The Controversy on the Depenalization of Religious Blasphemy in Contemporary Greece

Abstract

French

This article deals with the controversy over the depenalization of religious blasphemy in present-day Orthodox majority Greece. Focusing on an overview and critical analysis of the Greek legislation and contemporary case law (20th–21st centuries), the article highlights the State’s “religious protectionism” and the influence of the “dominant religion” via the legal and judicial apparatuses. The claims for abolition of the blasphemy legislation and the overall criticism, by several actors, of civil society are examined in the wider context of the contemporary debate on the necessity of separation between Church and State, and the denouncing of the interweaving between various actors at different levels of State and Church power.

Keywords

blasphemy case law depenalization politics Orthodox Church Greece

Introduction

The depenalization of religious blasphemy is at the core of many public debates in contemporary Greece. Especially in the last decade, the reappearance, often violent, of the issue of religious blasphemy has created significant tensions within civil society, and public opinion is profoundly divided. There is an on-going process of contestation regarding the law on religious blasphemy, not only from within the legal professions, but also in civil society itself. This process raises a series of questions, such as the legitimacy of penal legislation on religious blasphemy in an increasingly secularized society, and the judges’ role, as fundamental actors in the definition, the (re)shaping, and/or the contestation of religion, in an eventual de-legitimization of the legislation in question. Further, it raises the following questions: Does the fact that the majority of members of Greek society claim an orthodox religious identity change the tensions inherent in this controversy? Is there an official position on the part of the established Orthodox Church? And what can be observed in terms of the impact on the enjoyment of human rights? The Greek case study can shed more light on, and stimulate reflection on, the centrality of law in the management of religion within pluralist, secularized European societies. The re-emergence of the issue of blasphemy in the past decades, not only in Greece, but also in most European countries, is in fact indicative of the tensions inherent in the transition process from being culturally and religiously homogeneous to multicultural and multi-religious societies in the context of globalization. Greece has been undoubtedly influenced by this transformation process – due, to a large extent, to the subsequent waves of immigration in the last twenty years. However, the country is relatively homogeneous in terms of religion, with Greek Orthodox Christians making up to 98 percent of the population.¹ The specificities of Greece’s historical legacy and Church/State relations, as well as the strong religion–national identity link, clearly differentiate this country in several accounts from other European and Western countries. These specificities are strongly highlighted in the particular context of religious blasphemy in Greece, which causes a much higher number of lawsuits and controversies than in other European countries and appears to be a rather complex and multidimensional issue in Greece: not only linked with religious factors but also with political instrumentalizations, for example, the growing influence of the neo-Nazi nationalist party “Golden Dawn.” As is illustrated in the diagram in Figure 1, blasphemy has to be analysed at the core of multiple complex interactions such as those that take place between the established religion (Orthodox Christianity) and the national identity (Greek ethnos), the state-church (Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG): Holy Synod and individual bishops), politics (the political influence of the OCG and the role of the Golden Dawn party in the blasphemy related controversies), and case law (the role of judges).

Figure 1.

Multiple interactions between (case) law, ethnoreligious identity and politics.

Given the plurality of actors involved in the blasphemy related debate and controversy, it would be unrealistic to attempt an in-depth analysis that would take into consideration all aspects inherent in this issue. We have therefore chosen to focus on three actors that we consider particularly representative of the various positions adopted with regard to blasphemy: the religious institutional actor (Orthodox Church of Greece), the civil society, and the judges. The role of the Golden Dawn political party will also be examined briefly, to the extent that it contributes to the overall debate regarding the interplay between (Orthodox) religion and (Greek) national identity in the context of blasphemy.

The Greek Legislation and Case Law on Blasphemy: A Signifier of the State’s “Religious Protectionism” and Influence of the “Dominant” Religion?

Greece’s main blasphemy laws are found in Section 7 of the Penal Code, entitled “Offenses Against Religious Peace.” Articles 198 and 199 specifically address blasphemy and religious insult. Article 198 punishes any public and malicious blasphemy against God with a maximum of two years in prison, and punishes the public “manifestation of a lack of respect for the divinity” with up to three months’ imprisonment. Article 199 is directed at established religions as opposed to God or “the divinity,” and prescribes up to two years’ imprisonment for “one who publicly and maliciously and by any means blasphemes the Greek Orthodox Church or any other religion tolerable in Greece.”² In theory, Greece’s blasphemy laws are not limited to a particular religion and formally protect the Orthodox Church as well as any other “tolerable” (i.e. officially recognized by the state) religion from offense. In practice, however, these laws are used only to prosecute cases of perceived blasphemy against the Orthodox Church. In fact, all cases that have been brought before the Greek judicial authorities for blasphemy (Articles 198 and 199 of the Penal Code) concern insults against the Eastern Orthodox Christian religion (Venice Commission Survey, 2008: 168; Christopoulos, 2008: 78; Sarafianos, 2010: 108). This de facto discrimination is indicative of the special status enjoyed by the Church within the state establishment (Temperman, 2008: 529).

In response to the 2008 Venice Commission Survey, a Greek expert, Professor Christopoulos (2008: 166), observed that “the very existence of Chapter 7 of the Greek Penal Law can be regarded as a solid material for the integration of the Orthodox religion into the penal machinery.” He added, “It should not be regarded as accidental therefore, that the Greek case law related to crimes contained in the Chapter 7 of the Code is inexistent when it comes to condemnation of blasphemous acts against ‘any other religion tolerable in Greece’.”

Blasphemy cases can be brought before civil and criminal courts. In some cases civil courts have used prior restraint to prevent the public expression of a work that is deemed blasphemous. Such interim measures have been used to prevent a work of art from being exhibited and a movie from being screened. The differentiation between Articles 198 and 199 lies in the fact that for the latter a complainant is required, whereas for the former, the state initiates prosecutions on the basis of public interest, even in the absence of an offended person. This approach has been justified by the notion that religion is the “foundation of the state” of Greece, and consequently religious feelings must be protected for the good of society.³ The prosecutor has discretionary powers to carry out investigations into alleged blasphemy against the divinity, reportedly with no supervision or mechanism for appealing the prosecutor’s decision on whether to proceed (Venice Commission Survey, 2008: 169). Most state-initiated cases under Article 198 come as a result of pressure from Greek Orthodox groups; the more prominent cases are almost always initiated by the Orthodox Church (Freedom House, 2013: 41). A characteristic example in this respect is the renowned case of Martin Scorsese’s film The Last Temptation, based on the book by N. Kazantzakis (Court of First Instance of Athens, ruling 7115/1988), and the case of the novel M to the Power of N by Mimis Androulakis (Court of First Instance of Athens, ruling 5208/2000). The Holy Synod, the governing body of the Orthodox Church of Greece, had officially asked the government for bans respectively on the film and the book, in both cases (Tsapogas, 2010: 118). In the Scorsese case, the release of the film provoked demonstrations that were reportedly led by Orthodox priests, who called on the faithful to protest outside cinemas, and which ultimately degenerated into riots and clashes with the police. Orthodox groups ultimately forced the government to initiate legal proceedings to ban the movie, despite its having been given the censorship board’s approval.⁴ The Orthodox Church had published an encyclical explicitly appealing to the government and the parliamentarians, demanding that the Church’s protest be considered, and requiring that they “respect the religiosity of the Greek people, and not allow this kind of desecration of Jesus Christ.”⁵

In a more recent, equally renowned case, that of the contemporary Art Exhibition Outlook (2003), the painting Asperges Me by Belgian artist Thierry de Cordier, which depicted a crucifix alongside male genitalia, drew a public outcry from the Orthodox Church and some of its followers, as well as from a number of right/far right wing politicians. Far right wing MP Karatzaferis reportedly submitted a formal complaint to the judiciary alleging that the artwork was blasphemous and in violation of the Penal Code.⁶ The painting was consequently withdrawn from the exhibition, and a 17-month investigation into the complaint was initiated by the prosecutor, much to the dismay of artists and others in Greece who argued that even an inquiry into a possible criminal violation of this kind “threatens artistic freedom of expression.”⁷ The prosecutor claimed that the very display of the “despicable work” with “repulsive content” in a public exhibition was proof of the curator’s “malicious will to scorn and ridicule the Eastern Orthodox Church” (Tsapogas, 2010: 117). In 2005, a judge concluded that there were indeed grounds for criminal prosecution under Article 198.⁸ The Magistrate’s Court of Athens (ruling 44540/2006) finally acquitted the art curator, Ioakimidis, of all charges, finding that there had been no malice, and that the curator had not intended to offend the Orthodox Christian religion or public decency. In spite of the Church’s influence with regard to the initiation of prosecutions, it becomes evident that the courts often dismiss the charges.

Similarly, in the Androulakis case, the Court of First Instance of Athens, in its decision 5208/2000, found that this allegorical work of literature (which included references to the sexual desires of Jesus Christ) did not constitute “malicious insult” because it was aimed at condemning misogyny rather than offending Christianity, and did not “attack religion as such” (Sarafianos, 2010: 107). In the case of the Austrian cartoonist Gerhard Hederer, who was accused of blasphemy under Article 198 for his satirical book The Life of Jesus, the artist was found guilty of malicious blasphemy by the Magistrate’s Court of Athens, and was afterwards acquitted of all charges by the Appellate Court of Athens (decision 4532/2005), on the grounds that “the humorous quality of the book precluded it from being malicious” (Sarafianos, 2010: 107). The interpretation of the notion of “malice” constitutes in fact a key element in the Greek jurisprudence on blasphemy, and highlights the evolution of the judges’ attitude over the past decades in this matter. At first, the mere intention of derisory use of religious symbols was enough to qualify the offence as malicious;⁹ but the turnaround of case law in the mid-eighties led to a significant restriction of the scope of malicious blasphemy and malicious religious insult, since according to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (decisions 928/1984, 1869/1984) the term “malicious incorporates a vilifying act aimed directly at offending a religion for the offender’s gratification” (Sarafianos, 2010: 105–106). Nevertheless, legal scholars have criticized the fact that this turning point did not affect the scope of blasphemy simpliciter, which, in some cases, is still punished by the courts, even when it is obvious that the offender does not express indignation against God or religion but against a specific person (Sarafianos, 2010: 106). Moreover, the motivation of court decisions regarding the qualification of “blasphemous” acts remains deeply problematic: all derisory or scornful remarks and manifestations of “ill-will” are taken as blasphemous per se (Sarafianos, 2010: 108). According to a recent international report, Policing Belief: The Impact of Blasphemy Laws on Human Rights:

The apparent pattern in Greece is that “petty” complaints of malicious blasphemy by individuals are usually dismissed by courts of first instance, while high-profile cases involving works of art lead to injunctions and convictions that are eventually overturned (…) The blasphemy laws essentially allow certain elements of society to engage in legal harassment and intimidation of those who offend them, with the blessing of the state. Even if they end in exoneration, blasphemy prosecutions impose financial and other burdens on the defendants, have a chilling effect on the broader creative community and media sector, and curtail the general public’s fundamental right to have access to information and a variety of viewpoints. (Freedom House, 2013: 41)

Critiques by scholars, commentators, or human activists, on both the Greek legal apparatus and case law on blasphemy, have stressed the socio-historical and politico-religious specificities of Church/State relationships that have contributed over the centuries to forging the so-called “Greek peculiarity” in the matter of blasphemy: the origins of these relationships and the continuing recognition of a “dominant” religion – that is, a state religion – and the atmosphere of a “natural” alliance between justice and the Church in view of their supposed common moral pursuits (Tsapogas, 2010: 118); the particular position of the Greek Orthodox Church in the State, according to the Greek Constitution; and the dominant role of the former in the social, cultural, and political history of Greece, which has led the Greek legal system to be “marked by a very high level of religious devotion” (Christopoulos, 2008: 165). Legal scholar Tsapogas, characteristically refers to the “sense of continuity” of the Greek judge: however modern on the surface, the penal treatment of blasphemy and religious insult dates back to a clearly discernible legal lore that is nothing other than the articulation of State and Church, and the court practice does not appear to have contributed in any particular way to modernizing the interpretation of this obsolete formulation of the Greek Penal Code (Tsapogas, 2010: 115, 117).

The renowned jurisprudence on Martin Scorsese’s film The Last Temptation is the most representative example in respect to the above critiques. In this case, “the mediation of cinematographic art is not taken into consideration in favour of the defendant, as a presumption of the exclusion of ‘malice’ or a pursuit which enjoys constitutional protection in itself but, on the contrary, it counts as an element against the defendant, a misleading, almost satanic, medium by definition” (Tsapogas, 2010: 116). Another scholar criticized the fact that the decision undertook a flawed balancing exercise between artistic creation and religious feeling, clearly taking a stance in favour of the latter, as an obvious limit to freedom of art (Sarafianos, 2010: 106–107). According to the decision 7115/1988 of the Court of First Instance of Athens:

Protection of religious feelings is imperative because they are moral–social values, social and legal interests worthy of protection to the benefit of civilization and polity. Religion is not a purely personal affair, a wholly inner relationship of the soul with God, irrelevant to the state, but the foundation of the state, a vector of spiritual civilization affecting not only the feelings and thoughts but also the actions of human beings.

This famous jurisprudence highlights in the best way the interaction between the following elements: (1) the Church’s initial influence with regard to the initiation of the legal proceedings, (2) the judges’ hesitation with respect to the intention criterion, and finally, (3) the decision of conviction, which is based on a flawed balancing exercise, and demonstrates an implicit identitarian bias on behalf of the judges.

If one considers the taxonomic criterion of State/Church relationships as the most apposite standard for any typology of criminal treatment the world over – with typical examples of a series of Islamic countries, at one end, and of the United States, at the other end – (Tsapogas, 2010: 118), then it comes as no surprise that a court in late 20th century Orthodox Greece considers, in a blasphemy case, that “religion is the foundation of the state.” Legal scholars have challenged the myth of “benign establishment” – official establishment of a religion as a state religion – arguing that comparative legal–sociological data substantiate respectively an empirical correlation, on the one hand, between establishment and “governmental favouritism” and, on the other hand, between “governmental favouritism” and increased restrictions on religious and other liberties (Temperman, 2012). Viewed in the light of the “disestablishmentarian” argument, the overall legislative and judicial blasphemy framework in Orthodox Greece seems to be more a corresponding pattern of this line of argument, and much less a “Greek peculiarity.”

The Revival of the Controversy on the Depenalization of Blasphemy at the Occasion of the 2012 Elder Pastitsios and Corpus Christi Cases

Two recent legal cases (autumn 2012) involving charges of criminal action on the grounds of blasphemy have put the issue of penal legislation in the spotlight, generating a revival of the controversy on the depenalization of blasphemy: the Elder Pastitsios¹⁰ and Corpus Christi cases. The Corpus Christi case was about the Greek production of Corpus Christi, the controversial Terrence McNally play that portrays Jesus and his apostles as gay men in modern-day Texas. The Greek State charged Vassiliou and his cast with malicious blasphemy and insult of religion, after a lawsuit was filed by Metropolitan Seraphim of Piraeus, a high-ranking member of Greece’s Orthodox Church¹¹ (on the grounds of Art. 199 of the Penal Code). According to Greek historian Bournazos, these kinds of prosecution are an integral part of a long tradition of similar cases in post-1974 (post-dictatorship, “metapoliteftiki”) Greece, in which he distinguishes between three intersecting circles that have various common characteristics.¹² The first circle concerns the mobilizations, criminal prosecutions, convictions and prohibitions on grounds of “blasphemy” and “religious insult,” whereas the second and third circles are respectively about cases of censorship and prosecution of artworks mostly, which are considered “impudent” or insulting public decency, and censorships more generally of freedom of expression, freedom of speech, or of scientific opinion (Bournazos, 2013: 105–113). Some of the common characteristics referred to above, can in fact be identified in the recent Elder Pastitsios and Corpus Christi cases. Greek Orthodox priests, ultranationalists, ultraconservative groups, far-right circles, and parliamentarians of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party were leading the protests both ideologically and practically, in front of the Hytirio Theater in downtown Athens, where they tried to prevent the opening of the premiere of Corpus Christi. The various protagonists in the campaigns against the “blasphemers” seemed to act in their capacity as the self-proclaimed guardians of morals and conservative values, and as the defenders of the Greek Orthodox faith, identity and Nation. Demonstrators were shouting slogans such as: “Long live the Nation!” (Zito to Ethnos), “Long live Orthodoxy!” (Zito i Orthodoxia), and “Greece means Orthodoxy” (Hellas simainei Orthodoxia), among others. The protesters’ discourses constituted a heteroclite mixture of intolerance, nationalism, fanaticism, and demagogy, enriched by elements of homophobia–sexism, and racism.¹³ It is characteristic that the demonstrations at the Hytirio Theater were dominated by violent clashes with the police, screams of obscenities, incitement to hatred, and threats. When interviewed after the events, the play director, Laertis Vassiliou, said “it was like being attacked by Christian Talibans,” and that he felt that he was being terrorized. He and the actors reportedly received numerous death threats during a period of two months.

These events, and the criminal prosecutions undertaken, generated the vivid reaction of the Hellenic League for Human Rights (HLHR), which organized a public debate (16 October 2012) on the theme “God has No Need for a Public Attorney,” with the participation of a wide range of speakers, including lawyers, jurists, academics, historians, philologists, and the two recent defendants in the criminal action against blasphemy. The debate focused on the various aspects of the recent Elder Pastitsios and Corpus Christi affairs, the issue of intolerance, and a critical overview of older blasphemy/censorship cases, as well as of the existing penal legislation on blasphemy.¹⁴ On the HLHR’s webpage announcing the event, it was stated:

Our League in a former proposal of 2005 regarding a new arrangement of the relations between the state and the church has been positioned in favour of the abolition of the offence of blasphemy and vituperation against religions of the Penal Code, which constitutes an ostentatious legal anachronism. The recent criminal action against the theatrical performance Corpus Christi and of the creator of the social media webpage “Elder Pastitsios”, has brought the issue back in the limelight.¹⁵

This is the first proposal recorded in Greece in favour of the abolition of the crime of blasphemy, on behalf of a civil society institution. The main argument is that the criminal provisions on blasphemy constitute a legal anachronism, a feudal remnant, which needs to be abolished; a democratic, liberal state has the duty, as is also the case with political and philosophical convictions, to treat religious feelings like ideas. Treated as such, religious convictions are exposed publicly and are then susceptible to criticism, satire, and even mockery (Mallios and Papapantoleon, 2013: 36–37). Besides, the abolition of the crime of blasphemy would not lead to a vacuum of legal protection, given the fact that the Penal Code protects the reputation of individuals, through the adoption of specific criminal provisions to protect honour (insult, defamation, etc. Art. 361 of the Penal Code). Consequently, the faithful whose religious feelings are offended could make use of the above provisions (Christopoulos, 2008: 75–76). Moreover, the criminal provisions on incitement to hatred (recommended by the Venice and UNO Commissions, 2008, 2011) constitute another possible alternative (Christians, 2012: 107–119).

The blasphemy controversy cannot be viewed independently from the more general debate on the necessity of the separation of Church and State in Greece, and the deconfessionalization of the Greek public sphere. The existence of this legal anachronism is an integral part of the overall machinery of Church/State relationships, and echoes the problematic interactions between different levels of power. It is indicative that the HLHR, in an older statement, had denounced the characteristics of the Greek case, in the following terms:

When entire regiments of the judiciary secretly march through the offices of prelates, the suspicions of those who entrusted the protection of their religious freedom in Greek justice become reasonable (…) this consorting of judicial officials with clergymen from the dominant religion is still seen as the corollary of an allegedly natural alliance between these two domains in their assumed attachment to the common pursuits of justice and morality (…) the separation of the church from the state is an indispensable prerequisite for gradually instilling religious neutrality into judicial and other public officials. (Tsapogas, 2013: 81; our emphasis)

Another reaction came from the Greek Union of Atheists (GUA), which addressed a letter to the Parliament, the Ministry of Justice, and the Union of the Judiciary, advocating the depenalization of blasphemy. The GUA argued characteristically that:

The concept of blasphemy is relevant only within the context of the celebration of religious dogmas, whereas it has no place whatsoever in the legal framework. The notions of “God” and the “divinity” neither refer to the existence of real beings, nor do they constitute universally accepted values, but they concern solely the faithful and the priests of specific religious dogmas. Consequently, the inclusion of these notions in State laws is inadmissible.

Finally, it is stressed that

whereas respect to [the notions of] “God” and the “divinity” may constitute an obligation for the faithful of a specific dogma, on the contrary, the State has no right to enforce this respect against all citizens, by means of penal legislation.¹⁶

Most legal scholars and intellectuals have criticized the de facto discrimination that occurs in the context of the existing legal apparatus, in favour of the politically and legally dominant Eastern Orthodox Church (Dimoulis, 2008: 128–130; Christopoulos, 2008: 78; Tsapogas, 2010; Sarafianos, 2010). Blasphemy cases are indeed initiated by Orthodox ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical circles, aiming at repressing the critics and challengers of the “dominant” Orthodox religion. The crime of blasphemy as an object of jurisprudence and judicial practice constitutes one of the structural elements of state censorship, which, in the Greek case, guarantee exclusively the interests of the Orthodox Church (Dimoulis, 2008: 130). Moreover, this overprotection of religious convictions, as one of the few cases of institutionalized censorship, is not only due to the fact that the legal order considers the divine as a state value; it is also due to the influence of organized social groups that require the maintenance of this particular piety, even against the operating codes of the constitutional state. Such groups, in the Greek case, are particularly powerful and fit in with the mechanisms of the “prevailing” religion (Dimoulis, 2008: 128).

Blasphemy, the Orthodox Church of Greece and “Golden Dawn”: Interplay between Religious Nationalism and Politics?

It came as no surprise that the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Greece, in a press release (7 June 2012), condemned the performance of Corpus Christi as blasphemous. According to the Holy Synod, the play:

vilifies the human–divine person of our Lord Jesus Christ, is offensive and historically incorrect, since it is not based on the Holy Scriptures and is further contrary to the long traditions of our homeland [Greece] and the Greek Orthodox Church. The playwrights must show the necessary respect to our People’s historic tradition and the teaching of our Church.

And the Synod added:

We feel very sorry about the playwrights’ morbid imagination and we incite our People to disapprove of the play.¹⁷ (Sakellariou, 2013: 42–43)

But it is of particular interest that the Holy Synod, as the representative organ of the OCG, officially established its distance from the criminal action initiated by Metropolitan Seraphim of Piraeus (the complainant), by explicitly denying its involvement:

To avoid all misunderstandings, the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Greece denies any participation whatsoever in the lawsuit filed against the play director and the actors of the play Corpus Christi; nor did the Holy Synod give any instructions whatsoever to proceed to such an act.¹⁸

The OCG, in its majority, seems to stand in favour of safeguarding the existing criminal provisions on blasphemy (Sakellariou, 2013: 57). Nevertheless, the reactions of various high-ranking bishops of the Orthodox clergy (mostly Metropolitans) in the Corpus Christi controversy indicate that there is no official, homogeneous position of the Orthodox Church, but rather a plurality of individual reactions of bishops and a variety of types of discourse. For instance, Metropolitan of Gortyna and Megaloupoli, Jeremiah, stated that “Corpus Christi is precisely a case of Sodoma and Gomorra”, and characterized the play as “blasphemous and despicable.” He declared that “Everyone has the right to freedom of conviction and speech, nevertheless, we should not allow anybody to insult publicly and systematically our faith,” adding that it was inevitable that such an insult would provoke the anger and the protest of “those brave Christians and confessors who demonstrated against this impious and blasphemous play,” without fearing the consequences.¹⁹ He congratulated and praised the protesters, who, in his view, “proved to be genuine infants of the Church, given the fact that the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Greece, in her press release of the 7th of June 2012, had urged Christians to disapprove of the play.”²⁰ The sociologist Sakellariou commented ironically that “the compatibility between freedom of conviction and speech and the incitation to react against ‘blasphemous’ artworks seems to adhere in the sphere of metaphysics, or, better, of undisguised hypocrisy” (Sakellariou, 2103: 46–47). The most controversial ecclesiastical figure, Metropolitan of Piraeus, Seraphim, the complainant in the procedure, stated that: “The crude violation of the penal law was embellished, since it was being presented as an alleged freedom of expression or freedom of art (…).” He added:

The Greek people, as it can be historically proved, defend freedom of religion and freedom of religious conscience. But the mockery and vulgarity at the expense of His holiness the Christ, Lord of our faith, incite us to take action, peacefully and legally, without even fearing for our own life.

He considered that there was a paradox:

all those Greek compatriots, who, even though they are justified to stand in support of Muslims that face religious discrimination, do not act in the same way towards their Christian Orthodox compatriots, but they rather stand in support of those who violate the truth.²¹

In another statement, the Metropolitan Seraphim criticized “the lack of democratic sensibility of the press” which “rushed to cover the playwright’s and actors’ outrage, trampling, in a vulgar way, on the religious feelings of the Greek Orthodox people, which are insulted and brutally attacked by the paranoid delusions of the American homosexual author.”²²

In a slightly lower tone, Metropolitan of Sisani and Siatista, Pavlos, declared himself “very vexed by this despicable play, like everyone who loves Christ, believes in Him, and has put oneself in His service (diakonia) for life.” He further commented:

[…] But one knows that his Christ has absolutely nothing to do with the content of this play, He is not threatened by these sad weaklings […] pretending to make art […] by the impudence of the atheists and the corrupted. Faith is rather threatened by the impenitence of Christians, the absence of sanctification […] the secularization of the spiritual life of Christians; the latter have replaced the sanctification and the martyrdom for the sake of faith, which constitute the genuine spiritual resistance, with the lynching of the infidels.²³

In the above excerpts from some representative discourses by Orthodox Metropolitans who were the protagonists in the protests, we find the recurrence of religious and ethno-patriotic references (Greek Orthodox homeland (patrida), Greek Orthodox compatriots), mixed together with theological (diakonia, martyrdom and sanctification) or sociological elements of analysis (with respect to secularization), as well as elements of religious populism and nationalism, and attacks and insults against a variety of actors. In spite of the diversity of ecclesiastical reactions and discourses, the perception of the recent blasphemy events as an offence and threat to the Greek Orthodox ethnos and identity appears to be a common denominator.

It is this allegiance to the ethno-patriotic Greek Orthodox ideals that emerges as a common axe justifying the mobilization against the blasphemers, by both the religious institutional actor and the nationalist neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party. Only two bishops of the OCG declared openly their opposition with criminal prosecution, and only one clearly took a stand against the Golden Dawn party.²⁴ The OCG was in fact strongly criticized for its silence, and for not having issued an official, public condemnation of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party (Zoumboulakis, 2013b: 103), an attitude that puts at stake the Church’s ecclesiastical role and mission, and jeopardizes its social dimension. The condemnation by individual bishops, however positive, is insufficient to transmit a clear message to the faithful and to public opinion, that the official Orthodox Church radically condemns phenomena rooted in intolerance, violence, and neo-Nazi, racist attitudes, as the latter are represented in the overall ideology and systematic actions of Golden Dawn.

The presence and active implication, even hegemonic position, of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, which was leading the protests, ideologically, politically and practically constitutes in fact, as scholars have pointed out, the new element, the qualitative difference regarding the recent blasphemy cases in Greece (Bournazos, 2013: 122–124; Zoumboulakis, 2013b: 102). Golden Dawn, as a self-proclaimed “ethno-patriotic” party, and defender of the Greek Orthodox identity and tradition, aside from the established Orthodox Church, seems to have infiltrated some fundamentalist milieux of the latter. It is characteristic that Golden Dawn openly supported the Metropolitan of Piraeus Seraphim in the criminal prosecution initiated by the latter against Corpus Christi. In the Elder Pastitsios case, a few days before the arrest of Loizos, the creator of the Facebook page, Christos Pappas, MP of Golden Dawn, submitted a parliamentary question to the Ministers of Education and Public Order, on the issue of “the opprobrious mockery of Elder Paisios” by a Facebook user, who “insults, ironizes and attempts to humiliate this sacred figure of Greek Orthodoxy” (Bournazos, 2013: 121). According to scholar Zoumboulakis (2013a), the self-perception of the OCG as a “defender of the Greek Orthodox identity” and the “Hellenic Nation,” is an element explaining why the Church is attracted by organizations bearing an ethno-patriotic and nationalistic ideology. But there are mostly historical reasons pertaining to the OCG in the wider context of the contemporary political history of Greece, that can explain the existence of this minority tendency inside the OCG in favour of (or simply tolerant toward) Golden Dawn; for instance, the fact that, during the last two years of Greece’s occupation by Germany, and the Greek Civil war that followed (1946–1949), the fear of communism, atheism and persecution led the Church to be more inclined towards right-wing ideologies and to join the opposite side (Zoumboulakis, 2013a: 63). On the other hand, the instrumentalization, by Golden Dawn, of the national narratives on Greek Orthodox identity explains to a certain extent the “legitimization” of the neo-Nazi political party in the eyes of a large part of public opinion, which is “educated with the Greek-Orthodox patriotic rhetoric” (Zoumboulakis, 2013b: 103) and is, therefore, particularly prone to adhere to the party’s ethno-religious and politico-religious propaganda.

Conclusion

An overview of the Greek legislation and contemporary case law (20th and 21st centuries) on blasphemy highlights in the most illustrative way the State’s “religious protectionism” and the influence of the “dominant” religion. The crime of blasphemy as an object of jurisprudence and judicial practice constitutes one of the structural elements of state censorship, which, in the Greek case, guarantee exclusively the interests of the Orthodox Church. The claims for abolition of the blasphemy legislation and the overall criticism, by several actors, of civil society should thus be viewed in the wider context of the contemporary debate on the necessity of separation between Church and State, and the denouncing of the interweaving between various actors at different levels of State and Church power, which puts at stake not only the effective exercise of individual liberties (especially freedom of speech and artistic freedom), but also democracy itself. The recent Elder Pastitsios and Corpus Christi cases, though they are not new phenomena, constitute a sad illustration of the interplay between religious nationalism and politics in present-day Greece, including a new qualitative element, which is the active implication of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party. The allegiance to the ethno-patriotic Greek Orthodox ideals, and defense of the Greek Orthodox identity as a common axe justifying the mobilization against the blasphemers, explains partly the de facto rapprochement between the Orthodox Church and Golden Dawn. In the light of the recent events, it becomes even more urgent for the Church to establish a clear line that separates it from such political entities, which constitute a danger, not only to the Church itself, but also to the social peace and democratic foundations of the State. But the Church should also find the courage to condemn and isolate those of its members who engage in hate and racist discourses. The blasphemy controversy illustrates compellingly the antithetic tensions still inherent in Greek society, with regard to Greek Orthodox ethno-religious identity. Whereas a big part of civil society supports the deconfessionalization of the public sphere, and is in favour of the separation of Church and State, there are social groups that embrace the Greek Orthodox patriotic rhetoric, and strive for the maintenance of the status quo by all available means. Hopefully, the debate initiated on the subject of blasphemy will carry on, enhancing reflection and peaceful dialogue at all levels of civil society, the State and the Church.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

References

Androutsopoulos

(2010) Religious Freedom According to the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (I thriskeftiki eleftheria kata ti nomologia toy Arioy Pagoy). Athens: Sakkoulas.

Bournazos

(2013) “Pastitsios”, “Hytirio” Theater and Golden Dawn (O “Pastitsios”, to “Hytirio” kai i Hrysi Avgi). In: Hellenic League for Human Rights (ed.) God has No Need for a Public Attorney. Church, Blasphemy and Golden Dawn (O Theos den exi anagki isaggelea. Ekklisia, vlasfimia kai Hrysi Avgi). Athens: Nefeli, pp. 105–125.

Christians

(2012) Polémiques religieuses et intentions cachées. Nouvelles sacralités et méta-discrimination en droit contemporain. In: Dierkens

Schreiber

J-PH

(eds) Le blasphème : Du péché au crime. Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, pp. 107–119.

Christopoulos

(2008) Introduction. Censorship and rights : From Mohameth’s cartoons to the Greek blasphemy. In: Ziogas

Karabinis

Stavrakakis

. (eds) Aspects of Censorship in Greece (Opsis logokrisias stin Ellada). Athens: Nefeli, pp. 67–86.

Dimoulis

(2008) Censorships of “thiology” and social power relationships. In: Ziogas

Karabinis

Stavrakakis

. (eds) Aspects of Censorship in Greece (Opsis logokrisias stin Ellada). Athens: Nefeli, pp. 119–131.

Freedom House (2013) Policing Belief. The Impact of Blasphemy Laws on Human Rights. Greece. A Freedom House Special Report, available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Policing_Belief_Full.pdf (accessed 7 May 2013).

Hellenic League for Human Rights (HLHR) (ed.) (2013) God has No Need for a Public Attorney. Church, Blasphemy and Golden Dawn (O Theos den exi anagki isaggelea. Ekklisia, vlasfimia kai Hrysi Avgi). Athens: Nefeli.

Labropoulou

(2005) Curator on Trial for “Obscene” Art. The Independent, 4 June 2005.

Mallios

Papapantoleon

(2013) Satire and blasphemy: The adventures of a right (Satira kai vlasfimia: i peripeties enos dikeomatos). In: Hellenic League for Human Rights (ed.) God has No Need for a Public Attorney. Church, Blasphemy and Golden Dawn. Athens: Nefeli, pp. 17–37.

10.

Sakellariou

(2013) On blasphemy and other demons: The position of the Orthodox Church of Greece (Peri vlasfimias kai allon demonion: i stasi tis Orthodoxis Ekklisias tis Elladas). In: Hellenic League for Human Rights (ed.) God has No Need for a Public Attorney. Church, Blasphemy and Golden Dawn. Athens: Nefeli, pp. 39–61.

11.

Sarafianos

(2010) Blasphemy in the Greek Orthodox legal tradition. In: Blasphemy, Insult and Hatred: Finding Answers in a Democratic Society. Science and Technique of Democracy, Report no. 47. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pp. 105–111.

12.

Temperman

(2008) Blasphemy, defamation of religions and Human Rights Law. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 26(4): 517–545.

13.

Temperman

(2012) Are State Churches contrary to International Law? Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2(1): 1–31.

14.

Tsapogas

(2010) Blasphemy and justice in a Greek Orthodox context. In: Blasphemy, Insult and Hatred: Finding Answers in a Democratic Society. Science and Technique of Democracy, Report no. 47. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pp. 113–120.

15.

Tsapogas

(2013) The traditional recipes of intolerance (at the occasion of the adventure of the webpage “Elder Pastitsios”). In: Hellenic League for Human Rights (ed.) God has No Need for a Public Attorney. Church, Blasphemy and Golden Dawn. Athens: Nefeli, pp. 63–87.

16.

UNO (2011) Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred in Accordance with International Human Rights Law, Expert Seminar for the European Region, 9 and 10 February 2011. Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/CRP5Ghanea.pdf.

17.

Venice Commission Survey (2008) Tackling Blasphemy, Insult and Hatred in a Democratic Society. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

18.

Ziogas

Karabinis

Stavrakakis

. (2008) Aspects of Censorship in Greece (Opsis logokrisias stin Ellada). Athens: Nefeli.

19.

Zoumboulakis

(2013a) Golden Dawn and Church (Hrysi Avgi kai Ekklisia). Athens: Polis.

20.

Zoumboulakis

(2013b) Who is protected by the blasphemy laws? In: Hellenic League for Human Rights (ed.) God has No Need for a Public Attorney. Church, Blasphemy and Golden Dawn. Athens: Nefeli, pp. 89–104.

21.

Atheists claim the depenalization of blasphemy (Oi atheoi zitoun tin apopoinikopoihsh ths vlasphimias). Newbomb.gr, available at: http://gr.news.yahoo.com/oι-άθεoι-ζητoύν-την-απoπoινικoπoíηση-της-βλασφημíας (accessed 1 November 2012).

22.

Criminal action against the play director and actors of “Corpus Christi,” 16 November 2013, available at: http://www.romfea.gr/diafora-ekklisiastika/14527-poiniki-dioxi (accessed 19 May 2013).

23.

Free expression vs. religious sensitivity in battle over book. The Associated Press, 8 March 2000, available at: http://archive.ocl.org/?id=8034r (accessed 11 May 2013).

24.

Giota Sykka (2012) Insulters of free expression. The events outside the Hytirion Theatre bring on the surface extreme forms of reaction. Kathimerini, 16 October 2012.

25.

Gortynos: “The Corpus Christi is precisely a case of Sodoma and Gomorrha,” 16 October 2012, available at: http://www.romfea.gr/foni-ierarxon/14139-gortinos-gia-corpus-christi (accessed 19 May 2013).

26.

Greek ban on “blasphemous” book. BBC News, 10 March 2000, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/672736.stm (accessed 11 May 2013).

27.

Greek exhibitor of “Obscene” Art to face Court. Agence France-Presse, 2 June 2005.

28.

Holy Synod lashes out against former Communist MP over novel. Athens News, 8 March 2000, available at: http://archive.ocl.org/?id=8033 (accessed 11 May 2013).

29.

Metropolitan of Piraeus against “Corpus Christi,” 18 October 2012, available at: http://www.romfea.gr/ieres-mitropoleis/14157-corpus-christi (accessed 19 May 2013).

30.

Metropolitan of Siatista, Pavlos unleashed fire against “Corpus Christi” and “Golden Dawn,” 14 October 2012, available at: http://www.romfea.gr/foni-ierarxon/14101-corpus-christi (accessed 19 May 2013).

31.

Orthodox reaction. Move to ban novel of “sexual” Jesus. The Guardian, 25 April 2000, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/apr/25/helenasmith (accessed 11 May 2013).

32.

The statements of Laertis Vassiliou on the interim measures against Corpus Christi, available at: http://www.athinorama.gr/theatre/newsroom/?edtid=21149 (accessed 01 April 2013).

33.

Trial delayed of Greek accused of exhibiting “Blasphemous Painting.” Agence France-Presse, 3 June 2005.