Lost in Informational Paradise: Cognitive Arrest to Epistemic Inertia in Problem Solving

Directionality Between Evidence and Conclusion

As discussed, we make decisions through a simple and pragmatic process of syllogistic reasoning (i.e., if-then). In the syllogistic reasoning framing, people recollect former knowledge, collect new data, or elaborate on situationally applicable information to deploy as supporting evidence for a given judgmental conclusion. We not only use the rules we carry from prior situations, in a form of the if-then rule (e.g., [if] children watch violent movies, [then] they behave aggressively), but we also perform the current inferential tasks through deductive processing of an if-then syllogism (e.g., [if] we saw a very aggressive child, [then] he must have watched many violent movies in the past). Here, the extent of association (the strength of connection) between the if component and the then component is called “relevance” (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999).

We confer a certain amount of relevance to inferential association in correspondence with relevance we can draw from the decisional referent rule (e.g., [if] children watch violent movies, [then] they behave aggressively). The confidence we have in our judgmental conclusion (e.g., our confidence about “the aggressive kid who watched many violent movies”) is commensurate with the strength of the associative link between the if-then rule that we use as a decisional referent frame (e.g., the extent of one’s belief that “watching violent movies causes aggressive behaviors in children”). For example, if you observe a very aggressive act by a child, you might subsequently take that act as evidence to draw a judgmental conclusion that “the child must have watched many violent movies.”

Evidence intuitively precedes a conclusion. However, the initiation and completion of the judgmental process between evidence and conclusion in problematic situations can occur in any direction. One may start from a conclusion and proceed to seeking evidence, or one may start by seeking evidence and proceed to a conclusion. People sometimes benefit, whether consciously or unconsciously, by following the forward direction (i.e., evidence dictates a certain conclusion). For example, one might think “if someone is a Harvard graduate and working in upper management for a large business, then she must be smart.” At other times, however, people find conscious or unconscious merit in reverse-order reasoning (i.e., a conclusion dictates certain evidence).

One would draw a conclusion first by applying a salient rule—that is, a prime decisional referent—and next collect evidential information that warrants the predetermined conclusion. For example, a person with a terminal illness might draw a quick judgmental conclusion such as “I am OK” and then collect evidential information that indicates and reinforces belief in his physical well-being. Political leaders might quickly decide to go to war for a salient reason (e.g., the political regime of that country has been uncooperative) and next seek out additional supporting decisional referents and information (e.g., the leader of the country is a dictator, he made his people hungry, he has made weapons of mass destruction, he provided support for terrorist groups, etc.).

In this example, the conclusion (e.g., the choice to go to war) precedes substantial evidence (e.g., the reasons for war) that warrants and justifies the conclusion. In other words, a hastily or willfully drawn conclusion directs an individual to seek certain evidence that justifies it. It is important to understand that the drawing of the conclusion does not exclude active cognitive working or elaboration in a retroactive way. Even though we make a decision, we might feel it is necessary to elaborate on our chosen conclusion. Conventionally, we assume that a drawn conclusion completes our cognitive working process, but we frequently go backward in problem solving. Therefore, it is valid to conceptualize the process between drawing a conclusion and connecting evidence to it as bidirectional. ²

Forward Reasoning Versus Backward Reasoning

Next, we will elaborate on the two directional flows of syllogistic reasoning. Assuming an equal amount of cognitive resources and motivation in solving a problem, a problem solver can take two contrasting mental approaches in expending cognitive capacity and capability. One is forward reasoning, and the other is backward reasoning. Forward reasoning is the commonly conceived way of problem solving. In terms of the syllogistic if-then reasoning frame, we define forward reasoning as a cognitive approach in which evidence directs a conclusion. To illustrate the process of a forward reasoning approach, we offer the following:

In contrast, we define backward reasoning as a cognitive approach in which a conclusion directs evidence. The following is an illustration of a backward reasoning approach:

Here, the thinker quickly reaches a judgmental conclusion by a prime decisional rule and then seeks out rationales that make the selected option more conclusive and convincing. This is an optimization process for an a priori conclusion for posterior evidence.

Notably, in both cognitive approaches, a chosen solution for a problem should first contain the observational contents that best fit the major premise chosen within a syllogistic model. Then, the chosen solution will produce a level of confidence commensurate to the degree of relevance between the “if” and “then” components of the major premise.

Figure 2 demonstrates the two distinct cognitive reasoning approaches in problem solving by illustrating the directionality between evidence and conclusion.

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Figure 2.

Cognitive approaches in problem solving.

Certitude of a Given Conclusion

Using the syllogistic reasoning frame, we can define attitude as a judgmental conclusion drawn about a certain social object or issue (Kruglanski, 1989). The attitude—an evaluative judgmental conclusion—might be supported by evidential materials. However, the certainty one can draw from evidence is not determined by the frequency or amount of information connected, but by the subjective “relevance” of one’s prior beliefs or decisional referent rules in making the given judgment (usually, as another form of an if-then rule that becomes a major premise).

A person under pressure to make a quick judgment would draw on a referent criterion (in a form of an if–then rule that becomes a major premise) that is available and applicable to the given problem. Next, she or he seeks out analogous evidential material from the current situation via observation. When newly collected evidence is similar to the evidence in the activated referent criterion for the conclusion, the person then confers the given certainty (relevance in the major premise or referent criterion) in the old premise to the newly drawn conclusion, which is tantamount certitude attached to a fit (relevance) between the old if-then rule (the referent criterion one is deploying). In other words, when a person is under pressure to make a quick decision or problem resolution, he or she looks for evidence similar to that which supports his or her known experience or referent criterion. The extent to which the evidence is similar is commensurate with the degree of certitude that will be associated with the new decision or solution.

This can solve a puzzle that many public opinion researchers encounter. Researchers have often found that people who express a strong attitude about a topic lack cognitive knowledge to support a given evaluative conclusion toward the attitudinal target. Grunig and Hon (1988) reported and summarized such affective publics without cognitive counterparts on attitudinal objects:

Several studies of publics arising from environmental issues and corporate policy issues, however, have found some consistency in the cognitive strategies constructed by members of active publics and in the nature of their attitudes. Grunig and Ipes (1983) also found that active publics have more organized cognitions than do passive publics. Two studies, Grunig (1982a) and Grunig and Ipes (1983), showed that passive publics are more likely to hold attitudes than cognitions. Active publics are equally likely to hold both attitudes and cognitions. Less active publics express attitudes even when they have no cognitions on which to base them [italics added]. (Grunig & Childers, 1988, pp. 5-6).

Combining this judgmental process with our model of directionality of initiation and completion of a judgmental task could explain why passive publics often have unreasonably strong attitudes (conclusions) in the absence of cognition (evidence). As most dual models of social influence (e.g., the elaboration likelihood model, ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) suggest, people with limited judgmental motivation and capability become cognitive economizers under some conditions. People draw quick conclusions using an activated previous judgmental rule (referent criterion or schema) and match easily identifiable evidential materials.

However, when individuals have an internal preference or directional expectation about the outcome their decision might produce, they are more likely to engage in backward reasoning, because the preferred outcome influences the selection of a referent criterion or prior rule. This is the way in which wishful thinking happens and why many decisions that a lay person makes are unrealistically biased. People adopt a referent criterion that best warrants their own preferred end state regardless of its actual likelihood. This is because a preferred outcome state powerfully influences an individual to activate a certain prior judgmental rule that more successfully warrants the preferred outcome state compared with others.

Parallel Syllogistic Reasoning Processes

At the same time, drawing a conclusion initially does not necessarily limit one to a single conclusion. It is possible for a person to intentionally (and often thoughtfully) select multiple, conflicting conclusions. Problem solvers may want to be scrupulous or wish to reduce possible errors and risks in the judgmental task. The forward reasoning strategy requires a person to consider a relatively large number of alternative courses of action (i.e., a larger number of solution candidates). In contrast, the backward reasoning strategy would consider fewer alternative courses because of the chosen, ready-made solution, or because of a strong prior motivation that leads one to a specific course of action. Although backward reasoning problem solvers can cognitively work hard enough to construct multiple syllogisms, problem solvers who employ a forward reasoning approach are likely to construct and go through a more scrupulous process of multiple syllogistic reasoning.

Behavioral Molecule

Drawing from Richard Carter’s (1973, 1974) behavioral molecule concept, Grunig and Hunt (1984) and Grunig (2003) proposed a behavioral molecule that illustrates how people (e.g., an organizational manager) make decisions about what to do in problematic situations. The molecule consists of several segments that capture the processes individuals or systems go through when planning and selecting behaviors. The segments are, in order: detect, construct, define, select, confirm, behave, and detect. The segments or steps are described as sequential, theoretically endless, and if followed thoroughly, able to allow more successful problem solving.

Detect is the segment in which a person discovers a problem and begins to think about a solution. Construct is the segment in which a person begins to formulate a solution to the problem he or she detected. In this segment, the person aims to be totally objective and abstains from making a judgment about what to do. The major task here is to be effortful in cognitive processing to define the problem, choose appropriate objectives pertaining to the problem, and formulate alternative solutions to the problem. Define is the step in which a person specifies distinctly how each alternative can be implemented. The define segment ends when a single plan of action has been elaborated for each alternative. Select is the step during which one chooses the best alternative for solving the problem. Here, applicable prior decision rules (i.e., referent criteria) or one’s values or attitudes exert greater influence on which alternatives one will favor (or eliminate) over the others. Next, in the confirm step, a person reviews the practicality of the selected solution and finalizes it before enacting it. Behave is the segment in which one translates the chosen course of action (solution) into implemented action for problem resolution. Finally, the last segment is once again detect, to evaluate whether the intended effect, or problem resolution, has been achieved.

Grunig and Hunt (1984) suggested that the segments should ideally occur in sequence because to maximize the potential of making the best behavioral decision about a problem. However, in reality, the full sequential order might be shortened because of situational constraints. The steps of the behavioral molecule provide a useful way to describe some common mistakes in problem solving. Often, problem solvers omit some of the segments in the behavioral molecule or change the sequence from the model. Some common mistakes include:

Using our new descriptive framework of the cognitive approach in problem solving, dogmatism, rationalization, and habit are special cases of cognitive retrogression, or a backward reasoning approach, whereas indecision, procrastination, and perfectionism are examples of cognitive progression, or a forward reasoning approach.

The sequence between information collection and problem solving can be interchangeable in some cases. In the cognitive progression approach, information helps construct and define the alternatives—that is, a prospective use of information. In the cognitive retrogression approach, information is used to justify the omitted steps (i.e., construct and define) and to reinforce the selected alternative—that is, a retrospective use of information.

Experimental Finding

Obhi and Haggard (2004) summarized the groundbreaking finding from the Libet et al. (1983) study on the “source of control” as follows:

. . . participants watched a small clock hand that completed one full revolution in 2.56 seconds. While fixated on the clock, a participant voluntarily flexed his wrist at a time of his choosing. After the movement, the clock hand continued to rotate for a random time and then stopped. Then, a participant reported the position of the clock hand at the time when she first became aware of the will to move . . . this subjective judgment W, for “will.” In other parts of the experiment, participants judged when they actually moved . . . this judgment M, for “movement.” The timing of the W and the M told . . . when—subjectively speaking—a participant formulated a will to move and actually moved. In addition, Libet’s team measured two objective parameters: the electrical activity over the motor areas of the brain, and the electrical activity of the muscles involved in the wrist movement. Over the motor areas, Libet recorded a well-known psychophysiological correlate of movement preparation called the readiness potential (RP). . . . [RP] is measured using electroencephalographic recording electrodes placed on the scalp overlying the motor areas of the frontal lobe, and appears as a ramplike buildup of electrical activity that precedes voluntary action by about 1 second. By also recording the electrical activity of the muscles involved in the wrist movement, Libet precisely determined the onset of muscle activity related to the RP. (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, pp. 358-359)

Libet et al. (1983) studied the temporal order of conscious experience and neural activity by comparing the subjective W (will) and M (movement) judgments with objective RP and muscular activity. Their findings first showed that W came before M, meaning that the participants in the experiment “consciously perceive the intention to move as occurring before a conscious experience of actual moving,” which is consistent with our common conception (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, p. 359). However, Libet et al. also found an intriguing temporal order in which “actual neural preparation to move (RP) preceded conscious awareness of the intention to move (W) by 300 to 500 milliseconds” (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, p. 360). Obhi and Haggard (2004) restated the meaning of this surprising finding:

Put simply, the brain prepared a movement before a subject consciously decided to move! This result suggests that a person’s feeling of intention may be an effect of motor preparatory activity in the brain rather than a cause . . . this finding ran directly contrary to the classical conception of free will [italics added]. (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, p. 360).

Libet et al.’s (1983) findings, however, did not totally upset the conventional relationship between intention and action, which is that conscious processes such as intention cause actions. Subsequent findings suggested that “conscious processes could still exert some effect over actions by modifying the brain processes already under way” and thus it would be more accurate to call it “free won’t” rather than “free will” [italics added] (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, p. 360). The temporal order between intentions and actions can be bidirectional—that is, either from intention to action or from action to intention. According to Obhi and Haggard (2004), our brain perceives the intention of an action when the prediction of movement fits well with the actual movement. Thus, when the fit occurs—for example, when past examples of a similar action can guide the current action well—the person might feel a euphoric sense of control. In addition, a strong sense of intention can script an action subsequently.

In addition, a mental illness known as utilization behaviors in which “patients uncontrollably interact with and use every object that they come across” provides a piece of interesting evidence that the cognitive backward approach can appear in some cognitive neuroscience studies (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, p. 364). Utilization behavior patients are not aware of what they are going to do until after the action has been taken. In such a case, there is “no awareness of intention before the movement,” and thus “the patient is left to rationalize the behavior afterward” (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, p. 365).

The bidirectional reasoning conception (i.e., cognitive retrogression and cognitive progression) in the present model explains that a person flexibly situates himself or herself on either a cognitive forward approach or cognitive backward approach, depending on his or her situational-perceptual conditions. As psychophysiologists have found, our actions are sometimes followed by our will and vice versa. Similarly, our problem-solving acts (a conclusion for a judgmental task) are often done first and followed by a certain intention of why they were done. This case of backward reasoning is one of the cognitive approaches in the present model. Per Libet et al.’s (1983) findings, in many situations, our intention or will to perform a certain action is reconstructed in reverse. Frequently, we are asked by others (e.g., experimenters) to explain our actions. In our routine life, intention itself has little use until it becomes necessary to explain our acts to others. It is then reconstructed—reasoned backward—to make sense of our actions (conclusion) to ourselves and others. Very often, intention is situated within a subjective time sequence as if it occurred ahead of an action (e.g., when asked to reflect on prior action). ⁴

Default Cognitive Strategy

We postulate that the human default cognitive strategy is cognitive retrogression rather than cognitive progression. Generally, people only adopt a cognitive progression approach when they face a nonroutine or extraordinary problem without a readily available solution. In contrast, people more often take a cognitive retrogression approach when they have a problem with a ready-made solution. This gives us an intuitive explanation for why the cognitive retrogression approach becomes the default mental approach, as problems are always fewer than nonproblems. The cognitive retrogression strategy lessens the cognitive effort required to address the present problem in order to economize problem-solving capacity for concurrent or more urgent tasks at any given moment. In the face of familiar problems, the cognitive retrogression approach increases one’s ability to adapt to other problems by speeding up the problem-solving process. However, when encountering unfamiliar problems, we cannot maintain our pattern of nonthinking and minimal cognitive investment. In these cases, we are likely to shift from cognitive retrogression to a cognitive progression strategy to compose a new solution and to restore our default cognitive idleness (cf. Carter, 1965, “evaluative mode” and “reinforcement mode”).

To summarize, the cognitive retrogression approach could be described as the shortest path through the behavioral molecule, using the fewest steps (“detect—behave”), whereas the cognitive progression approach is the longest path using all the steps and completing the full process of the behavioral molecule, detect—construct—define—select—confirm—behave, until a problem situation has ceased to be problematic (Grunig & Hunt, 1984). Many human motor behaviors (e.g., blinking if a person detects a sudden movement near the face) are done through the cognitive retrogression strategy. Many times, we do not have any intention regarding a certain behavioral decision beyond simply acting. However, if we detect an out-of-the-ordinary situation for which the motor-behavior-like response will be ill-suited, we are likely to make a transition to the cognitive progression approach to better adapt to the new problem. Here, the model of cognitive progression and retrogression strategies captures the human tendency to establish and recycle certain knowledge that allows us to extend the use of the cognitive retrogression state. Thus, when implementation of a ready-made solution is difficult, our cognitive working goes into an “extraordinary cognitive mode” until we have decided on a novel solution. This extraordinary cognitive modus operandi is known as cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving (Kim, 2006).

A normative implication of the two cognitive strategies is that it is problematic for a person to lack cognitive aptness—that is, a cognitive ambidexterity in changing one’s mental approach from cognitive retrogression to progression and vice versa. For instance, many serious health problems become worse because of the problem holder’s cognitive ineptness (e.g., maintaining a cognitive retrogression approach to a new problem, either deliberately or otherwise). At the other extreme, many people also suffer from unnecessary cognitive stress due to employing a cognitive progression approach even when a retrogressive approach would adequately deal with the problem. Therefore, neither cognitive progression nor cognitive retrogression is invariably superior to the other.

Rationality Assumption in Cognitive Strategies

Grunig (1968) criticized the rationality assumption in major economics and communication programs because they considered a rational person to be a “profit maximizer,” or one who “seeks always to maximize a pre-set goal” (p. 4). Against such a presumption, Grunig extended the meaning of rationality to be construed as one’s ability to find and evaluate alternative solutions to a problem and to select one based on its merits. Thus, he studied the conditions under which a person becomes a rational entrepreneur. Grunig’s conceptualization of the entrepreneur paved the way for decision makers to become more rational in problematic situations. In contrast, in our model of cognitive progression and retrogression strategies, we conceptually separate rationality from cognitive progression (entrepreneurial problem solving).

Grunig (1968) seemed to equate high entrepreneurial decision making with high rationality in tackling a problematic situation. However, the model of cognitive progression and retrogression strategies considers the highly entrepreneurial approach (i.e., the cognitive progression strategy) and the low entrepreneurial approach (i.e., the cognitive retrogression strategy) as independent from one’s rationality in problem solving. In other words, to be more entrepreneurial is not always to be rational. For example, given situational constraints such as low cognitive capacity (i.e., lacking cognitive resources) or the “hardware aspect,” and high cognitive capability (i.e., having a ready solution) or the “software aspect” (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999), a problem holder who adopts a cognitive retrogression or backward reasoning strategy with a well-rehearsed conclusion (a prior solution applicable to the current problem) would be considered more rational.

Deconstructing and determining what is considered rational problem solving requires considering unique situational conditions (e.g., constraints) in problem-solving contexts. Specifically, the cognitive progression and retrogression model no longer equates an entrepreneurial approach with rationality in problem solving. A less entrepreneurial approach can actually be more rational if it economizes cognitive capacity for the problem solver. With this concept, we identify a key problem from which many problem solvers suffer: The problem holder’s ineptness in making flexible shifts from cognitive progression to cognitive retrogression and vice versa when situational contexts demand such mental dexterity. When problem solvers are less able to make these shifts, they are less able to adapt to the environment.