“One cannot doubt the potential effect of these fatwas on modern Muslim society.” 1 Online Accusations of Disbelief and Apostasy: The Internet as an Arena for Sunni and Shia Muslim Conflicts

Abstract

French

This article focuses on a number of fatwas published on the Sunni website Islamqa that, among many things, present negative understandings of Shia Islam. Before discussing the content of the fatwas, I offer a brief reconsideration of the major lines of conflict that divide Sunni and Shia Muslims both in history and at the present day. I then argue that, although contemporary tensions and hatred between different Muslim individuals and groups can potentially be supported by stereotypical presentations of Shia Muslims on the Internet, in order for an individual or a group to turn to violence, a socio-political context is required that is conducive to violent interpretations of religious views. The fatwas considered here do not contain much that is new, and more or less repeat old theological positions. However, in the context of the current crises in Iraq and Syria, old tensions and conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslims have gained momentum, making it obvious that theological differences are being used to dehumanize the Other and to legitimate violence against the religious Other.

Keywords

Sunni Shia Internet fatwas religious conflict Islamqa radicalization Syria Iraq

Between them, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the uprising in Syria in 2011 have created a new political situation in the Middle East. Former power constellations have been challenged, and both Iraq and Syria have been thrown into a political situation that can best be described as an open civil war. Minority politics, as well as religious affiliations that are used in identity politics, have grown in importance, and today it is clear that the historical differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims have become more important in building up lines of conflict in the Middle East and the wider Muslim world (Hegghammer, 2013; Larsson and Thurfjell, 2013; Steinberg, 2009).

Though it would go far beyond the scope of this article to try to explain the complex rationale and history behind the conflicts in contemporary Syria and Iraq, it is not uncommon to hear voices in public debates stressing how social media, especially the Internet, but also Facebook and Twitter, are being used to promote interpretations that support violent solutions and that some of these media outlets have ensnared individuals to become supporters of ISIL (the Islamic State in the Levant, or the Islamic State/Daesh) and other movements. To test this claim, it is important to investigate how conflicts that relate to international tensions, and especially to conflicts between Muslim groups like the Sunni and Shia, are played out in online Muslim forums. While some studies like, for example, Carter, Maher and Neumann (2014), Winter (2015) and Gustafsson (2015) have examined how ISIL and its supporters are making use of social media to promote their understandings and analyses of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, there are few if any studies analysing how intra-Muslim conflicts are verbalized and transmitted on the Internet.

In contrast to studies such as those by Carter, Maher and Neumann (2014), Winter (2015), and Gustafsson (2015), my article focuses on how the differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims are debated in a milieu that is not explicitly related to the current conflicts in the Middle East. Even so, I will argue that, by analysing anti-Shia polemics in a more general sense, we will gain a better understanding of how theological differences can be used to create a stereotypical and negative presentation of the Other. The empirical data for my study are taken from the webpage Islamqa. Although this site is not explicitly related to either ISIL or the wars in Syria and Iraq, I will argue that this case is interesting to analyse because it promotes an interpretation of Islam accusing Shia Muslims of having a “wrong” understanding of Islam and stating that “true” Muslims should avoid them. Although it is not possible to say whether the theologians who are associated with Islamqa have the intention to promote a black-and-white understanding of Sunni and Shia differences for use in legitimizing oppression or even violence against the Shia, their way of arguing can easily support an interpretation of Islam to the effect that Shia Muslims are “bad” or even heretical and apostates from Islam. From this point of view, the argumentation is similar to that of groups like ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, which also associate Shia Muslims with a wrong understanding of Islam. In addition, Shias are also associated with both the Assad regime in Syria and that of the former Iraqi ruler Nuri al-Maliki. While the theologians found on the webpage of Islamqa are silent when it comes to how to treat Shia Muslims, groups like ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra argue that the problems with or challenges of Muslims or non-Muslims who do not support them or who have a “wrong” understanding of Islam should be solved using violence. This understanding is, for example, clearly presented in the ISIL magazine Dabiq.

… these Muslims [i.e. those who do not support ISIL] are renegades whom it’s permissible to fight, and for no reason other than the fact that they refuse to give bay’ah (allegiance) to one imam or another. (Dabiq, vol. 1: 25)

Yet another example from the same magazine reads:

… anyone who rebels against its [i.e. the Islamic State’s] authority inside its territory is considered a renegade, and it is permissible to fight him after establishing the hujjah against him [i.e. clarifying his error to him with proof]. (Dabiq, vol. 1: 27)

Despite the fact that ISIL and the magazine Dabiq clearly differ in their methods and approaches to Shia Muslims, the theologians quoted by Islamqa agree that the Shia are seen as the deviant Other (i.e. heretics or apostates). The methods and suggestions for how to handle Shia Muslims are different, but the descriptions of them show some important similarities.

Thus, in order to understand the theological rhetoric that is deployed in the current conflicts in the Middle East and to analyse how social media can potentially support the mobilization of a specific theological interpretation, I will argue that it is vital both to highlight the historical roots of the tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims, and to delve into contemporary aspects of the conflicts by focusing on how conflicts that divide Sunni and Shia are upheld and disseminated via Muslim webpages that issue recommendations and provide analyses of both current and historical situations.

The Case Study

Since it is possible to find an infinite number of webpages and social media debating how to read and interpret Islamic history and theology and how Islam “should” be understood and acted upon, I have limited the scope of my analysis to one source: the Sunni Muslim webpage Islamqa, a multi-lingual portal that provides Islamic answers (i.e. fatwas) in a number of languages (including English, Arabic, Turkish, Uygur, French, Spanish and Chinese). Furthermore, I do not analyse all content on this site, rather I focus on answers and questions that are related to differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims.

It is important to stress that the webpage I have selected for my study is not representative of all Sunni Muslims, but has been chosen because it promotes a consistent position against Shia Muslim interpretations. Furthermore, according to Alexa.com, which provides information about webpages, it is a fairly popular site in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria.² Islamqa is a so-called online fatwa service providing Q&As on Islamic topics from a Sunni Muslim point of view. From a general point of view, it is fair to say that the Islamqa is closely related to Wahhabi interpretations, and several of the theologians quoted in the fatwas I have analysed have functioned as central leaders in Saudi Arabia. From this point of view, the selected website is an example of a resource that promotes a very strong anti-Shia rhetoric.

Disposition

The article consists of three sections. In the first section I provide an overview of the historical and theological background to the division and conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims. This backdrop is important because history can function as a repository to be used in enhancing division and conflicts between members of the in group (in this case Sunni Muslims) and the out group (in this case Shia Muslims). In the second section, which provides the empirical basis for my argument, I analyse fatwas posted on the webpage Islamqa that explicitly relate to how Sunni Muslims “should” view and refute Shia Muslims. In the third and final section, I analyse the fatwas that have been uploaded on the Islamqa webpage in the light of the historical and contemporary lines of conflict that exist between Sunni and Shia in contemporary Syria and Iraq. The findings are also discussed and analysed in relation to the current wars in Syria and Iraq, especially the influx of foreign fighters who have joined movements such as ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra. The article ends with some final conclusions.

Some Methodological Considerations

Before I turn to the fatwas posted on the Islamqa webpage, I should point out the difficulties involved in making a causal connection between what is found on the Internet and why people act as they do in their ordinary lives outside the Net. It is therefore impossible to come up with a monocausal explanation for why some people actually pick up negative attitudes towards a specific group (in this case, Shia Muslims) or some resort to violent action against them. Although social and psychological explanations must be taken into consideration, research indicates that an individual or a group of people are more likely to pick up stereotypical or negative opinions against an out group as a response to political trends or distressful events, such as conflicts and crises (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008: 419). However, in order to determine whether the readers of a specific webpage pick up anti-Shia opinions in their attitudes and behaviour, it would be necessary to conduct interviews and participant observation with those who utilize this online service. Even though I have not conducted interviews or field studies for this article, I argue that it is of great importance to look more closely at how the split between Sunni and Shia is portrayed and promoted in online milieus. However, before I turn to the contemporary material, it is necessary to review what we know about the split between the Sunni and Shia Muslims and how that split has been remembered or reconstructed in Muslim discussions and debates. Since this is a very complex part of Islamic history, the following outline sticks to the essentials, my aim being merely to point out the most important aspects of the relevant history and theology when debating differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims. It is also important to be aware that the two categories of Sunni and Shia are used as ideal types in most research (including in this article). Closer scrutiny would readily demonstrate the large variety both among and between different so-called Sunni and Shia Muslim groups in both history and the contemporary period.

A Historical and Theological Background

The conflict and split between Sunni and Shia dates back to the first century of Islam and the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632. After Muhammad’s death, the early Muslim community became divided over who should govern it. According to the majority of preserved sources, the leadership was given successively to Abu Bakr (r. 632–634), Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644) and Uthman ibn Affan (r. 644–656), the first three Caliphs.

However, according to the followers of the Shi’at ‘Ali (literally “the party of ‘Ali”), the leadership should first have been given to Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (r. 656–661). Because of his kinship with Muhammad, he was seen by the Shi’at ‘Ali as the rightful leader of the Muslim community, but more importantly, Shia Muslims argue that Muhammad had given his leadership to ‘Ali and not to Abu Bakr (Sanders, 1992: 88; Sharon, 1984: 137–138). This version of events was and is not accepted by the followers of the three first Caliphs, i.e. by the party that has become known as Sunni Muslims. From an outsider’s point of view, and leaving aside the question of the accuracy of the historical accounts, the conflict between the Shi’at ‘Ali and the Sunni Muslims is a textbook example of how history, and especially the writing of history, can be used for different purposes, clearly illustrating that historiography is not an objective or innocent business (see, for example, Khalidi, 2009, ch. 5; Keaney, 2013; Sharon, 1984: 123–124; and Sharon, 1986). To put it in the words of Moshe Sharon:

Major events in the life of the Prophet were remodeled retrospectively, or even completely invented, in order to suit the political needs of one political group or another. (Sharon, 1984: 122)

According to the historical records, the split between the two parties was already foreshadowed during the reign of Uthman, and especially after his murder (Keaney, 2013). Following the unresolved murder of Uthman, the conflict continued during the reign of ‘Ali (656–661), who was himself murdered in 661. His two sons, Hasan and Husayn, who were also to meet brutal ends, succeeded him. After Hasan had been murdered, the Umayyad Caliph, Yazid, turned the Sunni Muslims against his brother, Husayn. The split in Muslim society was definitively marked by the battle of Karbala in 680, when Husayn was beheaded and his followers were killed (Hylén, 2007).

Today we understand the historical outline as a political and theological conflict, but according to some, for example, Hodgson (1955), it is not clear that the two parties looked upon themselves as Sunni and Shia Muslims in the early, formative period of Islam. These labels are therefore most likely of a later date, and even though the early history is of great importance for the legitimacy of the leader, we have to remember that the formative history is very difficult to reconstruct and that both the Sunni and Shia camps were themselves split by internal differences. Most historical records that deal with the formative and early history of Islam were also compiled and written down during the eighth and ninth centuries. Because of this, we hardly have any records written during the formative period of Islam and the Umayyad period. This part of Islamic historiography was mainly produced during the reign of the Abbasids, who favoured a Sunni perspective, and consequently the records show a preference for anti-Umayyad perspectives and a more favourable view of the Abbasids (for an overview of the problems with the sources and the early research, see, for example, Berkey, 2003; and Robinson, 2013). Hence, it is more productive to look at the early history as a complex period, when it is expected that a large number of different groups and individuals were competing over power, legitimacy and authority (see, for example, Gleave, 2009; Abrahamov, 1998; and Sharon, 1984). Notwithstanding the problems with the quality of the sources, however, it is clear that many groups still look upon this period as the most fundamental time for Islamic history and theology. The state in Medina set up by the Prophet Muhammad and the rule of the four so-called rightly guided Caliphs, which is a Sunni construct, is seen as what can best be described as a golden period. However, it is clear that this period can be put to use by a large number of different and often conflicting Muslim groups when it comes to giving legitimacy to a particular interpretation advocated by a specific group.

From a theological point of view, most Shia Muslims argue that ‘Ali’s kinship with Muhammad gave him a superior understanding of how Islam should be interpreted and deployed, and that because of this knowledge he was the best choice as leader to govern the Muslim community. All Shias argue that ‘Ali was the first imam, i.e. the leader of the Muslims, and that he followed what Muhammad actually said and did (cf., for example, Sharon, 1986: 178). This understanding is contested by Sunni Muslims, who argue that, although ‘Ali may have been an elected Caliph, this did not make him a more righteous or better leader than the three first Caliphs. From a Sunni point of view, to give him superior qualities is to exaggerate. In their opinion, those who held this view were labelled ghulat (i.e. those who exaggerate; cf. Hodgson, 2014), a term also used today by Sunni Muslims expressing negative opinions about the Shia. As I shall demonstrate, the term rafida – i.e. those who did not support the three first Caliphs – has also been used as a negative marker for Shia Muslims both in history and today.

From a Sunni point of view, the whole concept of the imamate (i.e., that ‘Ali and his descendants were given an unique and superior position) is called into question. For Sunni Muslims, it was rather the best or most suitable person, he who had won the consensus of support among the believers (rida wa-jama’ah), who should govern society, meaning that the leader should not be selected only for his relationship to Muhammad (see, for example, Sharon, 1984). But when discussing Shia Muslims, it is also important to stress that this group is not a homogeneous group, and as with Sunni Muslims, there exist internal conflicts and divisions over theology and history within Shia Islam. For example, because of growing external political tensions and internal conflicts, the Shias themselves split into two major groups. The Ithna Ashariyya (the Twelvers) argue that twelve imams have followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad and that the twelfth imam, Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Mahdi, went into seclusion (ghayba) in 874 because of the growing threat from the Sunni Muslims (Kohlberg, 1976: 528, 533). The other Shia group are the so-called Ismai’ilis, who have a similar understanding to that of the Ithna Ashariyya, but are divided regarding who should be seen as the seventh imam. Without going into any details – and this has been a topic of extensive research over the years – it is clear that the early history and the tensions between the different Muslim groups have been used as a historical topos that can function as a resource or reservoir to be used in criticizing other competing groups, not least by Sunni Muslims who criticize and hold Shia Muslims to be bad Muslims or even apostates. In some Sunni Muslim texts, Shia Muslims are compared and equated with the Jews (Wasserstrom, 1994), and thus not recognized as Muslim.

To summarize, the sources are problematic and indicate that there were important differences among the groups that we today lump together as either Sunni or Shia (see Gleave, 2009; Abrahamov, 1998; and Kohlberg, 1976). These two categories are at best umbrella terms that can encompass a vast number of differences and internal variations, and today the majority of researchers do not believe it is possible to come to a conclusion that can tell us “Wie es eigentlich gewesen ist,” to quote the dictum of the famous German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). If we remember this methodological problem, it is evident that the Other, whether marked as Sunni or Shia, can still be misrepresented as a homogeneous phenomenon in Islamic history.

Old Questions in a New Forum

A quick browse on the Internet reveals the ease with which one can find webpages and forums devoted to questions relating to the split between Sunni and Shia. For the purposes of this article, and to determine how conflicting interpretations are discussed and played out, it is of particular importance to look into so-called fatwa sites, i.e. websites that offer Islamic answers to questions that have been posted by Muslims or non-Muslims on Islamic issues. (On the rule and function of fatwas in Islamic history and theology, see, for example, Masud et al., 1996). The overarching aim of these sites is to give authoritative answers as to how Islam “should” be understood and practised. However, from an academic point of view these locations are interesting because they provide examples of how different Muslim theologians and interest groups struggle over who has the power to determine who should be seen as authoritative and “sound.” In the following section, I will focus on how the question of Shia Islam is debated and framed in a Sunni Muslim web milieu and, specifically, the Islamqa webpage. Under the headline “about,” we read the following about this specific site:

Welcome to Islam Question & Answer! This site aims to provide intelligent, authoritative responses to anyone’s question about Islam, whether it be from a Muslim or a non-Muslim, and to help solve general and personal social problems. Responses are composed by Sheikh Muhammed Salih Al-Munajjid, a known Islamic lecturer and author. Questions about any topic are welcome, such as theology, worship, human and business relations, or social and personal issues.³

The quotation above reveals that this is a Sunni Muslim webpage linked to the Saudi Arabian theologian Sheikh Muhammed Salih al-Munajjid (b. 1960), who is known to be a strong supporter of a Hanbali-based interpretation of Islam, having studied Islamic law under the guidance of leading Muslim theologians who are close to the Saudi Arabian state and Wahhabi interpretations of Islam (i.e., under Sheikh ‘Abd al’Aziz ibn Baaz, Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen, Abdullah Ibn Jibreen, Saleh Al-Fawzan and Abd ar-Rahman Al-Baraak). He is also a prolific user of the Internet, and his webpage Almunajjid.com is a popular site in Arabic-speaking countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco.⁴ In the following discussion, I will focus on how the topic of “Shia Muslims” is addressed by al-Munajjid in the fatwas posted on the Islamqa webpage.⁵ Using “Shia” as a key word for searching the English version of the Islamqa webpage produced 93 results.⁶ Separated by category, the results were focused on the following topics according to the divisions and spellings applied by the Islamqa webpage (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Topics separated by category.

Topic	Number of hits
Schools of Thought and Sects	25
Innovations in Religion and Worship	8
The Companions of the Prophets	5
Belief in the Messengers	3
Schools of Thought and Religions	3
The Quraan and its Sciences	3
Science of Hadeeth	3
Leading Prayer	3
Where Zakaah is to Be Spent	3
Invalid Marriages	3
Biography of the Prophet	3
Names and Nicknames	3
Shirk and its Different Forms	2
Quraanic Exegesis	2

Source: http://islamqa.info/en/search?key=Shia&yt0=search (retrieved 3 April 2014).

Under the heading “Schools of Thought and Sects” are several answers (i.e. fatwas) that take a clear stance against Shia Muslim interpretations and practices. The posted answers contain both theological and dogmatic refutations, as well as clear positions against Shia Muslim practices, and Sunni Muslims are at all times advised not to mingle or associate with the rafida, that is, Shia Muslims. The Arabic word “rafida” can be translated as “those who reject” (i.e., the first three Caliphs and the early successors of Muhammad), and the term is commonly used in a derogative and negative sense in Sunni Muslim contexts (see, for example, the ISIL magazine Dabiq for several examples). However, in a Shia Muslim context it is more often used as a positive term suggesting “the people of the Pharaoh who rejected their master and chose to join Moses instead” (Kohlberg, 2014). According to this understanding, the followers of ‘Ali should be compared to those who followed Moses instead of the unrighteous Pharaoh (i.e., here designating the first three Caliphs) (cf. also, Wasserstrom, 1994).

In Fatwa No. 101272, a text that deals with the topic of “The status of the imams of the Ithna ‘Ashari Shi’ah,” the term rafida is defined as those who “rejected (rafada) most of the Sahaabah [the early followers of Muhammad] and they rejected the leadership of the two Shaykhs Abu Bakr and ‘Umar ….” In the same answer it is also argued that the Shia Muslims are wrong to claim that Muhammad promised ‘Ali and his descendants that they should be imams.⁷ The whole idea of the imamate is rejected, and the answer is written in an ironic style when discussing this office:

From the above it is clear that this madhahb [Islamic school of Law, but in this case referring to Shia Muslims] is false and that it goes against the beliefs of Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jamaa’ah [i.e. “People of the Sunnah and the Community”] and that its beliefs will not be acceptable from anyone, either from their scholars or their common folk. As for the imams to whom they claim to belong, they are innocent of this lie and falsehood.⁸

Among the most frequently occurring accusations against the Shia are the following (all of them are to be found in, for example, Fatwa No. 101272):

They [i.e. Shia Muslims] exaggerate about their imams and claim that they are without error.

The imams are made into something that the Shia Muslims worship.

They [i.e. Shia Muslims] say that the Koran has been altered and changed.

They [i.e. Shia Muslims] regard most of the early followers (sahaabah) as unbelievers and say that many of them left Islam after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.

They [i.e. Shia Muslims] introduce new doctrines and practices that were not held before or during the life of the Prophet.

They [i.e. Shia Muslims] believe in the possibility of taqiyah (dissimulation), something that supports lies, hypocrisy and dishonesty.

They [i.e. Shia Muslims] believe in raja’ah, i.e. that that the Prophet, his household and the imams will return.

The Imami Shi’ah madhhab (law school or school of thought) is a fabrication and has been introduced into Islam.

From a general Sunni Muslim point of view, it is common to argue against the idea that the Shia Muslims had been divinely designated to lead the early community. The importance of kinship to the Prophet Muhammad via ‘Ali, i.e. that they belong to the family of the Prophet, Ahl al-Bayt, is often debated among Sunni and Shia Muslims. In Arabic the term Ahl al-Bayt translates as “the people of the house,” but the term is also understood as “the House of the Prophet.” From a Shia point of view this kinship gave the Shia imams supra-human qualities to rule, a perception strongly refuted by Sunni Muslims.⁹ Those who argue that Shia Muslim leaders have some extra quality are exaggerating. Hence they are called ghulat, those who exaggerate, and because of this belief they are portrayed by many Sunni Muslims as extremists (Hodgson, 2014). Furthermore, according to al-Munajjid, to believe in the imams and their return (raja’ah) is blasphemous and contradicts the fundamental belief in God’s oneness and unity (tawhid) in Islam. Belief in the imams is also seen as a form of shirk (i.e. associating or equating something with God, or polytheism), and those who are accused of this error are generally called mushrikun (i.e. those who associate or equate something with God or, more generally, polytheism). Likewise taqiyya (precautionary dissimulation) is not approved of according to the theologians on this specific website (on Shi’i discussions of taqiyya, see Kohlberg, 1975). To accuse someone of altering the Koran is also a serious charge because the Koran is understood to be the word of God. With some minor variations, these points are repeated in almost every answer given by Islamqa that deals with Shia Muslims. There are few if any exceptions to this rule, and the language on the website is in general judgemental and hard on those who do not follow the interpretation advocated by al-Munajjid and the other theologians he supports, and on whom he bases his opinions.

However, the criticisms and refutations of Shia doctrines are not just limited to dogmatic issues, as the website also contains several answers dealing with practical issues and the accusation that Shia Muslims have invented new traditions not found in the Koran or the hadith literature. According to the interpretations put forward by al-Munajjid, the contemporary weakness of the Islamic world has to do with the fact that Muslims – especially Sufis and Shia Muslims – have introduced bid’a (negative innovations) not found in Islamic texts (Steinberg, 2009). One example of how Shia rituals are criticised comes in Fatwa No. 20093, a text that deals with the question of prayer and whether it is allowed for Sunni Muslims to pray behind Shia Muslims. In this fatwa, one readily receives the impression that Sunni Muslims should not mingle with Shia Muslims at all. In the fatwa, bin Baz says:

It is not permissible to pray behind any of the mushrikeen [those who associate or equate something or someone with God; also polytheists] including those who seek the help of anyone other than Allaah and seek support from him, because seeking help through anyone other than Allaah, such as the dead, idols, the jinn, etc. is shirk, the association of others with Allaah, glorified be He.¹⁰

Sunni Muslims who follow the advice given on this website are therefore warned against imitating Shia Muslims when it comes to prayers and rituals.¹¹ Sunni Muslims are encouraged to pray in the “proper way” and not to follow Shia practices when it comes to prayer.

There is nothing wrong with letting the arms hang by the sides during prayer because of tiredness, so long as one goes back to holding the right hand over the left once the tiredness has gone. That is not regarded as imitating the Raafidis, because it is done temporarily and for a reason. It is only imitating them if the worshipper takes it as a habit and lets his arms hang by his sides in every prayer, and never holds the right hand over the left.¹²

A number of fatwas also reject the celebration by many Shia of Ashura and Muharram, two memorial days filled with rituals closely associated with the battle of Kerbala in 680 and the early historiography outlining how the division between Sunni and Shia became a reality (see earlier section, but also, for example, Hylén, 2007; and Flaskerud, 2012).

What the Shi’ah do on “Ashoora” of beating their chests, slapping their cheeks, striking their shoulders with chains and cutting their heads with swords to let the blood flow are all innovations that have no basis in Islam. These things are evils that were forbidden by the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him), who did not prescribe for his ummah to do any of these things or anything similar to them to mark the death of a leader or the loss of a martyr, no matter what his status.¹³

As a final example, it is clear that the Islamqa website contains several texts rejecting the claim that ‘Ali was chosen as the leader of the Muslim community (wasiyyat ‘Ali) by the Prophet Muhammad at the Ghadir Khumm, the oasis at which, so Shia Muslims argue, Muhammad transferred his legitimacy to ‘Ali and laid it down that ‘Ali should be the leader of the Muslims after his (the Prophet’s) death. As Sanders and others have pointed out, most Shia Muslims also believe that ‘Ali was given the unique authority to interpret the revelation and that this quality should be passed on to future imams (Sanders, 1992: 88; Veccia Vaglieri, 2015). This claim is rejected in the following fatwa:

With regard to what happened at Ghadeer: Ghadeer is the name of a well in a place between Makkah and Madeenah which is called Khum. The hadeeth was narrated by Imaam Muslim in his Saheeh (no. 2408) from Zayd ibn Arqam, who said: “The Messenger of Allaah (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) stood up and addressed us one day at a well called Khum, between Makkah and Madeenah. He praised Allaah and exhorted and reminded us. Then he said: “I am leaving among you two important things: the first of which is the Book of Allaah” – and he urged us to adhere to the Book of Allaah, then he said: “And the people of my household (ahl bayti). I remind you of Allaah with regard to the people of my household, I remind you of Allaah with regard to the people of my household, I remind you of Allaah with regard to the people of my household.” Zayd said: “his wives are among the people of his household, but the people of his household who are forbidden to receive sadaqah (charity) after his death are the family of ‘Ali, the family of ‘Aqeel, the family of Ja’far and the family of ‘Abbaas. All of these are forbidden to receive sadaqah.” [abbreviated version]

His advice concerning the people of his household has to do with honouring and respecting them, and not exposing them to abuse or annoyance. This does not mean that they are to be given preference over others who are known through the texts to be more virtuous than them, such as Abu Bakr, ‘Umar and ‘Uthmaan (may Allaah be pleased with them all).¹⁴

To summarize, the claim that the Shia should lead the Muslim community is based on a wrong interpretation of Muhammad’s word, at least according to the Muslim theologians who are associated with Islamqa. Shia theology is in general based on a misunderstanding or wrongful interpretation of Islam. The “true” Muslims (i.e. the Sunni Muslims who listen to and follow al-Munajjid’s interpretation) have a theological obligation to point out errors and to correct the Shia according to the fatwas posted on the Islamqa website.

Analysis and Discussion

The ease with which one can find conflicting opinions on how to interpret Islam in the past (see, for example, Friedman, 2005; al-Jamil, 2011) as well as at the present day (Steinberg, 2009) should now be evident. From this point of view, the tension between Sunni and Shia is one of the most important examples of how various Muslim groups have fought over history, authority and leadership, a fight that is still being fought in many parts of the world. Even though it is important to study theological divisions, it is essential to stress that the breaking out of open violence should not automatically or only be linked to theological differences: social, economic, historical and political factors are at least if not more important to explain individuals’ interpretations of a religious tradition to address a specific situation or meet the current needs of an individual or community. For example, writing about sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia in Iraq, Steinberg says:

Religion is an important factor in these events, but they are not determined by religion. Rather, confessional violence only breaks out when several factors concur: firstly, in most historical cases of anti-Shi’i violence, radical Sunni groups or individuals believe that true Islam is in danger—mostly because of a threat posed by a foreign power—and that Shi’is form a part of this threat. Often, Iran and Shi’ism are identified by Sunnis so that any military threat emanating from Iran might trigger strong anti-Shi’a sentiments among Sunnis especially in Iran and its neighbouring countries. Secondly, these radical groups need able and ruthless leaders as well as the opportunity to build an infrastructure in order to become a force to be reckoned with. Thirdly, for major conflicts to break out, Shi’i militant actors have to retaliate. (Steinberg, 2009: 108)

From a historical point of view, it is easy to find examples of tensions and violence between Sunni and Shia being accentuated during periods of external threat. For example, when the Fatimids, a dynasty based on Shia Muslim interpretations, rose to power in the beginning of the tenth century, Sunni Muslims on the Iberian Peninsula found it necessary to take precautions against perceived threats from the Shia and other so-called heretical interpretations (Fierro, 1987). An external threat was also important for the Sunni Muslim theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), when he issued his famous fatwas against the Nusayri-’Alawis in the fourteenth century. Even though these fatwas were specifically targeted at the Nusayri-’Alawis, they are today read as a general criticism of Shia Muslims, and especially the rule of the Assad family, which belongs to this group (Steinberg, 2009: 121). In these medieval legal documents, the Nusayri-’Alawis were blamed for corrupting Islamic dogmas and spreading heretical interpretations, as well as for collaborating with the Christian crusaders and the Mongols who had destroyed the ‘Abbasid Caliphate in 1258 (Friedman, 2005; al-Jamil, 2011). In a similar way, the Shia in Iraq are accused of collaborating with the new crusaders, that is, the American troops who invaded the country in 2003. Yet another contemporary example is the Saudi Arabian decision to execute the opposition Shia leader Nimr al-Nimr in early 2016. The fact that Iran has been given a more central position in the peace process in Syria is most likely perceived as a threat by the Saudis, who do not want to see Iran gain a key role in the Middle East, while for the Saudi Arabian state it is disturbing that the United States and the European Union find it necessary to listen to Teheran. The execution of this Shia opposition leader is therefore more likely to have been a political signal to non-Muslim international leaders, as well as to the regimes in Iran and Syria and other Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states (Hammargren, 2016). No matter what the real reason behind this execution, it is highly likely to fuel tensions and conflicts between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and between Sunni and Shia Muslims around the world on the other.

Although Steinberg’s analysis was made before the rise of ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the growing tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it is still likely that several of the predicaments he describes are present in the current conflicts in both Iraq and Syria. First of all, some of the most important Shia centres are located in Iraq (for example, Najaf and Karbala), parts of Iraq that have always had a close connection to the Shia world and to Iran (see, for example, Mallat, 1988). The war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s is still a fresh memory for many people in Iraq, and during this war religious differences were put to use in propaganda. However, as Claudia Wright has pointed out, the importance of religious rhetoric in the war between Iraq and Iran is mainly a post-factum explanation. Political considerations and pragmatic decisions, not religious differences, played the most important role in the war breaking out and continuing. According to Wright’s analysis, religion was mainly used to legitimate the war after it had been started and to boost the morale of the soldiers fighting it (Wright, 1985; cf. also Mallat, 1988).

After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the first Gulf War in 1991, the Shia in Iraq became even more persecuted because of their attempted rebellion against Saddam Hussain that followed.¹⁵ With the fall of his regime in 2003, a window of opportunity was opened for the Shia Muslims in the country. With the toppling of Saddam Hussein, it became possible for Nuri al-Maliki to come to power and to become the Prime Minister of Iraq between 2006 and 2014, a move that clearly benefited the formerly oppressed Shia groups in the country, but at the same time this development became a serious threat to those groups that had benefited from the old regime (Tønnessen, 2014). To make the situation even more complicated, some Muslim theologians had interpreted the American-led invasion as a war against Islam, and the Shia Muslims came to be regarded as a fifth column or a Trojan horse that had sided with the Americans. For example, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (1966–2006), who was affiliated to al-Qaeda as a spokesman, interpreted the fight in Iraq as a war between the right and wrong faith. In his understanding, the Shia Muslims were not true Muslims, and because of their beliefs they were portrayed as possible targets. It was thus considered lawful for Sunni Muslims to kill Shia Muslims and to fight against the new “crusaders,” i.e. the American troops in Iraq (Napoleoni, 2005; Steinberg, 2009; Tønnessen, 2014).

In Syria the situation is in some ways similar to that in Iraq, but also very different. In Syria the regime of Bashar al-Assad is to a large extent based on family, ethnicity and religious ties, and from the second half of the twentieth century the Nusayri-’Alawis rose to power (Friedman, 2005: 349, 362; Pipes, 2006). Contrary to the situation in Iraq, this process gave the Shia, and especially the members of the Nusayri-’Alawis clans, a privileged position in Syrian society. But prior to the revolution in Syria in 2011, Syria seemed open to a process of Shiitization, this being a time when Iranian influences were growing in the country, according to Pierret (2013). Without going into any details – for more examples one should consult Pierret (2013) – it is also a fact that the regime of Bashar al-Assad has gained the support of the Lebanese Hezbollah, a Shia Muslim party fighting on the side of the Assad regime in Syria today (Sullivan, 2014). However, as in Iraq, the conflict has also attracted a growing number of foreign fighters who are willing to fight against the Assad regime (Neumann, 2015). Some of these foreign fighters (especially those associated with ISIL) are advocating an interpretation of Islam that portrays the Shia as non-Muslims, heretics or apostates who should be converted to ISIL’s interpretation of Islam or be killed. ISIL thus interprets Islam in a way that resembles Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s position. The war is not only a war about world power, it is a theological war between good and evil (Steinberg, 2009; cf. Hegghammer, 2013).

Even though my case study in this article, the Islamqa webpage, is far from being a site that advocates the use of violence – more explicit examples are, for example, the Alneda.com portal, which was associated with al-Qaida (Halldén, 2006), the website of Abu Muhammad al-Maghdisi and the online magazine Dabiq produced by ISIL – the use of the Islamqa website as a source of inspiration for people who dislike Shia Muslims is readily visible. The arguments used against Shia Muslims in the fatwas I have analysed do not really reveal any new information on theology, as they mainly repeat old theological positions and dogmas upheld by Sunni Muslims (cf., for example, Wasserstrom, 1994). But – and it is a very important but – the situation has changed both locally and globally, and the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have now developed into a resonator echoing and reinforcing older political, social and economic tensions and conflicts, processes in which theological lines of conflict can easily gain momentum and new meanings.

The reasons why individuals take one side in a struggle or join an international conflict can obviously vary (cf. Roy, 2015), but according to some findings there seems to be a general difference between those who went to Iraq after 2003 to fight against US military forces and the new regime in Iraq, and those who became foreign fighters in Syria after 2011. For example, Norwegian researcher Thomas Hegghammer suggests that “anti-Americanism was a much more important motivation than anti-Shiism” for those who left for Iraq, while those who joined the fight in Syria made use of an anti-Shia rhetoric more openly. However, he continues:

More likely than not, the anti-Shiite rhetoric coming from Syrian foreign fighters and their recruiters today is a post facto rationalization of a military project undertaken for other reasons, such as the desire to protect a suffering Sunni population or to build an Islamic state. To be sure, it is easier for Sunni Islamists to legitimize jihad against an Alawite regime than against a Sunni one, but it is too early to conclude that anti-Shiism is a stronger motivator than, say, hostility to Western military interventions in Muslim countries. (Hegghammer, 2013: 5)

Even though the fatwas analysed for this article do not advocate or support violent acts against Shia Muslims, it is unclear how the presumed consumers of the Internet read them. In line with McCauley and Moskalenko’s argument in the article “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism” (2008), fatwas that only promote negative opinions about Shia Muslims may produce a stereotypical or categorical hostility against them. Because of this bias, the texts have the potential to be read as legitimizing hatred. In the online context I have examined, the Shia are in general portrayed as the theological Other and are viewed as lesser Muslims or even as apostates – i.e. they are depicted as heretics (murtad), unbelievers (kuffar), extremists (ghulat) and those who reject (rafida) the truth and consequently advocate apostasy (ridda). As noted earlier, to trigger hatred and to turn from an abstract dislike to physical violence is a long process, and most individuals who visit Internet sites promoting a dislike of Shia Muslims are not likely to become violent. Support for violent interpretations via the Internet does not happen in isolation, and consequently most social scientists do not find strong support for the “lone wolf syndrome” – that is, that individuals act alone and become promoters of violence on their own without contact with peer groups outside the Internet (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008: 419). On the contrary, in order to become violent, most if not all individuals are in need of input from a real or virtual peer group and need to be part of a context that supports the use of violence (cf. Roy, 2015: 7–8). This conclusion is also supported by the probability that the majority of Western foreign fighters who have left for Syria and Iraq have been “recruited” by friends, relatives and so-called “disseminators” who are sympathetic to the “cause” and who “lend moral and political support to those in the conflict” (Carter, Maher and Neumann, 2014: 15), rather than by so-called professional recruiters or online propaganda alone. Although it is not clear what role and function the Internet plays in recruiting people to movements like ISIL and the Jabhat al-Nusrat and persuading them to travel to Syria and Iraq, social media and the Internet are clearly places for the dissemination of propaganda, information and moral support (Roy, 2015: 8). These are also places where so-called hang-arounds and supporters can gather, groups that can give moral support and legitimacy to those who decide to go to Syria and Iraq to fight. But it is the peer group, as well as external factors that can be related to the exterior world and/or the individual personal biography, that seem to be the most important motivations pushing individuals into ideas that make space for violent solutions. McCauley and Moskalenko write:

Individuals are radicalized by personal grievances and by identity-group grievances as conveyed by mass media, rumor, or the testimony of others. (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008: 417)

If we read the quotation above in relation to the current situation in Iraq and Syria, it is easy to see that many people might have motives driving them into a world view that accepts violence as a solution. Power constellations have rapidly been changed, oppressed groups have found new possibilities, many are prepared for revenge, and a large number of foreign fighters who have intervened in the conflicts, as well as external forces (i.e. foreign countries), are also using the conflicts in Syria and Iraq to gain political and economic advantages in the region; these are all factors that may contribute to a more explosive and violent situation. In these circumstances, references to religion, identity, past acts and ethnicity are likely to be used to legitimate the use of violence. From this point of view, it seems as if Friedman’s prediction about the use of Ibn Taymiyya’s anti-Nusayri-’Alawis fatwas from the fourteenth century was correct when he wrote: “one cannot doubt the potential effect of these fatwas on modern Muslim society” (Friedman, 2005: 363). Today, it is likely that individuals with personal experience of or emotional attachment to the wars and conflicts in Iraq and Syria have the potential to understand the messages found on websites differently than do those without the same experiences or attachment. And many individuals and families have truly been affected by the wars in Syria and Iraq. Today it is estimated that approximately 220,000 individuals have died in Syria, and according to UN estimates more than 12.2 million Syrians require humanitarian assistance inside and outside the country.¹⁶ With this depressing backdrop in mind, in this article I have tried to argue the importance of collecting more data on how users of fatwa sites who have negative opinions about, for example, Shia Muslims actually understand and make use of the messages they receive via their computers.

Some Concluding Remarks

To make a causal connection between what is found on the Internet and what people actually do and why they do it in their offline activities is in general highly problematic. Yet the Internet and the perceived anonymity that the new media seem to offer have created a novel situation in which it has become easier to raise sensitive questions and to utter controversial and provocative opinions (see, for example, Carter, Maher and Neumann, 2014). At the same time, it has also become easier to find alternative information that can be used to foster dialogue and a growing understanding. Yet it is still clear that social media have the potential for nurturing hatred and conflicts and that the Internet and other social media can be used to spread hatred between different religions and different believers (Højsgaard, 2006). For example, in this article I have highlighted a number of fatwas that present a negative understanding of Shia Islam. Besides outlining the content of the fatwas, I have provided a short overview of the major lines of conflict that have divided Sunni and Shia Muslims in both history and the contemporary period.

In conclusion, I argue that a so-called radicalization process can be supported by a stereotypical presentation of the enemy, but that in order for this to develop into a violent interpretation, it is necessary to see the online content in relation to a real situation outside the Internet.¹⁷ When it comes to content, it is clear that the fatwas I have analysed do not contain much new information – they more or less repeat old theological positions – but the current situation in Iraq and Syria is new. Since 2003 and 2011, it has become evident that old tensions and conflicts between Sunni and Shia have gained momentum and that theological differences are being used today to dehumanize the Other and to legitimate violence against what is perceived to be the theological Other (Steinberg, 2009).

There are also indications that the tensions between Sunni and Shia are spreading. For example, in April 2014 the first so-called world Anti-Shia Alliance Convention was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, and in early 2016 an important Shia Muslim leader, Nimr al-Nimr, was executed in Saudi Arabia. According to media reports, the meeting in Indonesia contained thousands of participants and several governmental officials calling for a jihad against Shia Muslims.¹⁸ In what ways the Anti-Shia Convention and the execution of Nimr al-Nimr will have an effect and create more tensions and violence between different Muslim groups is an open question, but these events show the necessity of academic researchers paying closer attention to how anti-Shia statements are read and put to use by Sunni Muslims.

Likewise, however, it is important to highlight that the Internet and other social media have the potential to support dialogue and tolerance among and between Sunni and Shia.¹⁹ No matter what our research focus, whether on conflicts or on dialogue, it is an important academic task to study how the Internet and other social media are being used to discuss, promote and construct a difference between us and them and to challenge images of the Other. However, in order to be able to analyse what actually goes on in cyberspace, it is paramount to pay close attention to both historical developments and current political situations in the world. The complex interplay between online and offline activities cannot be stressed enough, which is why media sociologists should pay particular attention to both the history of religions and political science when studying the interface between religion and the media.

Footnotes

Acknowledgment

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to my two colleagues at Södertörn University, Stockholm, Dr Simon Sorgenfrei and Professor David Thurfjell, who read an earlier draft of this text. This study was prepared in the framework of a larger research project, “Leaving Islam: Apostasy, Freedom of Religion and Conflicts in a Multireligious Sweden,” funded by the Swedish Research Council (VR).

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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