A Test of Labor Union Social Responsibility

Abstract

Social responsibility is addressed to corporations, but can also be applied to other powerful organizations. This study tests the impact of labor union social responsibility on key measures of labor union attachment. After developing a scale of labor union social responsibility, craft union apprentice workers were surveyed and their responses analyzed with structural equation modeling. Labor union social responsibility was directly and positively related to union commitment and job satisfaction. Union commitment and job satisfaction fully mediated the negative relationship between labor union social responsibility and propensity to withdraw from the union, and the positive relationship between labor union social responsibility and union participation. The results suggest that labor union social responsibility can enhance union attachment and inform union strategy.

Keywords

labor unions social responsibility union member attachment

In the global economy the notion of social responsibility, defined as actions that further some social good beyond self-interest and what is required by law (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), has gained currency among stakeholders (Doh & Guay, 2006; Matten & Crane, 2005) and academics (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Consumers expect social responsibility (Mohr & Webb, 2005; Mohr, Webb, & Harris, 2001), and the public rewards socially responsible companies with enhanced reputation (Fombrun, Gardberg, & Barnett, 2000) and employee recruiting preferences (Turban & Greening, 1997). Social responsibility expectations have been primarily directed toward businesses, but labor unions are also very powerful organizations with broad societal influence. As providers of essential goods and services, unions have profound and widespread impact on consumers (e.g., education, public transportation, health care, first responder services, and trucking), and play a major role in the economic well being of their members, communities, and countries. Hence, there is little reason for unions to escape the imperative to operate in a socially responsible manner.

To date, labor unions have been somewhat conflicted about corporate social responsibility (CSR). Despite historically striving for what many would argue are key tenets of corporate social responsibility—an equitable wage, humane working conditions, due process for workers, and rights for marginalized communities¹—some union leaders fear that social responsibility will undermine their preferred structure of contracts and regulation (Justice, 2003; Preuss, 2008). Others contend that a broad, socially conscious labor movement that is genuinely concerned about social justice is better positioned for the future (FNV Mondiaal, 2004; Wheeler, 2001), and that a more favorable view of unions by members and potential members is a requisite for union revitalization (Freeman & Rogers, 1999). Amid this reticence, U.S. labor unions are beset with the public perception that they selfishly pursue the interests of their members (Panagopoulos & Francia, 2008), and skepticism about their purpose and power (Pew Research Center, 2010). This article espouses the view that social responsibility is itself a valuable end. If, however, there are connections between labor union social responsibility (LUSR) and key measures of union attachment, then identifying the nature of those connections can inform discussion of union revitalization, strategy, and tactics.

There is a paucity of research that explores the nexus of labor unions and social responsibility, but LUSR has potentially important implications for union members and the societies to which they belong. This study focuses on union members’ perceptions of LUSR and the extent to which those perceptions impact union attachment. The first section describes why labor union social responsibility is warranted, its benefactors, and how labor unions can discharge social responsibility. The second section presents hypotheses regarding the extent to which perception of LUSR positively impacts key measures of union attachment such as union commitment, job satisfaction, propensity to participate, and propensity to withdraw. The third section provides an explanation of the methodology of the study, participants and procedure; measures, and the analytic strategy for structural equation modeling and hypothesis testing. After presenting the results of hypothesis tests, the article concludes with discussion of the implications of LUSR for business ethics and labor relations research and practice.

Labor Union Social Responsibility

Dawkins (2010) describes socially responsible labor unions as those that pursue economic equity, workplace democracy, and social justice in ways that are consistent with general expectations of organizational conduct, consider the interests of their stakeholders, and benefit society. A discussion of LUSR can begin with three basic questions: Why is labor union social responsibility warranted, to whom are labor unions responsible, and how can labor unions discharge their responsibility?

Why labor union social responsibility is warranted

Concerning the first question, labor union social responsibility is warranted because the actions of labor unions can, and often do, affect or put at risk the interests of others. Social responsibility implies that powerful organizations occupy a role that extends beyond laws and regulations to encompass a wide range of societal norms, values, and expectations (Carroll, 1991). Support for this supposition is derived from institutional theory, deontological ethics, and social contract theory.

According to institutional theory, organizations whose actions are consistent with the normative values of society are deemed legitimate and receive preference in transacting business (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995). That preference is, however, constrained by responsibility because it might otherwise produce negative externalities (Valasquez, 1996). The iron law of responsibility states that businesses are social institutions that must use their power responsibly, or risk losing that power altogether (Davis & Blomstrom, 1971). Through collective bargaining labor unions play a major role in domestic economic health, function as the sole representative of their members’ workplace interests,² and provide essential goods and services for consumers. It follows that if labor unions operate in a manner that is inconsistent with the goals and values of society they are also likely to lose their societal preferences.

Moral duty has also been an enduring aspect of the labor movement ethos, and is still evident as institutions akin to the Catholic Church and the United Nations endorse labor unions as vehicles for improving working conditions and recognizing human potential (Pope Paul XXIII, 1991; Thomas 2009; United Nations, 2008), but it also implies ethical behavior by labor unions.

Social contract theory, which is derived from the writings of philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, details an implicit moral and ethical agreement between society and an organization whereby society authorizes the organization in return for its contributions to important societal goals. Hasnas (1998) states that the social contract is essentially comprised of social provisions or stipulations that require businesses to benefit: (a) consumers through economic efficiency; (b) workers through employment opportunities and workplace dignity; and (c) society by avoiding practices that degrade a given group or entity (e.g., worker exploitation, environmental ruin). In order to warrant continued authorization, the advantages an organization provides to society must outweigh any disadvantages it poses (Donaldson, 1982). Because they are economic and social organizations authorized by society, the provisions of the social contract apply to labor unions as well. Thus, in addition to the imperative of responsible operation to maintain legitimacy, and the ethical duty to advance workplace protections and human potential, LUSR is warranted because it is the means through which labor unions discharge their social contract obligation to provide economic, workplace, and social benefits to society.

To whom are labor unions responsible

With regard to the second question, labor unions are responsible to stakeholders. Freeman (1984, p. 46) defined a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.” The essence of stakeholder theory is that managers should create and sustain moral relationships, and make good on the affirmative obligation to fairly distribute the harms and benefits of their organization’s activities (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1994).³ According to Evan and Freeman (1993) the obligation to stakeholders is derived from Kant’s principle of respect for persons, which holds that persons are entitled to be treated not merely as a means to the achievement of the ends of others, but as valuable ends in themselves. Thus, organizations are morally obligated to address the interests of their stakeholders and direct resources and activities to their benefit.

According to Dawkins (2010), labor union stakeholders can be placed in economic, workplace, and social categories, which correspond to the stipulations of the social contract. Economic stakeholders include (a) union members who need competitive wages and benefits, (b) consumers that desire consistent delivery of products and services, and (c) management and shareholders who call for economic efficiency. Workplace stakeholders include (a) union members who desire equitable treatment, (b) nonunion workers who constitute an opportunity for union growth and derive a collateral benefit from labor union initiatives, and (c) managers who desire a stable, orderly workplace. Finally, social stakeholders include (a) disenfranchised persons (domestic and international) who desire freedom of association, freedom from forced and child labor and employment discrimination, and nonexploitative wage levels, (b) workers who desire an adequate social safety net and safe work conditions, and (c) environmental entities that lack dedicated representation.

The respect for persons underpinnings of stakeholder theory help leaders to broaden their view of the organization’s responsibilities to include interests of less prevalent groups and entities, but provides no clear direction for reconciling the competing interests of stakeholders. While assessing the relative standing of stakeholder interests remains a considerable challenge for organizational leaders, the LUSR model provides a means with which to systematically examine those interests and determine a suitable response.

Components of Discharging Labor Union Social Responsibility

Thus far, it has been argued that labor unions have institutional, ethical, and social contract obligations to return benefits to the societies within which they operate, and stakeholder theory has been employed to specify those to whom labor unions are responsible. As McWilliams and Siegel (2001) have noted, social responsibility does not necessarily require a radical departure from organizational activities, but rather an extension of those activities beyond narrow self-interest. It follows that a socially responsible labor union will discharge its obligations to society by, not only addressing its members, but also the economic, workplace, and social interests of their other stakeholders.

The economic component addresses the traditional “business unionism” (Dubofsky & Dulles, 1993; Hattum, 1993) role of bargaining for better wages, benefits, and job security. As the exclusive bargaining agent and steward of union dues, a labor union’s primary responsibility is to assure that its members receive an equitable share of the economic rewards they help to produce. All other labor union roles are premised on this fundamental duty. Consequently, it is to be expected that the majority of labor union activities will be directed toward economic equity. The pursuit of economic equity is, however, bounded by the financial constraints of corporations and the needs of consumers for consistent delivery of important goods and services.

The workplace component entails providing union members with a means of workplace democracy by which to influence the tenor of their work lives. However, just as corporations cannot focus solely on shareholders, the focus of socially responsible labor unions extends beyond the interests of union members. Workplace democracy also includes the interests of supervisors, the management and union hierarchies that jointly administer the collective bargaining agreement, and all workers. Suitable activities include addressing management needs for flexible scheduling and problem-solving contributions from workers, prohibitions of child and sweatshop labor, and broad advocacy for a workplace that is both humane and efficient.

The social component pursues the objective of social justice, particularly for the community of workers and marginalized sectors of society to whom labor unions have historically appealed (Cornfield, 1991). Social justice pertains to the distribution of benefits and burdens in the economic, political, and environmental systems and entails involvement in the political process to influence outcomes in those areas. Lastly, the social component involves advocacy on issues of broad concern such as the impact of globalization on human and worker rights around the world. Injustices in the broader social environment make it less likely that workers and less powerful stakeholders will achieve economic equity and workplace democracy. The economic, workplace, and social components are not mutually exclusive or cumulative. That is, activities in each area constitute only part of LUSR and can be pursued simultaneously. Labor unions in varying degrees have pursued objectives in each of these areas, and continue to do so. This LUSR model serves to facilitate analysis of labor union activities and call attention to all aspects of social responsibility.

Labor Union Social Responsibility and Union Member Attachment

In addition to LUSR’s normative value, the extent to which perception of LUSR positively impacts key measures of union attachment such as union commitment, job satisfaction, propensity to participate, and propensity to withdraw, make LUSR a potentially useful construct. Gordon, Philpot, Burt, Thompson, and Spiller (1980) describe union commitment as containing four major constructs; an attitude of loyalty to the union, a feeling of responsibility to the union, a willingness to exert strong effort on behalf of the union, and a belief in the goals of unionism. Labor union social responsibility has the potential to impact union commitment because, although it is related to the societal impact of union activity, it is likely to parallel pro-union attitudes. There is evidence that pro-union attitudes and ideology are foundations for the development and maintenance of union commitment (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl, 2001; Gordon et al., 1980). Consequently, Tetrick and Barling (1995) and Newton and Shore (1992) have argued that unions must make a greater investment in developing prounion attitudes as a source of union commitment.

Labor union social responsibility also has the potential to influence commitment through perceived external prestige, what relevant others think about an organization (also called construed external image and organizational prestige; see Smidts, Pruyn, & Van Reil, 2001). Organizational commitment was influenced by perceived external prestige (Carmeli, 2005), and socially responsible companies are more attractive to potential workers and tend to have more committed workers (Brammer, Millington, & Rayton, 2007; Turban & Greening, 1997). There is also evidence that persons like to be associated with socially responsible voluntary organizations (Boezeman & Ellemers, 2007). In the same way, union members’ perceptions of unions improve when unions are diverse (Bacharach & Bamberger, 2004), or engage in altruistic activities (Fiorito, 1992), and positive perception of unions precede other measures of union attachment such as union participation (Gordon, Barling, & Tetrick, 1995).

Hypothesis 1: Labor union social responsibility is positively related to union commitment.

Labor union social responsibility can enhance job satisfaction by improving external aspects of job satisfaction and the labor relations climate in the workplace. Job satisfaction is an evaluative judgment workers make about their job and is derived from the extrinsic rewards, or the intrinsic tasks and responsibilities of the job itself (Weiss, 2002). Union members view the internal aspects of job satisfaction such as task complexity, degree of autonomy, and opportunities for promotion less favorably than do nonunion workers (Freeman & Medoff, 1984), and it is difficult for labor unions to influence these factors. Labor unions can; however, favorably impact extrinsic factors of job satisfaction such as pay, and work rules and procedures (Bryson, Cappellari, & Lucifora, 2003; Farber & Western, 2002; Renaud, 2002) and socially responsible unions will attempt to do so. Socially responsible labor unions also have the capacity to improve the labor relations climate. A poor labor relations climate reduces job satisfaction (Artz, 2010), and thus it is reasonable to infer that a good labor relations climate will increase job satisfaction.

Hypothesis 2: Labor union social responsibility is positively related to job satisfaction.

According to Barling, Fullagar, Kelloway, & McElvie (1992) there are a number of variables that predict union commitment, but job satisfaction is among the most prevalent. How job satisfaction affects union commitment is not entirely clear. One view proposed by Newton and Shore (1992) and Iverson and Kuruvilla (1995) is that the impact of job satisfaction on organizational commitment is mediated by other attitudes. Barling et al. (1992) have argued that job satisfaction has a direct and independent effect on union commitment. Finally, Bamberger, Kluger, and Suchard (1999) conducted a meta-analytic study of job satisfaction and union commitment research and found that models proposing direct and mediated effects of union commitment on job satisfaction fit better than models positing direct or mediated effects alone. One conclusion that can be drawn from this group of studies is that job satisfaction regularly mediates the relationship between attitudinal variables and union commitment.

Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between labor union social responsibility and union commitment is mediated by job satisfaction.

Union participation is a behavioral expression of union commitment (Parks, Gallagher, & Fullagar, 1995) involving activities such as attendance at union meetings, talking up the union, volunteering time and effort to benefit the union, and voting in union-sponsored elections (Shore & Newton, 1995). Organizational withdrawal entails the intent to reduce job inputs and work-role inclusion (Hanisch, Hulin, & Roznowski, 1998), but is demonstrated in the union context by diminished involvement in voting, recruiting, and other activities, or disassociating with the union altogether.⁴ Participation in local union activities has been a consistent and positive consequence of union commitment (Bamberger et al., 1999; Tan & Aryee, 2002). Moreover, Fullagar, Clark, Gallagher, & Carroll (2004) have demonstrated that the impact of union commitment on union participation persists over time. Snape and Chan (2000) add that commitment precedes participation in union activities because commitment provides the motivation to participate. Besides being the inverse of participation, union withdrawal is likely to have a negative association with union commitment because there is no motivation to participate.

Hypothesis 4a: Union commitment is positively related to union participation.

Hypothesis 4b: Union commitment is negatively related to propensity for union withdrawal.

As noted by Hammer, Bayazit, and Wazeter (2009), meta-analytic studies of union commitment and participation show that job satisfaction has direct or indirect influence that, in turn, contributes to union participation. Withdrawal indicators such as intent to quit are often explained as consequences of two mediating variables, organizational commitment and job satisfaction, both of which are proposed to have a negative effect on turnover cognitions (Price, 2001; Somers, 1995). Because job satisfaction coincides with favorable activity such as organizational citizenship behaviors and is negatively associated with intentions to quit, it is likely to mediate the relationship between LUSR and union participation and propensity to withdraw from the union. Commitment is also likely to mediate the relationship between LUSR and union participation and propensity to withdraw from the union because it mediates the impact of attitudes on withdrawal intentions and cooperative intent (Boezeman & Ellemers, 2007).

Hypothesis 5a: Job satisfaction and union commitment will mediate the positive relationship between labor union social responsibility and union participation.

Hypothesis 5b: Job satisfaction and union commitment will mediate the negative relationship between labor union social responsibility and propensity to withdraw from the union.

Method

This section explains the methodology of the study: Participants and procedure; measures; and the analytic strategy for structural equation modeling.

Participants and Procedure

The respondents in this study were union carpentry apprentices enrolled in an apprenticeship-training program jointly sponsored by a craft union and an association of building contractors under terms of their collective bargaining agreement. Apprenticeship programs are designed to equip full-time workers (apprentices) with skills in all aspects of a particular craft through supervised on-the-job training and related in-class theoretical instruction delivered by certified union trainers (Bilginsoy, 2007). Craft unions organize workers on the basis of common skill (e.g., electricians, plumbers), whereas industrial unions tend to organize based on industry (e.g., steel, auto). The apprentices are craft union apprentices, and will generally complete journey-level certification (one who has fully learned the trade) in 3 to 5 years.

With the help of union instructors who were blind to the purposes of the study, two separate surveys were administered representing the independent and dependent variables respectively to craft union apprentices in the southwestern United States. Participation was voluntary and confidentiality was promised, but not anonymity, because the two-stage data collection required respondents to identify themselves such that their surveys could be linked together at the individual level. The first survey instrument was administered containing the independent variables (Time 1) prior to the start of quarterly classroom training and the second survey containing the mediating, and dependent variables was administered three days later (Time 2).⁵ At Time 1, 325 respondents completed the survey, and approximately 96% of Time 1 respondents also completed surveys at Time 2 (312 of 325). The respondents were all men with a mean age of 26 years and mean union tenure of approximately two years (standard deviation = 0.11). There are no controls for gender, age, or occupation in the study because of the homogeneity of the group.

Measures

There were five variables: The independent variable LUSR; two mediating variables, job satisfaction and union commitment; and two dependent variables, union participation and propensity for union withdrawal. All of the items for the variables were scored using five-point (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) Likert-type scale items with higher values indicating greater evidence of the underlying construct.⁶ In addition, language experts were employed to perform forward and back translations of the survey such that it could be administered in English and Spanish.⁷ A three-step process was used to develop the LUSR scale. First, items were derived by reviewing research on labor union roles (e.g., Godard, 1997) and posing questions based on those studies to focus groups of union members and nonunion continuing education students. Second, prominent corporate social responsibility scales were reviewed (e.g., KLD Analytics Scale and Boston University Corporate Citizenship Survey) and 12 items were developed by adapting questions from those surveys to labor unions. Third, items were pilot tested with continuing education students not previously involved in the focus groups.

Next factor analysis, a statistical method used to examine how underlying constructs influence the responses on a measured variable, was employed. Confirmatory factor analysis seeks to determine if the number of factors and the loadings (relation of measured item to underlying construct) conform to what is expected on the basis of pre-established theory, model, or rationale. Indicator variables are selected on the basis of prior theory and factor analysis is used to see if they load as predicted on the expected number of factors. The researcher’s a priori assumption was that each factor (the number and labels of which may be specified) was associated with a specified subset of indicator variables. In this case the factors were proposed components of LUSR. Based on factor analysis of the pilot study results, three subscales of LUSR were developed reflecting the economic, workplace, and social components. The subscales included items such as labor unions improve wages and benefits, labor unions help find positive solutions to workplace problems, and labor unions care about consumers (composite reliabilities = 0.78, 0.86, and 0.81 respectively), and were combined to comprise LUSR.⁸

Union commitment was assessed with an index derived from the Sverke and Kuruvilla (1995) scale. The index was comprised of two subscales of four items each for the value-rational and instrumental-rational components of union commitment, and included items such as “I feel that I am an important part of my union” and “my union’s chances of improving my work situation are good.” The mean scores of each subscale were combined to represent union commitment (composite reliability = 0.83 and 0.88 respectively). Job satisfaction was measured with five-items derived from the Fricko and Beeher (1992) scale and included items such as I enjoy coming to work each day and I get a feeling of satisfaction from my work (composite reliability = 0.85). Union participation was measured with four items adapted from the Shore and Newton (1995) scale and included items such as I am more likely than other union members to vote in union elections (composite reliability = 0.89). Lastly, propensity for union withdrawal was measured with two items adapted from the Hom, Griffeth, and Sellaro (1984) intention to quit questionnaire (composite reliability = 0.75), that included items such as if I could get a similar job without a union, I would.

Analytic Strategy

In order to estimate models and test hypotheses, structural equation modeling (SEM) was used with AMOS software (Arbuckle, 2003). Structural equation modeling essentially combines factor analysis and multiple regression techniques to test the validity of a proposed theoretical model and to analyze the structural relationships between independent (i.e., exogenous) and dependent (i.e., endogenous) variables (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) jointly. Structural equation modeling is generally comprised of two steps: validating the measurement model (i.e., confirmatory factor analysis) and fitting the structural model (i.e., multiple regression path analysis). The process is based on a proposed theory or model of relationships, which is tested. Construct indicators are developed for each variable and verified with confirmatory factor analysis. Items can be dropped from the model to improve fit—the extent to which the data conform to the hypothesized constructs—after which the proposed theoretical model can be evaluated against a null or competing model (Garson, 2011).

Like many statistical techniques, SEM has proponents and detractors. Kelloway (1995) identifies the primary criticisms of SEM as the qualitative nature of structural equation models whereby theorists assume that a group of variables are causally related and test propositions about them, the assessment of global fit, the use of specification (adjusting theoretical models to fit data), and its complexity. Conversely, SEM permits the testing of complete models rather than individual variables, permits testing of models with multiple dependent variables, and permits modeling of mediating variables rather than being restricted to an additive model such as in ordinary least squares regression. Moreover, whereas regression is highly susceptible to errors of interpretation by misspecification, the SEM strategy of comparing alternative models to assess relative model fit is more robust. The general conclusion is that, appropriately employed, SEM has the potential to substantially advance the understanding of organizational phenomena (Garson, 2011; Kelloway, 1995). As shown by the hypotheses, this article has a theoretical model, several constructs that must be tested jointly, multiple dependent variables, and mediating variables. Given these characteristics, the author judges that SEM is an appropriate analytical tool.

Anderson and Gerbing (1988) recommend a two-stage process to conducting SEM whereby a researcher validates the measurement model with confirmatory factor analysis before completing structural analysis of the model. If the indicator variables load as predicted on the expected factors then the confirmatory factor analyses reveals that the model fits the proposed theoretical model. Goodness of fit tests determine if the model being tested should be accepted or rejected and reflect the outcome of confirmatory factor analysis. These overall fit tests do not, however, establish that particular paths within the model are significant. If the model is accepted, the researcher will then employ structural analyses to interpret the path coefficients in the model (Garson, 2011).

A battery of fit statistics is generally employed in SEM analyses. Initially, the chi-square goodness of fit to degrees of freedom ratio test is employed. The chi-square statistic is used to test the hypothesis that the relationships proposed in the model provide a plausible explanation of the measured data. The chi-square statistic, however, is sensitive to sample size, and is thus often coupled with degrees of freedom to provide a more robust measurement. To further assess the fit of each of the tested models, Schumacker and Lomax (2004) recommend the following additional tests: (a) the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), (b) the comparative fit index (CFI) (c) root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), and (d) standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR). Satisfactory model fit is indicated by ratio of chi-square goodness of fit to degrees of freedom no greater than two (Browne & Cudeck, 1993), TLI and CFI values no smaller than 0.90, and RMSEA and SRMR values no greater than 0.08, and 0.10 respectively (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The values used to assess fit are analogous to significance levels in regression and other statistical techniques. Additionally, Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest assessing model fit using a combination of SRMR, CFI, and TLI, and chi-square difference tests to ensure a robust assessment of the hypothesized measurement and structural models.

For the confirmatory analysis of the measurement model, all of the indicator items were included for each of the independent variables and revisions were based on examination of the modification indices, standardized residuals, and indicator reliabilities provided in the AMOS output.⁹ To guard against multicollinearity, the reliability of the variables was evaluated by calculating composite reliabilities and average variance extracted as recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). Composite reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) draws on the factor loadings generated in the confirmatory factor analysis to produce a measure of internal consistency comparable to coefficient alpha. Average variance extracted indicates the ratio of total variance that is due to the latent variable.

To determine the significance of the hypothesized paths and test mediation, bootstrapping—a nonparametric approach to hypothesis testing that does not assume a mathematical distribution, but still permits empirical estimates of the standard errors—was employed (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Sampling distributions associated with indirect effects (i.e., mediating variables) are often non-normal, which compromises the statistical power of traditional parametric tests. To avoid this difficulty, nonparametric bootstrapping procedures are recommended when examining indirect effects because assumptions of normality regarding the underlying sampling distribution are not required (Bollen & Stine, 1990).

Results

Inadequate variance, nonnormal data, and multicollinearity can present substantial problems with SEM and hence they are addressed here. Preliminarily, the data were screened to locate ill-scaled items, which have variances larger than 10 times the smallest variance, as this can cause problems in SEM (David, Kline, & Yang, 2005) and it was determined that all of the variances were within the acceptable range. Next, given the detrimental impact of nonnormality (kurtosis in particular) on maximum-likelihood estimates and their standard errors and model fit statistics in SEM, the observed indicator variables were screened for out-of-range skewness and kurtosis. Skewness values ranged from −1.40 to 0.98 (Median = 0.69), and kurtosis values ranged from −0.02 to 2.40 (Median = 0.10) falling within suggested ranges of −/+ 3 for skewness and −/+ 10 for kurtosis (David et al., 2005; Kline, 1998).

Lastly, it was determined whether multicollinearity posed unacceptable Type II error rates. Grewal, Cote, and Baumgartner (2004) advise that multicollinearity can cause substantial Type II error rates in SEM models when: (a) composite reliability is weak, 0.70 or lower; (b) explained variance is low, 0.25 or below, and (c) sample size is relatively small (e.g., less than a 3:1 ratio between respondents and the variables tested). However, as composite reliability improves to .75 or higher, explained variance reaches 0.50, and the sample becomes relatively large (6:1 ratio), Type II error rates are reduced to below five percent. As shown by the descriptive statistics in Table 1, the composite reliabilities, averages of explained variance, and sample size for this study comport with the required conditions. Thus, the amount of Type II error risk posed by multicollinearity is within a statistically acceptable range. Also, confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated the discriminant validity of the constructs. Lastly, it is conceptually consistent for the some of the subscales (e.g., union commitment and LUSR) to be highly correlated because they represent components of the larger construct.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics^a,b, Zero Order Correlations, Reliability, and Average Variance Extracted Estimates^c.

Variable	M ^c	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
LUSR–economic	4.13	.75	.62/.66
LUSR–workplace	3.94	.75	.61**	.84/.65
LUSR–social	3.77	.83	.60**	.72**	.81/.69
Value-rational commitment	3.90	.82	.41**	.49**	.43**	.83/.77
Instrumental-rational commitment	3.94	.83	.45**	.57**	.57**	.69**	.88/.84
Job satisfaction	4.39	.62	.31**	.41**	.41**	.41**	.49**	.85/.77
Union participation	3.43	.97	.26*	.41**	.47**	.45**	.44**	.36**	.89/.85
Propensity to withdraw	3.14	1.58	–.14**	–.23**	–.16*	–.22**	–.26**	–.27**	–.10*	.75/.68

Scale ranges from 1 to 5. N = 312 for all variables.

Mean scores were computed by summing the final items and dividing by the number of items.

Composite reliability and Average Variance Extracted estimates are at the end of each row.

LUSR = labor union social responsibility; M = mean; SD = standard deviation.

Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Measurement Model

As shown in Table 2, based on confirmatory factor analysis, the initial measurement model, which compares the data with the proposed theoretical model, was a relatively poor fit. The chi-square to degrees of freedom statistic was above two and neither of the fit indices exceeded the recommended threshold of .90 (TLI = 0.88, CFI = 0.89). Model re-specification—eliminating questionnaire items to improve the fit of the data with the proposed theoretical model—is, however, to be expected in confirmatory factor analysis (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Thus, after considering factor loadings, squared multiple correlations, and modification indices, seven questionnaire items¹⁰ were eliminated that did not correlate well with the other items and constructs being measured. As shown in the revised measurement model in Table 2, this action resulted in a measurement model with TLI and CFI fit indices that exceed the recommended threshold of 0.90.

Table 2.

Goodness-of-Fit Results for Measurement Models^a

Model	χ²	df	Δ χ²	TLI	χ²/df	RMSEA	CFI	SRMR
Revised measurement model	674.67**	410		.94	1.65	.05	.95	.06
Initial measurement model	1516.16**	770	841.49**	.88	1.93	.06	.89	.06
Independence model	5360.17**	465	4685.50**		11.53	.18
One-factor model	2006.50**	431	1331.83**	.65	4.65	.11	.68	.91
Three-factor model^b	1333.45**	428	658.78**	.80	3.12	.08	.84	.071

Note. N = 312. Change in chi-square was calculated independently by contrasting the different models against the hypothesized models. TLI = Tucker–Lewis Index (Tucker and Lewis, 1973); RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation (Steiger, 1990); CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual.

The variables were labor union social responsibility, union identity, instrumental union commitment, value-based union commitment, union activity, and propensity to quit.

Three factors are LUSR items on a single factor, union commitment and job satisfaction items on a second factor, and participation and propensity for union withdrawal items on the third factor.

p = < .001.

For purposes of comparison, the hypothesized measurement model was contrasted with the less constrained independence model—representing the null hypothesis—and two constrained nested models (i.e., submodels) in which the items were set to load on specific factors. Because the survey was comprised entirely of self-report measures, the goodness of fit of a single factor model was also examined to test for common method bias. If a single factor accounts for the majority of variance in the observed variables, it may be indicative of common method variance. In this case, the poor fit of the single-factor measurement model provides evidence against bias from common method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Lastly, given the high intercorrelations between job satisfaction and union commitment, a three-factor model was created by loading the LUSR items on a single factor, the union commitment and job satisfaction items on a second factor, and the participation and propensity for union withdrawal items on the third factor. The hypothesized measurement model fit the data significantly better (TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.05, SMSR = 0.06) than either of the alternative models (see Table 2), indicating that the items converged as intended. In addition chi-square goodness of fit to degrees of freedom (χ²/df = 1.65) was below the 2.0 threshold established by Browne and Cudek (1993).

Assessing concurrent and discriminant validity provides further support for the validity of the model. Concurrent validity concerns whether the central concepts, such as the specific components of LUSR, actually predict other constructs that they could be expected to predict; discriminant validity refers to differences between the three components in terms of divergent relationships to other variables. Consistent with the model, the results suggest that the three LUSR commitment components correlate with each other, but are distinct, and demonstrate both discriminant and concurrent validity.

Structural Model and Support for Hypotheses

Table 3 displays the standardized factor loadings for the indicators used in the revised measurement model, and Table 4 displays the fit statistics for the structural model. The fit statistics indicated good overall fit with the data (χ²/df = 1.57, TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.05) according to the recommended cutoffs. As shown in Figure 1, the hypothesized model explained a considerable amount of variance in union commitment (69%), and moderate amounts of variance in job satisfaction (26%), union participation (35%), and propensity for union withdrawal (25%).

Table 3.

Measurement Model Indicator Loadings.

Variable	Questionnaire item	Loading
LUSR–economic 1	Labor advocate wage demands that improve the standard of living for workers.	.89
LUSR–economic 2	Labor unions increase job security.	.41
LUSR–workplace 1	Labor unions respond to members’ concerns.	.67
LUSR–workplace 2	Labor unions help find positive solutions to workplace problems.	.71
LUSR–workplace 3	Labor unions ensure workers health and safety.	.78
LUSR–workplace 4	Labor unions ensure fair treatment of workers	.71
LUSR–workplace 5	Labor unions give workers a “voice” similar to that of management.	.77
LUSR–workplace 6	Labor unions enable workers to have a say in what happens to them at work.	.66
LUSR–social 1	Labor unions care about consumers.	.70
LUSR–social 2	Labor unions support sound environmental practices.	.79
LUSR–social 3	Labor unions do volunteer work in the community.	.68
LUSR–social 4	Labor unions speak up for disadvantaged people.	.81
LUSR–social 5	Labor unions reduce discrimination in the workplace.	.74
Job satisfaction 1	I enjoy coming to work each day.	.77
Job satisfaction 2	I get a feeling of satisfaction from my work.	.71
Job satisfaction 3	I am considering leaving carpentry for another career (reverse scored).	.68
Job satisfaction 4	The job fits well with my lifestyle.	.61
Job satisfaction 5	The longer I am on the job the better the job gets.	.62
Value-based commitment 1	I believe in the goals of my union.	.65
Value-based commitment 2	I feel that I am an important part of my union.	.73
Value-based commitment 3	My union means a great deal to be personally.	.83
Value-based commitment 4	I feel a strong sense of belonging to my union.	.71
Instrumental commitment 1	My union’s chances of giving me more say in the way I do work are good.	.70
Instrumental commitment 2	My union’s chances of offering me employment security are good.	.73
Instrumental commitment 3	My union’s chances of improving my physical work environment are good.	.76
Instrumental commitment 4	My union’s chances of fixing a problem are good.	.68
Union participation 1	I am more likely than other union members to vote in union elections.	.86
Union participation 2	I am more likely than other union members to read the union newsletter.	.88
Union participation 3	I am more likely than other union members to attend general membership meetings.	.77
Union participation 4	I am more likely than other union members to help with union activities.	.61
Propensity to withdraw 1	All things being equal, I would take a job that does not require union membership.	.69
Propensity to withdraw 2	If I could get a similar job without a union, I would.	.65

Note. LUSR = labor union social responsibility.

All loadings were significant at p < .01.

Table 4.

Goodness-of-Fit Results for the Structural Models.^a

Model	χ²	df	Δ χ²	TLI	χ²/df	RMSEA	CFI	SRMR
Hypothesized structural model	704.99**	449		.94	1.57	.04	.95	.05
Independence model	5351.18**	496			10.79	.18
Additional direct path
LUSR–Union participation	703.41**	448	1.58	.94	1.57	.04	.95	.05
LUSR–Propensity for union withdrawal	704.98**	448	.01	.94	1.57	.04	.95	.05

Note. LSUR = labor union social responsibility; TLI = Tucker–Lewis Index (Tucker and Lewis, 1973); RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual.

Figure 1.

Path Model of Labor Union Social Responsibility and Indicators of Union Engagement.

Table 5 presents the direct and indirect effects and associated confidence intervals. Hypothesis 1 predicting a positive relationship between LUSR and union commitment was confirmed with a beta coefficient of 0.63 and significant at the .001 level (ß = 0.63, p < .001). The positive beta indicates that union commitment generally follows LUSR, in the sense that commitment tends to move up when LUSR moves up. Moreover, the p-value of >.001 indicates that the relationship between LUSR and union commitment was almost certainly not attributable to chance. Hypothesis 2 predicting a positive relationship between LUSR and job satisfaction was confirmed as well (ß = 0.51, p < .001). Hypothesis 3 predicted that the positive relationship between LUSR and union commitment would be mediated by job satisfaction and was supported. The indirect effect of LUSR on union commitment was positive and significant (ß = 0.16, p. < .01). Tests of hypotheses 4a and 4b confirmed the predicted positive relationship between union commitment and union participation (ß = 0.59, p < .01) and negative relationship between union commitment and propensity for union withdrawal (ß = −0.33, p < .01) respectively. Hypothesis 5a predicted an indirect and positive relationship between LUSR and union participation and was supported (ß = 0.45, p < .01). Finally, Hypothesis 5b predicting an indirect and negative relationship between LUSR and propensity for union withdrawal was supported (ß = −0.34, p < .01).

Table 5.

Standardized Direct and Mediated Effects and the Associated 95% Confidence Intervals.

Direct effects	Estimate	Lower	Upper	P
LUSR–Union commitment	.63	.50	.74	.00
LUSR–Job satisfaction	.51	.36	.65	.00
Job satisfaction–Union commitment	.32	.20	.43	.00
Union commitment–Union participation	.59	.48	.68	.00
Union commitment–Propensity to withdraw	–.33	–.46	–.21	.00
LUSR–Union participation	.14	–.19	.48	.31
LUSR–Propensity for union withdrawal	–.01	–.33	.57	.93
Mediated Effects–Labor union social responsibility
Union commitment (via job satisfaction)	.16	.09	.24	.00
Union participation (via union commitment)	.45	.34	.57	.00
Propensity for union withdrawal (via union commitment)	–.34	–.48	–.21	.00

Note. The upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval (shown in parentheses) were based on the findings from bootstrapping (e.g., nonparametric hypothesis testing) analysis.

To further assess whether the hypothesized indirect effects of LUSR on union participation and propensity to quit were fully or partially mediated, two additional models were tested including distinct direct paths between LUSR and union participation and propensity for union withdrawal. To complete the analysis the hypothesized model was used as the basis for comparison with the nested-models, direct paths between LUSR and union participation and propensity for union withdrawal were included, and changes in the fit indices were examined. The significance level of the change in chi-square between the hypothesized model and the additional models reflect the effects of the added paths, providing a test of model fit. Table 4 shows the results of the models that include the additional direct paths and neither of the additional direct paths produced a significant change in model fit suggesting that the added paths were not significant. This outcome suggests that the effect of LUSR on union participation and propensity for union withdrawal was fully mediated by job satisfaction and union commitment.

Discussion

This study offers an empirical test of the impact of LUSR on the job satisfaction, union commitment, union participation, and propensity for union withdrawal of union members. Labor union social responsibility explained 35% of variance in union commitment and 26% of variance in job satisfaction. As predicted, union commitment and job satisfaction subsequently mediated the impact of LUSR on union participation and propensity for union withdrawal. These results suggest that members who perceived labor unions to be more socially responsible were more committed to the union, more satisfied with their jobs, more likely to participate in union activities, and less likely to withdraw from the union. The LUSR construct demonstrates predictive capacity in that all of the hypotheses predicting direct and mediated impacts on aspects of union engagement were supported. These results are the only empirical test of the Dawkins (2010) three-component model of LUSR and provide preliminary evidence for its validity.

Although the findings invite discussion of causal relations, further testing is required to more thoroughly examine the links between the components of LUSR and union engagement. With regard to measurement, the objective was to develop a valid measure of LUSR with conceptually distinct components. The confirmatory factor analysis of the economic, workplace, and social components revealed that it is possible to distinguish among three components of LUSR. The distinction is important because in order for a union to improve its social responsibility it must be able to identify the areas of its shortcomings. On the other hand, the components of LUSR are clearly correlated. The correlations between the economic, workplace, and social components are, however, consistent with previous research on broad-based constructs such as organizational commitment and union commitment (e.g., Allen & Meyer, 1990; Hackett, Bycio, & Hausdorf, 1992; Sverke & Kuruvilla, 1995).

The LUSR model can be improved by drawing distinctions between the overall perception of LUSR and its separate components. For example, is a union that excels on the economic component but largely ignores the social component socially responsible? A rigorous assessment on LUSR might require adequate performance on each component as opposed to permitting excellent performance on one component to offset poor performance on another. Conversely, reasonable arguments can be made in defense of labor unions that focus more heavily on the economic and workplace components during contract years. The Dawkins model could be markedly improved by providing guidance for labor union leaders on how to reconcile the components of LUSR he identifies.

Implications for Research and Practice

Because the LUSR construct has the potential to explain and predict union attitudes and activity, there are implications for labor relations research and practice. First, it can potentially inform and broaden discussions of union revitalization. Snape and Redman (2004) identify three broad models (strategies) of unionism in the labor relations literature and there are LUSR implications for each. The “service model” (Bamberger et al., 1999), emphasizes satisfying the economic needs of members with relatively less attention to ideological considerations. The “organizing model” (e.g., Bacharach et al., 2001; Frege & Kelly, 2004) highlights active, self-reliant workplace unionism through mutual support and solidarity, and focuses primarily on members, but extends beyond their economic and workplace needs to their social aspirations. The covenantal model (e.g., Herman, 1997) goes further in stressing, not only economic gains and social support for union members, but the value-based social movement aspects of unions demonstrated through partnerships with NGOs, and other social and political activism.

Proponents of the covenantal model have argued that union members who identify heavily with the union are more likely to work for the union than members whose commitment is based heavily on economic premiums (e.g., Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 1997; Burchielli, 2006). Similarly, Freeman and Rogers (1999) contend that a bottom up resurgence is required for union revitalization that begins with union member attachment. Based on the Dawkins formulation, however, socially responsible labor unions can address the foci of service, organizing, and covenantal models concurrently in ways that comport with their moral and social contract obligations. Because LUSR is a multifaceted construct wherein the individual components can have differential impact, it would be interesting to examine how the components of LUSR severally influence perception and behavior. For example, would the social component of LUSR, which aligns with the covenantal model, have greater impact on union member engagement than the workplace and social components? If Freeman and Rogers are correct, unions wishing to increase member attachment will need to buttress the social component of LUSR while continuing to deliver vital economic rents and workplace protections.

Secondly, the LUSR model provides a basis for comparisons of strategy and tactics across public and private sector union settings. Public sector unions operate under a different regulatory regime in the United States and have much higher membership density than private sector unions. It may be that the public perceives the work of public sector unions such as firefighters, civil service workers, and teachers as having greater social value. Research directed at extending the LUSR model should focus on validating and employing measures of LUSR with different types of unions, occupations, and in countries with different regulatory structures. More broadly, it is plausible that in other countries the regulatory apparatus is so different that the perception and relative impact of the economic, workplace, and social aspects of LUSR are quite different than in the United States.

Lastly, framing labor union activity in terms of social responsibility could influence the tenor of discussions regarding labor relations outcomes. Budd (2004) identifies efficiency, equity, and voice as the key outcomes of the labor relations system. Efficiency reflects the priorities of managers, investors, and consumers for affordable goods and services, while equity and voice reflect union member desires for reasonable apportionment of economic rents and the capacity to influence the nature of workplace governance. Labor union social responsibility adds a social component and also provides a model with which to discuss the balance of these outcomes in labor relations systems that reflects a broader consideration of all stakeholder interests.

Whereas unions in the United States have traditionally been characterized by their “bread and butter” focus on economic outcomes (Dubofski & Dulles, 1993; Hattam, 1993), which can lead to poor public perceptions, the success of programs like the Justice for Janitors campaign in Southern California indicate that the public can be supportive of labor initiatives that highlight social objectives (Erikson, Fisk, Milkman, Mitchell, & Wong, 2002). This research suggests that union members (i.e., internal stakeholders) may be similar to external union stakeholders in desiring to see unions as positive forces both in their lives and in the broader world community. It may be that if labor unions demonstrate greater concern for the broad economic, workplace, and social interests of their stakeholders, they will reap the benefit of higher levels of commitment among their members, and support from the outside community. Corporations and managers do not perceive more favorably labor unions that attend carefully to the social component of LUSR. Given the current level of labor law violations by employers (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 2001; Mehta & Theodore, 2005) that level of good faith is not currently in evidence. An enduring challenge for LUSR is likely that some objections to labor unions are not due to their activity, but to their mere existence.

Limitations and Conclusion

The findings of this study must be considered in light of its shortcomings. First, the generalizability of the study is limited because of the demographic characteristics of the sample, and the job context. Gender, age, job and union tenure, and occupation all influence union attitudes and behavior (Bender & Sloane, 1999; Posthuma, 2009; Schur & Kruse, 1992). Thus, results obtained from craft union apprentices may not translate to journey certified craft workers or industrial union members. Clearly, replication studies with samples drawn from other types of union members, such as white-collar, industrial, and professional workers will be useful in establishing the generalizability of the LUSR construct. Second, this study was conducted in the United States and additional research is required to establish the impact of LUSR more broadly. Given the preliminary nature of the construct and limited empirical research, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the findings are unique to this sample. Lastly, all data were collected using self-report measures from a single source, which raises the possibility that common method variance influenced the findings. Several steps were taken to reduce this possibility, including collecting the data in two waves, and applying the one-factor test, which suggested that common method bias was not an issue.

In this article a model of LUSR was tested and the fact that LUSR correlated with measures of union engagement in a manner generally consistent with the labor relations literature should increase confidence in the meaningfulness of the construct. Hence, the study indicates that the prediction of various attitudes and behaviors (e.g., union commitment and participation) can be improved by considering the impact of LUSR. These findings may. Hopefully, this article encourages others to test the specific relations examined here more broadly and extensively, and advances research on how labor unions can manage their social responsibility to serve the interests of their stakeholders and enhance union viability.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Cedric E. Dawkins (PhD, The Ohio State University) is an associate professor of management at the Dalhousie University. His research interests include labour rights, corporate disclosure, and stakeholder engagement. His work appears in Business & Society, Business Ethics Quarterly, and Journal of Business Ethics.

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