Influence of Attitudes Toward Immigration on State Legitimacy

Abstract

The current article studies the influence of attitudes toward immigration on state legitimacy. We analyzed the European Union countries that received the greatest immigrant inflows in 2014: Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, through data from the latest edition of the European Social Survey. Our results show that citizens with negative attitudes toward immigration consider their states to be less legitimate. Conversely, positive attitudes toward immigration are not associated with increased state legitimacy (except in Spain). Based on these findings, there is a clear need for communication strategies that provide information on the actual effects of immigration. In their absence, the political discourse on this matter will continue to be co-opted by power-grabbing actors.

Keywords

immigration attitudes legitimacy state European Union

Introduction

Migratory flows are the consequence of economic, environmental, political, and social factors in the country of origin (push factors) or destination (pull factors; Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 2009). According to the European Union (EU), the relative economic prosperity and political stability of the region have contributed to a pull effect on migrants. EU statistical data shows that 4.7 million people immigrated into one of the EU-28 member states in 2015, of which 1,543,800 moved into Germany, 631,500 into the United Kingdom, 363,900 into France, 342,100 into Spain, and 280,100 into Italy.

Furthermore, the number of immigrants into Europe has grown over the past decades (Hooghe, Trappers, Meuleman, & Reeskens, 2008). Policy restrictions adopted by European countries in the 1970s did not stop the growth trend of individuals moving to Europe, whether as economic or work migrants, political asylees, or family reunification beneficiaries (Castles & Miller, 2003). Success at the polls by anti-immigration parties (Anderson, 1996; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002) have made evident the large number of citizens that perceive immigration as something with negative consequences (Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005). In this vein, Meuleman et al. (2009) confirm the existence of anti-immigration attitudes among European citizens.

The majority of the literature on attitudes toward ethnic minorities, immigrants, or immigration is focused on social context and individual variables such as education (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Hagendoorn & Nekuee, 1999; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007), economic interests (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Dustmann & Preston, 2004; Fetzer, 2000), religion (Billiet, Eisinga, & Scheepers, 1996; McFarland, 1989), human values (Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995), threat perceptions (Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; Semyonov, Raijman, Yom Tov, & Schmidt, 2004), voting behavior (Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006), and economic context along with size of immigrant population in the locality of residence (Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2008).

Additional research has looked into the evolution of attitudes toward external groups (Coenders, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2003; Coenders & Scheepers, 1998, 2008; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Quillian, 1996; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Semyonov et al., 2006). We find these studies particularly interesting because they add a dynamic perspective to theoretical frameworks. For example, Semyonov et al. (2006) investigates the evolution of prejudice in 12 European countries over the 1988-2000 time frame.

Even though some academic researchers have analyzed the relationship between attitudes toward immigration and welfare state policies (Oorschot, 2010), the relationship between these attitudes and the level of support of state institutions by its citizens—or state legitimacy—has not been confirmed. State legitimacy must be actively managed because individual actions, like migration or integration policies, can increase or decrease the perceptions of legitimacy (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004). According to Blanco-González, Prado-Román, and Díez-Martín (2017) and Gilley (2006), countries with low levels of legitimacy do not have popular support and are prone to social instability as well as political, social, and economic crises.

Currently, perceptions of state legitimacy are being threatened by the emergence of anti-immigration political parties in Europe such as Front National (France), Alternative für Deutschland (Germany), Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austria), or the United Kingdom Independence Party (United Kingdom), along with movements against the concept of Europe (for instance, Brexit). This presents a risk to the benefits of legitimacy: national competitiveness, citizen satisfaction, and attractiveness for investors and tourists.

In this study, we investigate the influence of attitudes toward immigration on state legitimacy. Our source data are based on the latest edition of the European Social Survey (ESS) from where we isolate the EU countries that received the greatest immigrant inflows in 2014: Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Our goal is to answer three questions: (a) How do attitudes toward immigration influence state legitimacy? (b) Is there a common pattern for these effects across different EU countries? and (c) Is it necessary to develop specific legitimacy-managing strategies depending on the levels of acceptance toward immigration?

Theoretical Framework

This study is focused on attitudes toward immigration and therefore the way in which people perceive the arrival of immigrants with different ethnic and cultural origins in their country. These attitudes can be seen as a surfacing from the out-group aspects of ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1960). This is a dynamic concept with multiple facets such as prejudice, perceived ethnic threat, social distance, and avoidance of external contact (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Since these concepts are theoretically and empirically close to attitudes toward immigration, we reference the literature on out-group attitudes to outline our theoretical framework.

Most of the existing research in this area has focused on attitudes toward Black minorities in the United States. In this country, starting around 1950, there has been a documented increase of support for values of equality (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Quillian, 1996; Schuman et al., 1997), which has not lead to the implementation of equal treatment. The paradox between values and implementation has led some researchers to conclude that, during the past few decades, traditional negative attitudes have expressed themselves through “symbolic racism” (Kinder & Sears, 1981) or “subtle prejudice” (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997).

These U.S.-centric historic developments cannot be directly generalized to European countries. Attitude changes in the United States are, at least in part, the product of an evolution in intergroup relationships from slavery to equal legal rights (Meuleman et al., 2009). In many European countries, the presence of significant ethnic minority groups is a recent phenomenon. The great migratory influxes to Europe happened in the second half of the 20th century (Castles & Miller, 2003; Hooghe et al., 2008).

Coenders and Scheepers (1998) is among the scientific studies of unfavorable attitudes toward ethnic minorities. They describe how support for ethnic discrimination in the Netherlands diminished notably between 1979 and 1986 but increased after that year. Similarly, Coenders and Scheepers (2008) conclude that German citizens offered less resistance to social integration of foreign workers in the 1980-2000 period. Finally, Semyonov et al. (2006) show that ethnic prejudice increased dramatically between 1988 and 1992 in 12 European countries, albeit with different intensities. These variations among countries are what make it hard to predict the evolution of attitudes toward immigration in Europe.

Out-group attitudes can be seen as coming from multiple sources. According to group conflict theory (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Campbell, 1965; Coser, 1956, Olzak, 1992; Quillian, 1995), negative attitudes toward external groups are essentially the consequence of a perceived threat on the group’s prerogatives. Negative feelings about the outside group can be interpreted as a defensive reaction to perceived competition for scarce goods (such as, housing, work, education, or health care), power, and status. Negative attitudes increase when the economic situation becomes more unfavorable. Alternately, when the economic situation is favorable, competition is less intense and there is less of a perception of a zero-sum game between majority and minority groups (Blalock, 1967; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006). Hence, the growth of far right, populist, and national political movements during the past European crisis.

Nonetheless, group conflict theory is not without critics (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Quillian, 1996; Schuman et al., 1997). One of these is based on the fact that the older and most prejudiced cohorts will die and be replaced by other younger, better educated, and less prejudiced cohorts. This alone can produce a meaningful evolution toward a more tolerant society (Meuleman et al., 2009).

Attitudes toward immigration also have political consequences at a state institution level. In democratic countries, citizens are mostly able to distinguish between the state and individual political parties. State stability requires citizen participation, trust in its institutions, and good governance (Lillbacka, 1999; Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982). Factors such as corruption, citizen participation, and attitudes toward immigration, political ideology, or national identity will affect state legitimacy (Blanco-González et al., 2017).

To analyze state legitimacy, one must consider its three dimensions: legality, justification, and consent. Legality refers to the fact that the state exercises its political power in accordance to its citizens’ opinions on laws, rules, and customs. This dimension is important because laws, when generally applied, create predictability. An example of this dimension is how citizens perceive corruption, the rule of law, or legal enforcement and police activity.

The second normative dimension examines shared values in a specific society: its ideas and values. Citizens of a state have an idea of how their state should act (Nevitte & Kanji, 2002). In other words, there is a set of shared beliefs that express themselves through state institutions (Beetham, 1991). This idea of congruence between the state’s actions and what society thinks it should be doing forms the basis of the literature on comparative politics and sociology (Nevitte & Kanji, 2002). Some indicators of this dimension are trust in political leadership or opinions on institutional effectiveness.

In the third place, consent or political support present a complementary view of state legitimacy by referring to participation and popular support. It is made up of those actions that reflect the belief that the state has global political authority and its decisions must be followed. Examples of acts of consent are voter participation, membership in associations, or affiliation with political parties.

According to Beetham (1991), Blanco-González et al. (2017), Prado-Román, Blanco-González, Díez-Martín, and Payne (2016), Gilley (2012), Seligson and Booth (2009), and Power and Cyr (2009), the three dimensions are not equally important. For these authors, legality would have a weight of 25% on total legitimacy, with consent and justification weighing the remaining 25% and 50%, respectively. Therefore, the state is more sensitive to justification than to the other dimension even though it is still possible to achieve elevated levels of legitimacy if the other dimensions are highly rated.

Honing into the relationship between attitudes toward immigration and state legitimacy, a sizable part of the literature on ethnic conflict notes that “plural” and “divided” societies are prone to conflicts and instability. In situations like these, it is hard to build a political system that is considered legitimate by all involved parties (D. Horowitz, 2000). For these reasons, some regions may be structurally inclined to having states with higher legitimacy. It is also possible, that these regional effects can be explained by specific cultural values that lead to legitimacy, as Huntington (1996) suggest with regard to Western culture. On the contrary, other regions can have profoundly rooted differences between state and society that undermine legitimacy. Researchers have identified examples in the Middle East (Hudson, 1977), Latin America (I. L. Horowitz, 1969; Nolan-Ferrell, 2004), Africa (Englebert, 2000), Eastern Europe (Ramet, 1999), China (Zhong, 1996), or Asia (Compton, 2000). For these reasons, both the intrinsic culture and the national origins of existing resident can influence the receiving country’s state legitimacy or anti-immigration attitudes.

According to rational choice theory, individuals will believe that states are legitimate if they themselves are prospering (for instance, Munro, 2002). As a consequence, if a country loses competitiveness its legitimacy will be reduced, as will happen if anti-immigration sentiments grow due to economic issues. Notwithstanding, managing anti-immigration sentiments is not easy for states that are committed to human rights. Wellman (2008) and Macedo (2007) defend that restricting immigration is morally incorrect and may be inadmissible. In this case, why do states deny entry to refugees and asylum seekers? Refugees and asylum seekers have urgent interests in immigrating to states that can protect their human rights.

Another group of academics explores the relationship between immigration, attitudes toward immigration, and the Welfare State (Oorschot, 2010). Even so, nationalist movements that support anti-immigration sentiments have emerged in Northern European countries and have even joined the government (Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands, Vlaaams Belang in Belgium, Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden, Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, or Fremskrittspartiet in Norway). This literature leads to the question of how attitudes toward immigration may influence the trust that a country’s citizens have in its institutions—in other words, their state legitimacy.

Sample and Methodology

For this study, we obtain data from the biannual ESS performed by the Standing Committee for the Social Sciences of the European Science Foundation. The survey’s goals are to measure changes in attitudes and behavioral patterns of European citizens over time and between countries, to improve the quality of quantitative measures, and to establish solid social indicators that can be used to measure well-being in European countries. The ESS sample is representative of all persons aged 15 years and older (no upper age limit) resident within private households in each country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, or language. Surveyed individuals are selected by random sampling.

Specifically, we extracted data from the 2014 ESS for Germany, France, Spain, and Great Britain. These countries received the greatest migratory inflows and are among the top five EU economies. Table 1 presents information on the selected countries’ population and gross domestic product as published by the World Economic Forum for the year under study.

Table 1.

2014 Sample Description.

Item	France	Germany	Spain	The United Kingdom
Global competitiveness index	5.127	5.387	4.493	5.253
GDP (US$ billions)	2675.915	3352.742	1464.04	2183.607
Population (millions)	62.3	82.2	44.9	61.6
GDP per capita (US$)	42747.218	40874.635	31946.297	35334.32
GDP (PPP) as share (%) of world total	3.029	4.025	1.955	3.102

Note. PPP = purchasing power parity; GDP = gross domestic product.

Source. World Economic Forum (2017).

Measurement of attitudes toward immigration is done through three survey questions (Table 2), while state legitimacy is measured through 20 items previously identified by Gilley (2006) and Blanco-González et al. (2017; Table 3). In addition, sociodemographic and socioeconomic control variables are also included (age, gender, type of locality, level of studies, work activity, religion, and citizenship in receiving country).

Table 2.

Sample and Items for Attitude Toward Immigration.

Item	Scale
IMM1. Immigration bad or good for country’s economy	0-5
IMM2. Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	0-5
IMM2. Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	0-5
2014 Sample: France = 1,917; Germany = 3,045; Spain = 1,925; The United Kingdom = 2,264

Source. European Social Survey (2014).

Table 3.

Sample and Items of State Legitimacy.

Item	Initial scale	Final scale
LEG1. Trust in the legal system	1-10	0-100
LEG2. Trust in justice	1-10	0-100
JUS1. Satisfaction with your country’s democracy	1-10	0-100
JUS2. Satisfaction with your country’s economic situation	1-10	0-100
JUS3. Sate of education in your country	1-10	0-100
JUS4. Satisfaction with your country’ government	1-10	0-100
JUS5. Trust in parliament	1-10	0-100
JUS6. Trust in political parties	1-10	0-100
JUS7. Trust in politicians	1-10	0-100
JUS8. State of health services	1-10	0-100
CON1. Participation in an election in the past 12 months	1-2	0-100
CON2. Boycotted a product in the past 12 months	1-2	0-100
CON3. Feeling of closeness with a specific political party	1-2	0-100
CON4. Contact with public administration in the past 12 months	1-2	0-100
CON5. Member of a political party	1-10	0-100
CON6. Participated in a lawful public demonstration in the past 12 months	1-2	0-100
CON7. Signed a petition in the past 12 months	1-2	0-100
CON8. Voted during the last general elections	1-2	0-100
CON9. Worked in an organization or association in the past 12 months	1-2	0-100
CON10. Worked in a political party or action group in the past 12 months	1-2	0-100
2014 Sample: France = 1,917; Germany = 3,045; Spain = 1,925; The United Kingdom = 2,264

Note. LEG = legality; JUS = justification; CON = consent; legitimacy = LEG × 0.25 + JUS × 0.50 + CON × 0.25.

Source. Own elaboration by Prado-Román et al. (2016) and European Social Survey (2014).

Should analysis of variance (ANOVA) reflect that attitudes toward immigration are influencing legitimacy, we will build indexes of legitimacy as a function of attitudes. These indexes are built following the recommendations of Blanco-González et al. (2017), who suggest that input data must be homogeneous to compare the different measures. When the scales for the different items are not homogeneous they are transformed logarithmically to a 0 to 100 scale (0 = minimum legitimacy; 100 = maximum legitimacy) or by inverting their values (2 = no legitimacy; 1 = total legitimacy). After these transformations, they are weighted, the average value is calculated, and each dimension is attributed to a state legitimacy weighted measure. This allows us to compare items and to obtain a robust index (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009).

Finally, we perform ANOVA to quantify increases or decreases in legitimacy. This allows us to identify the degree of sensitivity of social groups and to confirm whether current strategies to promote trust in state institutions must be changed.

Results

First, we calculate state legitimacy following the indications of Blanco-González et al. (2017) and Prado-Román et al. (2016), who developed a metric that allows for legitimacy comparisons among countries with similar contexts as is the case in the EU. Results for state legitimacy in 2014 (Table 4) show that the four countries have scores over 50. Germany has the highest legitimacy score at 61.84 and Spain is the lowest (52.98). The spread is less than 10 points.

Table 4.

State Legitimacy Results.

Dimensions	France	Germany	Spain	The United Kingdom
Legality	73.22	76.98	69.74	75.77
Justification	56.81	67.79	54.23	64.69
Consent	32.96	34.79	33.72	30.39
Legitimacy	54.95	61.84	52.98	58.88

If we look at individual dimensions, legality is the highest overall, followed by justification and consent. Germany has the best results along the three dimensions. France has low consent values, Spain has the worst values in legality and justification, the United Kingdom’s worst value is consent.

As a second step, ANOVA analysis allows us to confirm variations in the answers related to state legitimacy. If the significance level is less than 0.05 it means that there are differences that depend on the segmentation criteria. Table 5 shows the differences in attitudes toward immigration and state legitimacy in three of the countries in this study (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom).

Table 5.

State Legitimacy ANOVA.

Type	France	Germany	Spain	The United Kingdom
Immigration
IMM1. Immigration: Economy	0.000***	0.000***	0.237	0.000***
IMM2. Immigration: Cultural life	0.000***	0.000***	0.438	0.000***
IMM3. Immigration: Place to live	0.000***	0.000***	0.001***	0.000***
Control variables
ED. Age	0.031***	0.000***	0.003***	0.000***
GEN. Gender	0.826	0.779	0.741	0.533
LOC. Type of locality	0.826	0.779	0.741	0.533
EST. Level of study	0.541	0.376	0.698	0.509
LAB. Work activity	0.123	0.400	0.853	0.344
REL. Religion	0.268	0.005***	0.020***	0.323
CIUD. Citizenship	0.145	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***

Note. ANOVA = analysis of variance.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

ANOVA of the control variables shows that gender, locality tape, and work activity affect legitimacy perceptions; age does so as well in all four countries; citizenship in three of them, and religion in two countries.

In third place, Table 6 breaks out the results and identifies the impact of each variable. When the general legitimacy index varies by less than 5% its considered to be stable, when it varies between 6% and 10% an arrow (up or down) is added to the variable, when the index varies between 11% and 25% two arrows are added. Changes above 25% are marked with three arrows.

Table 6.

Results of State Legitimacy as a Function of Attitudes toward Immigration.

Variables	Items	France			Germany			Spain			The United Kingdom
Variables	Items	LEG.	VAR.		LEG.	VAR.		LEG.	VAR.		LEG.	VAR.
IMM1. Immigration: Economy	Bad	40.4	−27%	↓↓↓	47.0	−24%	↓↓	39.6	−25%	↓↓	40.4	−27%	↓↓↓
	Neutral–Bad	54.2	−1%	≈	58.1	−6%	↓	47.8	−10%	↓	54.2	−1%	≈
	Neutral	57.4	5%	≈	64.0	3%	≈	51.1	−3%	≈	57.4	5%	≈
	Neutral–Good	61.2	11%	↑↑	68.3	10%	↑	52.9	0%	≈	61.2	11%	↑↑
	Good	58.9	7%	↑	68.2	10%	↑	45.3	−14%	↓↓	58.9	7%	↑↑
IMM2. Immigration: Cultural life	Undermined	39.0	−29%	↓↓↓	43.0	−30%	↓↓↓	38.1	−28%	↓↓↓	39.0	−29%	↓↓↓
	Neutral–Under	52.2	−5%	≈	58.7	−5%	≈	45.9	−13%	↓↓	52.2	−5%	≈
	Neutral	56.4	3%	≈	62.9	2%	≈	50.3	−5%	≈	56.4	3%	≈
	Neutral–Enriched	60.5	10%	↑	67.5	9%	↑	53.5	1%	≈	60.5	10%	↑↑
	Enriched	59.5	8%	↑	68.1	10%	↑	47.2	−11%	↓↓	59.5	8%	↑↑
IMM3. Immigration: Place to live	Worse	37.5	−32%	↓↓↓	44.2	−28%	↓↓↓	36.4	−31%	↓↓↓	37.5	−32%	↓↓↓
	Neutral–Worse	51.6	−6%	↓	58.7	−5%	≈	46.9	−11%	↓↓	51.6	−6%	↓
	Neutral	58.2	6%	↑	65.8	6%	↑	52.2	−2%	≈	58.2	6%	↑↑
	Neutral–Better	61.2	11%	↑↑	68.8	11%	↑↑	51.7	−2%	≈	61.2	11%	↑↑
	Better	56.9	4%	≈	67.8	10%	↑	44.6	−16%	↓↓	56.9	4%	≈

Note. LEG. = state legitimacy; VAR. = variation of legitimacy as a function of the VS group of overall legitimacy; ↑↑↑ = VAR. > 25%; ↑↑ = VAR. > 10%; ↑↑ = VAR. > 5%; ↓↓↓ = VAR. > −25%; ↓↓ = VAR. > −10%; ↓ = VAR. > −5%.

With regard to how immigration attitudes related to economic conditions affect legitimacy, it descends notably (under 50 points) in all countries when it is considered that immigration is negative for the economy. In France, legitimacy falls by 27%, in Germany by 24%, in Spain by 25%, and in the United Kingdom by 27%. In addition, on the other end of the scale effects on legitimacy are muted. In the midrange field, values remain stable with respect to global legitimacy.

Attitudes toward immigration that related to cultural activity also show the same large drop for those that consider that immigrants impoverish cultural life (France: −29%; Germany: −30%; Spain: −28%; The United Kingdom: −29%). As happened with immigration attitudes tied to economic factors, the values do not change considerably when the opposite happens.

Questions that measure whether people think that immigration makes countries a better or worse place to live show the same type of effects.

Furthermore, we collected information on the homogeneity of the results for three of the countries in the analysis: Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. These countries show the same directions of changes in each of the specific indexes. In these three, seeing immigration as something positive is related to small but evident increases in legitimacy. This is not the case for Spain, where positive attitudes toward immigration coexist with low trust in state institutions.

Finally, Table 7 offers results for control variables that ANOVA identified as modifying legitimacy. These were age, religion, and citizenship. The results show that the effect of these variations is not critical except for being a citizen in Spain. Those that reside in Spain see their institutions as 26% more legitimate. A similar but more muted effect showed itself in France and the United Kingdom.

Table 7.

Results of State Legitimacy as a Function of the Control Variables: Age, Religion, and Citizenship.

Variables	Items	Germany			Spain			France			The United Kingdom
Variables	Items	LEG.	VAR.		LEG.	VAR.		LEG.	VAR.		LEG.	VAR.
ED.	≤20 Years old	69.1	8%	↑	55.0	11%	↑	62.7	13%	↑↑	64.8	8%	↑
	21-30	64.2	0%	≈	47.0	−5%	≈	57.9	5%	≈	60.2	0%	≈
	31-40	63.1	−1%	≈	47.4	−5%	≈	55.2	0%	≈	61.5	2%	≈
	41-50	64.2	0%	≈	49.8	0%	≈	54.1	−2%	≈	58.6	−3%	≈
	51-60	63.2	−1%	≈	48.8	−2%	≈	53.2	−4%	≈	57.8	−4%	≈
	61-70	63.2	−1%	≈	52.5	6%	↑	54.4	−2%	≈	60.1	0%	≈
	≥71	63.7	0%	≈	53.2	7%	↑	56.1	1%	≈	62.0	3%	≈
REL.	Yes	66.7	4%	≈	54.0	9%	↑	56.0	1%	≈	62.4	4%	≈
REL.	No	60.5	−5%	≈	42.5	−14%	↓↓	54.7	−1%	≈	58.0	−4%	≈
CIUD.	Yes	63.7	0%	≈	49.1	−1%	≈	55.0	−1%	≈	59.8	−1%	≈
CIUD.	No	68.4	7%	↑	62.7	26%	↑↑↑	63.8	15%	↑↑	68.9	15%	↑↑

Note. LEG. = state legitimacy; VAR. = variations in legitimacy as a function of the global legitimacy VS group; ↑↑↑ = VAR. > 25%; ↑↑ = VAR. > 10%; ↑↑ = VAR. > 5%; ↓↓↓ = VAR. > −25%; ↓↓ = VAR. > −10%; ↓= VAR. > −5%.

Young people have higher legitimacy scores in the four countries (Germany: 8%; Spain: 11%; France: 13%; the United Kingdom: 8%), individuals that are not religious are somewhat more negative than those who are (e.g., in Spain nonreligious people lower their legitimacy score by 14%), and those that are citizens of these countries closely match the overall views on legitimacy.

Implications

Immigration adds complexities to a country’s make up related to increased racial, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity. While healthy, it can present risks to social cohesion and lead to tensions associated with xenophobia and discrimination in cities, work places, and schools.

Negative attitudes toward immigration have been linked to real conflict and economic frustration. Berry (2001) confirms that attitudes toward immigration follow economic trends, becoming increasingly negative as the economy worsens and vice versa. The perceived economic threat of immigration on host countries is an anti-immigration prejudice that affects approval and implementation of policies.

With the addition of integration problems in different European cities, the economic crisis, and the divide between politicians and the electorate, the trend has been toward increased protectionism, nationalism, populism, and xenophobia. These trends have economic consequences but also social and political effects on the state’s legitimacy, or how much its citizens support state institutions. It is beneficial for legitimacy to remain stable, since it is an indicator that predicts social and economic turmoil at a national level.

Furthermore, when state legitimacy is positive and stable it offers a path for stakeholder support, increased access to investment, greater competitiveness and productivity, or higher levels of citizen satisfaction (Blanco-González et al., 2017). For these reasons, this research article quantifies the influence of attitudes on immigration in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom on state legitimacy. We set out to confirm whether there was a common pattern that would allow us to generalize the conclusions of the effect of immigration attitudes on legitimacy. With these results in hand, it is possible to design political strategies for immigration acceptance that prevent states from losing legitimacy.

First, we confirm that attitudes on immigration will cause changes in the level of state legitimacy and that negative attitudes have a stronger effect on legitimacy variations. Those that consider that immigration is a negative force on the economy, cultural life, and life in general see their state institutions as 25% less legitimate. Those that consider these factors as something positive barely increase the legitimacy score. Even more, negative perceptions of immigration are related with legitimacy scores below the average accepted value (50 points out of 100).

Second, we validate the existence of a common pattern of influence of immigration attitudes on legitimacy on three of the four countries. The data for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom indicates that negative attitudes will cause sharp descents in legitimacy, while positive attitudes will cause gentle increases. The data for Spain indicates that unfavorable attitudes cause sharp descent in legitimacy, while positive attitudes cause moderate ones.

Third, sociodemographic variables such as gender, type of locality, level of studies, or work activity do not affect legitimacy scores. Age, religion, and citizen status do change the perceptions of legitimacy. Young people, religious people, and noncitizens have moderately better views on legitimacy. In Spain, legitimacy among noncitizens is especially strong.

This leads to implications related to strategies for immigrant insertion and especially to dismiss stereotypes on immigration being negative for countries. According to reports from the EU, immigrants have positive effects on the host country, since they fill in gaps in the work market, increase human capital that is being threatened by demographic trends, and bring with them new ideas or methods that propel creativity and innovation.

First and foremost, it is necessary to inform citizens about the positive effects of immigration and neutralize the negative effects on legitimacy and its spillover into the political arena as has happened with anti-immigration movements (Front National in France, Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria, United Kingdom Independence Party, Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands, Vlaaams Belang in Belgium, Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden, Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, or Fremskrittspartiet in Norway) or secessionist movements against the idea of the EU (Brexit in the United Kingdom). In order for attitudes toward immigration to evolve to a greater tolerance and globalization it will be necessary that state institutions establish educational and back-to-work programs, and also become more transparent and effective at increasing representation of all political groups.

Nevertheless, these results must be interpreted with care. While the number of countries selected was a representative sample, it is necessary to expand this study to all EU member countries for future research. The time horizon will also need to be augmented in order to confirm the effect of the economic crisis and to increase our understanding of how these attitudes evolve and their influence on state legitimacy.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biographies

Cristina del Castillo-Feito has a degree in of Management and Business Economics (Carlos III Universty) and a Master in Advanced Management (Rey Juan Carlos University). She is a visiting professor in Rey Juan Carlos University. Her professional experience is in marketing and business development in the Renewable Energy sector. Her research lines are: Quality of the relationship, quality of service, legitimacy and reputation

Alicia Blanco-González is an associate professor in Business Economics Department at Rey Juan Carlos University (Madrid). Alicia is vice-president of European Academy of Management and Business Economics and member of Spanish Association of Academic and Professional Marketing. She is secretary general of the Camilo Prado Foundation. Her research interests include organizational legitimacy, SCR and consumer behavior.

Encarnación González-Vázquez is a professor of Marketing at the University of Vigo since 1997. She has degree in Business Sciences and a PhD in Marketing and Market Research. She is president of European Academy of Business Management and director of the I-mark research group at the University of Vigo, director of several research projects related to Corporate Social Responsibility.

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