Abstract
Emergent structural approaches to institutional complexity tend to inhibit the role of agency in addressing logic multiplicity scenarios. Prior studies of logic multiplicity have documented a diverse set of outcomes, ranging from domination through hybridization, and characterized by various levels of conflict. A new stream of research has emerged that seeks to explain this heterogeneity through the structural components of complexity. These studies tend to minimize the role of agency in institutional complexity scenarios, positing that outcome diversity, and the organization’s ability to exert agency, can be accounted for by the interaction of exogenously determined parameters, such as centrality, compatibility, prioritization, and jurisdictional overlap. This article revisits the role of agency in these models, suggesting that agency is not only framed by, but may itself shape, structure. The article draws on a comparative case study in five Israeli nonprofit organizations, focusing on the introduction of the business logic through a strategic planning process, and the challenge that this represents for the legacy social logic. The case studies demonstrate that organizations regularly use a set of distinctive mechanisms to manipulate the structural components of complexity, and, in so doing, agentically regulate logic multiplicity outcomes.
One of the recurrent themes of institutional theory, and specifically in studies of institutional logics, has been the role of agency (Thornton et al., 2012). Scholars have argued that institutional theory, as originally conceived (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), understated the effect of agency, fashioning actors as subservient to institutions (DiMaggio, 1988). This critique prompted the development of agency-centric models that assert the actor’s ability to shape the social environments and organizations in which people live, work, and play. As noted by Abdelnour et al. (2017), the development and defense of the agentic approach are manifest in studies of institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009), and institutional change (Battilana et al., 2009).
Recently, a new stream of research has emerged, in the form of what might be described as a structuralist model of institutional complexity, which appears to represent a fresh challenge to the agentic orientation (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Jancsary et al., 2017; Raynard, 2016; Waldorff et al., 2013). In addressing the question of why different organizational settings generate diverse constellations of complexity, this new approach focuses on the exogenic structural elements inherent in logic multiplicity scenarios, and the defining role these elements play in the determination of outcome configurations. While acknowledging a role for agency, these nascent models emphasize that structural parameters delimit the scope of agency and, as such, diminish its explanatory role in empirical and theoretical accounts of institutional complexity.
In this article, I argue that agency assumes a more definitive and primary role than these models would suggest. More specifically, the study identifies a series of mechanisms through which organizations can exert agency on the defining structural components of complexity scenarios. The focal scenario here is the strategic planning process (SPP) in five nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in Israel. The process was perceived as representative of a business orientation, and, at least initially, as a highly disruptive challenge to the traditional social logic that dominated these organizations. Nonetheless, despite the initial conflicts, the organizations’ resistance progressively transmuted into measured assimilation and acceptance of the business logic. The article looks at how organizations managed this transition, and particularly the coexistence of the divergent and at times contradictory prescriptions of the incumbent social logic and the challenger, the business logic. The analysis shows that in managing conflict in complexity scenarios, the organizations used a series of techniques, or mechanisms, that manipulate the parameters that the new structuralist theorists have identified as regulating the interaction between logics. The article explores the implications of this finding for concepts of agency in the context of institutional complexity, suggesting that although structure may indeed constrain agency, it is also the object of its exertion.
Accounting for Logic Multiplicity
Institutional logics are “taken-for-granted social prescriptions” (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, p. 1420) that shape attitudes, decisions, and behaviors for individuals and organizations (Friedland & Alford, 1991). When confronted by institutional complexity, situations in which multiple logics offer incompatible prescriptions (Greenwood et al., 2011), organizations may need to respond to avoid potential confusion and conflict. The competing demands of multiple logics can raise dilemmas regarding fundamental issues, such as the goals the organization should pursue and the appropriate means to achieve those goals (Pache & Santos, 2013).
The phenomenon of institutional complexity has generated a significant body of research that has set out to map the diverse patterns of organizational response to logic plurality. These patterns of response can be viewed on a continuum, where constellations of complexity are distinguished by the extent to which the competing logics are manifest separately in the organization. This continuum ranges from competitive dominance scenarios, in which only the senior logic is effectively present (Greenwood et al., 2002), through blended, hybrid logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), and, at the end of the continuum, collaboration and coexistence, in which the adversarial logics retain their original form, and are expressed intact, either whole or in part (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013).
Institutional complexity yields not only a diversity of form, but also widely divergent outcomes, as reflected in varying levels of conflict, sustainability, and organizational effectiveness. Studies have shown that institutional complexity can have significant positive consequences for organizations, enabling change and innovation (Binder, 2007; Jay, 2012), encouraging institutional entrepreneurship (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001), and broadening legitimacy (Kraatz & Block, 2008). However, institutional complexity can also generate conflict and risk, impinging performance (Tracey et al., 2011), intensifying politicization (Pache & Santos, 2010), and triggering antagonistic practices (Zilber, 2002).
In response to this perplexing diversity, an emergent stream of research is exploring the factors that generate different constellations and outcomes in logic multiplicity scenarios (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Jancsary et al., 2017; Raynard, 2016; Waldorff et al., 2013). In presenting their research agenda, Besharov and Smith note, “Existing research offers little insight, however, into the conditions under which these different outcomes arise” (p. 365). They ask, for instance, why multiple logics produce internal conflict in some organizations, but in others not, and why logic multiplicity can act as an empowering force for some organizations, but paralyzes others.
This research initiative represents a salient pivot in the study of logic multiplicity, transferring scholarly attention from an emphasis on mapping and classifying constellations of complexity, to an explanatory orientation, whose objective is to identify the factors that trigger one constellation rather than another. As noted by Besharov and Smith, “Our framework thereby shifts research from focusing on whether organizations embody multiple logics to understanding variation in how they do so” (p. 375). Similarly, Jancsary et al. (2017) claim that such approaches represent a new stepping off point for the study of institutional complexity: “Unlike existing literature in this area, however, we address recent calls to go beyond competitive dyads and provide a more systematic examination of the structure of multiple logics instantiated as configurations of interconnected elements” (p. 1161).
This emergent research stream focuses on the structural, exogenously determined dimensions of pluralism, such as compatibility, prioritization, and jurisdictional overlap, which, as posited in these studies, delineate complexity outcomes. Greenwood et al. (2011), for instance, note that the extent of complexity depends on the number and specificity of logics to which an organization is exposed. According to the Besharov–Smith construct, logic multiplicity outcomes, defined by characteristic levels of conflict, are a function of the centrality and compatibility parameters. Centrality is the degree to which multiple logics impact core operations of the organization. Compatibility refers to the consistency of organizational guidance prescribed by different logics. These parameters combine to yield different complexity outcomes. For example, conflict tends to increase when incompatible logics compete as equals in the organizational core, while decreasing when the organizational core is dominated by one of the logics. Jancsary et al. (2017) introduce the permeability parameter, noting that organizational response to institutional complexity is shaped by the extent and intensity of the interface between competing logics.
The current study addresses the role of agency in the context of these structural models. The emphasis on structure has important implications for agency because structure limits and shapes the scope of agentic action. In their analysis of how distinct logic multiplicity scenarios yield differential potential for agency, Waldorff et al. (2013) argue that “the concept of constellation of logics [offers] a new way of understanding agency. We see that it is the arrangement and relationship among logics that helps to explain how action can be both constrained and enabled” (p. 125). The authors posit, for example, that the ability of actors to exert agency is mediated by the relationships between logics, where, for instance, additive relationships, in which the prescriptions of multiple logics are cumulative, tend to constrain action, while facilitative relationships, in which adherence to one logic can foster adherence to another logic, tend to enable action. Similarly, in the Raynard (2016) article, the determining components of pluralism, identified as compatibility, prioritization, and jurisdictional overlap, combine to frame the organization’s opportunities for agency. In Raynard’s “segregated complexity” scenario, for example, the competing logics are incompatible, and the field does not offer salient prioritization between the logics. This configuration of structural components constrains the ways in which the organization can exert agency to mitigate conflict. However, this “segregated complexity” scenario, in which the jurisdiction of each logic is clearly bounded, also offers a path for agency. Specifically, organizations can proactively mitigate conflict by focusing activity within a single, uncontested domain, or by segregating activities into separate domains, where each domain is dominated by a specific logic. In a similar vein, Van Wijk et al. (2019) suggest that opportunities for agency are mediated by different combinations of complexity and degree of institutionalization.
In these models, organizational agency emerges as a function of the interaction between the components of complexity. From the actor’s perspective, these structural attributes constrain agency. As such, agency occupies a somewhat secondary and tangential role, its scope confined to managing complexity outcomes rendered by structure. Framed as “outcome management,” agency operates to mitigate conflict and other possible risks that might characterize complexity outcomes. By way of contrast, the current study will argue that agency may itself shape structure. Rather than framing the structural components of complexity as the parameters that define logic multiplicity outcomes, there is a sense in which structure itself is constructed (Ramus et al., 2017; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013). In this, the article responds to Schildt and Perkmann’s (2017) call for a research strategy, one which they contrast with the Besharov–Smith model, that would “explain the compatibility of logics as an endogenous accomplishment that is stabilized through the organizational settlement and not as an exogenously given characteristic” (p. 142).
Furthermore, the article is positioned within the conceptual framework of collective agency. In arguing for a collective rather than individual conceptualization of agency, Abdelnour et al. (2017) note, “Without disengaging agency from individuals, theorists risk falling back to simplified . . . models of organizations and society as linear derivatives of individual pursuits” (p. 1782). The collective approach aligns with a meso-level framework of analysis. In so doing, it eschews a focus on the individual, disengaging from a micro-level analysis of the histories, emotions, and capabilities of institutional “superheroes,” while ascribing agency to the collective patterns of behavior exerted within an organization.
The findings presented in this article suggest that organizations can manipulate the structural parameters of logic multiplicity scenarios and, as such, shape complexity outcomes. This represents a significant contribution to the study of institutional complexity, rendering a view of an organization with the capacity to proactively navigate conflicting logic scenarios. This is especially important given the divergency and potential impact of complexity outcomes, which range from the risk of debilitating conflict through the benefits of enrichment, such as broadened legitimacy, an enhanced ability to innovate, and reinforced sustainability. Moreover, as will be discussed in the “Concluding Comments”, the assertion that agency may mold structure also has important implications for theoretical and empirical modeling of institutional complexity, including the framing of logic multiplicity outcomes, our understanding of the multidimensional intricacy that organizations need to take account of in navigating institutional complexity scenarios, and potential mitigation of the paradox of embedded agency.
Research Setting: Social and Business Logics in NPOs
The study focuses on the SPP in NPOs in Israel. In this section, I will argue that this process, at least in the Israeli NPO setting (Strichman et al., 2008), can be framed in terms of the interaction and conflict between social and business logics. The dyad of social and business logics has been widely used in the research of complexity in NPOs (Baines, 2010; Battilana et al., 2015; Pache & Santos, 2013). The business logic holds that people and corporations make choices and take actions that maximize their profit and utility (Friedman, 2002). Familiar, widely used concepts and management devices, such as performance measurement, the generation of value for shareholders (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), and employment productivity (Westermann-Behaylo et al., 2014) are a product of the business logic. If the underlying norm of the business logic is profit-driven self-interest (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 56), the social logic is oriented to the promotion of social justice, equality, and the support of disadvantaged groups. Indeed, these values provide the motivation for a person’s membership and activity in a social organization (Rothschild & Milofsky, 2006). Similarly, the NPO is characterized by its focus on the execution of a social mission as opposed to profit generation (Brainard & Siplon, 2004). The NPO must protect this orientation to maintain its identity and execute its social role (Westermann-Behaylo et al., 2014).
Baines (2010) argue that the interaction of social and market orientations in social organizations diverts the social organization’s dialog from its original and primary focus on solidarity and equality. As a result of the encounter with business logic, NPOs tend to become driven by management models focused on performance and results (Salamon, 1993), rather than social goals. Although the adoption of standards of professionalism and efficiency strengthens organizations, the penetration of business logic to the NPO also results in an erosion of the social orientation, a decline in morale, and a diminution in new social initiatives (Hwang & Powell, 2009).
I posit that the SPP in the NPO can be framed as an encounter between a nascent business logic and the incumbent social logic. The transition of strategic planning from the business sector to the nonprofit environment has proven challenging for nonprofits (Pache & Santos, 2010; Stone & Bryson, 2000). These difficulties have been broadly documented in both US and European contexts (Domanski, 2011; Hwang & Powell, 2009). Stone and Bryson (2000) argue that strategic process models that were developed for the for-profit sector are not necessarily appropriate for organizations whose mission is the delivery of social value. Brown and Iverson (2004) point to the emphasis that the SPP places on enhancing the organization’s ability to compete, an orientation that NPOs perceive as foreign to their social mission (Sharp, 2018). Hwang and Powell (2009) cite the nonprofit’s decision to undertake an SPP as a primary indicator of a business orientation. In line with these studies, and as will be discussed in the “Findings” section, the participating organizations consistently referred to strategic planning as representative of a business mind-set, a way of thinking they found new, foreign, and disruptive.
Method
Data Collection
As noted, the study focuses on the SPP at five Israeli NPOs. The choice of organizations was based on the following criteria: execution of a strategic process, the time interval from the completion of the strategic process until commencement of the initial data collection phase of the study, demographic parameters, and the domain of activity. The candidate organizations were identified following the initial recommendations of local third sector experts and application of the snowball sample method (Creswell, 1998). The strategic process criterion was based on subjective self-definition, as defined and reported by the organizations themselves. Specifically, when asked in a screening interview, each of the organizations eventually selected for the study responded without hesitation or reservation that they had conducted a strategic process. Of approximately 200 organizations that were approached, less than 10 met this criterion. Some of these 10 organizations were not interested in cooperating, eventually leaving five organizations in the study. Note that although all the organizations referred to an SPP, the actual processes implemented by the various organizations differed in terms of scope, method, level of participation, and duration. As detailed in the organizational profiles presented in Table 1, all the case study organizations are service providers.
Profiles of the Organizations.
Note. NIS = New Israeli Sheqel.
Sources of income are presented according to the order and self-definitions of the organizations in their financial reports.
The data comprise interviews and archival material. The archival material consists of the final strategic plans, presentations, meeting memos, and various summary documents from the process. The interviews were semi-structured in-depth interviews. In each of the organizations, the interviews were completed within 15 months of the formal finalization of the SPP. With the exception of The Volunteer, where one key person had left, all the key participants and process leads were active in their organizations at the time of the interviews. Most of the interviews were of 60- to 90-minute duration. I used an interview guide containing a bank of 73 questions. Interviewees were asked, for example, to describe the SPP in detail, their reasons for conducting the SPP, the role of the consultants, levels of participation, methodology used, resistance to the process, and their assessment of the importance and effectiveness of the SPP. The specific questions asked depended on the interviewee’s position and knowledge, and as such varied from interview to interview.
The interviews were conducted with managers and employees involved in the strategic process, representatives of the boards, and the external strategic consultants engaged by the organizations. To gain another perspective, the interviews with each organization also included at least one member of the organization who was not personally involved in the strategic process. All told, 58 interviews were conducted across the five organizations with seven interviews at Family Tradition, The Volunteer eight, Special Needs 21, Food Rescue 12, and Technology Advances 10. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The number of interviews varied according to the specific circumstances and scope of the strategic process in each organization.
Data Analysis
The analysis of the data followed established qualitative research techniques. The first phase in the analysis was to summarize the interviews for each organization. Inspired by the technique of “replication logic” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), these summaries helped me form a close understanding of the “story” of the strategic process in each organization, as well as differences and similarities across the organizations. This organization-level perspective also provided a basis for the development of meaningful codes in the next stage of the data analysis. For instance, one of the salient themes that I identified across the organizations was the progressive transformation of the strategic process from high to low conflict. Accordingly, my subsequent data coding and grouping was contextualized by my interest in understanding how this transformation occurred.
The second phase in the data analysis was the coding of the interview transcripts. Following coding conventions developed by Gioia et al. (2012), and using Atlas.ti to support the process, the first step was to code the interview transcripts based, wherever possible, on “in vivo” words and phrases, as used by the interviewees to describe the SPP. The first-order codes related, for instance, to the flow and activities of the strategic process, emotional and attitudinal responses that it evoked, and changes to the organization that emerged. As part of this stage, I read and re-read the interviews a number of times. As this stage progressed, I was able to refine the coding of the data, adding, combining, and deleting categories, while also modifying the assignment of passages to specific codes. For example, in discussing the decision to reduce availability of a certain therapy for handicapped patients, one of the interviewees at Special Needs responded with a strong emotional outburst. Accordingly, I added a relevant code and checked for similar responses in other interviews. Throughout this process, additional questions emerged, which, as relevant, I referred back to the original informants.
The second step involved aggregating the first-order codes. The focus here was on the identification of common attributes and recurring themes across the organizations. This step created a more concise group of first-order categories. Where possible, I tried to retain the terminology of the interviewees, but generally I was obliged to use my own terminology to create meaningful groupings. For instance, the interviewees described a series of controversial incidents in which there was a direct clash between the idealism of the organization and economic efficiency. However, the incidents were unique to each organization, meaning it was not possible to use an “in vivo” code that would apply across organizations. I combined all these incidents, for example, the “Arab workers incident” code at Food Rescue, and the “Catering service” code at Family Tradition, under a generic “Incidents around values” code. Despite using my own words, I tried not to infuse these codes with concepts from the literature. Prior to moving to the next step, the creation of theoretical categories, I asked a second researcher to examine the material and verify the first-order categorizations, including both the initial granular codes and the subsequent groupings. This researcher had an independent outsider’s perspective as he had not previously been involved in the study. There was general agreement on most of the categorizations. On items where there were differences, we discussed and reached consensus on retaining the original codes, refining them, or changing the coding assignment of the passage.
The third step involved connecting these first-order groupings into theoretically significant second-order themes (see Figure 1). The process was an iterative one in which I would cycle through the first-order categories and the relevant institutional theory literature, grouping first-order codes into superset-categories reflecting themes of potential theoretical significance. In each cycle, I would refine and enrich these themes. For instance, the first-order categories of “Model for other nonprofits,” “Creating coalition for national projects,” and “Lobbying for social legislation” were subsumed under the “Amplification” theme, referring to the high-profile national agenda that the case study organizations adopted in response to the SPP. The final step in the data analysis focused on theory. The theoretical development suggested in this article was triggered by my observation that the behavior patterns of the case study organizations, as captured in the second-order data categories, have potentially significant implications for emerging structurally centric models of institutional complexity.
Data structure.
Findings
Conflict
The SPP generated internal conflict in the organizations. As described below, the level of conflict varied chronologically, its intensity peaking in the initial phases, and progressively dissipating over time.
Kick-off
With the exception of The Volunteer, the organizations themselves initiated the strategic process. At The Volunteer, the process was requested and funded by the foundation that serves as the organization’s leading patron, but the organization was allowed full freedom in the management of the process. Nonetheless, the initiative met with strong resistance, particularly in the early stages of the process, and as manifest in the selection of the strategic consultants.
The selection of consultants is significant in that consultants, as outsiders, are well positioned to import logics and to facilitate their acceptance within an organization (David et al., 2013). All the organizations demonstrated a reluctance to hire a “pure” business strategist, preferring to impose a certain balance between the social and business worlds. For example, at Family Tradition, the new managing director chose a professional marketing consultant specializing in nonprofits, whereas Food Rescue chose a consultant specializing in social responsibility in business organizations.
The Volunteer was the only organization in the study that worked with a consultancy group that specializes in strategic processes for for-profits. Despite initial attempts to find common ground, the first meetings of the strategic process turned into what would be described in the interviews as a “battlefield.” In response, The Volunteer defined a series of modifications that would align the consultant’s strictly business methodology to the special needs of the nonprofit. For example, in accordance with the democratic principle generally characteristic of NPOs, they demanded a more egalitarian approach, with broader participation of staff in the process. The consultancy group was forced, against its will, to accept this approach.
Planning phase
With the exception of Food Rescue, the SPP initially encountered widespread resistance. At Special Needs, the senior managers felt threatened by the discussion of economic considerations, complaining that the process was making them “businessmen,” and that monetary considerations compromised their role as rehabilitation professionals. Similarly, the managers at Technology Advances were very critical of the consultants who led the process, arguing that they were overly business in their orientation. Conflict was apparently most intense at The Volunteer. The proposed changes were perceived as “revolutionary,” and the process was characterized by verbal violence and controversy, initially between the managing director and the consultants, but subsequently involved employees at the field level as well.
Implementation phase
Following the initial tension and conflicts, the strategic process itself was generally conducted in a relatively peaceful and harmonious manner, virtually devoid of conflict. The Volunteer was the exception, where conflict continued, albeit at a lower level of intensity, through the implementation phase. In the other four organizations, only sporadic, albeit intense, incidents were reported after the planning phase.
Organizational Enrichment Through the Business Logic
Symbolic manifestation
One of the most salient findings from the case studies is the undisguised fascination of these socially oriented organizations with the business mind-set. Admiration is interwoven with an almost apologetic desire to be as good as business organizations. The founder of Food Rescue expressed this as follows: “My organization is like a business, there is no difference at all between me and FedEx. OK? We have good people, good information systems, a good delivery infrastructure. We are a serious organization.”
This was also reflected in attitudes toward the SPP itself. By the conclusion of the process, the initial opposition had been replaced by virtual consensus in the management teams of each of the organizations that the process had been successful and had achieved its goals. Commenting on the project, the managing director of The Volunteer said, “This was a very prestigious process. I’ll tell you the bottom line. At the end of the process, the consulting firm’s vice president asked to be a member of our board.” Most of the other interviewees from The Volunteer also referred to the process with great pride. NPO admiration for representatives of the business logic was a recurring theme across all the participant organizations.
At the symbolic level, the penetration of the business logic was also reflected in the business lexicon and orientation that came to inform management operations and decision-making. At Special Needs, for example, managerial discussions had traditionally been decoupled from financial aspects. As noted by the finance manager, “My room was the only place where people discuss business. Outside of this room, it was very difficult to discuss business in this organization.” In contrast, following the strategic process, “We speak about the budget all the time, one cannot discuss strategy without it; it’s not something one can disregard” (managing director). And similarly, We have defined three criteria as critical to success: economic infrastructure, human capital and partnerships . . . It was the first time we actually articulated it, said it in such a clear voice, that part of strategic thinking is to ensure that we have the suitable economic infrastructure.
The managing director of Technology Advances described the change that the organization had undergone: “Now we see what it means to have an economic map that speaks the language of money and operational targets, then we say, OK, we really never had anything like it before.” Family Tradition also modified their approach to new initiatives: “Look, our organization is now like a business . . . If it can’t be covered financially, I won’t allow it” (senior manager). At The Volunteer, the managing director noted, “It was important to teach the staff a new language, the language of the competitive zone.”
Material manifestation
The acceptance of business logic was also manifest in organizational action, reflecting the material aspect of logics. In coding the interview data, I observed a series of recurring themes that the respondents referred to in discussing their adoption of a business orientation. I organized these themes into five clusters: (a) the systemization of operations, as reflected, for example, in the adoption of a more methodical approach to decision-making and project management, including the implementation of procedures for feedback and postmortem analyses; (b) an enhanced emphasis on standardization and quantification, as manifest in expanded requirements for training of employees and volunteers, for example, Technology Advances’ implementation of training for professionalization of management skills, Family Tradition’s adoption of standardized branding, The Volunteer’s establishment of quantifiable service level criteria, and Food Rescue’s introduction of tools for measurement of employees and project effectiveness; (c) the more explicit inclusion of business criteria in management discussions and considerations around new initiatives and ongoing activity, such as Special Needs’ insistence that the launching of new projects now be contingent on the prior securing of funding, and Technology Advances’ adoption of needs-based marketing techniques in evaluating new and ongoing projects; (d) the forging of operational partnerships with business organizations, the relationships with whom, prior to the SPP, had been almost exclusively confined to funding initiatives; and (e) the launching of commercial, for-profit activities, such as Special Needs’ initiative to rent out their premises and equipment for private health activities, the establishment of a gift shop, and the launch of fundraising courses for other NPOs. As detailed in Table 2, all the organizations adopted business-like practices, although there was significant variance in the extent to which such practices were adopted or rejected by the organizations, and, using the Besharov–Smith centrality parameter, in the tendency for these practices to be embedded in core as opposed to noncore peripheral operations.
Core-Peripheral Instantiation of the Business Logic.
Note. SPP = strategic planning process.
Systemization and professional standards were implemented at the management level only, not for cross-organizational operations. bPrior to the SPP, the organizations had funding relationships with business organizations, but not as operational partners.
Organizational Awareness of Contesting Logics
The interviews reveal that the organizations were aware of plural and at times contrary needs that this logic multiplicity scenario obliged them to address. As noted, the organizations admired the business logic and actively pursued its material expression. However, these business-oriented aspirations were tempered by the perceived need to minimize conflict and preserve the organization’s idealistic social identity. As noted by the chairman of Special Needs, “Finding the balance between values, humanity and ethics, and the cold efficiency of an organization that manages finance, salaries, office cleaning and everything else, is not easy, but it is essential for the real success of the organization.” Similar sentiments are articulated by a senior manager at The Volunteer: “We are an organization that always tries to maintain that fine balance between a business organization and a social organization.”
Acceptance of the business orientation was consistently qualified by the ultimate precedence of the social logic. Commenting on his business background, the managing director of The Volunteer noted, “I very much come from there. I see everything through a budget.” But this business orientation is modified by an overriding commitment to a social mission: “What matters is what I do because I’m committed to justice. We don’t measure success the way others do.” Similarly, a senior manager at Special Needs noted, “As a result of the strategic process, there was great concern regarding the business aspect. We defined a set of very rigid red lines, beyond which there will be no business-like activity.” The managing director of Technology Advances also gave priority to the social logic: “One of our targets is working with youth from deprived backgrounds. If we fail [in this], this is a failure . . . even if this activity generates millions.” The founder of Food Rescue acknowledged that the incorporation of a business orientation needed to be tempered by an awareness of the organization’s social mission: “Let’s not forget who we are, why we exist, and who are the people that receive our services.” These comments exemplify an asymmetric duality: while allowing the presence of both logics, the organizations’ commitment to the business logic is moderated by an apparently more fundamental commitment to the social logic.
Control Mechanisms
As discussed, in dealing with institutional complexity, the organizations encountered an intricate composite of needs that included assimilating the business logic while maintaining the NPO’s social orientation, mitigating conflict, and preserving organizational harmony. As summarized in Table 3, the case study findings suggest that in response to logic multiplicity, the organizations evoked certain recurring patterns of behavior, referred to here as episodic override, compartmentalization, and amplification. These behaviors seem to serve as mechanisms of complexity control, allowing the organizations to manage this multifarious and, at times, conflicting set of needs.
Mechanisms to Maintain Precedence of Social Logic.
Episodic override
The case study organizations were required to contend with various situations marked by open conflict between the two logics. For instance, Food Rescue’s founder described the following scenario: the organization employs a group of elderly Arab women who work in fruit-picking (in situations where orchard owners are donating the unpicked fruit). He explained that these workers work quite slowly and productivity is low. As a result, the cost of collecting the fruit was higher than it would otherwise have been using alternative methods or resources. However, he noted, their employment in the Food Rescue framework was the first time these women had had the opportunity to earn a regular salary with full social benefits. This situation brought the social and business logics into direct conflict. The decision, which was described by the founder as “strategic,” was to continue their employment. The founder noted that given the organization’s commitment to sound business conduct, this decision was not taken easily.
Special Needs declared policy guidelines to deal with such scenarios. In situations in which there was a clash between the use of facilities for the organization’s beneficiaries, as opposed to their use for commercial activities, the guidelines granted precedence to beneficiaries. Similarly, at Technology Advances, the consultant recommended the exclusive use of financial criteria for assessing performance of the resource development unit. The organization rejected this recommendation, choosing instead a set of social criteria that derived from the organization’s social mission. Family Tradition was offered the opportunity to expand its existing kitchen operation to provide for-profit catering to other schools. Management rejected the idea based on their concern that such a development could compete with and potentially diminish the scope of their charitable kitchen services.
The findings show that these occasional confrontational episodes were consistently resolved in favor of the social mission and values. In routine operations, it seems that the two logics co-existed harmoniously, operating together in non-conflictual space where each logic could be expressed in management decisions and organizational practices. Nonetheless, engagement with both logics periodically surfaced a residual, underlying rivalry. In these “conflict point” situations, the organizations avoided arrangements that would potentially compromise the key social logic. Rather, they reverted to an explicit override function, tightly focused on the specific episode at hand, awarding precedence to social values, but containing and localizing the conflict to the current instance.
Compartmentalization
One of the most salient expressions of the business logic was the establishment by three of the organizations of new for-profit operations. These initiatives were set up to operate separately from the organization’s mainstream nonprofit operations. For instance, The Volunteer established a for-profit service to provide knowledge on volunteerism as an outsourcing operation, minimizing direct involvement of the organization’s employees and volunteers. Similarly, new for-profit initiatives were trialed as separate, off-site units. In an extreme form of compartmentalization, promising for-profit pilots were “exported” out to other organizations who would then adopt and run the initiatives themselves.
Special Needs established an on-premises gift shop as a joint venture with a national gift shop chain, where Special Needs provided the space at its facility. This provided a profit-sharing opportunity while isolating the Special Needs operation and brand from a business orientation. Technology Advances opened a “resource development” unit. This approach ensured the organization could confine business-related activities, such as development of partner relationships with business organizations, revenue growth, and general expansion of financial resources, to a well-defined zone, rather than allowing their broad diffusion across the organization.
Amplification
In each of the organizations, the SPP was accompanied by an expansion of the scope of the legacy social logic. The amplification of the social logic was expressed, for instance, in the decision of some of the organizations to transition, as part of the SPP, from a localized service-specific function to a social leadership role, operating nation-wide and even internationally. For example, Family Tradition, which had focused on educational and welfare services, established a lobbying activity “. . . to offer all that we have done locally [in the city of Beersheba] and become a nationwide activity” (managing director). Similarly, the organization’s mission was broadened to “provide a national model for education.” The Volunteer, which had originally focused on training volunteers, expanded lobbying activity in government offices, with their stated aim “. . . to change the social paradigm in the country” (senior manager). The organization’s re-stated mission was now: “Lead youth volunteerism in Israel.”
Food Rescue, whose entire activity had been focused on physical distribution of food to the needy, reached a decision that it would “. . . not only distribute food, but also lead a change in the whole issue of the struggle against hunger” (deputy chairman of the board). This included lobbying for the establishment of national regulations to ensure “food security,” the establishment of specifications for nutritional value standards for food charity organizations, and assumption of a middleman role to supply food to distribution charities. Food Rescue’s mission was also expanded to “Lead and educate about ‘food charity’ in the Israeli nonprofit sector.”
Special Needs resolved to make a similar change, “[We] don’t want to provide just local services but to be an organization that leads change, generates change!” (senior manager). The organization’s mission statement was also modified to assume a national role: “To generate change in Israeli society regarding people with special needs.” This role included legislative and advocacy programs, participation in national forums, scientific research, lobbying, and an emphasis on community education and awareness programs. Similarly, the Deputy Managing Director of Technology Advances, noted, “We have been an organization that can perform excellently as a service provider, and which has now become a leader that has a say in national forums.”
Discussion
The study findings have demonstrated that the organizations were able to minimize conflict despite the active presence of apparently divergent logics. The study findings also suggest that the relative absence of conflict may be at least partly attributable to a series of behavioral mechanisms—episodic override, compartmentalization, and amplification—through which the organizations were able to mitigate potential conflict situations. In this section of the article, I will argue that the role of these mechanisms can be framed in the interface between the organization and the structural factors that delineate logic multiplicity. This argument has important implications for conceptualization of agency as manifest in the emergent stream of structurally centric models of institutional complexity. I will illustrate my argument in terms of the Besharov–Smith model, which serves here as an exemplar of this new structurally oriented approach.
Complexity Control Mechanisms
The Besharov–Smith model posits that in multiple logic scenarios, different combinations of centrality and compatibility yield different levels of organizational conflict. I would argue that the complexity control mechanisms used by the participant organizations impact the structural parameters of the Besharov–Smith model. As described below, by invoking these mechanisms, it appears that the organizations can manipulate levels of centrality and compatibility, and in so doing, manage complexity outcomes.
In this context, it should be noted that the structural parameters of the Besharov–Smith model are instantiated within the organization itself. To be sure, their model assumes that these parameters are shaped by factors in the institutional field: compatibility, for instance, by the number of professional organizations, and centrality by the configuration of power relationships within the field. However, the influence of organizational factors, such as the impact of hiring practices and socialization on compatibility, or the effect on centrality of a specific organization’s dependence on field resources, means that the expression of these parameters varies across organizations. Accordingly, the current case study explores the agential manipulation of the unique within-organization expression of these structural parameters. Indeed, in contrast, for instance, to Smets et al. (2012), who have shown how modification of work practices in complexity scenarios can yield new field logics, my findings provide no evidence to suggest that agency was directed to the field, and specifically, to the antecedent field-level parameters that shape the instantiation of centrality and compatibility. The resultant focus is on mechanisms that the organization can proactively launch and apply to structural attributes at the organizational level.
Episodic override
Turning first to the episodic override mechanism: while the business logic significantly affected core operations in the case study organizations, the acceptance and influence of the two logics were not symmetrical. In situations in which the organizations encountered overt conflict, the organization invoked the seniority of the social logic to override the business logic. This was illustrated, for instance, in Family Tradition’s rejection of the proposed for-profit catering opportunity, and in the case of the Arab women workers at Food Rescue. In this differentiated, discriminatory approach, the selective override device functions as a fallback mechanism to deal with acute conflict in an otherwise high–compatibility space. This device allows the organization to leverage the benefits of complexity: assured of being able to confine and resolve occurrences of risk-laden conflict, the nonprofit can allow itself to benefit from the otherwise enriching, synergetic presence of both logics.
Stated in terms of the Besharov–Smith model, the episodic override mechanism lowers centrality by excluding business logic considerations from the organization’s decision on the particular issue at hand. In other words, even in a high–centrality scenario, with both logics in play in the operational core, the organization can proactively invoke the underlying priority of the incumbent logic to delimit centrality on sensitive or problematic issues. As noted by Besharov and Smith, low centrality limits conflict: “when internal conflicts arise, differences can be resolved in favor of the dominant logic, limiting escalation and intractability” (p. 372). My departure from the Besharov–Smith model is in the proactive, agentic role of the organization in shaping the centrality parameter. This is a subtle but conceptually significant difference: from the organization’s perspective, centrality does not appear simply as an immutable given, but it can also be the object of manipulation by the organization.
Compartmentalization
The organizations also used compartmentalization to enable the presence of the business logic in the organization, while avoiding complexity configurations with high potential for conflict. As detailed in Table 2, this was demonstrated in the organizations’ approach to for-profit initiatives. The response of the organizations was to set up their for-profit initiatives as largely independent divisions, peripheral operations that did not overlap with core social activities. The insertion of overtly business activity within the domain of day-to-day core operations had the potential for high conflict outcomes. The organizations were able to mitigate the risk of conflict by marginalizing the business-style initiatives, separate from the core. In this context, it is noteworthy that while Ometto et al. (2019) have found that compartmentalization can undermine the organization’s connectedness to its social mission, the current findings suggest that compartmentalization may function as a bulwark against mission drift.
Analysis of the compartmentalization mechanism in the context of the structural parameters of institutional complexity suggests that compartmentalization may actually comprise two separate, distinct functions, namely segmentation and sideshow. “Segmentation” refers to the isolation of activities governed by a specific logic in a separate organizational unit. Jancsary et al. (2017) note that logics need not be compatible as a whole, “but only within the overlaps, where multiple logics may be evoked through the same practices” (p. 1163). Drawing on this distinction, I would suggest that by reducing jurisdictional overlap, segmentation reduces the effective extent of incompatibility between conflicting logics in an organization.
By way of contrast, “sideshowing” refers to the distancing of certain activities from core operations. One of the challenges of centralist configurations, where multiple conflicting logics are active in the core, is the threat that challenger logics pose to organizational identity. By isolating activities dominated by the challenger logic in a peripheral operational unit, detached from core activities, the organization can mitigate the challenger logic’s threat to its identity. Sideshow, then, is a more stringent form of segmentation: while segmentation separates selected activities, even within the core, to minimize overlap and thus suppress incompatibility, the sideshow device also mitigates centrality by isolating and distancing those activities from the core. While closely related, segmentation can be invoked without sideshowing. For example, we could envisage segmented core operations, where the defining arenas of an organization’s activities are broken out into separate, parallel units with minimal interface. In this hypothetical situation, segmentation is in play, but not sideshow, in that all key activities remain co-located in the core.
In the current study, it seems that the organizations were focused on sideshowing, rather than “mere” segmentation. In explaining the rationale for establishing separate organizational units for business operations, the chief executive officer (CEO) of The Volunteer notes, “We don’t want to confuse the core. So entrepreneurship is kept separate, totally cut off from the core . . . It’s different from hi-tech. We are committed to justice, to solving social problems.” The CEO’s comment manifests a concern for the potentially debilitating impact of for-profit operations on the spirit of the organization. In dealing with this threat, merely segmenting for-profit and nonprofit activities within the organizational core was deemed insufficient. To avert the identity threat, for-profit operations needed to be detached, “totally cut off from the core.” In selecting the sideshow device, then, it seems that the organization was focused on reducing centrality. Had the concern been the mitigation of incompatibility, this could have been achieved by segmentation of for-profit operations, to reduce jurisdictional overlap, within the core itself.
Amplification
The findings also demonstrate that the organizations draw on an amplification mechanism. I would argue that amplification modifies the overall weighting of the centrality parameter within the organization. In all the case study organizations, the adoption of the challenger business logic was subsequently followed by the development and strengthening of the legacy social logic. This “amplification” response suggests a pattern of behavior that has not previously been identified in the literature. Battilana et al. (2015) described amplification of the historically peripheral challenger logic. The inhibition of the legacy logic has also been well documented; for example, in analyzing the institutionalization of diffusing logics, Reay and Hinings (2009) reported that the status of the legacy logic was reduced. The current study reveals the reverse phenomenon, namely the strengthened expression of the legacy logic.
The penetration of a potentially incompatible challenger logic represents a conflictual risk-point for the organization. As noted by Besharov and Smith, this threat increases as a function of the centrality parameter; namely, the extent to which the competing logics are equally manifest in the core features of the organization. By means of the amplification mechanism, the organization is able to reduce centrality by expanding the sphere of influence of the incumbent logic. Expansion of the incumbent social logic, reinforcing its paramount governance role in the organizational core, reduces centrality. However, unlike override or sideshow, amplification does not inhibit the active role of the business logic in core operations. Rather, by undertaking new and large-scale social initiatives, the participant organizations were able to perceptibly re-assert the dominance of social values in the organization’s regime of logics. The intensified commitment to the social logic reduces the organization’s sense of centrality, mitigating concerns over the challenge to the NPO’s social identity, and the attendant volatility and potential for conflict.
Revisiting the Role of Agency in Emergent Structural Models of Complexity
To this point, the analysis has shown how the organization can draw on various practices, such as episodic override, compartmentalization—in the form of segmentation and sideshow—and amplification, through which it can manage the instantiation of logics in complexity scenarios. This finding suggests an agential interpretation of the emerging structural models of institutional complexity, one in which the organization can shape complexity outcomes by manipulating the defining structural components of logic multiplicity scenarios.
To be sure, Besharov and Smith acknowledge the role of member agency, pointing to environmental and other mediating factors, such as the strength of ties to field actors, that may indirectly influence compatibility by regulating the ability of actors to deviate from logic dictates. Similarly, centrality may be influenced by the power structure within an organization, in that power structures can mediate the propensity of actors to bring their preferred logic to bear in core operations. However, the scope of agency in the Besharov–Smith model remains residual in that it is strictly constrained by a cluster of field and organizational factors that shape centrality and compatibility. Moreover, their model does not explore the ways in which agency is exercised. Similarly, Raynard’s model allows agency, explaining how the scope of agency is determined by the defining components of complexity. By way of contrast, the current study suggests that the relationship between structure and agency is bi-directional, accepting that structure can limit agency, while asserting that actors can also actively manipulate the parameters of complexity to optimize outcomes and mitigate conflict.
Re-Framing Outcomes for Agency
In terms of complexity modeling, the agential perspective has important implications for the framing of outcome scenarios. The emerging structural theories define complexity outcomes in terms of conflict levels. Besharov and Smith rank their ideal-type outcomes from “Contested,” characterized by extensive conflict, through “Dominant,” in which there is no conflict. Similarly, the outcomes defined in the Raynard model span “Volatile,” where conflict is potentially maximized, through “Aligned” and “Segregated” outcomes, where conflict is relatively minimal. I would argue, however, that to the extent the organization can control the delineating parameters of institutional complexity, outcomes cannot be explained in terms of conflict mitigation alone. In the Besharov–Smith model, for instance, exclusive use of the conflict criterion would render conflict minimization the dominant outcome: Were organizations assessing outcomes solely in terms of conflict mitigation, they would consistently avoid high-centrality instantiations, which elevate the risk of conflict, while gravitating to outcomes that minimize or eliminate conflict. Indeed, even in high-compatibility scenarios, they would prefer to minimize centrality and minimize conflict. This does not fit our case study findings. All the organizations, to varying degrees, incorporated the business logic into core operations, an option that bears inherently higher conflict risk than configurations that peripheralize the business logic.
Organizational enrichment
In trying to explain these findings, the case study data suggest that in addition to “conflict costs,” outcomes also need to take account of “enrichment benefits.” “Enrichment” serves here as a composite variable intended to capture the various benefits, such as enhanced legitimacy, innovation, and sustainability, that accrue to an organization exposed to multiple logics. As presented in the findings, the organization leaders and mid-level managers openly acknowledged the enrichment effect, emphasizing the importance of the influence of the business logic for their organizations, and the significance of adopting business standards and practices.
Conflict-enrichment trade-off
The combination of conflict and enrichment in the outcome equation creates a nuanced trade-off for organizations as they navigate through logic multiplicity scenarios. The dimensions of this trade-off can be illustrated in terms of the centrality and compatibility parameters (Figure 2). In high-compatibility scenarios (right-hand quadrants in Figure 2), organizations can adopt low- or high-centrality configurations (bottom-right or top-right quadrants, respectively). Low centrality can be invoked, for example, through peripheral instantiation via sideshowing, or by override, to check expression of the challenger logic. Following Besharov–Smith, it is assumed that low centrality reduces potential conflict. However, as argued here, low centrality is also associated with low enrichment because it nulls the potentially positive impact of the business logic on core operations. By way of contrast, the high compatibility–high centrality pairing (top-right quadrant) exposes the organization to a certain level of conflict risk while maximizing enrichment through the influence of both logics in core activities.
Centrality-compatibility quadrants.
By way of contrast, in low-compatibility scenarios (the left-hand quadrants in Figure 2), colocation of the logics in the core (top-left) would yield high enrichment effects, but would also expose the organization to the risk of extensive conflict. In contrast, the bottom-left quadrant, while minimizing enrichment, offers the organization a reduced conflict option for the low–compatibility scenario.
Agentic response to complexity trade-offs
The case study findings suggest that organizations are aware of these outcome trade-offs. At The Volunteer, for example, one of the ways in which the business logic was expressed was the systemization of operations. The organization perceived this as inherently compatible with the social logic. Referring to the introduction of measurement techniques, one of the managers noted, “The whole issue of quantification and evaluation actually sits well with our fundraising needs because we need to report to our partners on the success of the organization and on having met our performance objectives.” Similarly, describing the adoption of needs-based marketing techniques for evaluation of new initiatives, one of the senior managers added, “I think that we are now addressing our customers’ needs better.”
At The Volunteer, the intrinsic alignment of these expressions of the business logic with the legacy social logic yielded outcomes characterized by high compatibility and high centrality. It seems that where social and business logic dictates were consistent (high compatibility), the perceived risk of conflict was low enough to allow the organization to tolerate instantiation of the challenger logic in core operations, and in so doing, optimize enrichment benefits from incorporation of the business logic. In The Volunteer, these benefits included, for example, enhanced funding security by addressing donor requirements for performance measurement, and improved sustainability through the more comprehensive application of professional management standards. In situations of high compatibility, then, The Volunteer preferred top-right solutions, declining to invoke mitigation mechanisms, such as segmentation or episodic override, which would have maneuvered the organization to a no-conflict outcome in the bottom-right quadrant.
However, under conditions of low compatibility, the organizations seem to view the trade-off between conflict mitigation and logic enrichment very differently. Here, the case study organizations preferred low centrality. In discussing options for entrepreneurial initiatives and for-profit operations, The Volunteer was concerned not “to confuse the core,” affirming that this organization is “different from hi-tech.” As noted, the organization’s response to these concerns was to outsource for-profit initiatives, operate them off-site, and even spin them off to other organizations. This pattern of response correlates with the organization’s stated concerns, suggesting that in low-compatibility scenarios, the risk reduction offered by low centrality seems to outweigh the potential enrichment gains of high centrality.
In other words, in areas of incompatibility, the organization exhibited its preference for bottom-left outcomes over the potentially more conflictual, but more enriching, top-left quadrant. Given manifest incompatibility, the balanced expression of the two logics in the operational core cannot be sustained, despite potential enrichment benefits, without risking disruptive tension and conflict around organizational identity.
Concluding Comments
The core finding of this study is that organizations are able to manipulate the structural parameters of logic multiplicity scenarios. This finding has significant implications for the study of institutional complexity. First, in contrast to the new structuralists’ approach, in which complexity outcomes are a function of the effectively immutable structure of logic multiplicity scenarios, the study findings suggest a more prominently agentic perspective in which the organization can modify structural parameters to shape complexity outcomes. This finding was demonstrated using the Besharov–Smith framework, where the case study organizations used a series of mechanisms, specifically, episodic override, sideshowing, and amplification, to manipulate the centrality parameter, and, in turn, craft preferred conflict-enrichment pairings. This approach is important in that it shifts the perspective of organizational agency in institutional complexity from the management and mitigation of externally determined outcomes, to the shaping of outcomes to achieve organizational goals. The image is of an organization empowered to embrace logic multiplicity, using it to enrich management perspectives and decision considerations, while absorbing a level of conflict it perceives to be acceptable.
In terms of the structural parameters of complexity, my core finding suggests that these parameters are not immutable as assumed in the new structuralist models, but are malleable, in the sense that they are subject to agential manipulation. However, the apparent malleability of these parameters may not be uniform. The current study suggests that the centrality parameter is relatively more malleable than compatibility. While not observed in the current study, it is at least theoretically possible to envisage the manipulation of compatibility using mechanisms such as segmentation to reduce jurisdictional overlap, or even modifying logic content through, for example, blended hybridization of logics (Ramus et al., 2017). Nonetheless, given the variant malleability of centrality and compatibility observed in the current study, future studies should be mindful of the possibility that different structural parameters may respond variously to agential manipulation.
The differential malleability of the components of complexity, including the possibility that certain components may be virtually immutable in some circumstances, offers an important qualification to the agential perspective presented in this article. My argument is not that agency is unfettered. On the contrary, the apparent immutability of compatibility, as manifest in the focal organizations, imposes constraints on agency, a finding that aligns with the structural approach. Indeed, the theoretical contributions of this study should be viewed as building on the structural models, suggesting that the relationship between structure and agency is more complex than previously discussed, such that structure may both constrain, and itself be shaped by, agency.
Second, the current study highlights the importance of including organizational enrichment, in addition to conflict costs, in structural modeling of institutional complexity. Initial structural models have focused on the conflict attribute, where different combinations of complexity parameters yield variant levels of organizational conflict. By way of contrast, the case study findings showed that, in some scenarios, the organizations eschewed available mechanisms for conflict minimization, preferring outcomes that were somewhat conflictual. These findings, I contend, can only be explained in terms of conflict-enrichment trade-offs.
Third, the study also suggests that in dealing with institutional complexity, the agentic organization is required to deal with a more intricate and challenging decision space than that defined “just” by the multiplicity of logics. The current findings indicate that in managing an institutionally complex arena, the organization needs to navigate a decision space populated not only by logic multiplicity, but by a series of additional factors that mediate and complicate opportunities for agency. These factors include the following: (a) the heterogeneity of complexity parameters across different organizational zones—for example, in the business strategy arena, the organizations found the social and business logics to be generally incompatible, while in human resources management or financial management practices, compatibility issues were virtually not encountered; (b) the variant malleability of complexity parameters, such as the apparent or perceived immutability of compatibility in the case study organizations, as opposed to the relative pliancy of centrality; (c) the complexity of outcome calculations, involving composite risk (conflict) and benefit (enrichment) trade-offs; and (d) the heterogeneous outcomes that organizations are able to finesse by creating different configurations of logic multiplicity across different domains; for instance, through selective application of the sideshow device, the case study organizations peripheralized some, but not, all aspects of the business logic. The organization’s ability to navigate and effectively manage this multilayered “complex of complexity” has significant implications for our conceptualization of the organization’s role as an active agent and would appear to represent a fruitful arena for future research.
Fourth, I would also like to suggest a possible relationship between the agential perspective and modes of logic instantiation. As noted earlier, organizational response to logic multiplicity can be traced along a continuum that ranges from domination through hybridization and coexistence. Ramus et al. (2017) suggest that organizations may manage complexity by creating hybrid, standalone blends of logics. By way of contrast, the current study finds that the organization’s response to complexity may be at least partially dependent on a coexistence strategy in which it preserves the separate identity and independence of the competing logics. This is reflected, for example, in the exertion of the episodic override and amplification mechanisms, where the senior logic’s dominance is invoked over the junior logic. Had the focal organizations created a hybrid blend, replacing the original rival logics, they may not have had recourse to mechanisms that were dependent on accentuated expression of the social logic.
Finally, this coexistence strategy, in which the logics remain intact, while the organization tangentially regulates complexity outcomes by manipulating structural parameters, suggests a possible path for mitigation of the embedded agency paradox. The paradox would be mitigated to the extent that the agent is able to act, in this case, to manage complexity outcomes, without being required to repudiate the very logics that define the agent’s identity. As has been argued here, the current study suggests that the organization can effectively regulate logic multiplicity scenarios by manipulating the structural components of complexity, without rejecting or modifying the prescriptions of the contending logics.
The theoretical implications of this study are stated with due caution, based as they are on findings from a limited set of case studies, all of which reside in a very similar organizational setting. Future research may address questions that emerge from this limitation, in particular, the preferences exhibited by the case study organizations: for example, in low-compatibility scenarios, the case study organizations consistently preferred the lower conflict option of low centrality. This low conflict preference, favoring harmonious equilibrium, may reflect a cultural bias, or the value systems of some types of NPOs. Organizations with greater indifference to conflict may be more willing to tolerate the conflict risk of high centrality despite low compatibility. In addition, as noted, the present study focuses on the role of agency in modifying the structural attributes of complexity within the organization. Future studies could also explore how agency might address the field-level factors that mold these in-organization structures. I would also note that the current study focuses exclusively on the centrality and compatibility parameters. Subsequent research might examine mechanisms for the manipulation of other structural parameters of complexity, such as prioritization and permeability, that are emerging in the literature. More broadly, the study findings suggest that future empirical studies and ongoing theoretical development in this arena should be mindful of the potentially multifarious interaction between structure and agency in the evolvement of complexity outcomes.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I am most grateful for the constructive comments of the three anonymous reviewers and particularly for the guidance of the handling editor, Dr. Christopher Wickert. Their suggestions and insights have contributed significantly to the enhancement of the paper.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
