Abstract
Research illustrates that social movements can fuel new markets and that these markets can create social change, but the role of leaders in this process is less understood. This exploratory interview-based study of the localism movement contributes to such understanding. It articulates the relationship of social movement leaders and the legitimacy of their organizations to new market creation. Specifically, leaders in this study engaged in a dual role to legitimize their organizations and to legitimize the movement. At an organizational level, leaders chose strategies that conformed to a conventional organizational model of the social movement organization (SMO) as a business network, much like a local chamber of commerce. At a movement level, the SMO’s level of legitimacy influenced the leader’s choice of strategies to grow a “local” market. These strategies aimed, primarily, to shape consumer purchase behavior and, secondarily, to foster the development of producers’ skills, and only in a tertiary way, to alter the nature of exchange. Finally, this study’s findings suggest a tension between the dual roles that may ultimately challenge the efficacy of the movement.
Keywords
Social movements, defined as formal or informal groupings of people focused on social change, are important forces that affect relationships between businesses and societies. Social movements can manifest themselves through social movement organizations (SMOs; Zald & Ash, 1966). These SMOs are usually formal organizations, often not-for-profit organizations, that share the movement’s goals and may coordinate to resist or effect change through group action. Since the 1980s, some SMOs have shifted from lobbying governments for statutory and regulatory changes to demanding social responsibility from global corporate actors (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Scherer & Palazzo, 2008). SMOs can use pressure tactics such as boycotts and protests. For example, SMOs pressured Nike to take responsibility for labor conditions in suppliers’ factories (Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007), and Coca-Cola to respond to water stewardship demands.1 (See King, 2008, for a discussion of the impact of boycotts on corporate response behavior; and Gardberg & Newbury, 2013, on who boycotts whom.)
While some social movements focus attention on powerful market actors, others sidestep existing markets and aim instead to build new modes of exchange. By defining new product categories—thus lowering barriers for new producers and communicating a clear value proposition to consumers—social movements and their organizations have played a crucial part in creating new markets (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000; Schneiberg, 2002; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008).
These market-oriented social movements infuse new markets with moral values (Weber et al., 2008; see also Fourcade-Gourinchas & Healy, 2007; Rao & Giorgi, 2006; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; Zelizen, 1983). For example, Rao et al. (2003) studied how the nouvelle cuisine movement in France led haute cuisine chefs to embrace the nouvelle value of truth, as well as of light, simplicity, and imagination. Social movements shape and deploy clear, common frames (Benford & Snow, 2000; Weber et al., 2008) and in some cases fashion public policy favorable to their goals, thus helping to draw in new producers. For example, Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch (2003) showed how the recycling movement was able to engage in both grassroots action and mainstream policy negotiation with federal, state, and local governments to “emerge as a core solid waste solution and industry by the 1990s” (p. 96). Schneiberg (2002) demonstrated how SMOs, in particular, promoted diversity and alternative organizational forms in American insurance, dairy, and grain industries. Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) assessed the organizational dynamics behind the recent growth of the microbrewery industry. Sine and Lee (2009) found that SMOs influenced, “through construction and propagation of cognitive frameworks,” the U.S. wind energy sector from 1978 to 1992.
Creating a new market is a complex process. Markets are “social structures characterized by extensive social relationships between firms, workers, suppliers, customers, and governments” (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007, p. 105; see also DiMaggio, 1994; Gartman, 2002; Weber et al., 2008), who evolve roles and form observations of each other’s behavior (White, 1981, p. 518; Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995; see also DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Fligstein & Dauter, 2007, p. 107). Markets require (a) entry of producers, (b) the creation of producers’ collective identity to form the basis of internal community and external differentiation, and (c) the organization of relationships within and between communities of producers and consumers (see Weber et al., 2008)
Few empirical studies directly examine the microprocesses linking social movements to markets. Weber et al. (2008), aiming to address this gap in the literature, examine the nascent market for grass-fed beef. Through the lens of contemporary framing research, those authors found that key activists and producers shared a set of cultural codes to organize collective action among producers and consumers.
But, as with other studies that explicate the role of framing in social movements, this work does not highlight SMO leaders and their strategic solutions (see Morris & Staggenborg, 2004; also Barker, Johnson, & Lavalette, 2001; Ganz, 2004; Reger, 2007). In general, social movements are portrayed in the literature as largely actor-less (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004), in the sense of an absence of leadership. Benford (1997) observed this shortcoming to be in part a “neglect of human agency” (p. 418). For example, where Weber et al. (2008) ask, “How are entrepreneurial producers themselves produced?” one might ask more specifically, “How do leaders help producers to enter the new market?” Where Weber et al. focus on how producers and consumers develop relationships, one might also study how social movement leaders facilitate these connections.
Leadership is critical to the development and character of social movements (Barker et al., 2001; Melucci, 1996; Morris & Staggenborg, 2004; Reger, 2007). Leaders define movement objectives. They provide means for action. They maintain a movement’s structure and cohesion. They mobilize member support. And leaders have “an expressive function which is central to the process of collective identity construction. They present members with an image of the movement’s identity which can form the basis of solidarity, identification and ‘affective gratification’” (Melucci, 1996, p. 340).
Leaders’ role in fostering collective identity is particularly important to new market development to engender community among producers and between producers and consumers. Collective identity refers to a shared sense of oneness/we-ness, as in “we’re in this together” (Snow, 2001, p. 3; see also Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 285). Collective identity, however, is not fixed: It is, “at its core, a process rather than a property of social actors” (Snow, 2001, p. 3). In new market development, leaders, in part, seek to mobilize customers to identify with the movement through their purchase behavior, and to motivate producers to identify through their business practices (e.g., ownership model, location, supply chain choices, product, or service).
Collective identity requires boundaries to determine who is in and who is out. Demographic (e.g., race), physical (e.g., geography), or symbolic (e.g., cultural institution) characteristics can mark boundaries (Taylor & Whittier, 1992). These boundaries are often permeable—people enter and leave—and so they require framing and maintenance. Non-members must recognize the boundaries for a collective identity to emerge (Jenkins, 1996).
In the present study, the authors consider SMO leaders’ framing strategies to foster a collective identity around and within two sets of protagonists: producers and consumers, in the service of creating a new market. The authors argue that this framing is a twofold process that is simultaneously externally and internally oriented. Considered from an external orientation, collective identity research seeks to understand the strategic choices leaders make to mobilize a movement (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Strategic choices “are not simply neutral decisions about what will be most effective. . . . [T]hey are statements of identity” (p. 293).
Strategic decision-making is central to the collective identity process. Some strategic decisions may be a result of a cost/benefit (instrumental) calculation; others may be intrinsically appealing (i.e., “activists choose strategies that conform with who they are,” p. 292, such as using protests, sit-ins, or market promotions). Yet, still others may result from a combination of the two: Instrumental calculation depends on the collective identities that are associated with particular strategies. For example, rather than emphasize boundaries of their social movement, social movement leaders with strong organizational resources and access to policymakers tend to suppress their differences from the mainstream and push for political change instead (Polletta & Jasper, 2001).
In an internal orientation, leaders seek organizational survival. They nurture and maintain boundaries, so as to legitimize the SMO itself. Valocchi (2009) alluded to the distinction between an internal and external orientation in his research in Hartford, Connecticut. Leaders who Valocchi termed “organizational activists” are motivated by “a commitment to the charter, mission, or organizational goals” and “are . . . dedicated to building the organization they see as crucial to this work” (p. 67). Valocchi quoted an informant to illustrate his point:
Jack, a veteran community organizer in the city, explicitly values organization building along with concrete victories: “If you’re not building organization, you’re going to end up losing. . . . So, one of the things that we learned even when we’re doing issues and campaigns that might take awhile is paying attention to the small things that are constantly helping to build the organization.” (p. 76)
These organization-building activities reflect the need to legitimize the organization as well as its mission.
In the present study, the authors make explicit the process by which organizational activists play this dual role to legitimize simultaneously the SMO and the social movement. This study examines leaders’ micromobilization strategies—“the rather normal work in which activists [engage] to produce a ‘movement’ for example, the assembling and activating of material resources, cultural capital, and labor” (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 438). Through an examination of the localism movement, the present study aims to help explain the role leaders play in creating social change through market forces.
A grassroots movement, localism advocates co-location of production, distribution, and consumption in pursuit of environmental and social sustainability. In this study, localism leaders are those who played pivotal roles in one of three large non-profit networks, each intended to bolster the localism movement. A “producer” is any entity that sells a product or service. A “consumer” most often refers to a retail customer or a client, but can indicate business-to-business exchange as well.
The authors’ core thesis is threefold. One, at an organizational level, leaders maintain their SMO boundaries through actions that legitimize themselves and the SMO. Leaders choose strategies that conform to a collective identity of the SMO as a business network, much like a local chamber of commerce. Two, at a movement level, this achieved legitimacy influences leaders’ solution choices, which consist of four groups of strategies 2 that leaders adopt to grow a “local” market, and which act to create a collective identity within and between producers and consumers. Three, this dual role—to legitimize the SMO and to grow a “local” market—creates a tension that may ultimately challenge the efficacy of the movement.
The rest of this article proceeds in four additional sections. The next section presents an overview of the localism movement. The third section presents the study methodology. The fourth section assesses the relationship between leaders’ frames and their strategies to exploit or change market conditions. The final section concludes with implications, challenges, and suggestions for future research.
Localism as a Social Movement
The localism movement is important because it represents an attempt to wrest control of markets from global corporations and return it to local communities. Although oriented toward market rather than political solutions, localism is properly understood as a social movement. Diverse groups of citizens come together not only to support locally owned and independent business but also to share concern about global problems (e.g., environmental issues, oil dependence), degradation of the economy, poverty, and the overall quality of life in their communities (Hess, 2009). By some accounts, this emphasis on local supply chains and exchange rather than government intervention “represents a dangerous political bargain [that] can lead to the dismantling of hard-fought rights for state protection” (DuPuis, Goodman, & Harrison, 2006, pp. 256-257; cited in Hess, 2009, p. 144). Others argue that the movement is “in support of government policies and economic practices oriented toward enhancing democracy and local ownership of the economy in a historical context of corporate-led globalization” (Hess, 2009, p. 7). The present study provides insight into the degree to which localism movement leaders seek influence over local economic decisions via market means, rather than via political institutions.
With the rapid expansion of national localism networks after 2007, the increased profile of “buy local” campaigns, and the explosion of markets for “local” food (see Martinez et al., 2010), the localism movement seems to have begun coalescing. Christiansen (2009) described this period in the evolution of a social movement as a time when a “movement becomes more than just random upset individuals . . . At this point they are now organized and strategic in their outlook” (p. 3). In this stage, leaders play particularly significant roles in framing and legitimizing the movement’s grievances and demands; therefore, a look at U.S. localism in this period provides a compelling context in which to examine the role SMO leaders play in creating new markets.
Despite this recent surge of support, the call to patronize local enterprises has a long history in the United States. In the early 20th century, chain stores with modern management practices, better access to capital, and ability to attain economies of scale, offered consumers lower prices and gained market share rapidly, provoking an anti-chain movement (Ingram & Rao, 2004). 3 But unlike these early calls for local business protection, which centered largely on disputes over economic power between small business owners and national chains, localism’s more recent incarnation claims a broader base of support. In recent years, a push for environmental and social sustainability has fueled a growing localism movement in the United States and in other developed countries (Hess, 2009). Some activists owned small businesses directly threatened by Walmart, the Olive Garden, and Barnes and Noble, and others joined the movement out of concern for what Mitchell (2006) called community “hearts”—the unique downtown spaces where neighbors create and renew bonds to each other and their specific communities.
Like other social movement actors (Passy & Giugni, 2001), localism leaders participate in SMOs to connect with prospective participants and to shape the decisions of new adherents. The U.S. localism movement encompasses at least 11 national organizations (see Kurland, McCaffrey, & Zell, 2012); 3 particularly prominent organizations rely uniquely on a federated, network, membership structure, which allows for study of network leaders. This study examines Food Routes Network (FRN), the American Independent Business Alliance (AMIBA), and the Business Alliance for Local Living Economies (BALLE). While the three organizations share many goals, they vary in focus.
FRN, formed in 1997, grew out of the “Fires of Hope” and “buy locally grown” initiatives, for which the Kellogg Foundation had provided seed grants (Francis, Poincelot, & Bird, 2006), and seeks to counter industrial food production. Headquartered at the time in Troy, 4 Pennsylvania, FRN supported a loose network of regional coordinators, who connected to 78 “Buy Fresh Buy Local” chapters in 24 states. 5 Buy Fresh Buy Local members tended to be farmers and restaurants, and chapters emphasized economic gains (to farmers) and health benefits (to consumers) of buying locally. Leaders also talked increasingly about food access and equity.
Opposition to industrial food production spurred one set of localism leaders to action; the frenzied expansion of big-box retailing in the last quarter of the 20th century stoked localism’s other arm (Mitchell, 2006). 6 Big-box development has its cheerleaders, 7 but Walmart has proved to be an easy target for anti-big-box sentiment. The company has been accused of destroying local businesses and local economies, substituting low paying jobs for living wage jobs, 8 and contributing to pollution through the degradation of open space and encouragement of suburban sprawl (Frontline, 2004; Longworth, 2007; Mitchell, 2006). Although Walmart has long been the chosen mark of anti-big-box activists, competitors in the big-box segment (including the slightly more upscale Target) successfully replicated the Walmart model, and may have had the same negative impacts on local merchants and downtown thoroughfares (Serres, 2005; see also Basker, Klimek, & Pham, 2012).
The anti-big-box movement spurred groups of activists to coalesce around a political agenda and to provide tools for organizing. The Institute for Local Self-Reliance (founded in 1974), the E. F. Schumacher Society (later named the New Economics Institute, in 1980), and the Social Ventures Network (founded in 1987) formed to promote sustainable and just communities. These organizations served as precursors to BALLE.
Founded in 2001 with help from Social Ventures Network (Hollender & Fenichell, 2004; Shuman, 2007) and headquartered in Bellingham, Washington, BALLE has four regional hubs (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Bellingham, Washington; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Grand Rapids, Michigan). These hubs acted as regional consultants to (but not coordinators of) the 78 regional member sustainable business networks in 29 states, the District of Columbia, and Canada, which represented more than 20,000 individual organizations. 9 Members of these regional networks ranged from retailers to service professionals to small manufacturers, and included individuals and NGOs as well as for-profit firms. Unlike FRN and AMIBA (discussed below), which focused nearly exclusively on the location of production and/or ownership, BALLE espoused a triple-bottom-line (social, environmental, and economic) standard for successful outcomes.
The year 2001 also marked the founding of AMIBA, an organization dedicated to helping local, independently owned businesses survive (Jeff Milchen, personal communication, May 25, 2011). Now headquartered in Bozeman, Montana, AMIBA was established to help communities replicate and build on the local organizing model that Jeff Milchen and Jennifer Rockne pioneered in the Boulder (Colorado) Independent Business Alliance. By 2012, AMIBA boasted 70 independent business alliance members in 33 states, the District of Columbia, and one Canadian province. 10 Members of these local Independent Business Alliances included retailers, restaurants, and small manufacturers who were dedicated to strengthening locally owned and independent businesses. Compared with BALLE’s triple-bottom-line focus, AMIBA emphasized economic fairness at the national level through strong anti-chain-store messaging.
The Study
The authors began this study in 2010 to examine the role of leadership in promulgating the localism movement. (Eisenhardt, 1989, explains the benefits of beginning with a general research question.) The authors developed a semi-structured interview format to understand how BALLE, AMIBA, and FRN national and regional affiliate leaders viewed the movement, what they did, what challenges they faced, and what futures they envisioned. 11 Questions ranged from the general “Can you tell me a little about your background?” to inquiries about the goals of the movement generally and of their network in particular. In this study, the authors defined a leader as a person who founded or, at the time of the interview, held a formal position of leadership in a national organization or regional affiliate.
For this qualitative study, the authors conducted a purposive (non-probabilistic) sample in which “participants are selected according to pre-determined criteria relevant to a particular research objective” (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006, p. 61). Quantitative research methods prescribe standard methods for professional sampling, but the methods for qualitative research sample selection are more varied (see Miles & Huberman, 1994; Robson, 2011). Rather than selecting a random sample from a pre-defined universe, for this study the authors sought saturation in the data. Saturation is that point at which it becomes counter-productive to collect additional data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990/1998, p. 136) or that “point in data collection and analysis when new information produces little or no change to the codebook” (Guest et al., 2006, p. 65). Scholars differ on the number of interviews necessary to reach saturation, but tend to settle on between 25 and 50 (Mason, 2010). Guest et al. (2006) demonstrated that saturation occurred in the first 12 interviews of a non-probabilistic sample size. Richards (2009) explained that “the size of data records is never, alone, a relevant criterion for a good outcome . . . [C]ompletion of a qualitative project . . . happens when the question is answered” (p. 19). This methodology gives the authors reasonable confidence concerning the present study’s findings. However, these findings do not state standard statistical reliability, representative non-bias of the findings reflecting a representative sampling, nor do they provide sufficient information for a testable model of under what conditions leaders can implement effective strategies. Such a model will involve further research efforts.
From November 2010 to May 2011, the authors identified and interviewed 38 leaders from the regional and national organizations. First, they identified leaders of local BALLE-, AMIBA-, and FRN-affiliated networks. Second, they compiled a database of the contact information found on BALLE, AMIBA, and FRN websites. 12 This database contained 215 contacts: 70 BALLE Sustainable Business Networks, 71 AMIBA Independent Business Alliances, and 74 FRN Buy Fresh Buy Locals. The organizations had created a widespread presence throughout the United States in about 10 years. However, there seemed to be little geographic overlap among the three organizations, suggesting that while they were growing separately, either their different focal messages helped reach a wider population, or they did not need message variation because people only started a new chapter where there was none from any of the organizations.
The authors emailed interview requests to the 215 contacts. Fifteen addresses came back as invalid. In all, 37 leaders replied that they would consider being interviewed, and 25 of these 37 ultimately scheduled to participate in the study. In addition, the authors identified several informants through the snowball technique of asking the interviewees for other names, particularly of key leaders in the movement, that informants thought should be interviewed; the authors contacted these people directly. In total, the study included 38 leaders from 20 states: 16 from BALLE, 15 from AMIBA, and 9 from FRN and related food organizations. 13 These numbers included leaders of two networks that affiliated with both BALLE and AMIBA. Two interviews were with leaders at Food Routes itself (rather than a local affiliate), and three were with leaders associated with food-related non-profits that were not part of Food Routes.
The authors interviewed and recorded each leader by phone or in person. Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. Respondents in this study were assured anonymity. For reference in this article, the authors coded them by organization (A = AMIBA, B = BALLE, F = Food Routes, and AB = for those members of both AMIBA and BALLE) and assigned them numbers. Following each interview, the authors noted their first impressions of the data. To become even more grounded in the data, the authors transcribed the majority of the interviews themselves; interviews transcribed by assistants were reviewed carefully.
The authors identified recurrent themes and patterns (Guba, 1981; Kreftig, 1991; Leininger, 1985). They enhanced credibility through the “repetition of questions” (May, 1989, cited in Kreftig, 1991, p. 218); that is, they asked the same basic questions of all respondents. They further increased the dependability of the findings by conducting a code–recode procedure (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
The authors engaged with the data through four rounds of coding using two separate software analysis packages. The authors first coded each interview through NVivo9, a qualitative research data analysis software package, using an emergent, iterative process in which the authors coded for the following broad core framing tasks (discussed below): motivation; diagnosis—assigned blame; diagnosis—identified a problem to fix; prognosis. It emerged that leaders engaged in two processes: one directed inward to legitimize their SMOs and the other directed outward to legitimize the movement.
The authors then coded the data a second time, now for evidence of Scott’s (2008) sources of legitimacy (discussed below). For regulatory legitimacy, the authors considered evidence of legal and related formal validation; for normative legitimacy, the authors looked for evidence of value alignment between the SMO and the local community; and for cultural-cognitive legitimacy, the authors coded for indications of what respondents considered critical characteristics for SMO survival. The authors also considered how leaders defined their networks (as emphasizing relationships with consumers, producers, government, or other) and leaders’ mentions of how external actors viewed their networks. From this second analysis emerged evidence of at least 15 strategies in which leaders engaged and which the authors discuss later under “prognosis.”
The authors then recoded these strategies according to whether they related to “producer entry,” “producer collective identity and differentiation,” or “creating relationships within and between communities of producers and consumers.”
In a fourth coding round, the authors used the web-based, mixed-method data analysis software Dedoose (Version 4.5). Dedoose enables quantitative counting of excerpts. The authors recoded explicitly for the 15 strategies. In the process, they collapsed two categories and added 5 for a final total of 18 strategies that leaders used to bolster the local market. The authors next sorted the leaders based on the SMO chapter’s age and the presence of paid staff. They justify these sorting criteria in the section titled “More and Less Legitimized SMOs.”
In addition to the interviews, the authors attended one board meeting of a local sustainable business network, and a combined board meeting of the local sustainable business network and a local buy fresh buy-local organization. In November 2010, the first author attended a speech given by Judy Wicks, a BALLE founder. In March 2011, the second author attended an SMO-sponsored daylong training session on how farms acquire the third-party sustainability “Food Alliance” certification. The first author interviewed 10 members of a single local sustainable business network. Finally, the authors studied each organization’s website as an indication of its public face. Together, these data provided an additional context to understanding the movement. The appendix presents a general profile of this study’s localism leaders.
In the following sections, the authors detail how localism leaders legitimized their SMOs, and the inferred relationship of this legitimacy to leaders’ strategic choices regarding (a) producer entry, (b) producer collective identity and differentiation, and (c) creating relationships within and between communities of producers and consumers.
Leaders’ Frames, Legitimacy, and “Local” Market Creation
A primary function of leaders in social movements is to select, and then disseminate, frames that explain the movement and help it cohere. Leaders frame their motivation for participation in the social movement (motivation), what they diagnose to be the problem and who is to blame (diagnosis), and strategies for appropriate change (prognosis). These core framing tasks emphasize how social movement processes generate, elaborate, and diffuse ideas and meaning (Benford & Snow, 2000), but they overlook the process by which leaders seek to legitimize the SMO itself. In the present study, the authors find that leaders adopted both an inward and an outward focus. When focused inward, leaders sought to legitimize the buy-local SMO. When focused outward, leaders sought to legitimize the localism movement. Below, the authors discuss leaders’ motivations for acting. The authors then distinguish leaders’ inward focus to legitimize the SMO from their outward focus to legitimize the movement.
Underlying Moral Values: Why People Should Act
A motivation to act emerged from moral principles and values that underlie the localism market. Localism leaders pointed to moral principles and values of aesthetics, economic fairness, choice, and ecological sustainability. In particular, they framed their motivation as springing from a desire to create and/or maintain the unique character of their town—a character that stemmed (in part) from locally owned and independent businesses and was trammeled by national chains. These leaders aimed to strengthen their local economies, to secure economic fairness, and to re-anchor power in the community. Respondents wanted to ensure that people had options as to where they spent their money (e.g., to avoid, if they chose to, national firms such as Walmart and Gap). Leaders also wanted to encourage local businesses to reduce their negative impacts on the natural environment.
Leaders Focus Inward to Legitimize the SMO
Leaders do not act in isolation. Rather, stakeholders’ perceptions of the SMO in general will influence a leader’s effectiveness. One metric of stakeholder perception is legitimacy, the “relationship between the practices and utterances of the organization and those that are contained within, approved of, and enforced by the social system in which the organization exists” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 416). Legitimacy is inherently a relational concept. It does not exist apart from social groups: “It ultimately resides within the psyches of social actors, who may or may not be reflectively aware of legitimacy’s role in their thinking and decision-making” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 417; see also DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Social actors include what Weber et al. (2008) labeled “activists . . . engaged in active boundary maintenance” (p. 548). In this study, these activists are SMO leaders strengthening the SMO boundaries to reinforce its collective identity by enhancing its legitimacy.
Scott’s (2008) three pillars of legitimacy—regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive—serve as a useful lens for understanding SMO legitimacy. Indeed, analysis of interview data through this lens shows that localism leaders sought legitimacy for themselves and for the SMO, and that both sets of factors served to legitimize the SMO. Table 1 presents a summary of these conclusions.
How Localism Leaders Legitimized Themselves and Their Social Movement Organization.
Regulatory legitimacy
Regulatory legitimacy rests on legal sanction (Scott, 2008). Indicators of regulatory legitimacy include laws, rules, sanctions, and standards created by governments, credentialing associations, and professional bodies: Attaining such indicators “provides legitimacy for the organizations among a wide variety of stakeholders” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 418; see also Deephouse, 1996; Scott, 2008; Singh, Tucker, & Meinhard, 1991).
In the localism case, at the SMO level, two types of regulatory legitimacy were relevant: NGO-sanctioned and government-sanctioned. Localism leaders gained regulatory legitimacy for their SMO, for example, through formal membership in the national organization. As one national leader commented, “The biggest factor in local groups succeeding or failing is whether . . . they get support from [the national network]” (A13). A chapter-level leader (B1) observed, “BALLE gives us an anchor, an identity, provides a direction so we know what we’re focused on.”
Decisions on SMOs’ legal status sprang from leaders seeking government-sanctioned regulatory legitimacy. Leaders deliberated whether to obtain 501(c) status or not, and if so, whether c3, c4, or c6 designations best served their interests: The 501(c)(3) status is a charitable organization and it has to have an educational, scientific, or charitable mission. Networks that adopt this tax status orient (at least partly) toward social fairness and sustainability issues. The 501(c)(6) status, in contrast, is appropriate for associations of for-profit firms (including chambers of commerce), and was preferred by networks aiming to concentrate on a “buy local, support independent” theme (B14). The 501c4 organizations center on social welfare concerns and may lobby government.
Finally, leaders derived legitimacy for themselves from titled positions as “director,” “president,” “executive director,” “founder,” “board member,” or “board president.” (Table 4 provides more complete demographics.) Titles accompanied official responsibilities, as specified in chapter bylaws, for example. 14
Normative legitimacy
Normative legitimacy rests on that which is morally governed (Scott, 2008), and derives from leaders’ perceived alignment between the SMO and relevant norms and values (Zimmerman & Zeitz, based on the work by Parsons, 1960; also see Scott, 1991).
For the localism leaders, the basis of normative legitimacy derived from the local community: To what degree did a leader help align the SMO’s expressed values with those in its self-declared jurisdiction? For example, when asked which localism SMOs were the most successful in the United States, one leader responded,
Certainly Sustainable Connections in Bellingham [Washington]. And I think part of, I don’t want this to be an excuse, but there is certainly a more progressive perspective in much of the western coast, compared to [the east coast]. It has taken a lot of us longer, especially in our community, to see the importance of being progressive and environmentally focused and to understand what sustainability means. (B3)
Where alignment of local culture with the values of the localism movement was not evident, leaders needed to project a non-exclusionary image. Leaders emphasized their organizations’ non-partisan stance, and that their members were “both Republican and Democratic. We don’t want to turn anyone off” (B8). As one respondent explained, a few members of what became her AMIBA chapter had been involved in an earlier campaign against a proposed Barnes and Noble bookstore, which affected perceptions of the organization: “We built up a negative image of being anti-everything, which isn’t true. And we’ve been fighting that ever since” (A8).
Moreover, this desire to align the SMO with the community’s values often led to ambiguity about how leaders defined the term local. Leaders defined the term by five different logics: clear political boundaries or mileage; relative definitions (from that which is best to that which is considered worst: buying from an independent and locally owned shop, to purchasing from a regionally owned shop, to purchasing fair trade at a mass distributor, to buying online from a non-local website); ecological (watershed or foodshed); personal/social relationships; and value-based or moral (see McCaffrey & Kurland, 2014). A small minority of leaders felt that the lack of a clear definition for “local” would hamper the movement politically on a national level (F3), but most leaders preferred to defer to preexisting understandings within communities, and, as one national leader argued, let “local define local” (A13). 15
Cultural-cognitive legitimacy
Where normative legitimacy relies on evaluation, cultural-cognitive legitimacy derives from taken-for-granted assumptions about “roles and rules of action (like rules in a game)” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 420) that are distinct from evaluation (Suchman, 1995, p. 582). These assumptions constitute “what the system is and that specify what it means to be an actor in such a system” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 420, referencing Scott, 1994, p. 81). Cultural-cognitive legitimacy reflects those “internalized symbolic representations of the world . . . Symbols—words, signs, and gestures—shape the meanings we attribute to objects and activities” (Scott, 2008, p. 57; see Hirsch, 1997, p. 1715).
Leaders may seek cultural-cognitive legitimacy by conforming to expectations; that is, organizations can achieve cultural-cognitive legitimacy by “complying with ideas, models, practices, etc. assumed to be correct, such as hiring top managers with desirable experience and education credentials” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 424; Table 2). In the present study, leaders identified three objective conditions as critical to an SMO’s survival: having paid staff, having a leader with business experience, and having a leader with excellent communication skills. In addition, recognition of the SMO leader by powerful local actors contributed to cultural-cognitive legitimacy.
Management by Affiliates’ Age (n = 36).
Note. Table 2 excludes two national leaders who did not also lead a local network, but includes a state-level FRN chapter leader.
Includes one leader of an Independent Business Alliance that has been a chamber of commerce for more than 5 years.
First, the existence of a paid (professional) staff member conferred cultural-cognitive legitimacy on SMOs. “In order to be a successful organization, you need an executive director . . . Without an executive director, you have an all-volunteer board, and when you have an all-volunteer board, you have burn-out” (B14). In the present study, 55% of the leaders (representing 17 SMOs) were paid (see Table 2).
Second, leaders mentioned the importance of having business experience: “It . . . helps if someone’s [actually run] a business . . . people coming from the public sector, they have no idea how businesses operate” (B12); “It helps me tremendously to have owned a business” (A12); “You need someone who can span the world between non-profit and for-profit, who is entrepreneurially-driven, charismatic” (B4). In the present study, 58% of the leaders had some business experience.
Third, excellent communication skills conferred legitimacy:
Some organizations don’t have a good communications background . . . I had a sponsor say “How do I get my logo on this event you’re doing in May?” He gave me $150 because he thought [my communications work] was very professional and he wanted to be associated with it. (B13)
In the present study, 31% of respondents mentioned having some background in education, journalism, and/or marketing (see Table 4).
Evidence of cultural-cognitive legitimacy included leaders’ recognition that powerful local actors took the SMO seriously. One AMIBA chapter leader described how she organized a forum with candidates for mayor as a way to recruit new members (A6); others discussed their ties with better-known, older organizations, such as the Rotary Club (B9). Being connected to, recognized by, and involved with government leaders and well-known public service organizations established and reinforced cultural-cognitive legitimacy.
In sum, U.S. localism leaders derived regulatory legitimacy for their SMOs from affiliation with the national network, obtaining formal 501(c) status, and for themselves by holding titled positions. They derived normative legitimacy for their SMOs by projecting a pro-market, non-exclusionary message and/or through alignment with local community values, and for themselves by acting as connectors. And leaders garnered cultural-cognitive legitimacy for their SMOs by having paid staff, being positively recognized by government officials and other legitimate organizations, and for themselves by having business experience and exhibiting excellent communication skills. In this way, leaders, as part of the need to acquire legitimacy, assimilated their SMOs into conventional organizational models.
More and less legitimized SMOs
The authors sought additional differences based on an SMO’s legitimacy. In particular, SMOs possessed more and less legitimacy based on two indicators: (a) presence of paid staff (or executive director) and (b) the chapter’s age. Because the study domain restricted focus to localism SMOs that were officially affiliated with one of three national networks—AMIBA, BALLE, or FRN—membership with these national organizations (an indicator of regulatory legitimacy) was not by itself sufficient to distinguish more from less legitimacy of individual chapters. Although the authors lacked consistent data on value alignment between the SMO and its host community, the authors did know each SMO’s age; they used affiliate age, therefore, as a proxy for value alignment (an indicator of normative legitimacy). While another potential indicator of normative legitimacy would be membership size, the authors found that leaders were inconsistent in how they counted members. Some leaders counted only paid memberships; others allowed for paid business memberships while non-profits could join for free (B10). Still others included as members any name listed on their email distribution list (B1); another automatically included any local business in the network’s focal region as a member (A1).
In contrast to inconsistency in reporting of membership numbers, data on whether a network had at least one paid staff member were clear. As respondents consistently underscored the message that network success depended on a paid staffer, the authors used the presence of such an indicator of cultural-cognitive legitimacy. Hence, the majority of the respondents clustered into two groups: “paid staff and SMOs over 5 years old” and “volunteer-only and SMOs less than 5 years old.” Therefore, for the purposes of this study, older networks with a paid staffer were “more” legitimized, whereas those younger with all volunteers were “less.” Table 2 presents a summary of these data.
Below, the authors highlight how leaders diagnosed the problems the localism movement seeks to address, and then they outline the strategies leaders adopted to influence the three requirements for new market creation of (a) producer entry, (b) producer collective identity and differentiation, and (c) relationships within and between communities of producers and consumers.
Leaders Focus Outward to Legitimize the Message and Movement
Diagnosis: What is the problem and who is to blame?
Leaders in this study blamed big-box retailers, government, and customers for the lack of “local ownership of the economy” (Hess, 2009, p. 7). They decried big-box retailers and industrial agriculture as having too much power: “Corporations are here to stay . . . but . . . they dominate the world more than they should . . . There’s an unfair playing field” (B6). They argued that government policies favor these large enterprises over locally owned and independent enterprises: “Government purchases are restricted to take the lowest bid without consideration whether the bid is from a local business” (A7); “The Food Safety Act . . . is geared to the industrial food system” (F1). Leaders also faulted customers for choosing convenience and selection over local economic needs: “Even with our members, I’d like to say they all think local first, but I’m not sure they do” (A7); “The greatest obstacles to a strong localism movement are apathy, the Internet, money, economic woes” (AB7).
However, as the authors discuss below, while leaders blamed these three stakeholders, their strategies to fix the problem emphasized converting the retail customer, building SMO membership, and, to a lesser extent, mentoring producers. This strategic modesty reflected both weakness—the SMOs’ lack of resources—and the strength of focused leadership.
Prognosis: Encouraging producer entry and competitiveness
Markets require producers to engage in exchange. One goal of localism is to give consumers an alternative to national chain stores and factory-farmed foods. As SMOs do not produce goods, localism leaders encouraged new firms to enter the “local” market and to increase the competitiveness of firms already selling local goods. To ensure the supply of “local” producers, leaders relied on at least four strategies: building membership, educating to enlarge a like-minded community among non-members, mentoring producers, and developing resources to lower entry barriers. Table 3 provides a summary of these strategies for leaders of “more” and “less” legitimized SMOs.
Strategies Leaders of “Most” and “Least” Legitimized Social Movement Organizations Used to Influence “Local” Market Conditions.
Note. More legitimized: Leaders of networks that have at least one paid staffer and are between 5 and 10 years old. Less legitimized: Leaders of networks that only have volunteers and are less than 5 years old. The first number in each cell reflects the absolute number of leaders who in some way were coded as mentioning the strategy; the percentage in parentheses reflects the percentage of the total of that type of leader (based on the presence of paid staff and affiliate age) connected to that code. SMO = social movement organization.
Leaders sought to build their SMOs’ membership and, in general, enlarge a like-minded community. Membership in the SMO not only provided producers with access to services to connect with customers and develop their skills, it also engendered a shared (collective) identity and broadened a like-minded community among non-members. As one leader commented,
[A localism leader] needs to [be] . . . a “weaver,” stitching different constituencies together over time, making sure that various stakeholders are not just “connected” in the sense that they are aware of one another and what others are doing, but [are] also really embedded in one another’s work in continually deeper ways. (A2)
Another observed, what our members “want from us is connection to a like-minded community” (B4).
SMO leaders also mentored producers to build their skills. One leader developed a “boot camp for entrepreneurs.” This seminar, which he labeled “economic gardening,” was designed to “[grow] local business and [grow] entrepreneurs, as opposed to trying to recruit [national] businesses to come and create jobs” (B10). Other leaders sponsored information programs, teaching local firms how they could become more competitive via money-saving green business practices (B16). Leaders recognized that participation by entrepreneurs was crucial to their SMOs’ success, and were proud of efforts to facilitate training: “One [thing we do really well] is connecting early entrepreneurs with more seasoned successful entrepreneurs” (B4).
Mentoring producers was one strategy that leaders of more legitimized networks emphasized twice as much as leaders of less legitimized networks. Not only did additional resources enable more advanced programming, such as providing farmers with legal advice (F9) or developing marketing channels for farmers (F5), but the more legitimized networks generally had more accumulated experience to move beyond ideation, and were called upon by to assist fledgling networks (e.g., B4). One exception was a leader of a volunteer-only network who was more than 5 years old. Independently wealthy from his previous entrepreneurial ventures, this leader now devoted his efforts full-time to cultivating a “local” producer community (B10).
Leaders also sought to remove or lower barriers to producer entry, by “dealing with the city in terms of codes or permits” (A12) and by leveraging local assets. Examples included the creation of a revitalization fund (“We created a revitalization loan fund that was spearheaded by four community banks,” B9), the development of a leasing program to facilitate new farmers getting access to land (F9), and an information program for local firms to capture federal stimulus funds (B4). Others spoke of ambitious efforts to obtain grants (B16, F9), to bolster community bank involvement (B9, B13), to develop local currencies (B15), and to increase community capital via peer-to-peer lending (B1), to recruit an angel investor network (B10), and to fund microenterprise (B10). Leaders of more legitimized SMOs framed efforts in terms of plans they were implementing; leaders of less legitimized networks were clearly just entering a strategic planning phase.
In short, while all leaders focused on building membership and a like-minded community, leaders of more legitimized networks had the resources and the experience to advise members and other networks, and were more actively engaged in efforts to lower entry barriers.
Prognosis: Creating collective producer identity and differentiation
To nurture new markets, leaders need to foster a “positive collective identity” that actors both within and outside the movement recognize (Weber et al., 2008, p. 546). Growing the SMO through membership, as discussed above, was one mechanism for localism leaders to create collective identity. Localism leaders also fostered community by partnering with other not-for-profit organizations, by sowing leadership, and by advocating locally owned, independent-friendly government policies.
Partnering with localism-friendly organizations was a key strategy for many localism leaders. In one case, a not-for-profit contributed “meeting space, telephone lines, access to databases, [the leader’s] expertise” (F1). In another, a library offered “space . . . for our events” (A11). Leaders also partnered to benefit their membership. In some cases, these partners helped fill gaps in training (“Because there are other partner organizations that do a great job with training programs on getting organic certification, using integrative pest management . . . we don’t need to duplicate that,” B9). In other cases, leaders partnered to pass legislation (“We were able to work with B-Lab to get legislation passed last year to create tax incentives for B-Corps, first legislation of its kind in the country,” B4).
16
And in still others, leaders partnered to ensure customer access to local businesses during construction:
Right now we’re having light rail put in in the central corridor . . . that’s obviously really, really hard on the businesses to have that kind of construction going on. A lot of them have less parking. So we’ve partnered with the [local chamber of commerce] and the [local business association] to really try to support those businesses. (A9)
Localism leaders strengthened collective identity by fostering the development of new leaders. In one case, a leader held leadership circles, groups of business owners, separate from boards of directors, who worked with the SMO leader to “look at problems and obstacles facing local business and try to find solutions and then share those solutions with the membership at large” (A12). In another example, the leader worried about professional development of incoming leaders:
[What] I’m thinking about these days is are we as a movement bringing up new leaders . . . There are so many young people so excited about this work and they all want jobs . . . Are we finding ways to cultivate them as leaders? (F5)
While less common than other strategies, leaders of more legitimate SMOs emphasized leadership development more than leaders of less legitimized networks.
To a much lesser extent, leaders also sought to alter government policy to validate and prioritize the “local” producer. Some leaders advocated independent-friendly government policies, albeit largely on the local and state levels. They wrote letters and white papers (A2) and met face-to-face with policy makers (B13). They partnered with local government by sitting on councils, inviting local and state government officials to participate in “buy local” events, soliciting local government employees to join the SMO’s board, and helping to craft legislation or revise government purchasing specifications (F3).
Critics argue that a focus on local market development “plays into neoliberal tenets of deregulation and reliance on market” (see Hess, 2009, p. 144, referencing DuPuis et al., 2006). Localism facilitates a shift in responsibility from the federal government to state and local government and to the private sector “via the politics of consumption” (Hess, 2009, p. 144). The present study found preliminary support for this assertion: When leaders indicated that they attempted to influence government policy, these efforts were largely limited to the local and state levels. Moreover, lobbying efforts were perceived as ancillary to the SMO’s primary role (which was to increase business-to-business and business-to-consumer connections), or were regarded as unrealistic or ineffective, and therefore not worth the effort.
Prognosis: Connecting producers and consumers
How do producers find consumers? This element of creating a new market remains underexamined (Weber et al., 2008; see Fligstein & Dauter, 2007). In the present study, leaders framed their actions to connect producers with consumers in two ways: (a) enabling or encouraging exchange by developing the “local” customer (i.e., creating demand) and (b) altering the nature of exchange (i.e., redesigning the system).
Develop the “local” customer to enable exchange
Marketing and promotion
Marketing and promotion was by far the most popular strategy leaders used to facilitate localization. All leaders mentioned efforts to market and promote the buy-local message. Marketing and promotion to the consumer was the easiest way to enter the movement, in large part because the national organizations provided new networks with pre-fab kits—well-designed labels, promotional materials, and ideas for publicizing themselves. These efforts included 10% shift campaigns (encouraging customers to shift 10% of their purchases from non-local business to those who are locally owned and independent), farm-to-table events (e.g., a dinner on a farm where chefs prepare food directly grown and raised on that farm), print and online buying and food guides, and loyalty promotions (to reward customers’ loyalty to locally owned, independent businesses). Leaders sponsored campaigns to engage consumers emotionally, by asking them to “Keep [Our City] Weird” (i.e., to keep it aesthetically unique and devoid of the homogeneity of chain retailers) or soliciting customer pledges to support downtown businesses “first.” Other campaigns, from local business directories to downtown maps featuring local enterprises, aimed to raise the profile of the localism movement together with that of the SMO’s members. Leaders also crafted experiences for consumers, such as “farm to table” events for dinners at local restaurants, “bike fresh, bike local” tours, and community fund-raisers to engage consumers with the movement. And social media (especially Facebook) was a key means of connecting the casual “local” supporter with the goals of the movement and the offerings from member firms.
Direct connections
SMO leaders often described themselves as connectors (F9, A2) or connective tissue (B1). Indeed, several believed that creating bridges was their central purpose: “Relationships are key to what we do” (B11); “I was chosen to be president because I’m good at relationship building” (A3). “I’m constantly living in that bridge of those relationships; that midwifing, that reciprocity” (B12). Food Routes-related SMO leaders highlighted the direct connections they made between chefs and farmers:
We work hard to introduce chefs and farmers . . . to have [them] meet in January and February when the farmers are ordering seeds and have the chef say, “I can take 50 lbs of onions a week” . . . and have the farmers planting for restaurants. (F7)
Networking events
Whereas FRN leaders emphasized direct connections, leaders of BALLE and AMIBA affiliates emphasized networking events. (Indeed, no FRN leader talked about holding networking events.) These events provided the opportunity for producers to connect with one another: “We have luncheons and breakfasts and happy hours” (A12); “We run monthly social hours where folks get together and meet each other” (A4); “We have a monthly networking event, Green Drinks” (B1); and “We hold small business network events around the community at members’ businesses” (B2).
Modeling: Walking the talk
A few leaders reported that they created change by modeling it. They walked the talk (and in this way also bolstered their own legitimacy). They talked about the importance of buying locally and they buy locally: “Someone who speaks one way and does something different is not going to lead. He could try but he’s not going to be followed” (A3). “I have to practice what I preach, that’s very important” (AB7). “I lead by doing” (A9). “In this movement, you have to [walk the talk]” (F6). “My job is . . . to walk the talk” (B10). Of particular note is that only leaders with clear business experience cited the importance of walking the talk.
Partner for group promotions
Leaders partnered with non-profit and for-profit organizations to increase sales. For example, one leader partnered with the local chamber of commerce to try a “local kind of Groupon thing . . . to find opportunities where we have common ground and places we can work together” (A4).
Educate to remove cultural barriers
Leaders educated the public. Indeed, leaders saw themselves fundamentally as community educators; they gave speeches to civic organizations and environmental action groups, or taught nutrition and cooking classes:
We work to educate [the public] about the economic side of this but also the cultural side. We all know that local businesses are cool and we like having them there, and we try to make the point that, if you don’t stop and give them a dollar sometimes, they’re not going to be there. (A12)
Removing economic barriers
Only two leaders highlighted removing barriers to aid consumer entry. They were both with FRN-affiliated SMOs and related to food access, such as implementing a Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 17 at a city’s fresh food market (F5).
In short, localism leaders emphasized customer development strategies of marketing, promotion, and education, but largely failed to tackle economic barriers to local consumption.
Alter the nature of exchange
On the production side, leaders sought to alter the nature of the exchange relationship between customer and producer through efforts to redesign the local economy and the local food distribution network.
Redesign local economy
Leaders engaged in creative efforts to redesign the local economy through charrettes, “asset quilting,” and business districts. These efforts emphasized collaboration and problem solving rather than competition, and were designed to create a sense of community, particularly among business owners, some of whom competed against each other in addition to national firms (A1, A6, A9, B1, B2, B6). Noticeably, leaders of more legitimized networks had efforts underway to foster significant structural change in the local economy, while strategies of those less legitimized remained in the ideation phase. Four examples of efforts to redesign the local economy are discussed below.
Charrettes
A charrette is an “intense period of design or planning activity.” 18 In any conference, much of the work happens informally in the hallways. One leader’s vision was to turn this experience upside-down. He wanted to bring the hallway conversations into the conference room (B1).
Asset quilting
One experienced leader designed “asset quilting” programs. These workshops pooled local talent to solve local problems:
Get a group of people around the table and [have them] . . . write down their assets on cards, and we have categories of assets that we suggest. People throw all the assets on the table. Then they figure what they can create out of this that’s something new . . . They become their own task force and committed . . . to making it happen. It’s a process . . . of creating a network of resources. (B10)
Business districts
Business districts “are clusters of locally-owned businesses around town” (A12). One leader helped “form a merchants’ association.” Then, the leader and the SMO marketed the district “as a district [and] not just [as] individual businesses” (A12). The SMO helped “solve problems with the neighborhood associations or with the city or other problems the district’s having and things like that,” resulting in “increased business to these districts” (A12).
Business–government summit
One leader organized a business–government summit to improve communication between local government and local business owners.
We held, in conjunction with the mayor’s office, a summit . . . where we invited 45 local business owners to come talk about the problems they were having with the city . . . We had city council, we had city management, we had city staff there. Out of that meeting came 130 individual issues, [from] communication issues [to] rewriting city code. Then the city took that 130, divided them among nine departments that they applied to, and for the first time in the history of our city, pulled all nine department heads into the same room at the same time. (A12)
Redesign local food distribution
While BALLE and AMIBA leaders generally discussed efforts to redesign the local economy, leaders of FRN spoke more consistently about redesigning the local food distribution system. These efforts included encouraging consumers to join a community-supported agriculture model of food distribution and to visit farmers markets (F9); getting “townies and the farmers . . . [to] sit across the table from each other” (F6); developing leasing programs for small farmers to move away from a more expensive ownership model (F9); moving “some of the waste from the fields, for example, [at] the end of a market day, the stuff that doesn’t get sold by farmers . . . into the food system at a lower cost” (F1) 19 ; and talking with farmers about extending their growing periods (F8).
In short, these findings suggest that leaders of both high- and low-legitimized networks emphasized strategies to build membership, build a like-minded (collective) community, influence local government, and market, promote, and educate consumers about localism. But leaders of more legitimized networks were able to also allocate resources toward building the future of the movement, through mentorship of producers and innovation to redesign the local economy system, and thought more about the need to develop movement localism leaders.
Conclusion
This study of the U.S. localism movement supports the claim that leaders played a dual role, and that this duality created a tension that may challenge the efficacy of the movement. In one role, leaders assimilated nominally “alternative” SMOs into conventional organizational models as part of the need to acquire legitimacy. Through various actions, leaders sought regulative, normative, and cognitive-cultural legitimacy for themselves and their SMOs, and conformed to a conventional organizational model of the local SMO as a business network, much like a chamber of commerce. SMO leaders perceived colleagues with business experience and excellent communication skills as more legitimate than leaders who lacked these resources; and they perceived the more legitimate SMOs as those with paid staff. Leaders also sought legitimacy by affiliating with a national organization, receiving 501c status, projecting a pro-market image, and being recognized by external organizations, such as the local chamber of commerce.
In their other role, leaders made strategic choices that largely neglected to challenge extant structural barriers that would directly reduce big-box retailers’ power and level the playing field through government policy. Localism leaders in this study appeared largely accepting of existing market models and institutions—they were generally economic policy “takers” and not “makers,” and thus clipped their own wings with pragmatism. This conclusion stems in part from the constraints leaders in this study appeared to face. They encountered ideological resistance (a lack of normative legitimacy), which led them to tailor the localism message and present it via pro-market, non-threatening frames. As a result, leaders of less legitimized SMOs concentrated efforts on increasing consumer demand for local goods, through education and incentives. Although leaders’ efforts aimed squarely at consumers, local retail often remained less convenient and more expensive than national competitors, making a game-changing increase in consumer demand for local goods a tough challenge. Even high-legitimacy leaders seemed to avoid the large structural challenges needed to achieve broad changes in consumption patterns. That local retail was often less convenient and local foods were more expensive seemed largely outside the focus of the respondents.
Another observed challenge to the movement was the lack of strategic planning and metrics. Only a few leaders specifically mentioned these as priorities, and they indicated that it had taken them several years to get to that point (B4, B9). Moreover, the metrics that leaders did mention related primarily to membership numbers, with more members signaling a stronger SMO. (However, as was noted earlier, relying on membership numbers was suspect, given the variety of extant membership models.) There were exceptions. One leader measured success based on sales receipts (A10), whereas another focused on green energy produced in his county, a metric developed in response to a strategic effort to design measurable outcomes (B9). A lack of strategic planning and metrics would reinforce short-term, reactive thinking rather than that required for long-term systemic change.
Also, leaders of both high- and low-legitimized networks held a lax attitude toward members’ bona fides. Few SMO leaders verified whether new members’ organizations were indeed locally owned and, apart from Buy Fresh Buy Local member restaurants, none required that members source locally (McCaffrey & Kurland, 2014). This lack of policing provided a low barrier to entry for producers in the new market. However, lax enforcement of stated “localism” values (see Kurland, McCaffrey, & Hill, 2012) could undermine the legitimacy of these SMOs in the long run.
Finally, while leaders engaged in a broad portfolio of strategies, they consistently emphasized a narrower selection (see Table 3)—to develop the local customer and to create a collective identity among producers. It was up to leaders of more legitimized networks, with their greater human and physical resources, to embrace a broader range, which included tackling more difficult tasks, such as mentoring producers to encourage their market entry and altering the nature of exchange between consumers and producers. This focus on changing consumer behavior to the neglect of developing producers and altering the nature of exchange may ultimately challenge the efficacy of the movement.
Limitations
The present study is subject to several limitations. First, it represents a snapshot in time and the researchers’ ability to interview for relevant data. Leaders may have engaged in activities that the authors did not note because the authors failed to ask the question that would solicit this information. Second, while this study of localism investigated strategies leaders used to try to change market conditions and how leaders framed their actions, the data here did not provide clear evidence of the relative success of these efforts. Future research should follow up to further test the presence and use of the identified strategies. To what extent do these strategies adequately capture leaders’ efforts to transform the economic system? What strategies operate that the authors failed to include? Relatedly, the present study did not focus on specific goals and the resulting outcomes. In other words, to what extent does an SMO leader’s focus on a particular strategy (e.g., marketing and promotion) or on a particular market condition (e.g., encouraging producer entry) realize higher overall revenue for local businesses?
Future Research
Scholars can extend the present research in at least five ways. First, SMO network leaders have latitude to adopt and implement strategic frames that fit their local environment. Indeed, the authors noted discrepancies between some regional leaders and their national affiliates. For example, a regional leader embraced sustainability but chose to affiliate with AMIBA (A2). Or, the regional leader retained a narrow anti-chain focus and affiliated with BALLE (B14). One leader chose to affiliate with both AMIBA and BALLE (AB7, AB11). Or, in an extreme case, a regional affiliate of AMIBA was also a chamber of commerce that welcomed big-box retailers into its membership (A10). Future research can examine these differences to understand the degree to which national SMOs effectively transmit their messages to regional actors.
Second, the authors heard repeatedly that leaders lacked resources, both human and financial. The SMO leaders whom the authors interviewed were rarely full-time employees. Rather, they were full-time business owners who volunteered, part-time, to spearhead a localism organization. To gauge the development of these volunteer-dependent SMOs that focused on market creation, a time-series study is needed. It would perhaps be fruitful to revisit the networks and assess their strengths and successes in 5 or 10 years as the movement matures. Related research could examine the impact a dual role has on leaders’ effectiveness. For example, do leaders’ responsibilities as organization builders and as movement mobilizers involve different skills?
Third, this study’s findings support research on social movements and the distribution of resources. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) observed that “resources important for the mobilization of social movements are more readily accessible to potential collective actors in core zones than is the case in the periphery” and expect that this mobilization would correlate “more strongly with resource availability than with the spatial distribution of injustice or grievance” (p. 119). In the present study, the more legitimized networks were located in core zones; this encourages questions about the relationship between resource availability and the spatial need for change. For example, future study might examine the correlation between communities with declining city centers or food deserts and network legitimacy.
Fourth, given that verification and oversight of chapter organizations impact the legitimacy of the national organization and of the social movement more generally, scholars could develop a concept of “ecological legitimacy.” Ecological legitimacy would expand Scott’s original social-science-based approach to legitimacy to the realm of natural science, extending Frederick’s (1995, 2012) related research on the link between natural science and the corporation. How does an SMO, and in particular, an SMO such as BALLE advocating ecological legitimacy, derive this legitimacy from the organization’s synergy with the natural environment?
Finally, some of the localism organizations’ relationships with local chambers of commerce seemed to interact with legitimacy. Leaders of those SMOs which were less than a year old were generally open to partnering with the local chamber of commerce, or actively sought validation from it. Leaders of older networks, however, were generally adamant that they were distinct from the chamber: They contended that it failed to meet the needs of local firms and the local community. Future research could examine how localism organizations, and new SMOs more generally, use affiliation with existing business organizations, like chambers of commerce, to bolster legitimacy. In some cases it appears that being affiliated with the chamber enhances cultural-cognitive legitimacy (B13, A10), while in other communities being unaffiliated with the chamber provides normative legitimacy (A12, B4). Also worth further study is the impact on new, market-oriented social movements and their SMOs, of gaining legitimacy via association with traditional business interests.
Respondents in our study agreed that localism was about retaining customer choice of producers, preserving “unique cultural values and traditions within particular communities,” and aiming for a “reduction in the scale of decision-making and a genuine transfer of power to the decentralized units” (Napoli, 2001, pp. 380-381; see Frug, 1980). These leaders appeared to play significant roles, not just as framers of ideology, but also as strategic partners who influenced corresponding social structures.
However, the leaders’ dual role of legitimizing the SMO to conform to conventional organizational models, while growing a “local” market, seemed to create a tension, such that leaders, particularly of low-legitimized SMOs, with their limited human and financial resources, softened the otherwise threatening nature of their localism message. This softening manifested in leaders’ neglect to tackle more challenging structural tasks designed to mentor producers and alter the nature of exchange.
Footnotes
Appendix
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Duane Windsor, as well as the anonymous journal reviewers who were so generous with comments on earlier drafts. The authors drew extensively on suggestions from the anonymous reviewers during the several rounds of revision work for this article. The authors consciously attempted to incorporate these suggestions into their own language and reviewed the reviewer comments to this purpose. The authors are pleased also to thank Deb Miller, Andrew Masterleo, Eleni Drakatos, Marley Strauss, and Ishmael Buckner for their help in transcribing interviews and developing spreadsheets based on data from the organizations’ websites. They would also like to thank the Mellon Scholars Foundation for supporting student summer work on the project, as well as Linda Aleci, Matthew Bidwell, and Douglas Hill for their comments on earlier drafts.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.