Policing terrorism with procedural justice: The role of police legitimacy and law legitimacy

Abstract

Research shows that procedural justice influences public cooperation with the police. However, it cannot be assumed that factors that influence cooperation in general crime control also apply to people’s willingness to cooperate in counter-terrorism. This proposition is tested among a sample of Arabic-speaking people in Australia. We explore whether procedural justice has an impact on reported willingness to cooperate in counterterrorism policing, and if this is mediated by law legitimacy and identity related factors. Our results show that perceptions about the legitimacy of the law and identification with Australian society matter a great deal when it comes to predicting cooperation in counter-terrorism. In contrast, perceptions of police legitimacy matter most for predicting cooperation in general crime control activities. Our discussion and results are linked to debates about how best to police terrorism.

Keywords

Arabic speaking communities cooperation counter-terrorism law legitimacy police legitimacy procedural justice

Introduction

Since September 11th 2001 domestic policing in Western democracies has been transformed by the increasing involvement of local police in counter-terrorism. While concern has been raised about the implications of this trend for the resourcing of routine police work, scholars have argued that it also has a bearing on police effectiveness because of its impact on police–community relations (Lambert, 2011). Studies indicate that among Muslim and Middle Eastern communities in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, there is widespread resentment and anger towards counter-terrorism efforts because they are seen as arbitrarily and disproportionately targeting groups due to their Islamic faith or ethnic identity (Pickering et al., 2008; Poynting and Nobel, 2004; Spalek and Imtoual, 2007; Sun et al., 2011).

The problem is that counter-terrorism policing can undermine both support for police and generate opposition towards the laws the police enforce – which also has implications for the perceived legitimacy of counter-terrorism policing (Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd, 2011; LaFree et al., 2009). Judgements of police legitimacy are essential to eliciting voluntary cooperation among community members (Murphy et al., 2008). Procedural justice has for some time been regarded as central to improving police legitimacy and public cooperation with police, with numerous studies supporting this observation (Mazerolle et al., 2010). Procedural justice refers to whether laws and policies are perceived as being implemented fairly by authorities. Further, perceptions that authorities enforcing those policies are treating citizens with respect and dignity are also important to perceived procedural justice. More recently, the pioneer of procedural justice research, Tom Tyler, has argued that procedural justice is relevant to the counter-terrorism context (Tyler, 2012). This is supported by three recent studies of US and UK Muslims (i.e. Huq et al., 2011a, 2011b; Tyler et al., 2010). However, it cannot be assumed that what influences cooperation in general crime control – the context from which most procedural justice research is drawn – is the same for cooperation in counter-terrorism policing. For instance, other factors, such as people’s perceptions about the legitimacy of counter-terrorism laws or their level of identification with the country in which they reside, might also be important for predicting willingness to assist police in these matters (Cherney and Murphy, 2011; Hocking, 2004).

This paper aims to test whether the procedural justice model extends to the counter-terrorism context among a sample of Arabic-speaking people in Australia. Of particular interest is exploring whether procedural justice has an impact on reported willingness to cooperate in activities aimed at counter-terrorism policing. We aim to explore factors that may mediate this relationship, and whether these factors may differ when it comes to predicting cooperation in general crime control. This is important to understanding what influences cooperation with police in different crime control contexts.

This paper is organised as follows: firstly, background theory and research is canvassed to situate the study in relevant literature and to illustrate the link between counter-terrorism and our key concepts of interest. The survey instrument and sampling process are described. Results are then reported, focusing on people’s cooperation in general crime control compared to counter-terrorism. The results are discussed, as well as the study’s limitations, and we conclude by reflecting on the implications of our findings for counter-terrorism efforts.

Background theory and studies

Procedural justice, cooperation and counter-terrorism

The procedural justice model of policing challenges the argument that people simply make judgements about the police on the basis of their performance (i.e. ability to identify and apprehend law breakers). Rather, people are also concerned about the basis of police decision-making and whether it is underpinned by a normative element based upon fair and respectful treatment. Procedural justice is seen as central to these normative judgements and is influenced by whether the police are neutral and transparent when applying legal rules; whether they explain their actions and seek input from community members before making decisions; and whether they treat people with dignity and respect. These dimensions are key predictors of peoples’ acceptance of police decision-making and the laws they enforce, as well as for promoting cooperation with police (Tyler, 2011).

Studies have shown that if police use procedural justice it helps build police legitimacy, and is a more effective way of securing long-term compliance with legal authorities (Mazerolle et al., 2010). In actual fact when procedural justice is absent citizens are more likely to become defensive, which encourages non-compliance (Braithwaite, 2009; Tyler, 2011). The reason procedural justice matters so much is because it communicates the message that an individual is a respected member of society and deserves to be listened to. It is a mistake to assume, however, that procedural injustice against a single person only affects their judgements alone. Rather, the impact of experiencing or observing unfairness in decision-making translates to one’s social group and can motivate groups to question the legitimacy and power of specific authorities (Braithwaite, 2009; Lind and Tyler, 1988). This can create defensiveness among social groups who react by withdrawing their consent and cooperation with legal authorities. In the specific context of policing this can have a significant impact on police effectiveness.

The procedural justice-based model of policing has important lessons for counter-terrorism policing. Firstly, it has been consistently argued that community cooperation is central to mitigating the risks of terrorism (DPMC, 2010: 67; Lambert, 2011; Pickering et al., 2008). In the counter-terrorism context, a procedural justice-based model of policing may have the potential to provide police with greater pay-offs (i.e. more accurate and timely intelligence) and can impose lower costs than coercive or intrusive forms of policing, because of its capacity to generate increased levels of community cooperation. Coercive and intrusive forms of policing can actually generate community backlash against counter-terrorism and may foster terrorist recruiting, hence undermining community support for efforts to combat terrorism, as has been illustrated in the period of the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland (LaFree et al., 2009). Given active and passive support for terrorism is influenced by the functioning of state institutions (Tessler and Robbins, 2007; Shapiro and Fair, 2009), how institutional authorities go about designing and implementing counter-terrorism laws and policies (i.e. whether they are designed and implemented in a procedurally just way) has a potential bearing on support for terrorism, and the willingness of groups to cooperate in counter-terrorism initiatives.

Limited evidence supports the link between procedural justice and cooperation in counter-terrorism. Research conducted by Tyler and his colleagues has found that among Muslims residing in the UK and US, procedural justice is a significant predictor of people’s willingness to cooperate with the police in counter-terrorism initiatives (see Huq et al., 2011a, 2011b; Tyler et al., 2010). In these studies judgements of procedural justice were more significant than judgements about the perceived threat of terrorism, and willingness to cooperate was neither influenced by ideological or religious beliefs (i.e. attitudes on foreign policy issues such the use of military force in Afghanistan or invasion of Iraq, or religious commitment). Importantly Tyler and colleagues found that procedural justice had a direct relationship with Muslims’ willingness to assist in counter-terrorism efforts (Huq et al., 2011b).

Law legitimacy, cooperation and counter-terrorism

While research has demonstrated the effectiveness of procedural justice to policing practice, procedural justice research to date has largely neglected the role that ‘law legitimacy’ plays in determining attitudes and behaviours towards the police (Jackson et al., 2012; Murphy and Cherney, 2012; Murphy et al., 2009). Research has examined how people view the legitimacy of police, but not how they also view the legitimacy of laws that police enforce. Given the law is the medium through which the police act, understanding how perceptions about the law effects public attitudes and behaviours toward police is relevant to understanding why people may choose to cooperate with police. Scholars have consistently argued that the law is the medium through which a shared sense of community purpose is created, and any resistance to those laws can create a crisis of legitimacy for state institutions (Dixon, 1997; Sarat, 1993).

The few studies that do exist show that law legitimacy can moderate the impact of procedural justice on cooperation with police (see Jackson et al., 2012; Murphy and Cherney, 2012; Murphy et al., 2009). Huq et al.’s (2011a, 2011b) and Tyler et al.’s (2010) research on public cooperation in counter-terrorism policing among US and UK Muslims did not take into account the role of law legitimacy, which potentially overlooks a particularly relevant factor impacting on support for counter-terrorism. Key pieces of legislation have expanded the power of the police to detain terrorist suspects without trial, impose control orders, outlaw groups deemed a security threat and intercept and collect people’s personal information (e.g. the UK Terrorism Act 2000; UK Counter-Terrorism Act 2008; the Australian Anti-Terrorism Act 2005; see Lynch and Williams, 2006). Scholars have argued that counter-terrorism laws have fundamentally changed public conceptions of civil liberties, given they require people to accept the expansion of police powers and potential intrusions in the name of pre-empting terrorism (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2012). Hence, it is not surprising that the legitimacy of counter-terrorism laws have been called into question (see Hocking, 2004; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2012).

In the UK and Australia the scope of counter-terrorism laws has proven particularly controversial among some minority groups who identify as predominantly Muslim, such as Lebanese in Australia or Pakistani in the United Kingdom. In their eyes, terrorism laws can create a sense of injustice because they can be judged as arbitrarily expanding the power of authorities to conduct surveillance of ‘suspect’ communities (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2012; Pickering et al., 2008; Poynting et al., 2004; Spalek, 2011). Hence, for some minority groups the issue of law legitimacy can be particularly salient. This can be compounded by the fact that immigrants who are recent arrivals in Western countries often come from nations with very different legal traditions and customs. Individuals who come from cultures where the laws and police operate quite differently can have experiences or traditions that impact on their assessment of laws in the country in which they have settled. This can transcend generations, with some locally born Arabic-speaking groups in Australia, the US and Europe often experiencing conflict between the perceived legitimacy and dictates of Western secular law and Sharia, the law of their Islamic faith (Kabir, 2005; Leiken, 2012).

Identity, cooperation and counter-terrorism

In addition to the relevance of procedural justice and ‘law legitimacy’ to predicting the willingness of groups to cooperate with police, research has highlighted that a sense of identification with the state or social group can have a bearing on procedural justice effects (Huo, 2003); with procedural justice being less effective for those who identify less strongly with a dominant social group and the authorities who represent them. The central argument is that the more individuals place emphasis on identification with their own sub-group and its customs and values, the less likely they are to identify with key social institutions in mainstream society and to see them as operating in their interest (Huo, 2003; Lind and Tyler, 1988). This can be particularly pronounced for minority groups whose ethnic or religious status can lead them to identify less strongly with the dominant culture in which they reside. Huq et al. (2011b) found that Muslims who had high levels of identification with British society were more likely to see the police as legitimate and hence cooperate with them in counter-terrorism.

The issues of identity and social connectedness have been raised in debates about the causes of terrorism and radicalisation (e.g. see Awan, 2008; Coolsaet, 2011; Sirseloudi, 2011). Our aim is not to enter these debates here, but rather to highlight that ethnic minority group identification potentially has a bearing on one’s sense of obligation to institutional authorities, which can impact on a willingness of groups to cooperate with the police in specific contexts. In the present study we also aim to test whether identity has a bearing on one’s willingness to cooperate with the police in efforts to combat terrorism.

Ethnic sample and methodology

In this study we report results from a survey of Arabic-speaking people living in Australia. Arabic-speaking groups in Australia, particularly those from Lebanese and Sudanese backgrounds, have experienced increased vilification and police attention as a result of terrorism and voice a lack of trust in the police (Hebbani and McNamara, 2010; Poynting and Nobel, 2004; Poynting et al., 2004). Since September 11th 2001 Arabic-speaking communities in Australia have also reported increasing levels of concern about the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on their sense of belonging and acceptance by mainstream Australian culture. This has been heightened by both media and political commentary relating to their ethnic and religious identity and its association with militant Islam or Middle Eastern terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah (Aly, 2007; Hebbani and McNamara, 2010; Kabir, 2005; Poynting and Nobel, 2004; Poynting et al., 2004). Hence, Arabic speaking groups provide an ideal sample by which to test the relationship between procedural justice and support for counter-terrorism efforts.

The data reported here was part of a broader project examining police and ethnic group cooperation. The project sampled people from three different ethnic minority groups living in Brisbane and Melbourne, Australia. The groups were Vietnamese-, Indian- and Arabic-speaking groups. The quota for the study was 900 participants, with 300 respondents drawn from each ethnic group across Brisbane and Melbourne (for more detail see Murphy et al., 2012).

A survey administration company specializing in the sampling of culturally and linguistically diverse populations administered the survey. They utilised an ethnic surname-based approach to generate the sample. This involved generating a list of the most common surnames found within each ethnic group. For the Arabic-speaking community 99 of the most common surnames were used (e.g. Abbas, Al Hassen, Ahmad, Bahar, Habib, Hassain, Mohammad, Omar, Sharif). The Electronic White Pages telephone directory was then used to randomly select participants with these surnames (N = 1800). This method has been used in other large-scale surveys to sample hard to reach groups (e.g. the International Crime Victimisation Survey, see Challice and Johnson, 2005) and has been shown to generate representative samples (Himmelfarb et al., 1983). However, it does have its limitations. For example, it excludes households that have unlisted phone numbers, or females from a targeted ethnic group who may have married outside of that ethnic group and have subsequently changed their surname. It can also under-represent recent immigrants (Himmelfarb et al., 1983).

Participants were contacted at random from the final list of 1800 names to produce a quota of 300 respondents in total. Only fixed land-line numbers were used to contact potential participants and five attempts were made before use of the phone number was discontinued. For the Arabic-speaking group in Brisbane, 534 households were contacted and 151 interviews conducted in total (response rate 28%). In Melbourne, 506 households were contacted, with 151 interviews completed (response rate 29%). Data from these 302 respondents are drawn upon here.

The survey itself was administered in the participant’s own language, at the participant’s home or at a place of their choosing. Participants were 18 years or older and interviews were conducted between September and December 2010. The interviews were conducted face-to-face with pen and paper and were approximately 50–65 minutes in duration. Remuneration in the amount of a $50 gift voucher was offered to all participants who completed an interview.

Questionnaire and scale construction

For the purposes of the present study, only survey questions relevant to procedural justice, police legitimacy, law legitimacy, distributive justice, willingness to cooperate with police in crime control, willingness to cooperate with police in counter terrorism, ethnic group identity, and Australian identity were analysed. The Appendix presents a list of the items used to measure these concepts.

Procedural justice

Procedural justice was operationalised here via Tyler’s (2006) four concepts of voice, fairness, respect and neutrality. The six items used to construct the procedural justice scale were measured using a five-point Likert scale (e.g. ‘Police treat people fairly’: 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree), with a higher score indicating greater perceptions of procedural justice (M = 3.61, SD = 0.81, Cronbach alpha = 0.89).

Perceptions of police legitimacy

Police legitimacy has usually been measured through people’s trust and confidence in police and their beliefs that authorities should be obeyed (Tyler, 2011). The five questions used to assess participants’ perceptions of police legitimacy in this study assessed feelings of trust and confidence in the police (e.g. ‘I have confidence in the police in my community’; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree); a higher score on this scale reflects higher levels of perceived legitimacy (M = 4.03, SD = 0.69, Cronbach alpha = 0.85).

Perceived legitimacy of the law

Our law legitimacy scale was based on three items adopted from Murphy et al. (2009). It assessed citizens’ overall sense of obligation to the law and whether they thought the law reflected community values (e.g. ‘The law is usually consistent with the values of the people in my community about what is right and wrong’: 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree); higher scores reflect those who see laws as more legitimate (M = 3.88, SD = 0.73, Cronbach alpha = 0.60).

Distributive justice

We also include two items related to distributive justice. Distributive justice is typically categorised as an instrumental dimension of policing with its focus on police performance, and refers to judgements about the distribution of police services across communities (Murphy et al., 2008). It was included to ascertain whether poor or favourable judgements about the distribution of police services across groups influenced willingness to cooperate with the police. It included two items (e.g. ‘Police sometimes give people from specific racial/ethnic backgrounds less help than they give others’: 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree; reversed scored) (M = 3.03, SD = 1.00, Cronbach alpha = 0.61).

Cooperation with the police in general crime control

The general cooperation scale was taken from Murphy et al. (2008) and included four items designed to measure respondents’ willingness to help the police (e.g. ‘If the situation arose how likely would you be to help police to find someone suspected of committing a crime by providing them with information’; 1 = very unlikely to 5 = very likely). Those scoring higher on this scale were more likely to indicate they would voluntarily cooperate with police in typical crime control activities (M = 4.27, SD = 0.71, Cronbach alpha = 0.81).

Counter-terrorism cooperation

Cooperation in activities related to counter-terrorism included three items adopted from the work of Tyler et al. (2010). We asked respondents about the likelihood that they would engage in cooperative actions with the police to tackle terrorism (e.g. ‘How likely would you be to go to police if you saw terrorist-related activity going on in your community’: 1 = very unlikely to 5 = very likely). Those scoring higher on this scale were more likely to indicate they would assist police in anti-terror activities (M = 4.17, SD = 0.85, Cronbach alpha = 0.82).

Ethnic group identity and Australian identity

Two identity scales were constructed which were based on work undertaken in the social psychology field (Haslam, 2004). Questions relating to the degree to which respondents identified with Australian society or their own racial/ethnic group were assessed. The ‘Australian identity’ scale assesses identity at the super-ordinate level of society. Those scoring high on this four-item scale place a high priority on identifying as Australian (e.g. ‘I see myself first and mainly as a member of the Australian community’) (M = 4.27, SD = 0.66, Cronbach alpha = 0.81). An additional scale assessed the level of identification respondents made with their respective ethnic/racial subgroup, and the importance they placed on being seen as member of that group – we have termed this the ‘ethnic identity’ scale (e.g. ‘Within Australia, I see myself first and mainly as a member of my racial/ethnic group?’) (M = 3.65, SD = 0.91, Cronbach alpha = 0.78). Higher scores on this scale indicate that respondents identify strongly with their own ethnic group.

Control variables

A number of variables were utilised in the analysis to control for individual differences. These included the age of the respondent (M = 38.94; SD = 13.06), their education level (1 = post-graduate degree to 9 = no schooling; M = 3.13; SD = 1.49), and the number of years since they had migrated to Australia (M = 12.21; SD = 11.91).

Results

Sample demographics

For our Arabic-speaking respondents 54 per cent were male and 46 per cent female. Sixty-five per cent of the sample were married, 30 per cent were in full-time employment, while 21 per cent identified as being a student and 17 per cent were in part-time work. The remaining identified as being engaged in home duties, retired, on a pension, sick or disabled or a sole parent. Thirty-eight per cent had a university degree or post-graduate qualification, while 19 per cent had a trade or technical certificate or diploma and 11 per cent had only completed high school. Twenty-five per cent earned an income of less than AUD$20,000, while 20 per cent earned an income of $20,000–39,000, 11 per cent earned an income of $40,000–59,000, while 5 per cent earned an income between $60,000 and $79,000, with the rest of the sample earning an income above $80,000. Finally, 57 per cent of the sample identified as Muslim/Islamic, 18 per cent as Christian, 3 per cent Catholic and the remaining identified as Orthodox, Druse or Atheists.

Factor analysis

A principal components factor analysis using oblique rotation was conducted to test for the dimensionality of the items used in this study. The scree plots and eigenvalues (7.40, 3.51, 2.58, 1.83, 1.63, 1.38, 1.22, 0.86, 0.83) for this analysis suggested that seven factors should be extracted, with inspection of the pattern matrix (see Table 1) supporting the scales that are described in the measures section. There was no cross-loading of items across different factors, although it should be noted that the general crime cooperation items and the counter-terrorism cooperation items did load onto the same factor. This has occurred given the items were used to assess the public’s willingness to cooperate with police. Given that the two cooperation scales were to be utilised in the analyses as dependent variables, we retained the items as two separate scales: general crime cooperation and counter-terrorism cooperation.

Table 1.

Principal components analysis, using oblique rotation differentiating items to construct the variables of interest.

Item	Factor
Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Police legitimacy
I trust police	.79
I have confidence in police	.78
Police do a good job	.69
Police are accessible	.55
Respect for police is important	.42
Procedural justice
Police treat people with dignity	−.80
Police are polite	−.78
Police listen to people	−.77
Police respect people’s rights	−.73
Police make decisions on facts	−.71
Police treat people fairly	−.67
Ethnic identity
I see myself first as ethnic group	.91
Important to be seen as ethnic	.88
Proud to be ethnic	.69
Australian identity
Proud to be Australian	−.82
I see myself mainly as Australian	−.77
Australia is important to me	−.75
Important to be seen as Australian	−.71
Law legitimacy
My feelings about right agree with law	.84
Law consistent with comm. values	.75
People should do what law says	.54
Distributive justice
Police provide less help to minorities	−.85
Police provide better service to rich	−.83
Cooperation with police
Educate people about danger of terror	.80
Go to police if saw terror activity	.80
Work with police to fight terror	.79
Assist police if asked	.78
Report dangerous activities	.70
Help police find offenders	.67
Call police to report crime	.50
Eigenvalues	7.40	3.51	2.58	1.83	1.63	1.38	1.22
Explained variance (%)	25	12	9	6	5	5	4

Note: Only loadings >0.35 are displayed. Due to space constraints in Table 1, full wording of items can be found in the Appendix.

Descriptive statistics

Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations for the measures used in this study. Table 2 shows that, on average, respondents reported being willing to report crime and terrorism-related activities to police. The high mean score on the police legitimacy scale also indicates that respondents generally viewed police as legitimate. The mean score of the law legitimacy scale suggests that respondents are more likely to question the legitimacy of the laws they are being asked to obey. The high mean score of the Australian identity scale suggests that respondents on average identified strongly with Australia, while the scores on the procedural and distributive justice scales indicate that police could do better in these areas.

Table 2.

Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations for all measures.

Measure	No. of items	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Procedural justice	6	3.61 (.81)	–
2. Police legitimacy	5	4.03 (.69)	.59***	–
3. Law legitimacy	3	3.88 (.73)	.17**	.33***	–
4. Distributive justice	2	3.03 (1.00)	−.19***	−.13*	.05	–
5. Crime coop.	4	4.27 (.71)	.19***	.40***	.29***	.05	–
6. Terrorism coop.	3	4.17 (.85)	.23***	.37***	.31***	−.08	.63***	–
7. Ethnic identity	3	3.65 (.91)	.20***	.11	.05	.13*	.06	.04	–
8. Australian identity	4	4.27 (.66)	.27***	.37***	.33***	.03	.32***	.43***	.23***	–
9. Age	1	38.94 (13.06)	.04	.06	.09	.11	.16**	.11	.07	.21***	–
10. Education	1	3.13 (1.49)	.15**	.17*	.15*	−.16**	−.02	.03	.10	.07	.00	–
11. Migrate	1	12.21 (11.91)	−.18**	−.07	.09	.22***	.06	.01	.01	.13*	.54***	−.09	–

Note: All scales measured on a 1 to 5 scale. Higher scores on scales indicate more positive evaluations/greater willingness to cooperate. * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < .001.

Table 2 also details the bivariate relationships between the measures. Procedural justice was positively related to views about police legitimacy, law legitimacy and willingness to report crime and cooperate with police in anti-terrorist activity. Interestingly, ethnic identity was not related to people’s willingness to cooperate with police in either general crime control or counter-terrorism, while Australian identity was. That is, those identifying more strongly with Australia were more likely to indicate a willingness to report both general crime and terror-related issues to police. Interestingly, Australian identity mattered more when it came to a willingness to report terrorism-related issues compared to willingness to report general crime. Furthermore, police legitimacy appeared to matter more for cooperating with police in general crime control than for counter-terrorism, while law legitimacy mattered more for people’s willingness to report terrorism related issues.

Regression analyses

One aim of this study was to ascertain whether the factors responsible for predicting people’s willingness to engage with police in counter-terrorism would be similar or different to the factors that have been shown to explain people’s willingness to cooperate with police in general crime control activities.

In order to address this aim two separate regression analyses were conducted. As can be seen in Table 3, the first regression analysis entered control variables at Step 1, procedural justice and distributive justice at Step 2, law legitimacy at Step 3, police legitimacy at Step 4, and Australian and ethnic identity at Step 5 of the analysis as predictors of willingness to cooperate with police in general crime control. The second analysis used these same factors as predictors of willingness to engage with police in counter-terrorism (see Table 4).

Table 3.

Predictors of cooperation with police in general crime control.

Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5
Predictor	β	β	β	β	β
Age	.18*	.14	.12	.12	.11
Migration	−.04	.00	−.02	−.03	−.04
Education	−.01	−.02	−.05	−.08	−.09
Procedural justice	.24***	.21**	−.05	−.06
Distributive justice	.07	.06	.08	.07
Law legitimacy	.24***	.12	.11
Police legitimacy	.45***	.40***
Ethnic identity	.01
Australian identity	.12
R²	.03	.08	.13	.24	.25
R² change	.03	.06	.05	.11	.01
F change	1.87	6.61**	12.83***	30.56***	1.54
df	3, 218	2, 216	1, 215	1, 214	2, 212

p < 0.05; **p < 0.001; ***p < 0.001.

Table 4.

Predictors of cooperation with police in counter-terrorism activities.

Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5
Predictor	β	β	β	β	β
Age	.07	.05	.03	.03	−.01
Migration	−.02	.04	.01	−.00	−.03
Education	.04	.02	−.02	−.06	−.05
Procedural justice	.19**	.14*	−.09	−.09
Distributive justice	−.04	−.05	−.04	−.06
Law legitimacy	.30***	.20**	.15*
Police legitimacy	.40***	.26**
Ethnic identity	−.05
Australian identity	.36***
R²	.01	.04	.13	.21	.31
R² change	.01	.04	.08	.09	.09
F change	.40	4.29*	20.38***	23.42***	14.10***
df	3, 217	2, 215	1, 214	1, 213	2, 211

p < 0.05; **p < 0.001; ***p < 0.001.

Table 3 shows that the control variables added very little for predicting willingness to cooperate with police in general crime control. It can be seen at Step 3 that those who viewed police as being more procedurally fair and perceived the law to be more legitimate were more likely to indicate that they would cooperate with police. However, when perceptions of police legitimacy were considered at Step 4, procedural justice and law legitimacy discontinued having a significant relationship with cooperation. Instead, it was police legitimacy that remained the sole predictor of willingness to cooperate with police. Sobel tests confirmed these mediation effects (z = 4.91, p < 0.001 and z = 3.61, p < 0.001, respectively). Finally, identity did not appear to play a role in predicting people’s willingness to cooperate with police in general crime control. Rather, police legitimacy continued to be the sole predictor of willingness to collaborate with police. In other words, Arabic-speaking people in Australia are more willing to collaborate with police in general crime control if they see police as legitimate.

Table 4 demonstrates the factors that are predictive of people’s willingness to collaborate with police in counter-terrorism activities. It can be seen that different factors explain willingness to cooperate in counter-terrorism, when compared to the factors predicting willingness to cooperate in general crime control. Similar to cooperation in general crime, it can be seen that both procedural justice and law legitimacy also predicted willingness to collaborate with police in counter-terrorism (see Step 3). However, at Step 4 perceptions of police legitimacy mediated the effect of procedural justice on cooperation in counter-terrorism (a Sobel test confirmed this mediation effect, z = 4.41, p < 0.001). Perceptions about the legitimacy of the law continued to predict cooperation in counter-terrorism.

In the final step of the analysis, it was found that identity factors played a very important role in predicting Arabic-speaking people’s willingness to cooperate with police in counter-terrorism. People’s perceptions of police legitimacy and law legitimacy continued to be important predictors, but Australian identity became the main predictor of people’s willingness to engage with police in counter-terrorism. Specifically, compared to cooperation in general crime control, those who identified more strongly with being Australian were much more likely to cooperate with police in counter-terrorism.

Discussion and conclusion

The aim of our study was to examine whether procedural justice would have a similar effect for promoting ethnic minority group cooperation in counter-terrorism policing, as it has for promoting cooperation with police in general crime control. Also of interest was how perceptions of police legitimacy, law legitimacy and identity influenced these effects. The results showed that for our Arabic-speaking group, willingness to cooperate with the police in typical crime control activities was predicted predominantly by judgements of police legitimacy. This reflects a standard finding from procedural justice research (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). Identity factors had no affect on willingness to cooperate. Interestingly, perceptions of law legitimacy played little role in predicting collaboration in crime control when people’s perceptions of police legitimacy were taken into account. When it came to cooperation in counter-terrorism policing, different results emerged. Police legitimacy again mediated the effect of procedural justice on cooperation in counter-terrorism, but perceptions about the legitimacy of the law continued to be one of the most important predictors of counter-terrorism cooperation. Also, group identity was extremely important, with respondents identifying strongly with Australia being more likely to work with police to tackle terrorism.

Taken together, these findings are important because they suggest that the key way in which authorities can engage Arabic-speaking people in counter-terrorism efforts is to ensure that : (1) the police act in ways that build their legitimacy; (2) social connection is fostered with Western society so that minority groups come to identify strongly with the ideals and values of the country in which they reside; and (3) counter-terrorism laws and policies are developed that are seen to be legitimate by the groups that are targeted by them. These strategies are quite different to those that are needed to promote cooperation with police in general crime control. The key to fostering cooperation in general crime control among Arabic-speaking groups is to improve perceptions of police legitimacy. We know from past research, and from the results presented in Table 2, that this can be achieved simply through treating citizens with procedural justice.

There are limitations with the current study. It would be important to know whether this study’s findings translate to other groups such as those of Pakistani and Indonesian origin, who have also been targeted by counter-terrorism policing due to their Islamic faith and its association with Islamic-inspired terrorist acts, for example the Bali bombings or the 7/7 London attacks. We did not compare outcomes across the two cities from which the Arabic speaking sample was drawn. It may be the case that attitudes towards the police and laws they enforce, and also a sense of identity with the dominant culture, vary across Brisbane and Melbourne. Such variations may reflect relative successes of government and community integration and assimilating strategies, including efforts by police in different jurisdictions to engage minority groups in cooperative crime control efforts.

Second, the survey only tapped a limited number of activities that people can potentially engage in to help police tackle terrorist threats. It was limited to three measures of counter-terrorism cooperation. Activities not assessed can also include providing information to the police about suspected terrorist-related activities, educating people about the dangers of terrorism and religious extremism, publicly repudiating terrorism, and alerting the police about the commission of terrorist acts. For some groups a willingness to cooperate with the police in the counter-terrorism context may vary according to the nature of the cooperative activity. It is possible that procedural justice may be more or less important in encouraging cooperation in counter-terrorism depending on the type of cooperative action that is desired or being encouraged, and the levels of perceived risks it presents to the individual. Future research should consider this issue, because understanding the circumstances under which groups are willing to assist the police is relevant to the design of counter-terrorism policies. It can help identify areas where greater levels of engagement and assistance may be necessary.

Another potential limitation is our measure of ‘law legitimacy’. This was based on a global measure, underpinned by normative judgements relating to a sense of obligation to follow the law and whether the law reflects community values. While a statistically reliable measure, it does not capture more specific attitudes to counter-terrorism laws operating in a respondent’s country. Hence, it might be useful for future studies to make a distinction between global and specific measures of law legitimacy.¹ Global measures relate to broad views about the law (i.e. what we have defined as feelings of obligation to obey the law or laws reflect community values), while specific measures relate to the legitimacy of particular laws (e.g. judgements about the fairness and scope of laws that allow police to detain terror suspects without trial, conduct surveillance of citizens, tap telephone conversations and outlaw groups deemed a terrorist threat). It may be the case that some communities report an obligation to obey the law, but reject specific laws related to counter-terrorism.

Our results while tentative do show there are potentially different factors that influence willingness to cooperate in counter-terrorism, compared to common crime control activities. It may be the case that for some minority groups, the factors influencing the perceived legitimacy of the police and the legal system are very different compared to majority groups (Brunson and Miller, 2006; Cherney and Murphy, 2011; Lambert, 2011; Murphy and Cherney, 2012; Weitzer, 2006). Law legitimacy may have greater salience for Arabic-speaking communities who have been portrayed and targeted, often unwittingly, as a potential threat due to the war on terror, with laws evoked in response. When coupled with political and media rhetoric relating to ‘ethnic crime waves’ and episodes of police racism (Poynting et al., 2004), lower confidence and trust in the police and the law will be inevitable. In such contexts identification with one’s ethnic/cultural group can be more salient for Arabic-speaking communities, who see it as important to maintain their traditions and faith in response to constant attacks that question their commitment to Australian values or legal rules. In such circumstances this could reduce their identification with the country in which they reside. One consequence is a withdrawal of consent to defer to legal authorities and hence they withhold cooperation.

The results provide insights into the design and implementation of counter- terrorism policies and laws. They show that police need to adopt a ‘hearts and minds’ policing approach to counter-terrorism (Lambert, 2011). This would emphasise displays of fairness, based on a willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue with relevant groups that sends a clear message they are respected by the police and will be listened to. For Muslims and other ethnic communities, such action can be particularly important, because while they may clearly reject the ideological justifications groups such as Al-Qaeda or its affiliates use to defend their activities, they can still resent and thus resist counter-terrorism policing. This is because counter-terrorism policing can be seen as being based on religious and racial stereotyping, rather than on actual risks that community members present a terrorist threat (Lambert, 2011; Pickering et al., 2008). This though is only part of the response because, as our results show, acting fairly, while important, can potentially have little effect if the laws underpinning police action are judged as illegitimate. Hence, effective counter-terrorism policing is not simply about ensuring the police act in ways that elicit community cooperation, thus improving their ability to pre-empt terrorism, but is also about whether the legal instruments the police use are seen as legitimate.

Footnotes

Funding

This project was supported through an Australian Research Council Discovery grant, DP1093960, ‘Understanding police and ethnic group interactions: Testing an integrated theoretical model’.

Note

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