply differ across most of the items examined in this study. As for beliefs about poverty, Blacks are either slightly less than or equal to Whites in their commitment to racially neutral individualistic attributions. However, they are far more structural in orientation than Whites. These expected findings hold constant across Blacks’ and Whites’ beliefs about the causes of racial inequality. Relative to Whites, African Americans are far more likely to attribute inequalities facing Black people to structural determinants such as “continuing discrimination” and “attitudes and inequalities in the larger society” rather than individual-level factors.

Table 2 shows that racial differences extend across the socioeconomic indicators and sociodemographic characteristics. On average, Blacks in the sample earn less income, are less educated, more often female, and younger than Whites. However, as compared with nationally representative samples of African Americans, our findings show that there are slightly fewer Black Houstonians situated near the bottom of the income distribution and slightly more situated near the middle (Davis & Smith, 2008; Emerson & Sikkink, 2006). Nevertheless, these results mirror the established finding that more than 80% of African Americans report an income in the lowest 60% of the total U.S. income distribution (Farley & Allen, 1987; Kerbo, 1996; Massey, 2007; Shelton & Wilson, 2009; Stoll, 2005; Webster & Bishaw, 2007). Thus, these findings not only reflect enduring disparities between Blacks and Whites, but also suggest that those African Americans situated near the upper 40% of the income distribution are highly privileged as compared to most other Blacks.

Moreover, Black Houstonians have greatly surpassed the national Black population in educational attainment. There are far fewer Black Houstonians who have failed to complete high school, and far more who have attended at least “some college.” Furthermore, the percentages of Blacks who have not only “completed college” but also earned a “graduate degree” approach nearly twice the national average (Davis & Smith, 2008; Emerson & Sikkink, 2006; Pew Research Center, 2006). Black Houstonians’ heightened levels of socioeconomic attainment are in part due to a robust local economy (only New York City is home to more Fortune 500 companies), a comparatively low cost of living, and the fact that two historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs) are either located within or are in close proximity to the city (Barr, 1982; Brown, 2007; Bullard, 1987; CNN, 2009; Feagin, 1985; Klineberg, 2005; Shelton et al., 1989).

The Race and Class Determinants of Beliefs About Inequality

Table 3 displays results from logistic regressions that assess levels of commitment to racially neutral individualistic attributions for poverty. Model 1 presents findings for the main effects of the predictor variables, whereas Model 2 includes Race × Class interaction terms specifically for Whites. The first set of results in Table 3 examines the extent to which respondents “agree” that most poor people “don’t have the motivation or willpower to pull themselves up out of poverty.” The main effects model shows that Whites (odds ratio [OR] = 1.57) are more than one and half times as likely as Blacks to “agree” with the aforementioned statement, holding all other variables constant. However, as compared to respondents in the lowest income category, those in the highest (OR = 0.95) income category are slightly less likely to assert that poor people lack willpower. Similarly, as compared with respondents who did not complete high school, study participants across all education levels are less likely to attribute poverty to “motivational individualism” (Hunt, 2007; Kluegel, 1990).

Table 3.

Logistic Regressions for Levels of Commitment to Racially Neutral Individualistic Attributions for Inequality

	Respondent agrees that most poor people don’t have motivation or willpower						Respondent agrees that most poor people don’t use money wisely
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 1			Model 2
Independent variable	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Race
Whites	0.45****	0.10	1.57	—	—	—	0.13	0.15	1.14	—	—	—
Socioeconomic status (SES) indicators
Income^a
Second lowest	−0.08	0.06	0.93	0.15	0.11	0.86	−0.12	0.09	0.89	0.15	0.16	0.86
Middle	−0.04	0.04	0.96	0.29 ***	0.11	0.75	−0.04	0.07	0.96	0.04	0.14	0.96
Second highest	−0.04	0.04	0.96	0.15	0.10	0.86	−0.04	0.05	0.97	0.04	0.13	0.96
Highest	−0.06*	0.03	0.95	0.18*	0.10	0.84	−0.04	0.04	0.96	0.08	0.12	0.93
Education^b
High school degree	−0.14*	0.08	0.87	0.28*	0.15	0.76	−0.06	0.12	0.94	0.11	0.22	0.89
Some college	−0.18****	0.05	0.84	0.23 **	0.10	0.79	−0.05	0.08	0.95	0.23	0.14	0.80
College degree	−0.21****	0.04	0.81	0.31 ****	0.09	0.73	−0.08	0.06	0.92	0.09	0.12	0.92
Graduate degree	−0.24****	0.04	0.79	0.16*	0.09	0.86	−0.08	0.06	0.93	0.04	0.13	0.96
Sociodemographics
Women	−0.27****	0.08	0.76	−0.28****	0.08	0.76	−0.11	0.12	0.90	−0.11	0.12	0.89
Age	0.01****	0.00	1.01	0.01****	0.00	1.01	0.02****	0.00	1.02	0.02****	0.00	1.02
Year	0.00	0.01	1.00	0.03	0.02	1.03	−0.03***	0.01	0.97	0.03	0.02	1.03
Interaction terms
Whites × Second Lowest				0.10	0.13	1.11				0.03	0.19	1.04
Whites × Middle				0.01 **	0.12	1.01				−0.00	0.16	0.99
Whites × Second Highest				0.14	0.10	1.15				0.00	0.14	1.00
Whites × Highest				0.14	0.10	1.16				0.05	0.13	1.05
Whites × High School Degree				0.21	0.17	1.23				0.04	0.26	1.04
Whites × Some College				0.09	0.12	1.10				0.22	0.17	1.25
Whites × College Degree				0.14	0.10	1.15				0.01	0.14	1.01
Whites × Graduate Degree				−0.08	0.10	0.93				−0.04	0.14	0.96
Whites × Year				−0.03	0.02	0.97				0.04 ***	0.03	0.96
Pseudo R²	.06			.07			.04			.05
χ²	125.40****			140.69****			39.41****			51.69****
N	2,752			2,752			1,276			1,276

Note: The coefficients for Blacks appear in bold; the total effect for a significant socioeconomic variable among Whites appears in italics.

Lowest income category reference group.

Less than high school degree reference group.

p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Model 2 reveals that after controlling for age, gender, and the year our respondents participated in the HAS, African Americans situated within the middle (OR = 0.75) and highest (OR = 0.84) income categories are less likely to blame the poor for their predicament. Furthermore, as compared to Blacks who did not finish high school, Blacks across all levels of educational attainment are less likely to “agree” that poor people lack the determination to pull themselves up by their bootstraps.

The interaction terms show that privileged Whites feel the same way that privileged Blacks do; the one class-based difference between racial groups is that Whites in the middle (OR = 1.01) income category are slightly more strongly committed to motivational individualism than Blacks in the middle income category (the total effects for Whites on a significant variable appear in italics).

The next set of results show that neither racial group membership nor socioeconomic position shapes levels of commitment to the long-standing belief that poor people “don’t use their money wisely.” A majority of Blacks and Whites across all income and education levels similarly believe that poor people are fiscally irresponsible.

From this point forward, our discussion of the multivariate findings will focus on Model 2. Results for this nested model are most central to our research goals; results for the base model are consistent with prior research across each of the remaining outcomes.

Table 4 presents results from logistic regressions that assess levels of commitment to racially neutral structural attributions for poverty. The first set of results scrutinizes whether respondents “agree” that most poor people “don’t have a chance for the education it takes to rise out of poverty.” Model 2 shows that Blacks in the second highest (OR = 1.29) income category are slightly more likely than Blacks in the lowest income category to “agree,” holding all other variables constant. Moreover, the interaction terms indicate that as compared to similarly situated Blacks, Whites with a high school degree (OR = 0.78) are less likely to attribute poverty to education-based structural disparities.

Table 4.

Logistic Regressions for Levels of Commitment to Racially Neutral Structural Attributions for Inequality

	Respondent agrees that most poor people have a chance for the education it takes to rise out of poverty						Respondent agrees that there are not enough jobs for all poor people who want to work
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 1			Model 2
Independent variable	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Race
Whites	−0.65****	0.15	0.52	—	—	—	−1.09****	0.16	0.34	—	—	—
Socioeconomic status (SES) indicators
Income^a
Second lowest	0.16*	0.09	1.17	0.20	0.17	1.22	−0.07	0.09	0.94	0.17	0.18	0.84
Middle	0.02	0.06	1.02	0.08	0.14	1.09	−0.16**	0.07	0.85	0.09	0.15	0.92
Second highest	0.01	0.05	1.01	0.25*	0.14	1.29	−0.18****	0.06	0.83	0.00	0.14	0.99
Highest	0.05	0.04	1.05	0.04	0.12	1.04	−0.10**	0.04	0.90	0.06	0.13	1.06
Education^b
High school degree	−0.11	0.11	0.90	0.33	0.21	1.39	−0.33***	0.12	0.72	0.22	0.24	0.81
Some college	−0.11	0.07	0.90	0.05	0.14	0.95	−0.11	0.08	0.90	0.13	0.16	0.88
College degree	−0.06	0.06	0.94	0.14	0.12	0.87	−0.14**	0.06	0.87	0.23*	0.13	0.79
Graduate degree	0.00	0.05	1.00	0.00	0.13	1.00	−0.11**	0.06	0.89	0.19	0.14	0.83
Sociodemographics
Women	0.17	0.12	1.19	0.19*	0.12	1.21	0.40****	0.12	1.49	0.41****	0.12	1.50
Age	−0.01***	0.00	0.99	−0.01***	0.00	0.99	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Year	0.04****	0.01	1.04	0.00	0.02	1.00	−0.07****	0.01	0.93	0.08 ****	0.03	0.92
Interaction terms
Whites × Second Lowest				−0.02	0.19	0.98				0.16	0.20	1.18
Whites × Middle				−0.07	0.16	0.94				−0.09	0.16	0.91
Whites × Second Highest				0.01	0.16	0.99				−0.21	0.15	0.81
Whites × Highest				0.00	0.13	1.00				−0.18	0.14	0.84
Whites × High School Degree				0.25 **	0.25	0.78				−0.17	0.27	0.85
Whites × Some College				−0.10	0.16	0.91				0.02	0.18	1.02
Whites × College Degree				0.06	0.14	1.07				0.10	0.15	1.10
Whites × Graduate Degree				−0.10	0.14	0.99				0.09	0.15	1.09
Whites × Year				0.04	0.03	1.04				0.02	0.03	1.02
Pseudo R²	.05			.07			.18			.18
χ²	54.72****			70.31****			185.08****			193.75****
N	1,328			1,328			1,332			1,332

Note: The coefficients for Blacks appear in bold; the total effect for a significant socioeconomic variable among Whites appears in italics.

Lowest income category reference group.

Less than high school degree reference group.

p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

The next set of results assesses the extent to which study participants “agree” that there are “not enough jobs for all [poor people] who want to work.” Model 2 indicates that as compared to Blacks with less than a high school degree, Blacks with a college degree (OR = 0.79) are less likely to attribute poverty to structural factors related to employment. This finding (as well as some of our previous results) attests to the importance of conducting a more nuanced analysis among African Americans: Relying solely on “main effects” differences between Blacks and Whites often conceals significant attitudinal variation between privileged and disadvantaged Blacks.

Table 5 presents results from logistic and multinomial logistic regressions⁷ that assess levels of commitment to racially specific individualistic versus structural attributions for racial inequality. As previously stated, the dependent variables examined here are coded so that positive scores signal greater support for structuralism, whereas negative scores signal greater support for individualism. Models assessing levels of support for “both” individualism and structuralism are not shown due to space constraints (however, these results are available upon request).

Table 5.

Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regressions for Levels of Commitment to Racially Specific Individualistic Versus Structural Attributions for Racial Inequality

	Respondent disagrees that Blacks and other minorities have the same opportunities as Whites						Blacks are worse-off because of continuing discrimination						Problems facing Blacks today are mainly the result of attitudes and inequalities in the larger society
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 1			Model 2			Model 1			Model 2
Independent variable	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Race
Whites	−1.64****	0.08	0.19	—	—	—	−2.01****	0.26	0.14	—	—	—	−0.60****	0.12	0.55	—	—	—
Socioeconomic status (SES) indicators
Income^a
Second lowest	0.05	0.04	1.05	0.07	0.08	1.07	−0.02	0.13	0.98	0.17	0.28	0.85	0.08	0.07	1.09	0.02	0.11	1.02
Middle	−0.03	0.03	0.97	0.10	0.07	0.90	0.03	0.10	1.03	0.11	0.30	1.11	−0.07	0.05	0.94	0.15	0.10	0.86
Second highest	0.03	0.03	1.03	0.13*	0.07	0.88	0.01	0.07	1.01	0.02	0.24	0.98	−0.07	0.04	0.93	0.23**	0.10	0.79
Highest	−0.01	0.02	0.99	0.19***	0.07	0.83	0.01	0.06	1.01	—	—	—	0.01	0.03	1.01	0.00	0.09	0.99
Education^b
High school degree	0.12*	0.07	1.13	0.14	0.11	1.15	−0.02	0.19	0.98	0.29	0.36	1.33	−0.16	0.12	0.85	0.01	0.18	0.99
Some college	0.22****	0.05	1.24	0.25****	0.08	1.28	0.16	0.13	1.17	0.12	0.23	1.13	−0.16**	0.08	0.85	0.11	0.12	0.90
College degree	0.26****	0.04	1.29	0.27****	0.07	1.31	0.13	0.10	1.14	0.29	0.24	1.33	−0.05	0.06	0.96	0.06	0.10	1.06
Graduate degree	0.26****	0.03	1.30	0.28****	0.07	1.32	0.29***	0.10	1.34	—	—	—	0.00	0.05	1.00	0.01	0.10	1.01
Sociodemographics
Women	0.03	0.06	1.03	0.03	0.06	1.03	0.51***	0.18	1.67	0.51***	0.18	1.66	0.07	0.10	1.07	0.07	0.10	1.07
Age	−0.00	0.00	0.99	0.00	0.00	1.00	−0.02****	0.01	0.98	−0.02****	0.01	0.98	−0.00	0.00	0.99	−0.00	0.00	0.99
Year	−0.04****	0.01	0.96	0.02*	0.01	0.98	−0.06	0.09	0.94	0.14	0.24	0.87	−0.05****	0.01	0.95	0.07****	0.02	0.93
Interaction terms
Whites × Second Lowest				−0.02	0.09	0.98				0.18	0.32	1.20				0.11	0.14	1.12
Whites × Middle				0.09	0.08	1.10				−0.07	0.32	0.93				0.12	0.11	1.13
Whites × Second Highest				0.05**	0.08	1.05				0.04	0.25	1.04				0.02	0.11	0.98
Whites × Highest				0.02***	0.07	1.02				—	—	—				0.02	0.10	1.02
Whites × High School Degree				−0.02	0.15	0.98				−0.43	0.43	0.65				−0.28	0.25	0.76
Whites × Some College				−0.02	0.10	0.98				−0.02	0.27	0.99				−0.09	0.16	0.91
Whites × College Degree				−0.01	0.91	0.99				−0.22	0.27	0.80				−0.15	0.13	0.86
Whites × Graduate Degree				−0.01	0.08	0.99				—	—	—				−0.03	0.12	0.97
Whites × Year				0.05**	0.01	0.95				0.11	0.25	1.12				0.03	0.03	1.03
Pseudo R²	.15			.15			.17			.19			.07			.08
χ²	602.49****			620.30****			131.43****			146.47****			171.52****			182.10****
N	5,103			5,103			813			813			2,632			2,632

Note: The coefficients for Blacks appear in bold; the total effect for a significant socioeconomic variable among Whites appears in italics.

Lowest income category reference group.

Less than high school degree reference group.

The first set of results examines the extent to which respondents “disagree” that “Blacks and other minorities have the same opportunities as Whites in the US today” (a negative coefficient indicates that respondents feel that Blacks and Whites have similar opportunities). This item is analyzed by way of logistic regression.

Model 2 reveals that a privileged class position can foster complex and contradictory attitudes about inequality among African Americans. Blacks in the second highest (OR = 0.88) and highest (OR = 0.83) income categories are more likely to declare the equality of opportunity in America, whereas those with at least some college (OR = 1.28), a college degree (OR = 1.31), and/or a graduate degree (OR = 1.32) are less likely to do so. This finding—that an elevated class position encourages attitudinal intricacies and inconsistencies in Black political and social thought—is common to the existing literature (Anderson, 1999; Dawson, 2001; Lacy, 2007; Patillo, 2003; Pew, 2007; Shelton & Emerson, 2010; Shelton & Wilson, 2009). Such intragroup conflicts are a product of minority group members’ increased awareness of and participation in the American mainstream (Alba & Nee, 2003; Gordon, 1964; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Shelton, 2008; Steinberg, 1981). A number of studies have shown that higher levels of income and educational attainment can differentially impact beliefs about inequality: The former tends to wield a conservatizing influence, whereas the latter can sometimes wield a liberalizing influence (Huber & Form, 1973; Hunt, 1996, 2004; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Robinson, 2009; Shelton & Emerson, 2010; Smith, 1985; Wilson, 1996). The findings presented here suggest that these contrasting effects are more pronounced among Blacks rather than Whites.

Regarding the interaction terms, as compared with similarly situated Blacks, Whites in the second highest (OR = 1.05) and highest (OR = 1.02) income categories are more likely to assert that Blacks and Whites do not have the same opportunities. In other words, some of the most privileged Black Houstonians are slightly more likely than some of the most privileged White Houstonians to declare the equality of opportunity in the post–civil rights era.

The second set of results assesses the extent to which respondents believe that African Americans are “generally worse” because of (a) “continuing discrimination” or (b) that Blacks “don’t try hard enough.” This item is analyzed by way of multinomial logistic regression. The findings presented in Model 2 suggest that privileged Blacks differ neither from disadvantaged Blacks nor similarly situated Whites on this item. However, this is misleading. The model was unable to produce reliable estimates because so few privileged Blacks attributed African Americans being “generally worse” off to a decidedly individualistic explanation.

The last set of results scrutinizes the extent to which respondents believe that the “problems facing Black Americans today” are the result of (a) “attitudes and inequalities in the larger society” or (b) “problems within the Black community.” This final item is also analyzed by way of multinomial logistic regression. Model 2 indicates that as compared with Blacks in the lowest income category, Blacks in the second highest (OR = 0.79) income category are less likely to assert that Black problems result from “attitudes and inequalities in the larger society,” controlling for all other variables. In other words, these privileged Blacks believe that Blacks themselves are most responsible for “problems within the Black community.”⁸

Race, Class, and Beliefs About Inequality Over Four Decades

In addition to our findings for the importance of class position, the multivariate results of this study also show that Blacks’ beliefs about poverty and racial inequality have meaningfully changed across HAS years. More specifically, some of our results support Hunt’s (2007) assertion that Blacks have grown progressively less committed to racially specific structural attributions with the passage of time. This finding begs the following critical questions: (a) How have privileged Blacks’ beliefs about poverty and racial inequality changed over the decades? and (b) Are privileged Blacks spearheading African Americans’ declining commitment to structuralism?

Table 6 displays percentage distributions for how a privileged income has shaped Black and White Houstonians’ commitments to racially specific and racially neutral individualistic and structural attributions over four decades. These findings suggest that privileged Blacks’ beliefs about poverty and racial inequality have undergone meaningful transformation during the post–civil rights era. For instance, between the early 1980s and late 1990s, the percentage of African Americans with a privileged income who “agreed” that poor people lack the “motivation or willpower to pull themselves up out of poverty” increased by nearly 15% (considerable attitudinal variation across and within these decades often exceeds this value).

Table 6.

Percentage Distributions for How a Privileged Income Has Shaped Blacks’ and Whites’ Commitments to Racially Specific and Racially Neutral Individualistic and Structural Attributions Over Four Decades

	Early 80s	Late 80s	Early 90s	Late 90s	Early 00s	Late 00s	Early 10s	% Change^a
(a) Race-neutral individual attributions
1. Agree poor lack motivation
Higher income Whites	60.2	42.7	58.6	48.7	—	—	—	−11.5
Higher income Blacks	40.0	33.3	19.0	54.5	—	—	—	+14.5
All other Blacks	58.2	48.8	61.1	55.3	—	—	—	−2.9
2. Agree poor don’t use money wisely
Higher income Whites	65.0	—	50.6	50.0	—	—	—	−15.0
Higher income Blacks	75.0	—	42.9	50.0	—	—	—	25.0
All other Blacks	61.7	—	51.3	54.7	—	—	—	−7.0
(b) Race-neutral structural attributions
3. Agree poor lack education chances
Higher income Whites	35.0	—	41.6	49.1	—	—	—	+14.1
Higher income Blacks	50.0	—	61.9	75.0	—	—	—	+25.0
All other Blacks	38.8	—	48.9	48.0	—	—	—	+9.2
4. Agree not enough jobs
Higher income Whites	28.8	—	37.0	11.1	—	—	—	−17.7
Higher income Blacks	50.0	—	71.4	50.0	—	—	—	0
All other Blacks	50.9	—	51.1	20.0	—	—	—	−30.9
(c) Race-specific individualistic vs. structural attributions
5. Disagree same opportunities
Higher income Whites	—	—	62.3	49.1	43.1	37.8	39.5	−22.8
Higher income Blacks	—	—	93.8	75.0	69.8	55.0	56.5	37.3
All other Blacks	—	—	52.2	48.8	45.8	47.8	41.7	−10.5
6a. Blacks worse off: They don’t try hard enough
Higher income Whites	—	—	44.4	41.7	—	—	—	−2.7
Higher income Blacks	—	—	5.3	7.1	—	—	—	+1.8
All other Blacks	—	—	39.8	38.7	—	—	—	−1.1
6b. Blacks worse off: Continuing discrimination
Higher income Whites	—	—	37.7	33.3	—	—	—	−4.4
Higher income Blacks	—	—	84.2	64.3	—	—	—	19.9
All other Blacks	—	—	40.9	38.5	—	—	—	−2.4
6c. Blacks worse off: Both
Higher income Whites	—	—	17.9	25.0	—	—	—	+7.1
Higher income Blacks	—	—	10.5	28.6	—	—	—	+18.1
All other Blacks	—	—	19.3	22.8	—	—	—	+3.5
7a. Black problems: Problems within the Black community
Higher income Whites	—	—	—	42.7	38.9	38.0	39.1	−3.6
Higher income Blacks	—	—	—	28.6	34.6	46.3	8.7	19.9
All other Blacks	—	—	—	37.9	40.0	39.6	31.9	−6.0
7b. Black problems: Inequality in the larger society
Higher income Whites	—	—	—	30.7	32.1	22.5	18.0	−12.7
Higher income Blacks	—	—	—	42.9	34.6	22.0	21.7	21.2
All other Blacks	—	—	—	35.7	35.6	26.0	19.1	−16.6
7c. Black problems: Both
Higher income Whites	—	—	—	26.7	28.9	39.5	42.9	+16.2
Higher income Blacks	—	—	—	28.6	30.8	31.7	69.6	+41.0
All other Blacks	—	—	—	26.4	24.4	34.4	49.0	+22.6

The total difference between the earliest and most recent data years for a particular survey item. Results for African Americans with a higher income (e.g., those situated within the second highest and highest income categories) appear in bold.

During the same time period, the percentage of Whites with a privileged income who agreed declined by 12%, and the percentage for all other African American income earners who agreed declined by 3%. Thus, it appears that Black Houstonians with a privileged income have grown stronger in their commitment to motivational individualism with the passage of time.

In contrast, the percentage of African American higher income earners who believe that poor people “don’t use their money wisely” dramatically declined. In the early 1980s, 75% of Black higher income earners “agreed” that poor people are fiscally irresponsible. A substantial majority of higher income Whites and Blacks across all other income levels also felt this way. Nevertheless, despite meaningful attitudinal changes across and within the decades, by turn of the 21st century, privileged Black and White income earners were similarly committed to this individualistic explanation for poverty: Exactly half (50%) of the members within these stratums posited that poor people “don’t use their money wisely.”

As for racially neutral structural attributions, the percentage of Blacks with a privileged income who “agreed” that poor people “don’t have a chance for the education it takes to rise out of poverty” substantially (and progressively) increased between the early 1980s and late 1990s. Whereas levels of support for this explanation also increased among privileged Whites and all other African American income earners, privileged Blacks remained by far the most strongly committed to this rationale for poverty.

However, during this same time period, the percentage of higher income earning African Americans who “agreed” that there are “not enough jobs for all [poor people] who want to work” remained constant. This is important because despite meaningful fluctuation across and within the decades, both the percentage of higher income Whites and Blacks across all other income levels who agreed with the statement declined by at least 18 points.

Table 6 also shows privileged Blacks’ commitments to racially specific individualistic versus structural explanations for racial inequality. These findings show that privileged Blacks’ beliefs about the roots of racial inequality have dramatically changed over the decades. For instance, the percentage of Black higher income earners who “disagreed” with the statement that “Blacks and other minorities have the same opportunities as Whites in the US today” declined by nearly 40% between the early 1990s and early 2010s. Although most Black Houstonians with a privileged income do not believe that Blacks and Whites have similar opportunities, it is possible that their commitment to this attribution will continue to weaken.

Moreover, although the percentage of Black higher income earners who believe that African Americans are “generally worse” off because they “don’t try hard enough” remained minimal, the percentage who attributed racial inequality to “continuing discrimination” declined by 20 points between the early 1990s and the late 1990s. This is especially important considering that the percentage for Blacks across all other income levels declined by only 2% over the same time period.

Furthermore, the percentage of Black higher income earners who attributed racial inequality to both “continuing discrimination” and the belief that Blacks “don’t try hard enough” increased by 18%, whereas the percentage for all other Black income earners increased by just 4%. This gap is even more salient considering that the answer response “both” was not offered to respondents but rather was recognized only if it was volunteered by the interviewee (Klineberg, 2010).⁹

Finally, despite considerable attitudinal variation across and within the decades, the percentage of Black higher income earners who attributed “problems facing Black Americans today” to “problems within the Black community” declined by 20 points between the late 1990s and early 2010s. Thus, as compared with privileged Whites and Blacks across all other income levels (whose beliefs remained relatively stable over this time period), considerably fewer privileged Blacks advanced a “cultural” and/or individual-level explanation that held African Americans solely responsible for contemporary racial inequality (Kluegel & Smith, 1986).

Importantly, however, there was a steady decline in the percentage of Black higher income earners who attributed the problems facing Black people to “attitudes and inequalities in the larger society.” In the late 1990s, 43% of privileged Blacks advanced a decidedly structural explanation for racial inequality, whereas about one third of all other Black income earners and privileged Whites did so. Yet by the early 2010s, the percentage of Blacks who supported this explanation for racial inequality fell by half.

The most interesting finding regarding support for this attribution is the dramatic increase in the number of privileged Blacks who volunteered the “both” option. In the late 1990s, just under 30% of higher income Blacks jointly attributed the problems facing Black people to “problems within the Black community” and “attitudes and inequalities in the larger society.” A comparable percentage of higher income Whites and all other Black income earners felt this way as well.

However, by the early 2010s, nearly 70% of higher income Blacks voluntarily recognized both individualistic and structural causes of racial inequality. This represents a 41% change over the decades. There are almost twice as many privileged Blacks than there are privileged Whites or Blacks across all other income levels who jointly recognized individual-level concerns among Blacks as well as structural disparities brought about by Whites when explaining the roots of modern racial inequality.¹⁰

Conclusion

The results of this study indicate that a privileged class position strongly influences African American attitudes about the causes of poverty and racial inequality. Findings from both our multivariate and trend analyses show that privileged Blacks’ explanations for the inequalities facing poor people are similar to—but not exactly the same as—the inequalities facing Black people. Higher status Blacks attribute the difficulties that these groups face to both individualistic and structural determinants. However, the weight of these explanations has shifted over time: Privileged Blacks are now less decidedly structural in their justification for the inequalities facing Black people, but are more decidedly structural in their justification for the inequalities facing poor people. Thus, higher status Blacks’ explanation for poverty has grown increasingly liberal, whereas their explanation for racial inequality has grown increasingly conservative.

The findings presented here strongly support W. E. B. Du Bois’s (1903/1990, pp. 8–9) classical notion of the double consciousness among Blacks. However, our results suggest that there is a class-based dimension to his argument that

one ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. . . . He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face.

Privileged Blacks’ beliefs are confounded by the duality of their advanced assimilation trajectories (e.g., their elevated socioeconomic status and increased awareness of as well as participation in the American mainstream), on one hand, and their enduring affinity for Black social heritage and racial solidarity, on the other (Lacy, 2007; Shelton, 2008; Shelton & Emerson, 2010).

This class-based tension helps with explaining the post–civil rights era emergence of a debate among African Americans over the extent to which (a) racism and/or (b) personal merit shapes the circumstances of a Black person’s life. This hotly contested dialogue occurs daily (not just in Houston) in Black households, churches, barbershops, fraternal groups, and activist organizations. It is also prevalent in Black media including websites, blogs, films, magazines, TV shows, and music (including the early 1990s hip hop anthem for which this article is named).

In recent years, ideological tensions between privileged and disadvantaged Blacks have been personified by Bill Cosby, a widely respected African American comedian. In his December 2004 address to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Cosby attributed many of Black America’s contemporary problems to the notion that “the lower economic and lower middle economic people are not holding up their end in this deal [e.g., racial integration].” He went on to blame specific problems within the Black community—such as the disproportionately high number of African American criminal offenders, high school dropouts, and single-parent households—on what he sees as a lack of adequate parenting among members of these relatively disadvantaged stratums (Cosby & Poussaint, 2007). However, the thrust of the controversy surrounding Cosby’s remarks centered on his reluctance to attribute the problems and inequalities facing Black people to White racism rather than personal responsibility:

For me there is a time . . . when we have to turn the mirror around. Because for me it is almost analgesic to talk about what the White man is doing against us. And it keeps a person frozen in their seat; it keeps you frozen in the hole you’re sitting in.

The results of this study are relevant to the current debate over whether Bill Cosby “is right.” Our multivariate and trend results provide qualified support for Dyson’s (2005) assertion that higher status Blacks are probably more likely to champion Bill Cosby’s controversial critique of disadvantaged Blacks rather than contest it. For many scholars and interested onlookers, some privileged Blacks’ beliefs about the causes of contemporary poverty and racial inequality probably confirms that the “Black middle class has lost its mind” (the subtitle of Dyson’s popular text). Nevertheless, that members of this racialized stratum are increasingly likely to augment their commitment to structuralism with individualism supports the old Black bourgeoisie adage that “you have to be twice as good as Whites in order to ‘make it’ in America.”

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank George Wilson and Matthew Hunt for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Bios

Jason E. Shelton is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at Arlington. His primary research interests concern the sociology of religion, as well as the intersections between race, class, and political/social attitudes in the post-Civil Rights Era.

Anthony D. Greene is Assistant Professor of African American Studies at the College of Charleston. His area of research specialization is in race-ethnic relations, cultural and ethnic identity, and Sociology of Education. His most recent work investigates how the perception of discrimination impacts social psychological factors among Black subgroups in the U.S.

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