Abstract
In a recent article, New Testament scholar Zeba Crook argues that in order for the study of Christian Origins to be taken seriously alongside other academic disciplines, a naturalistic philosophy must be adopted. Currently, there is a blend of openness, agnosticism and rejection among New Testament scholars with regard to miracles in the New Testament. This article responds to the concerns about an openness to the supernatural and offers a suggestion on how the study of religion can remain an academic discipline apart from theology and yet still be open to supernatural explanations.
Introduction
In his article “On the Treatment of Miracles in New Testament Scholarship” (SR 41/4, 461–478), Zeba Crook identifies an impasse when it comes to describing supernatural events historically. This article is helpful in demonstrating the disagreements that arise when competing worldviews influence an academic discipline. Zeba Crook argues that the academic study of Christian Origins must take its place among the rest of the social sciences and humanities and that requires the philosophical assumption of naturalism. While Crook makes many good points regarding the differences between a theological and an historical investigation of Christian origins, there are some significant problems with his conclusions. This article will attempt to expose some of these weaknesses. It should be noted that the purpose of this article is not to argue for a confessional interpretation of supernatural miracles but to offer another path to examine Christian origins from a historical perspective.
Anti-supernaturalism
Zeba Crook makes it clear that an openness to supernatural explanations has no place in an academic discipline. This is necessary for Christian Origins to be taken as seriously as other academic disciplines (2011: 475). However, Crook takes it farther than that. Crook takes issue with the suggestion that naturalism is seen as a failure, despite data that indicate a large majority of adult Americans believe in miracles (2011: 464). Crook accuses certain authors of bordering on “intellectual dishonesty” when they allow for supernaturalism in some cases and yet are willing to rely on the scientific advancements that have developed from a naturalistic worldview. Crook either misunderstands or misrepresents for rhetorical effect those who have a supernatural worldview. Most people who believe in miracles are not expecting seas to part, meals to be multiplied or the dead to be raised on a daily basis. The most common experience would be that of a practical (rather than philosophical) naturalism that assumes that natural laws will work today as they did yesterday, but with an openness that something supernatural could take place on rare occasions. It would be like a family budgeting in order to pay their bills, knowing that an unexpected cheque could arrive in the mail, but not relying on it. Supernaturalism (wrongly called anti-naturalism by Crook) does not necessarily lead to the chaos of police being required to investigate supernatural causes for criminal acts (2011: 473). In his appropriate attempt to set a high academic standard for Christian Origins, Crook ends up falling into both the straw man and slippery slope fallacies.
Miracles in the New Testament
Aside from the belief in miracles in today’s society, we are still left with the problem of how to interpret claims of miracles in the New Testament. Crook provides an overview of positions taken in a selection of New Testament introductions, which helps situate the discussion. Crook then examines and dismisses three explanations of miracles: methodological agnosticism, epistemological relativism and the sui generis nature of religion. The latter two options receive a short treatment as Crook quickly and rightly argues that they are incompatible with the academic study of Christian Origins. Crook spends more time examining methodological agnosticism, by which he means that “the place of the religion scholar is simply to report and describe but not to become embroiled in debates concerning the truth of religious claims” (2011: 468). While this solution may have provided some peace between theologians and historians, Crook rejects this explanation: “If methodological agnosticism does not shield ancient beliefs about gynaecology from modern dismissal, neither should it shield ancient beliefs about demons, the meddling and powerful spirit world, and the gods” (2011: 469). The only other option is to adopt a strict naturalism. As Crook explains, “If the historian’s work is informed by Enlightenment ways of thinking, then she must conclude that the claim of a miracle has to be understood another way, regardless of whether it is an ‘Old Testament’ or New Testament miracle” (2011: 466–467).
Modified Methodological Agnosticism
Is it true that to do history, one must adopt a naturalistic worldview? Even the most evangelical apologist would admit that one must look for naturalistic explanations when possible. Few would assume that an angel held the Apostle Paul’s pen for him, even if they believed in inspiration. The real question is about the miracles that are described in the Gospels. Specific miracles such as healings and exorcisms are difficult to deal with. John Dominic Crossan argues that miracles were not a later embellishment but an early part of the Jesus story and a “problematic and controversial phenomenon not only for [Jesus’] enemies but even for his friends” (1991: 310–311). An explanation for these miracles is not absolutely necessary to understand Christian origins, as even the Apostle Paul did not think they were important enough to mention.
Even if one was tempted to use methodological agnosticism for the majority of the miracles, things become more complicated when it comes to the resurrection of Jesus. There is a historical significance to the belief in the resurrection of Jesus. E. P. Sanders concluded this about Jesus: “we know that after his death his followers experienced what they described as the ‘resurrection’: the appearance of a living but transformed person who had actually died. They believed this, they lived it, and they died for it” (1993: 280). We can choose to be agnostic with Sanders as he confesses “I do not pretend to know what they saw or just who saw it” (1993: 278), but we must acknowledge that Christianity emerged out of a belief that Jesus really did rise from the dead.
Can a historian speak in an intelligent way to this event? Sanders may have bracketed out the resurrection from the historical Jesus (1993: 276), but it cannot be bracketed out of Christian Origins. In 1 Corinthians 15:3–7, Paul speaks of the resurrection of Jesus, not as a symbol of a spiritual truth, but as a real event with living eyewitnesses. This is not the place to give an apologetic for the literal resurrection of Jesus. Rather, there is a need to reflect on the role of history in speaking about the resurrection. Some scholars, even among evangelicals, have attempted to examine the resurrection of Jesus from a historical perspective. N. T. Wright has examined the resurrection of Jesus from its Jewish and Greco-Roman context and a careful examination of the New Testament (1992) and, more recently, Michael Licona has investigated the subject using a historiographical approach (2010). As Wright states, “There is no reason in principle why the question, what precisely happened at Easter, cannot be raised by any historian of any persuasion” (1992: 21). As it turns out, both Wright and Licona conclude that the actual resurrection of Jesus is the best explanation of the evidence. While one may be tempted to dismiss them for their confessional and apologetic agendas, any rejection of their conclusions should take place on historical rather than philosophical grounds.
What options are there beside naturalism, if all known naturalistic explanations have serious flaws? One option is that of a modified methodological agnosticism. A modified methodological agnosticism would allow the historian to examine the evidence, and acknowledge the adequate explanatory power of the resurrection, without necessarily adopting the resulting christology, soteriology and eschatology that most Christians draw from the resurrection. A supernatural explanation could be accepted, with “supernatural” being defined simply as something beyond the natural process of the world. Acknowledging that Jesus died and that he appeared alive on the third day does not have to contain theological content in terms of who was responsible for the resurrection or what that means for the identity or nature of Jesus. This does not mean that the historian is to be put in the position of blindly accepting every miraculous claim in every religion or mythology, although this method should be used beyond Christianity. Crook rightly questions, “does their philosophical openness to supernaturalism extend to the supernatural claims made in other religions?” (2011). A modified methodological agnosticism would be a willingness to look at any claim from a historical perspective, beginning with naturalistic explanations, but with an openness to a supernatural explanation once all naturalistic causes have been rejected. If a naturalistic explanation can adequately explain the evidence, then that explanation should be preferred.
Conclusion
Zeba Crook has a desire to see the study of Christian Origins as being on an equal footing with other social sciences and humanities. He should be commended for holding a high academic standard for Christian Origins. However, his solution of a full adoption of a naturalistic philosophy is not necessary for that to happen. Crook’s fear is that, “If one grants that miracles can happen, or to put it differently, that God is active in history, then the necessity of intellectual enquiry into explaining historical events evaporates” (2011: 474). Crook’s anxiety about anti-intellectualism as a result of openness to the supernatural is unfounded. This is the same sort of tactic as used by Richard Dawkins, that an openness to religion will ultimately lead to the end of science (2006: 323). It could be argued that a dogmatic insistence on the impossibility of miracles is the greater danger to intellectual inquiry. Academic research should be based on following the evidence and not on conforming the evidence to a preferred philosophy (naturalism or supernaturalism). The academic study of religion should not be blurred with the study of theology. A theologian will look at Easter and conclude that the God of Israel raised Jesus from the dead, affirmed the messiahship of Jesus, and that Jesus became the first fruits of the general resurrection. A historian can look at Easter, acknowledge significant problems with naturalistic explanations and conclude that Jesus did rise from the dead, a supernatural act in terms of a break in the natural process but without the theological content.