Abstract
Focusing on mobilizations around work, this article sheds light on generational identity as it emerges in activists involved in labor struggles in Italy in the past few years. Do Italian “millennial” activists perceive themselves as part of the same political generation? What are its main traits? And are the contextual elements that define it linked more to socioeconomic context or to experiences of collective action? The analysis shows a clear self-identification of Italian millennials, in the context of labor struggles, as “the precarious generation”: a generation mostly affected by the socioeconomic conditions of the past few years, with the explosion of labor precarity, of the economic crisis, and more generally, of neoliberal policies. While this shared identity refers to a specific socioeconomic context, there is a difference related to the experience of political mobilization: Activists are rather pessimistic when focusing on the youngest component of their generation, usually described as more individualist, due to their lack of exposure to intense waves of political mobilization. The contribution explores the multidimensional nature of generational identity and its asymmetric nature: If both the socioeconomic context and the experience of political socialization play a role in shaping a political generation, these dynamics do not always go hand in hand, and activists tend to actively work to reconcile the different dimensions of their generational identity into a coherent narrative.
Keywords
Introduction
This article focuses on generational identity as it has emerged in activists involved in labor struggles in Italy in the past few years. Do Italian “millennial” activists perceive themselves as part of the same political generation? What are its main traits? And are the contextual elements that define it linked more to the socioeconomic context or to the experiences of collective action?
The analysis shows a clear self-identification of Italian millennials, in the context of labor struggles, as “the precarious generation”: a generation that in its vast majority has been affected by the socioeconomic conditions of the past few years, with the explosion of labor precarity, of the economic crisis, and more generally, of neoliberal policies. This identity distances them from older generations, and activists stress how traditional organizations are not answering the challenges of generational change and individualization with sufficient creativity and courage. This widespread identification confirms the hypotheses presented in the introduction to this issue, on precarity and economic hardship being the fundamental elements of identification of a generation that has grown up in the context of the economic crisis. Furthermore, as we will see, expectations on new creative repertoires will also be confirmed.
This shared identity refers to a specific socioeconomic context, while there is a difference related to the experience of political mobilization: Activists are rather pessimistic when focusing on the youngest component of the “precarious generation,” those I have called “natives of the ruins,” who are usually described as being characterized by extreme levels of individualism and a lack of motivation to collective action, contrasting with the mythical past of the Global Justice Movement, the memory of which is narrated in epic fashion, and of anti-austerity mobilizations, in which this youngest component of the “precarious generation” did not participate. Nevertheless, activists, especially the youngest among them, do not fail to see the potential in their fellow students and young workers, and point out how it is up to collective actors to creatively elaborate new strategies and forms of participation in order to awaken this portion of the population to collective action.
Theoretical Framework: Generations, Protest, and Identity
In the context of the general effort to bridge youth studies and social movement studies that characterizes this issue, this article focuses on a specific element: the construction of a generational identity in the context of collective action. How is generational identity conceived in the study of collective action? Generational identification has been at the core of social movement studies for a long time. In particular, it was the explosion of student protest in the 1960s and 1970s that sparked the idea of collective action as something specific either to youth in general or to a specific generation of youngsters (Fillieule, 2013a; Whittier, 2013). On one hand, political attitudes (in this case, disposition to protest) were attributed to young people’s life cycle characteristics and needs, rooted in the exceptional condition of being young and its irreducible difference with adulthood (Erikson, 1968; Feuer, 1969). On the other hand, political socialization was considered the crucial element, identifying youth as the crucial phase of life when social and political events shape perspectives and worldviews that will last for life (Mannheim, 1952). The debate between life cycle effects and cohort effects, between those arguing for the significance of age and those underlining the centrality of generation, has often interacted with social movement studies, producing, on one hand, concepts like that of “biographical availability” (McAdam, 1989) to explain the peculiar relationship between youth and protest and, on the other hand, analyses of the role of different cohorts inside the same type of movement, as in the case of feminism (Whittier, 1995, 1997). Focusing in particular on generations, research has pointed out that a political generation exists as an “age-conscious group that mobilises for social and political change” (Braungart, 2013, p. 949; see also: Braungart & Braungart 1989), underlining the necessary presence of a conscious identification for generational belonging to be politically relevant. Furthermore, the literature on social movements has pointed out the centrality of political socialization in shaping worldviews, although rarely taking into account the contextual and historically determined factors that affect it (Fillieule, 2013b). Thus, a political generation has an agency-based component, but it is not arbitrarily constructed, independent of the historical context in which it takes shape, as has been observed by scholars interested in the cultural dimensions of generations (Eyerman & Turner, 1998). As this article will show, generational identity is constructed through the development of a certain collective memory of its origins: “A generation embodies its collective identity in response to traumatic and formative events [. . .]. A generational cohort survives by maintaining a collective memory of its origins, its historic struggles, its primary historical and political events” (Eyerman & Turner, 1998, p. 96). In this process, media not only contribute in the social construction of generational identity through technological practices (Vittadini, Siibak, Reifová, & Bilandzic, 2013) and through the creation of narrative labels such as “Generation X” (Kitch, 2003) but also provide “the cultural means of communication whereby shared images, shared songs and shared rituals can be enjoyed and appropriated by members of the generational cohort” (Eyerman & Turner, 1998, p. 97).
In particular, young people who have grown up in an era of individualization (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007) are often described as disenchanted and unengaged. The literature on social movements and youth participation, instead, has pointed out that individualization does not have homogenous effects (Gozzo & Sampugnaro, 2016) and “does not equate with depoliticisation” (Alteri, Leccardi, & Raffini, 2016, p. 718) but rather triggers the transformation of collective action, toward new forms of participation that are less challenging for individual identities than traditional ideologies (Bosi & Zamponi, in press; Juris & Pleyers, 2009; Loader, Vromen, & Xenos, 2014; Micheletti & McFarland, 2011), establishing a different relationship between individual and collective identity (Leccardi, 2014; Pirni & Raffini, 2016; Pleyers, 2010).
Young activists engaged in labor struggles in Italy live on the edge of this contradiction between individual and collective, between depoliticization and engagement. In this particular context, they develop their own peculiar self-representation as a generation. This article focuses on the self-identification of activists with a generation, following in particular Eyerman and Turner’s (1998) observation on the role of past experiences and Fillieule’s (2013b) suggestion to take into consideration the contextual aspects of political socialization. In this vein, it argues for the idea that generational identity can have multiple dimensions: In this case, in fact, activists identify with a broad “precarious generation” based on the shared socioeconomic context in which they have grown up, while at the same time differentiating inside it, and considering its younger component the “natives of the ruins”: less politically active and more individualized because of their lack of experience of social and political mobilization.
Case and Method: Labor Struggles in Times of Austerity in Italy
This article is based on 10 interviews of representatives (5 men and 5 women, between 22 and 40 years old; see the appendix) of organizations engaged in labor struggles: two activists of mainstream trade unions (the confederation CGIL [Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, Italian General Labor Confederation] and its steelworkers’ union FIOM-CGIL [Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici, Metal Workers’ and Employees’ Federation]), two activists of a grassroots union (ADL-COBAS [Associazione Difesa Lavoratori–Comitati di Base, Worker’s Defense Association–Grassroots Committees]), two activists of self-organized workers’ collectives (Deliverance Milano and Riders Union Bologna), two activists of radical political collectives focusing on labor (Camere del Lavoro Autonomo e Precario and Clash City Workers), and two activists of student organizations (Rete della Conoscenza [Network of Knowledge] and Unione degli Studenti [Students’ Union]). The rationale of the sampling strategy was to differentiate between types of organizations: mainstream trade unions, grassroots trade unions, radical political collectives focusing on labor, and self-organized workers’ collectives. In this section I will quickly reconstruct the significance of labor struggles, student protest, and gig economy mobilization in Italy.
The scholarship has shown the centrality of labor as a contentious issue both in protest events (della Porta, Mosca, & Parks, 2012) and in the public discourse on the economic crisis (Zamponi, 2017) in Italy in the past few years. This is partly rooted in the fact that the industrial-productive component of the economic crisis has been relatively more significant in Italy than in other countries (Ciocca, 2010; D’ippoliti & Roncaglia, 2011; Lucidi & Kleinknecht, 2009). The relevance of labor as a contentious issue in the Italian crisis is confirmed also by social movement research (della Porta et al., 2012; Zamponi & Vogiatzoglou, 2017).
Based on this background, I have decided to include in the sample mainstream unions, grassroots unions, and labor-related movements’ collectives, in order to account for the different organizational structures and cultures that characterize this movement sector. For what regards mainstream trade unions, I have selected CGIL, the largest trade union confederation in the country, once linked to the Communist and Socialist Parties and now politically independent but generally informed by a center-left/reformist worldview, and I have chosen to focus both on the confederation level and on the CGIL’s steelworkers union FIOM, which in the past few years has been the vanguard of the struggle for bargaining rights. Regarding grassroots unions, I have focused on ADL-COBAS, an organization rooted in particular in the northeast of the country and politically linked to the area of post-autonomous social centers, which in the past few years has been active in particular in the contentious field of logistics and has been also participating in some of the first experiences of organization of gig economy workers. Furthermore, I have included in the sample two labor-centered political networks rooted in two different sectors of the Italian radical left milieu, which represent two significant experiences of social movement unionism: CLAP (Camere del Lavoro Autonomo e Precario, Chambers of Autonomous and Precarious Labor), a network born in 2013 and now represented in three Italian cities (Rome, Padua, and Turin), politically part of the area of post-autonomous social centers; and Clash City Workers, a network born in 2009 and now represented in several Italian cities, rooted in the Marxist-Leninist strand of Italian radical movements.
Processes of labor flexibilization and precarization have been taking place in Europe for at least two decades. The introduction of online platforms in the labor market in the past few years has reshaped and accelerated these processes, giving birth to the so-called gig economy, a system in which working activities “imply completing a series of tasks through online platforms” (De Stefano, 2016, p. 1). In this organization of labor, “those who work in it carry out a series of ‘gigs’, i.e. one off jobs, in order to create an income” and “they are to be paid for a particular task or tasks, rather than receive a guaranteed income” (Sargeant, 2017). Labor becomes an on-demand service that can be easily accessed through an app. Thanks to digital technologies, platforms can function as databases that meet the supply of work with demand for it, while making a profit out of this process and exploiting to the maximum level the flexibility of a “pay-as-you-go” workforce. Human work becomes less and less visible as such, and risk is passed on from the company to the worker (De Stefano, 2018). Among these workers, food delivery couriers are the most visible. Young adults riding bicycles while carrying big boxes marked by the logos of companies like Foodora, Deliveroo, Justeat, Glovo, and so on, are today a common sight in most European cities. Several episodes of collective action has been taking place in Italy in this sector since 2016 (Tassinari & Maccarrone, 2017a, 2017b; Zamponi, 2018a, 2018b). For these reasons, I have included in the sample two of these collectives: Deliverance Milano and Riders Union Bologna.
Finally, in the past few years the Italian student movements have increasingly focused on labor, after the exhaustion of the “anti-Gelmini” cycle between 2008 and 2011 (Caruso, Giorgi, Mattoni, & Piazza, 2010; Zamponi & González, 2017), which took place in the context of a broader wave of mobilization in response to the neoliberal transformation of the university that has characterized a wide set of European and non-European countries (Brooks, 2016; Cini & Guzmán-Concha, 2017). After the implementation of the new school reform passed by parliament under the center-left government led by Matteo Renzi in 2015, Italian students have been increasingly focusing their protest on the so-called “school–work alternation”, a system that forces high school students to spend a part of their school hours in unpaid internships in companies. This innovation has been strongly criticized by student organizations due to the lack of oversight, of recognition of student’s rights, and of coherence between study and work that, in their analysis, makes “school–work alternation” a traineeship in exploitation. Building on the antiprecarity struggles of the previous years (Zamponi & González, 2017), in the Fall of 2017 students have been demonstrating dressed as factory workers and organizing “school–work alternation strikes,” pointing out the increasing nexus between knowledge and labor. For this reason, I have included in my analysis the Unione degli Studenti, the largest school students’ organization in the country, founded in 1994 and at the vanguard of the struggle against “school–work alternation,” and the Rete della Conoscenza, the umbrella organization that brings together the Unione degli Studenti and its university students’ counterpart Link-Coordinamento Universitario.
“Are We a Generation?”: Identity by Distinction and the Rejection of the Rhetoric of Youth
Activists tend to be very skeptical toward the rhetoric of youth and generational change that often characterizes political debate. To them, it seems like a cheap trick, an instrumental use of youth that tends to hide the real issues behind a facade of newness and coolness. Both a student union and a workers’ union representative told me very similar things, stating that what is needed is substantial change in organizational and political practices, rather that cosmetic change in putting young people in charge: Playing the generational card works today, this is demonstrated by the parties, the way in which they put things on the talk shows, just put a person a little younger, 10 points more. Because in a phase in which politics has been particularly immobile, with the usual old people always present, clearly people appreciate the novelty, something that, however, is now being exploited. Generational change does not always have a political sense, if you end up putting a young man who says the same shitty thing that an old man said, basically it is useless, it is a marketing operation, which is a bit what is happening today, that everyone has realized that being young is functional to show people “how cute, young engaged people.” (IL2) I have met the generational debate in the union in several ways. Sometimes pretentiously, “Let’s leave space to the young,” with fake dynamics. It is always difficult to judge what others do, but I think that when you make it only a generational thing, it means you want to put different people there and not to actually change something. The issue is how you change practices, not just change people. [. . .] We too have discussed, and are discussing, how to foster renewal processes, but renewal is not just generational, it is how your practices change. (IL6)
What emerges very clearly is that activists are very aware of the instrumental role that the rhetoric of youth and generational change has played in the past few decades in the neoliberal transformation of society (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2015). They are sick and tired of being instrumentally used for cosmetic or rhetorical reasons. As we will see in the next section, their whole generational identity is built on a feeling of disappointment and betrayal, the idea of belonging to the “precarious generation.”
A Shared Socioeconomic Context: The “Precarious Generation”
The activists I interviewed observed a widespread generational identity among those people who are usually identified as “millennials.” For them, this is the precarious generation. This generational identity, coherent with the sociological literature, depends on the experiences that people belonging to it shared: These experiences fundamentally coincide with precarity, the crisis, and a horizon of impoverishment in comparison with the previous generation. This was well summarized by an activist of a labor-centered radical political collective in Padua: We are the people between 30 and 40, the generation that has engaged in mobilizations and that was devastated by the laws on precarity, by the lack of opportunities. A generation that was deluded and then disappointed. Overskilled people that suddenly realize they are poor, marginal, and without a future. (IL8)
The generational identity, thus, is based on social elements, on shared socioeconomic conditions. The generational issue is understood by activists as a social issue, a matter of class, labor conditions, employment relations, access to welfare, wealth. Activists recognize that class or status distinctions still intersect with generational cleavages, but the widespread reading is that precarity and the crisis cut through class boundaries, threatening the lifestyle and the professional and personal perspectives of individuals coming from different social backgrounds and creating the conditions for a shared generation experience that, as we will see later, fosters shared generational traits, although not deleting preexisting class boundaries. This intersection between generational and class belongings is explained by an activist of a mainstream trade union: Generational belonging has an effect, but comes after social belonging. If I speak to people of my generation that attended university, we will probably have a lowest common denominator, in terms of thought, of life experience. If I speak to a person of my generation in a plastic factory in Sesto Fiorentino, I won’t even see the generational aspect, because he has a life experience that is completely different from mine. Then, there are common traits: my generation was the first generation that saw its perspective of life and success being inferior to those of the previous generation, so this can be a life experience that is common to everyone. It works for someone with a university degree as well as for the boy who left school and entered the factory at 16. (IL4)
This shared generational identity, based on social conditions such as precarity and the crisis, has broader consequences, according to activists. It is not simply an economic factor but shapes several aspects of people’s lives. This is how this issue is summarized by the spokesperson of a student union: For me today there is a generational identity, because it is determined by particular social conditions joined together. In a moment in which clearly the condition of poverty is extremely correlated with age, with a generational condition, then what we have in common is a social condition, not only age. Now [. . .] there is a generational poverty, there are some common problems, some psychological and social issues, from the fact of being digital natives to feelings of despair, depression, that are linked to systematic contradictions that people feel at the personal and individual level and to the fact that, society being very atomized, there aren’t the tools to face these issues. So, I think that in this moment there is an identity, clearly with some differences, that is determined by specific social conditions, that join together, more than once, people who belong to the same age group. (IL2)
According to activists of labor struggles, social conditions tend to be shared by those that are close in terms of age more than it used to be. These activists describe their generation as the recent graphic novel by Zerocalcare (another millennial, with a strong activist background, that in the past few years has become a bestselling author and a generational icon) “Macerie prime” does: as the survivors of a natural disaster (the crisis), that destroyed the social environment in which they grew up, creating a postdisaster setting in which they somehow try, relying on their sense of solidarity, to get on with their lives (Zerocalcare, 2018). The socioeconomic process of the crisis deeply affected the personal characteristics of individuals, producing outcomes in their psychological and social tendencies.
Different Political Participation Experiences: The “Natives of the Ruins,” Between individualization and Collective Action
In general, the crisis and precarity seem to have affected the preexisting processes of individualization, fostering widespread feelings of isolation, loneliness, and abandonment. Once again, according to activists, these feelings are rooted in socioeconomic processes and hinder the capacity of workers to organize. This does not mean that young workers are all isolated and passive while their older colleagues have the opposite attitude. As a representative of the steelworkers’ union FIOM explained, there are different kinds of loneliness: Among the workers, it is a different loneliness. It is not true that those who have arrived now are all unprepared. There are those who participated in great collective battles for the acquisition of certain rights, there are those who found those rights when entering the workplace, and then there is a whole generation of people who have arrived at work in a context of precarity. Not only the young, because there are also the precarious 50-year-old, desperate, because maybe it’s the third job they lose and they’ve gone through mobility three times . . . It’s the degree of isolation and loneliness you have in knowing that you have a destiny of individual blackmail, so you don’t look for information, you don’t get politicized . . . The real difference is the fact of being blackmailed. It is not by chance that they introduced rules that have clearly affected the isolation of workers. (IL6)
The dynamics of individualization seem to intensify over time and to have particularly significant effects in the youngest portion of this generation, those that are in their teenage years or in their 20s. These are the people that Zerocalcare’s graphic novel calls “natives of the ruins,” those that grew up in the context of the crisis since their childhood. Individualization seems to make significantly more difficult than previously the construction of collective action. Activists tend to cite the widespread use of social media as part of this process but more as a consequence of individualization than as its cause. This is how a student union representative explains this process: This has an effect on participation in particular with respect to social networks, the way in which physical mobilizations are perceived, the way in which we perceive media activism, the way in which collective organization is perceived. Clearly there are difficulties in physical organization. The digital tools that at the beginning of the development of Facebook were considered useful, instruments that are somehow complementary to the physical meeting, today are increasingly contradictory, starting from the famous fake news. So, in some ways there is certainly a bit of rejection of the collective organization, [. . .] if we want to say so, this is a bit the risk. On this there are contradictions that are important for us, so understanding how to find the tools of which the online space is not a substitute, but instead maintains its complementarity and broadens participation in physical moments, obviously it is a challenge, it is not very easy. It is about understanding how from the individualism that has been promoted, we can find a starting point for the reconstruction of a society, collectivity, and this also requires an effort, from our point of view, that must be very specific. (IL2)
Thus, for activists what is really worrying and challenging is the increasing atomization of society, more than the widespread use of social media, although the latter is commonly interpreted as an indicator of the former. It is more difficult to aggregate people, to create links of solidarity, to develop the prepolitical conditions for a shared social belonging and for collective political action. This consideration is not limited to students. Individualization, and a certain culture of individual responsibility that has become hegemonic in the years of neoliberalism, is identified as the main shared generational trait, and the main threat to collective action, also by an activist of a self-organized workers’ collective: There is a generational identity, but it is negative. [. . .] Those who grew up in a different phase, who have seen something better, resist. While the younger the workers are, the more they accept everything. You realize that the political situation of the country, the inability of the unions, the fact that the social actors are unable to rebuild society, to make society, make so that the dominant feelings among young people, the younger part of our generation, those who grew up with Berlusconi and Renzi, in the myth of the self-made-man, of sacrifice, the dominant feelings are just strong individualism and lack of faith in collective organization. Social struggle exists only as personal, revenge but very often there is not even this sense of revenge. (IL3)
In the activists’ analysis, this widespread sense of isolation is the outcome not only of socioeconomic processes rooted in the neoliberal transformation of society but also of the crisis of representation that has affected several collective actors in the last few decades: Without parties, unions, or social organizations, individuals tend to lose their capacity to feel part of something that goes beyond themselves and to take part in collective action. This process of education to individualism is described also by an activist of CLAP, and in her view it affects also activists themselves: There is a very strong difference in terms of political formation. I believe that the school and university reforms have achieved their goal fully: people are more ignorant, have less critical capacity and less mental elasticity. They are much more individualistic. Even the militants, the activists: there is a very different perspective. [. . .] As far as I am concerned politics has always started from studying: self-training, seminars. If there is an issue, we must start from there, plumb all that has been said by anyone who has gone through critical thinking, then a great job of research, reasoning, etc. This happens much less. I do not want to be too categorical, but I noticed that it is no longer part of the common approach. (IL8)
Nevertheless, there are socioeconomic roots in this process, and they do matter for its development. The “natives of the ruins” grew up in a context in which finding a job is not a given, in which the bar of expectations is rather low, and, thus, the attachment to any job becomes stronger and the consequent blackmailing of active workers becomes more dangerous. This is how this mechanism is explained by a gig economy activist: There is a latent conflict, but the way to aggregate people today, in our generations, is no longer the call to arms, the great imaginaries, this is not the generation of 2001, it is not the precrisis generation. That is, precrisis there was the risk of losing, today you are subjectivized in a social and political environment where your level of expectations is structurally lower than that of your older brothers, and then emerges a composition of the younger generation that is conservative, which is very similar to one’s parents paradoxically. One believes in work as a means of being able to live, work as a necessity whatever, the work that is needed anyway, here in the first assemblies “We are afraid to expose ourselves because we do not want to lose our job.” There is no willingness to say “Fuck, let’s try to do a lot of things, let’s see, so nothing will happen to us if we are many,” people do not believe in this thing. (IL3)
The same dynamic of training in exploitation and resignation that has characterized the years of the crisis and that particularly affects younger workers is described by an activist of a grassroots trade union: It is more difficult with young people, partly because we have suffered a lot this form of education that says “be thankful you have a job, try to shut up and keep it tight, because there is a crisis.” There is also a difficulty in exposing yourself in struggles. [. . .] In my opinion there is the lack of a narrative of the struggles. Even in schools there is no narrative of the conquest of rights through the struggle, so there is a bit of resignation. (IL10)
The relationship between individualization and social media, and the impact it has on constructing collective action, is described also by an activist of a student union, who points out how individual-based forms of expression make it more difficult to adhere to any kind of collective identity. This activist points out the challenge we will analyze in another section: how to respond to this process, changing the forms of organization to adapt them to a more individualized historical phase, without ceding to the neoliberal hegemony and completely renouncing collective action: Some elements, like social networks, have changed us, even our militants. For example, when I was younger, before expressing a Facebook status I waited for the organization to discuss the thing, but not today. There is Brexit, I express myself on my profile, then perhaps I call the assembly. There are the elections: I write on my profile then maybe I call the assembly. That is, the paradigm is different, and there is much more desire to get likes, also in style. [. . .] There is less time that you are willing to devote to politics, certainly in general. It is a consequence of society, it is not that the comrades are more assholes, and I think that the goal is, being in these contradictions and having them fully in mind, to understand how the organization changes, clearly not fully adapting, but maintaining a role that is not to defend an organizational form that perhaps no longer exists in today’s society. (IL2)
Genoa and the Wave: An Idealized Past
The previous section pointed out that the precarious generation, identified by the shared experience of economic hardship, is internally divided, according to activists, based on the political context in which their political socialization took place. In this context, the recent past takes on the traits of a mythical golden age. Some activists, during the interviews, spontaneously mentioned the demonstrations against the G8 in Genoa of 2001, and, more broadly speaking, the Global Justice Movements of the early 2000s, not only as a fundamental stage in their political coming of age, or a context that particularly favored mobilization and politicization, but also as a counterpart to the depoliticized contest in which we live: For what regards practices, going through some experiences makes a difference. For my generation, Genoa is the milestone on which you measure yourself. And this changes how you are in the union. But I think the issue is going through some experiences, not how old you were when you went through them. [. . .] Compared to the era of Genoa what is lacking now is a shared worldview, in the sense that before it seemed that it was all more socially widespread, now it is not so. People got isolated, meanwhile, precarity has increased, poverty has increased, so many dividends have increased, so in contexts where you felt you had great collective processes, you went through a very strong phase of disintegration. (IL6) Today even the social context is complex, while there are many foci of struggles we are not faced with large movements of a national or European nature as there were in other phases, as in the 90s and early 2000s, the “no global” movement. Today you have to find different ways. (IL10)
When asked to compare the present context with those of the Global Justice Movement, even a very young activist, who in 2001 was in primary school, describes the past in a rather idealized way, in comparison with the grim present in which she is active: At the time there were the movements. It was a different thing, the social forum, the international dimension was very different, today we have almost war with North Korea, there is Trump who carries on a totally protectionist position, when before the time of globalization, marches full of people, a different perception of the struggle, too . . . The political and social phase is certainly different. (IL2)
Memory, especially in the context of movement culture, often tends to idealize the past, and it seems like the memory of the Global Justice Movement is undergoing a similar process to the one that involved the narratives of 1968 (Zamponi, 2018c). People tend to forget that Italy in 2001 gave an overwhelming electoral majority to a right-wing government and that neoliberal globalization was much more hegemonic, in public discourse, then than it is now. Nevertheless, the construction of this mythical golden age seems also related to the fact that decades-long processes of individualization are often reduced to sudden changes that took place in the past few years. This has also probably something to do with how age differences and generational change are amplified by the young age. The 22-year-old representative of a student union, for example, self-identifies as a part of the “generation of the Wave,” referring to the 2008-2011 cycle of student mobilization, and thus expresses a significant distance from the younger students she represents: Personally I feel I belong to the Wave generation, even though I was very young. [. . .] A person who has not experienced student mobilizations has much more difficulty conceiving the contestation. This on the one hand is worrying, because we risk then not even more able to imagine how to carry forward a protest, as well as rediscovering the elements of radicalism from this point of view. But simply maybe with a different interpretation we could begin to understand that today the mechanisms of participation have simply changed, and therefore we must intercept them rather than lock ourselves in our conception. I say “our” because I feel almost belonging to another generation compared to the one I represent. We must ask ourselves about new forms of participation, because then the big question is how a boy born in 2000 participates in politics: it is a different way from the one I conceive of. Because for me political participation is physical, dialectical, public, etc. How can I not try to interpret at least the thrust that exists behind the comment, participation on the platforms and so on? (IL7)
What is interesting in this quote is the fact that a big cleavage inside the “precarious generation” of millennials is proposed, depending on whether or not people are old enough to remember or to have participated in the latest large wave of student mobilization, 10 years ago. As we have seen earlier in the comparison with the Global Justice Movement, the lack of large social mobilizations that has characterized Italy in the past few years is interpreted by activists as a relevant factor in the depoliticization of the youth and in its lack of training in social activism. Notwithstanding this perceived distance, as the quote shows, the activist feels compelled to challenge her preexisting habitus in terms of forms of participation, putting into question the established handbook of student mobilization and pushing herself and her organization to invent something new, able to respond to the needs or demands of younger students.
Addressing Individualization: New Forms of Participation for the Postcrisis Youth
As we have seen earlier, activists do not passively accept individualization, the increase in which they see in the youngest components of the “precarious generation,” as an obstacle to collective action, but they problematize it as an issue that needs to be addressed by them and their organizations, challenging established and routinized ways of doing things. The pessimistic view that emerges from the analysis does not bring them to resignation but instead pushes them to creatively address this issue. For example, as a student union representative told me, the familiarity with technology and the sense of immediacy that characterizes the “natives of the ruins” need to be taken in their multiple dimensions, including the inherent and unexpressed critique they entail: This generation is immediate. Immediate answers are sought, everything must be close at hand. The use of technology pushes us to want everything and immediately from the world around us. But I think there is still a tension towards criticism. The protest against the school reform, 2 years ago, unfortunately did not find answers, but helped to put pillars, in the students who experienced this mobilization. And the need to respond to material needs today is there for all to see. Technologies also pose contradictions, because it is not true that everyone has a smartphone. The student experiences inequality. [. . .] I also see a positive tension, of participation by the students, because if this were not the case, then we would not have succeeded in mobilizing anyone on the issue of alternation. I do not want to take it as a paradigm. But if this narrative had been so convincing, so real, the students would have believed it. But since this thing does not exist in the reality of the world, then this leads to activation. I see that what has been told to me is a lie. Maybe I do not have the tools to answer. But I see that my father does not find a job, even if he has skills. So we have to ask ourselves how we are to intercept people, rather than being locked in our leftist schemes that then no longer intercept anyone, but not because we have to lose values, but because it is our duty, otherwise we are out of the world and out of history. (IL7)
Activists observe in young people a need for politicization, that traditional organizations do not address and that, for example, youth organizations are sometimes more equipped for. A student union representative, in her interview, pointed out how increasingly people join her organization, or collectives that are somewhat related to it, because traditional social and political organizations do not address their needs of politicization. It seems like more horizontal and inclusive forms of participation, typical of less formalized organizations, are more and more able to involve young people, whose needs for socialization and politicization, in this context of individualization, would otherwise find no answer: There is a need for politicization, for more general politics, and this clearly means that our historical activities, like student representation, are a bit in crisis. This need comes from the fact that many social organizations do not do what they should do, many parties do not do what they should do, so the reaction of the comrades is “we have to do it.” For me it is wrong because everyone should have their social role, in terms of which subject subjectivizes, what is the limit between the general work that you do and then your real ability to affect the topic. Banally, Legambiente, which is an environmental association, certainly should have a greater ability to affect our environment, as the CGIL should take care of work and we should take care of students. In the general crisis, however, this border is clearly very fragile, so we find ourselves constructing a very broad analysis of everything and even then clearly having new organizational repercussions. (IL2)
These considerations echo the ongoing research on forms of collective action that go beyond the traditional claim-based repertoire of action (Bosi & Zamponi, 2015). These forms seem to increasingly resonate with the demands of socialization and politicization that individualization leaves unanswered. In a context in which individuals find it more and more difficult to subordinate their individual identity to a collective, new forms of action, based on a more pragmatic and modular approach, may allow people to enjoy some forms of collective participation without the heavy boundaries of political belonging. This, at least, is the experience recounted by a Bologna-based activist, who represents a gig economy workers’ collective but is also part of an ARCI club: The thing that can detract from this conservatism, from these individualistic attitudes, is precisely to act on human weaknesses, in the sense that we are a generation of lonely people, that when I finish education, we gradually restrict the fields of friendships to chase the work goals, to navigate in precarity, and as a result there is the need for contact between people, developing organizational arrangements much more based on shared aperitifs, on music nights, events in which to make people talk without the claim to have an immediate political translation. It is a much longer work, but it is a necessary work, since the traditional spaces of collective organization, which were the factory, the school, the university, are more and more places of passage, more and more. There is a need to invent new places, to aggregate by addressing one by one the different pieces of the identity of each person, because the social identities are now more and more varied: one feels to be a musician but is also a food delivery rider, maybe half of the day you involve him as a musician and the other half as a rider. Being realist today is doing this kind of work. Otherwise you resign yourself to be a fisherman with a small net. Today the social organizations unfortunately are in an irreversible crisis, so we must reinvent the form, the real challenge is to discuss the method, form, and style of the things you do more than of contents, because otherwise the fish quietly pierces your weak network. And this, however, causes your uselessness. If we do not do this, resentment and resentment will make fascism win, this is the point. (IL3)
In an era of individualization and atomization, in which even personal identities are fragmented, collective action needs to take this fragmentation into account, creating multiple nexuses between the individual and the collective, situated at different levels of the people’s day-to-day experiences. Interestingly enough, as we have seen, times of depoliticization create a new demand for politicization. And times of individualization create the demand for strongly tied communities, as a Padua-based activist said: I observe that there is a great need for a return to the community, even identity-based. The quest to build families, precisely, to build very strong, very clan-like relationships. I do not want to say that this is necessarily negative, but without a certain critical-feminist gaze, this threatens to reproduce hierarchical, hypermorbose, very dangerous dynamics. (IL8)
The relationship with technology, from this point of view, is a crucial issue: On one hand, activists feel the need to use it as much as possible in order to reach the people they aim to organize; on the other hand, they feel like they need to maintain a critical approach toward spaces that are inherently considered as inhospitable for collective action. A student union representative well described the dilemma: It’s a complicated issue, because on the one hand we need to always seek direct contact with the students, then pulling them back to the real movement, because using social networks is often alienating, but on the other hand these tools exist, we cannot live in the Middle Ages, so, for example, today the surveys we do, we do them using Instagram. This does not mean that we make that place anyhow political, and a poll is not the same as a discussion, but if there is a very alienated, depoliticized composition of the students, on the other hand there is an expression that we try to interpret, to understand how we can intercept it. (IL7)
This challenge to construct new forms of political participation, able to address the evolving characteristics of the youth, is the main issue of generational conflict inside social movement milieus. While youth organizations constitutively address this challenge, other actors are much more attached to established forms of collective action, and this creates the potential for generational conflict. Interestingly enough, both student union representatives recounted in these terms their experience of participation in the “No” front in the constitutional referendum of December 2016: There is a generational tension. Politicians, especially in a social organization, tend to think that organizations are monolithic. So the issue is that they do not realize that it is a phase, which we have largely defined, taking Gramsci, interregnum, in which either you change or die. [. . .] Consequently, not having clear in the analysis what is their role, they do not choose the right practices, which are then the same that would allow you to survive, changing, questioning the things that unfortunately or fortunately are needed, without making a value judgment if it was better to have a twentieth century organization or that of today. (IL2) There exists a refractory block just to any other mode of participation. It is the exact same thing of the reading that many are giving of the Five Stars vote: We tend to take distance from this new form of participation, expression of a vague willingness to participate. (IL7)
While these activists, as we have seen in the previous section, are rather critical and pessimistic toward their own generation, which they see as increasingly individualized and hard to involve in collective action, at the same time they are much more critical toward their older counterparts, who are seen as the remains of a world that does not exist anymore. These activists feel alone in addressing an issue that they consider difficult but unavoidable, and that, in their opinion, most organizations are ignoring.
Conclusions
The analysis conducted in this article shows the existence of multiple layers of generational identification in activists engaged in labor struggles in Italy. Although rejecting the instrumental rhetoric of youth, millennial activists do feel part of the same political generation, and the crucial element of identification they propose is the shared socioeconomic context in which they have grown up: the years of the crisis, the increasing precarity, the feeling of being the first generation that will be poorer and with less opportunities than their parents. Notwithstanding these strong unifying elements, activists point out significant differences inside this generation, especially to the increasing individualization that characterizes its youngest component. This increasing individualization is explained not only through a stronger impact of the socioeconomic context but also through the lack of experience with collective action. Thus, activists tend to develop a mythical narrative of the Global Justice Movement and of the years of anti-austerity protest, because they consider their political socialization in a context of collective action a strong component of their subgenerational identity. With this internal distinction inside the “precarious generation” being due to a lack of experience with collective action and an acceleration in the process of individualization, activists increasingly focus on elaborating new forms of participation in order to repoliticize the depoliticized component of their generation, and find very frustrating the lack of availability of formal social organizations in this endeavor.
The article sheds light on the multidimensional nature of generational identity and on its asymmetric nature: If both the socioeconomic context and the experience of political socialization play a role in shaping a political generation, these dynamics do not always go hand in hand, and activists tend to actively work to reconcile the different dimensions of their generational identity into a coherent narrative.
Footnotes
Appendix
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The research on which this article is based has been conducted with the support of the Italian ministry of education (MIUR) and the Scuola Normale Superiore.
