Abstract
Thirteen years ago, a study was conducted in which authors opened a question of applying co-orientation theory in studying communication behavior between two countries. The original study had two primary objectives: to compare attitudes toward certain issues relevant for the two nations and to examine degrees of agreement, accuracy, and congruency between two nations under the co-orientation model. The original study was later extended with another one in which authors included a third country and introduced not only evaluations of two countries’ attitudes toward a third country but also evaluations of opinions the two countries have between themselves (and to which the first is only an observer). They called it “second-order co-orientation.” More than a decade later, the original study was replicated to test how potential agreement, accuracy, and congruency between the two counties on these issues have changed over time.
Introduction
The interpersonal concept of public opinion involves two or more individuals ready to communicate about an object or issue of common interest. In the process of communication, the two sides are “co-oriented” toward a mutual issue or topic, as well as toward one another (Broom & Sha, 2013; D. Verčič, Verčič, & Laco, 2006). The co-orientation model of public diplomacy derived from the psychology and communication fields, and was developed to describe why groups of people change attitudes when in relationships with other groups of people (Heider, 1958). The main assumption of the model is that behavior is based not only on a personal construction of a situation but also on perceptions of other peoples’ orientations (McLeod & Chaffee, 1973). According to the model, parties in a relationship influence each other through information exchange and interaction (Walden, Bortree, & DiStaso, 2015). Public opinion is conceptualized as a result of individual perceptions on one side and the perception which a certain group has (on the opinion of others) on the other (D. Verčič et al., 2006). In case of potential disagreement, the resulting tension can cause corrective action. The co-orientational view on publics comes from the consensual framework in McLeod and Chaffee’s model (Avery, Lariscy, & Sweetser, 2010; Walden et al., 2015).
The model provides a framework for analyzing relationships between two groups—in this case, two publics in two countries. It uses four (in some versions three) variables that measure how close or distant the views of one entity are to those of the other (Broom, Casey, & Ritchey, 1997). Effective communication is defined as the level of accomplishment on one of the four variables (co-orientational indicators), that is, understanding, accuracy, agreement, and congruency (McLeod & Chaffee, 1973).
Public diplomacy is a relatively young concept and a multidisciplinary field of study (Huijgh, Gregory, & Melissen, 2017). The co-orientation model of public diplomacy developed from studies comparing public diplomacy and public relations (e.g., Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, & Kendrick, 2013; L’Etang, 2006; Macnamara, 2012; B. H. Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; van Dyke & Verčič, 2009). In public relations, the co-orientation model was used by Broom (1978) and further adapted by Grunig and Hunt (1984) to explain the relations between different groups in organizations. Within the field of public relations, the model has been applied in a variety of settings that includes different types of relationships, such as relationships between journalists and public relations practitioners (Avery et al., 2010; Shaw & White, 2004; Shin & Cameron, 2005; Stegall & Sanders, 1986; A. Tkalac Verčič & Colić, 2016; A. Tkalac Verčič, Lalić, & Vujnović, 2017; Yun & Yoon, 2011), co-orientation studies on public relations roles (Clemons, 2009), co-orientation in environmental management and decision making (Leong, McComas, & Decker, 2007), and in public diplomacy and international relations (Jing, 2010; Kim, 2016; D. Verčič et al., 2006; D. Verčič & Verčič, 2007). In this study, we aimed to analyze whether co-orientation theory could be used to advance relations among publics in two countries, thereby improving co-operation and reducing conflict.
Basic Concepts of the Co-Orientational Approach
Changes in attitude caused by communication can also be considered changes in orientation, that is, orientational effects, since the term “attitude” can stand in for orientation (Grunig & Hunt, 1984). Attitude describes the way individuals are oriented toward objects from their own environment, such as different organizations, other people or members of a neighboring nation. Public relations and public diplomacy efforts often include a change in the way in which, for instance, an organization and its publics orient toward each other (Kim, 2016) and toward mutual aspects of their respective environments. This mutual orientation is called co-orientation (Broom & Sha, 2013).
The key assumption of the co-orientational approach (McLeod & Chaffee, 1973) is that people’s behavior is based not only on their perception of their own world but also on their perception of the orientations that others around them hold (Kim, 2016). Another assumption is that, under certain conditions of interaction, other people’s real cognitions and perceptions can also influence the behavior of the mentioned person. Small social systems can also be assumed to function partially as a unit based on the intercognitive relations within the system itself, without particular system’s members necessarily being aware of it (Walden et al., 2015).
The early concept of co-orientation was introduced by Newcomb (as cited in McLeod & Chaffee, 1973), who developed an A-B-X paradigm to describe simple communication in which a person (A) communicates information to another person (B) about a topic (X) (Jing, 2010). Two persons, A and B, hold equivalent and reciprocal positions in the system: B’s relation toward A is the same as A’s relation toward B. The system can be observed from the perspective of A, from the perspective of B, or from the perspective of both. By expanding Newcomb’s A-B-X concept, McLeod and Chaffee (1973) developed a co-orientation model which underlined the reciprocal (instead of unilateral) and dynamic (instead of static) nature of opinion formation and attitudinal change. In their model, McLeod and Chaffee emphasized the importance and the operating mechanisms of reciprocal perceptions between a person and a significant other (Jing, 2010). McLeod and Chaffee (1973) elaborated on the X by defining it as the object or issue toward which A and B are oriented. McLeod and Chaffee suggested that a person is not oriented toward a particular object in the environment but toward the discrimination (difference) between objects. If there are more than two objects, a large number of discriminations become possible.
Broom (1978) and Broom and Dozier (1990) further adapted the model to include four variables to explain potential relationships between A and B, or how close the views of the organization are to their publics and vice versa (Avery et al., 2010). The first variable, agreement, is the degree to which two sides share comparable assessments of a particular issue of mutual interest. In order to quantify the agreement, it is necessary to calculate the difference between the cognitions of each side. A greater difference signifies a lower level of agreement (A. Tkalac Verčič et al., 2017; D. Verčič et al., 2006). The second variable, accuracy, shows the degree to which the estimates of one side match the real attitudes of the other side and is measured by comparing each side’s approximations or “the extent to which one party’s estimate of a given topic matches what the other party actually thinks about the topic” (Walden et al., 2015, p. 527). The third variable, congruency (Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 1999), is the degree to which each side believes that the idea or evaluation of the other side is similar to theirs (Grunig & Hunt, 1984). The fourth variable, understanding, measures the closeness of definitions between A and B. According to Cutlip et al. (1999), “agreement compares saliences, whereas understanding compares pertinences” (p. 272).
As a part of his study, Thomas Scheff (1967) proposed four states of perceived agreement presented in Table 1. For example, monolithic consensus is a high degree of real agreements accurately recognized on both sides. Dissensus happens in situations where there is disagreement accurately perceived by those involved. False consensus occurs when both involved sides disagree but believe they agree. In situations of pluralistic ignorance, the majority perceives a low degree of agreement, but the degree of agreement is actually high (Goutzamani, 2016). If parties involved do not recognize the state of real agreement, they might act based on their incorrect perceptions (D. Verčič et al., 2006). With false consensus and pluralistic ignorance, public opinion is not congruent with real individual orientations. Instead of trying to increase the accuracy of cross-perceptions in social relations, most communication is focused on increasing agreement (Cutlip et al., 1999). According to the co-orientation model, the increase of both agreement and accuracy should be key objectives in communication programs (Dozier & Ehling, 1992).
Types of Co-Orientational Consensus.
Source. Adapted according to Cutlip et al. (1999).
The co-orientation model meets three key conditions in communication planning (Goutzamani, 2016). First, co-orientational measures offer the information necessary to identify and define problems in relations between two publics. This approach includes an assessment of opinions on both sides to define the relations, which is better than defining the problem in ways that limit the strategies (for instance, changing the perception of the public). Second, co-orientational measures offer useful directions for planning the appropriate messages and answers to problems in relations between the two publics. Co-orientational measures can produce atypical but efficient solutions. Third, repeated use of co-orientational measures implies that the relations change as a result of communication and other corrective actions. In other words, agreement, understanding, congruency, and accuracy serve as indicators for assessing planned communication efforts (D. Verčič et al., 2006).
By including a large number of individuals simultaneously oriented toward the issues of common interest, the interpersonal co-orientation model expands to large social groups (Jing, 2010; D. Verčič et al., 2006; D. Verčič & Verčič, 2007). The co-orientation concept of public opinion in society provides an alternative to the usual psychological explanations of the consensus status (Cutlip et al., 1999).
Applying the Model to Publics in Different Countries
Countries have always tried to influence one another, and these attempts at influence have gone through various forms of development and designation throughout history. Since World War II, certain governments’ attempts to influence others via strategic communication have been dubbed “public diplomacy.” Signitzer and Coombs (1992) have shown that “public relations and public diplomacy are going through a natural process of drawing near” (p. 146) and that both professions are trying to achieve “similar goals by employing similar methods” (p. 145). It is therefore no coincidence that the interest in public or even communicative diplomacy (Plavšak, 2002), as well as international (Culbertson & Chen, 1992) and global public relations (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009) as a collective good (Tilson & Alozie, 2004) has become the focus of interest of scientific as well as the general public. The aforementioned facts present us with a question: How can we use public relations as a social technology (D. Verčič, Razpet, Dekleva, & Šlenc, 2001) to advance public diplomacy, co-operation, and lessen conflicts among nations?
Thirteen years ago, a study (D. Verčič et al., 2006) suggested that the co-orientation model can be used to identify the three basic forms of communicational problems and to offer solutions by using relatively simple communicational strategies. In the case of the Croatian and Slovenian publics, there are several potential problems. First, Croats and Slovenians each have different definitions of the basic problems in their mutual relations. They are simply not talking about the same thing when communicating about “the issue” (they are in fact talking about different issues). Second, one side’s perception of the attitudes (evaluation and/or cognition) of the other side does not match the actual attitudes of the other side. Decisions on a course of action that involves the public are based on incorrect assessments of public opinion (for one side, the other, or even both). Third, members of either or both sides have incorrect perceptions of the other side’s position when it comes to issues of mutual interest. Reactions of the public are based on erroneous assessment of the policy and values of the other side.
Crucially, in all three cases, relations between the two sides are jeopardized by differences in definitions and erroneous perceptions, not by their disagreement about the issues. None of the three situations require a change in the level of agreement (or disagreement) when it comes to the issue. The value of using the co-orientation model is in the analysis and definition of communication strategies that help synchronize definitions and increase accuracy, which improves relations between the sides. The results from a decade ago showed a multitude of communication problems. The relations between the two nations included dissensus (they did not agree on issues) and false conflict (they agreed on issues but were not aware that they agreed). Authors proposed a solution by developing strategies for altering attitudes of both sides in order to improve relations as well as internal and external strategies to improve the levels of accuracy and congruency.
Thirteen years after the original study, there were still a number of open issues between Croatia and Slovenia—some old, some new. However, two important events happened in between: while at the time of the original study in 2006, Slovenia was already a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU; both since 2004), Croatia entered NATO in 2008 and EU in 2013. The authors therefore tried to once again check the level of agreement between the two countries’ general publics, the accuracy of each side’s assessment of the other side’s opinions, and the degree of congruency of each side’s opinions with the responses they had predicted for the other side (Figure 1). They again proposed that the co-orientation model could be useful in the case of incorrect perceptions. Relations between two given nations can be improved not only by changing what people know and feel but also by increasing the degree of accuracy of their respective perceptions. So, just as in the first study, this study suggests the changes necessary for achieving improved relations.
Co-orientation model.
Authors also replicated the additional goal from the first study in which they wanted to compare the extent and direction of media coverage in both countries (as well as both populations’ attitudes toward this coverage), in order to get additional insight into the role media have in the described situation. This was to control for potential media influence on false conflict discovered in the original study, and any changes in the public’s attitudes between the two point in time (2004, when the original polls were done, and 2017).
Methodology
As in the original study, the key issues among Croatian and Slovenian citizens were defined through pretesting. Researchers asked a group of experts in diplomacy an open question: Which issues are most significant in relations between the two countries? After analyzing the answers, they chose four new issues and retained four issues from the original study. The tone (direction) of the issue was pro-Croatian in half of the issues, and pro-Slovenian in the other half. As before, they included two statements testing citizens’ perceptions of the extent and tone of media reports about both countries. The final list of issues is shown in Table 2. Questionnaires with 10 questions were then translated twice (from the original language to the other language, and back again to the original).
The List of Issues Included in the Study.
To determine the significance of each question for relations between the two countries, investigators conducted a public opinion poll in both countries, as shown in Table 3. They used a telephone poll, like in the original study. Both samples were nationally representative (Croatia, n = 500; Slovenia, n = 500). The survey was conducted at the same time in each country, from September 1 to September 31, 2017. In each country, respondents followed the same procedure. They estimated their agreement with 10 statements on Likert-type scales from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). They expressed their level of agreement with a particular item, and then assessed how the other side felt about the issue. We used these answers to estimate accuracy and congruency.
Sample Demographics.
Additionally, as before, parallel to the poll survey, a media monitoring study was conducted in both countries. Researchers recorded television news broadcasted on the first channels of the national public television stations (SLO 1 and HRT1). In both Croatia and Slovenia, they recorded 30 central news shows which were later analyzed.
Results
In line with the co-orientation model, and following the procedure of the previous study (D. Verčič et al., 2006), investigators first calculated the level of agreement, accuracy, and congruency among Croats and Slovenians. Agreement, shown in Table 4, indicates similarities in evaluations of problems between the two sides in communication. Table 5 shows the results of t tests for large independent samples. For a more detailed insight, they also calculated d results (difference scores, i.e., the differences between arithmetic means; Broom & Dozier, 1990).
Agreement: Average Level of Agreement With a 10-Question Sequence Within the Croatian and Slovenian Populations.
Agreement: Results of t Test for Large Independent Samples and Difference Scores.
Note. df = degrees of freedom.
Once again, just as in the previous study, the results were somewhat unexpected. In the first study, the difference in attitudes occurred in 9 out of 12 issues. In this study, all 10 issues showed a difference in attitudes between Croats and Slovenians. Some of the issues that did not show a difference in the first study proved to become a problem by 2017. For example, the issue of Slovenia building highways toward Croatia did not seem to worry Croats as much in 2004. In 2017, however, Croats seemed to believe this is a problem. Also, although the question on media presentation of Croatian citizens in Slovenia did not seem to bother Croats in the first study, this issue now bothers them. Among the new issues, there were some surprises. On the issue of Slovenia potentially blocking Croatia’s entry into the Schengen area, it was expected Croats to agree and Slovenians to disagree. The results, however, showed the opposite, with Slovenians agreeing with the statement, “Slovenia is going to block Croatia from joining the Schengen area,” but Croats disagreeing.
The next co-orientation variable, accuracy, measures the similarity between Croatian perceptions and what Slovenians believe to be Croatian perceptions (Table 6) and the similarity between Slovenian perceptions and what Croats believe to be Slovenian perceptions (Table 7). These two tables give insight into the degree to which predictions of attitudes of one side about the attitudes of the other are correct. The differences in agreements are compared by using t tests for large independent samples.
Accuracy: Average Level of Evaluations by the Croatian Population, and Predictions by the Slovenian Population About Evaluations by Croats (“What Slovenians Think Croats Think”).
Note. df = degrees of freedom.
Accuracy: Average Level of Evaluations by the Slovenian Population, and Predictions by the Croatian Population About Evaluations by Slovenians (“What Croats Think Slovenians Think”).
Note. df = degrees of freedom.
The results show a low level of accuracy in both instances. Neither the Croatian nor the Slovenian populations accurately predicted the evaluations of the other side. When predicting Croatian attitudes, Slovenians were wrong in 8 out of 10 cases. Croats were wrong in 7 out of 10 cases when predicting Slovenian attitudes. In our previous study, Slovenians showed a higher level of accuracy, with correct predictions in 6 out of 12 cases. Over time, the misunderstanding seems to have increased since in 2017 Slovenians seemed to have a lower grasp of Croatian opinions. Thirteen years ago, Croats showed relatively low understanding of the other side, correctly judging 2 out of 12 opinions. As of 2017, not much has changed—only two issues were judged correctly. In all other cases, both Slovenians and Croats underestimated the level of disagreement.
These results are not optimistic, especially in light of the previous study. The original study 13 years ago showed a certain level of misunderstanding, but even when perceptions were inaccurate, both nations mostly underestimated the other side’s support. For example, Slovenians stated that they want to help Croatia in joining the EU, whereas Croats stated that they were unaware of this attitude. In this study, on the other hand, Slovenians agreed with the proposition of blocking Croatia from joining the Schengen area, whereas Croats were once again unaware. When we compared issues used in both studies (2004 and 2017), there was a lower degree of accuracy on almost all statements on both sides (Table 8). When questioned about Slovenian border police making it inappropriately difficult to cross the border, Croats moved from mostly disagreeing in 2004 (M = 2.71) to mostly agreeing in 2017 (M = 3.20). Slovenians disagreed with this statement in 2004 (M = 2.04) and disagreed with it even more in 2017 (M = 1.96). There is the same trend in the question about Slovenian traffic police inappropriately discriminating against Croatian citizens. Croats disagreed in 2004 (M = 2.76), but moved toward agreement in 2017 (M = 2.96). Slovenians disagreed in the original study (M = 1.69), and in 2017 agreed even less (M = 1.50). When asked about the construction of highways toward Croatia being at the bottom of Slovenia’s list of priorities, Croats disagreed in 2004 (M = 2.40) and agreed in 2017 (M = 3.12). Slovenians disagreed 13 years ago (M = 2.45) and disagreed even more in 2017 (M = 2.25). The only positive change that happened between the two studies is on the issue of Slovenian guests not being appreciated enough on the Croatian coast. Croats recognized it more in 2017 (M = 2.12) than in 2004 (M = 1.93). Slovenians on the other hand agreed with this statement less in 2017 (M = 2.93) than in 2004 (M = 3.20). The two statements on media coverage show an interesting trend. Slovenian perceptions on how Croatian and Slovenian media cover the other side are almost identical. Slovenians disagreed that Slovenian media report negatively on Croatia (in 2004, M = 2.36; in 2017, M = 2.38), and they agreed that Croatian media report negatively on Slovenia (in 2004, M = 3.15; in 2017, M = 3.19). However, Croats changed their opinions over time. In 2004, Croats did not see Slovenian media as reporting negatively on Croatia (M = 2.34), whereas in 2017, they believed that to be true (M = 3.24). Croats did not see Croatian media as being negative toward Slovenia (M = 2.16), but in 2017 were less sure (M = 2.67). For the purpose of determining the level of congruency, Table 9 shows the difference between Croats’ opinions and Croats’ opinions on Slovenians. Table 10 shows the difference in Slovenians opinions and Slovenian opinion on Croats. Both tables include t test results (for large independent samples) and d results.
Comparison of Agreement With Issues Among Croats and Slovenians in 2004 and 2017.
Congruency: Average Level of Evaluations by the Croatian Population, and Predictions by the Croatian Population About Evaluations by the Slovenian Population.
Note. df = degrees of freedom.
Congruency: Average Level of Evaluations by the Slovenian Population, and Predictions by the Slovenian Population About Croatian Evaluations by Population.
Note. df = degrees of freedom.
Congruency explains the extent to which the views of one side matched their estimate of views of the other side on each issue, or in other words, the extent to which Croatian views matched Croats’ estimate of Slovenian views and vice versa. This variable is occasionally named “perceived agreement.” Congruency helps “formulate strategies for dealing with the other person or for spontaneously responding in interactions” (Cutlip et al., 1999, p. 271). Table 9 shows that Croatian evaluations and their predictions on Slovenian evaluations differed in a statistically significant way in all cases. These results further underline the level of disagreement. The two nations not only disagree but are also not equipped to deal with the other side, since the level of awareness is too low. Table 10 points to even more perceived disagreement. It seems Slovenians judge Croatian attitudes even more extremely than Croats do.
Content analysis of editorial content in both countries showed the scope and the tone of media announcements. Unlike in the previous study, where the media content proved to be equal in scope and completely neutral, these results were quite different. In Croatian news, there were 30 reports on Slovenia and Slovenians during the allocated month. In Slovenian news, there were 38 such reports. Six judges (three Croats and three Slovenians) evaluated the tone of each of 68 reports on a scale from 1 (extremely negative report), through 3 (neutral report), to 5 (extremely positive report). Unlike the first time, both showed a shift toward the negative. The mean grade of Croatian reports was 2.43, whereas the Slovenian reports were even more negative at 2.29.
Discussion
The results show lower understanding, lower accuracy, lower agreement, and lower congruency in attitudes between the two nations on almost all selected issues. Membership of both countries in two international organizations, which are based on shared values between members, NATO and EU, had no visible positive influence on how publics in two countries perceive each other attitudes. There is less mutuality in their orientation toward common issues, and therefore, co-orientation is lower. The dynamic of the relationship is negative: the two nations see issues more differently, they know less about how the other nation perceives these issues, and they estimate even worse how the other side views their perceptions on these issues. Considering physical proximity and size of the two nations (there are 4 million Croats and 2 million Slovenians living on 77,000 square kilometers, which is 10% smaller than Austria), one would expect that over time they will know more and not less about each other, yet the opposite is true. It is clear that attitudes of both sides are based on erroneous assessment of the policies and values of the other side and that there is no communication between them leading toward consensus. It is, however, important to observe that media reports in both countries became more negative though time.
It is safe to assume that governments and other actors in both countries actively communicate within each nation and direct communication toward the other nation in various forms of communicative and public diplomacy. Authors wonder if an explanation of these developments could be found in the proposition, known in international relations studies, that foreign policy (and public diplomacy is a part of it) is a continuation of domestic politics with other means (as many students in international relations believe; cf. Cadier & Light, 2015), that is, domestic concerns precede international issues, thus leading to unintended deterioration of relations between nations. The potential positive effects of energy spent on public diplomacy are annulled by the comparatively greater energy spent on domestic politics exploiting external disagreements, thus creating an external enemy to homogenize domestic populations.
As for the results of media monitoring, the results are informative. A rise in negativity on both sides is also quite worrisome and raises the question of which came first: media influencing the publics or the publics influencing the media. Decades of research on media influence shows that it is impossible to attribute causality in either direction. In liberal democratic societies (like Croatia and Slovenia), there is an interplay of influence between political elites, media, and publics, with one of them taking the lead from time to time but generally in balance. This, however, does not mean that it is impossible to investigate relative agenda setting or even making, with other effects as framing and priming being of similar explanatory power. To investigate this issue further, we need to employ new longitudinal studies.
What are the consequences for international public relations? From this analysis, authors deduce that for public diplomacy to improve understanding between nations, it must target both domestic and foreign nations, which is a highly contested proposition—under what conditions can governments spend public funds for communication directed toward domestic populations? We have accepted that this can be done in issues dealing with environment, health, and safety, but rarely in relations between nations—although we have seen this in the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and in referenda to enter EU and NATO in various countries in Europe. Where we believe this study shows value in applying co-orientational research is that it indicated where and when relations between two social groups develop into a negative spiral of conflict that has as much—if not more—substance in attitudes as it does in material “facts.”
Limitation and Future Perspectives
The major limitation of our study is that it is limited to just one pair of countries, Croatia and Slovenia. Further cases are needed to test validity of this study’s conclusions. Another limitation is a methodological one: a lot could be learned by a qualitative complement that would try to understand motives and behaviors key decision makers in both countries. In our study, we assumed their benevolence and use of public diplomacy to ease tensions between the two countries, and increase accuracy and congruence in perceptions of publics in the two countries through time. We have demonstrated that the situations is not improving, but deteriorating. What we cannot know is, if that is a result of incompetence (unsuccessful public diplomacy), malevolence (use of public diplomacy to alienate the general public in another country), or simply ignorance (negligence of public diplomacy as a tool to ease tensions between publics in two counties), or a combination of the three.
What we have learned and where should we go from here? If we postulate that successful public diplomacy must target both domestic and foreign publics simultaneously (as we have concluded above), a question emerges on the nature of its messaging: if domestic politics considerations preceed foreign policy ones, how are results of public diplomacy affected and by domestic messaging and communication? This research question should be added to future research. Another interesting area that needs further study is, how come that entering into the same international organizations that are based on common values (in this case NATO and EU) does not positively affect member’s general publics’ perceptions of each other? There are other similar pairs of countries, for example, Greece and Turkey in NATO, which could offer material for more in-depth studies.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Author Biographies
research team.