Erratum

Placeholder page number references to other articles in this issue should have been listed as follows:

Page 306, l. 2: Yet at least some in our field continue to designate important modes of experience as nonverbal, as Stern attests and Bucci demonstrates (e.g., “there are multiple modalities of experience that operate independently of the semantic components of language throughout life” [p. 280]).

Page 308, l. 2: Fonagy in particular elaborates the experiential components that are part of language, the embodied vestiges of personal and species history, and, on the other hand, is “at a loss to know how subjective experience may be accessible to exploration without language” (p. 293), as am I.

Page 308, paragraph 2, l. 6: However, because the “subsymbolic components, which are continuous in format, cannot be mapped directly onto the discrete symbolic forms of language” (p. 281), there are limits to the degree to which language can be integrated with the nonverbal modes.

Page 308, paragraph 2, l. 10: On the other hand, this integration is possible because “there is in fact little evidence for cognition or language that is not grounded in sensory modalities” (p. 281).

Page 308, paragraph 3, l. 3: Bucci’s notion of words as discrete symbols exemplifies Stern’s discussion of the view that “nonverbal meaning always overflows its verbal containers” (p. 299) and thus that words “flatten” experience.