Gandhi’s Response to Religious Conflict

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I offer the following reflections on Gandhi’s political thought by way of an effort to draw attention to an interesting and innovative approach for addressing seemingly intractable religio-political dilemmas. My hope is that shining the spotlight on Gandhi will provide some insights into an important dimension of democratic politics, relevant for India and other religiously diverse contexts. ¹ The possibilities we see in Gandhi’s thought are related to the development of robust associational activity where appropriate political action in the face of deep diversity results more from the fostering of relations of friendship and trust among citizens than from reliance upon either the instrumentalities of pacts and bargains, or those of a law-governed order. Most of the other essays in this special issue of Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses focus on the way state power engages conundrums attached to the political accommodation of religion. This article, by contrast, concentrates on what persons in deeply diverse jurisdictions can do to foster relations of friendship among religious communities. As will become evident, courage can be identified as the chief virtue undergirding Gandhian prescriptions for the generation of harmonious relations among diverse religious groups.

Gandhi held religion to be “a personal matter which should have no place in politics” (Gandhi, 1994: 38), but he also claimed to “approach politics, as everything else, in a religious spirit” (1994: 44). These two comments about religion and politics reflect Gandhi’s two understandings of religion. The first, (a), seems to refer to religion in the more conventional sense, that is, to plural forms of devotion, faith and worship. Let me call this “religion as faith.” ² The second, (b), evokes an adjectival sense, appearing to designate a dispositional quality; I will call this “religion as disposition.”

In what follows I want to suggest that Gandhi’s approach to inter-religious conflict, as is evident, for example, in the debate over cow slaughter, hinges on religion as disposition. It stresses a reflexive, inclusionary and respectful stance on the part of adherents of one religion vis-à-vis others and, interestingly enough, can converge with commitments entailed in religion as faith. In fact, Gandhi frequently bolsters the case for (b) by drawing upon the conceptual resources of religion as covered in (a). The substance of religion in sense (b) – religion as disposition – is determined by engaging issues important for religion understood more conventionally in sense (a) – religion as faith – such as the oneness of God, the importance of scripture/text, the role of individual reason in interpreting textual requirements, and loyalty toward and defence of one’s religion in the face of perceived threats to the integrity of that religion. ³ A closer understanding of the moral psychology underlying the doctrine of equal and free partnership reveals the way religion as disposition enables associative political action and how, in the Gandhian view, it is prior to religion as faith.

II

Gandhi held that questions of religion are better dealt with outside of the domain of compulsion because they belong to a realm in which external prohibitions are not relevant. Recall that Gandhi considers religion to be a personal matter. While Gandhi does not rule out a role for government in religious matters, it is amply clear from his writings that the best way to handle religious questions dear to believers was for believers to focus on appropriate modes of personal conduct, which in turn would have implications for associational activity through which they could pursue their religiously inspired goals. Thus it is that, when it comes to questions of inter-religious relations, Gandhi decries the reliance on law to settle vexatious issues pertaining to inter-religious conflict. For him, it is “obviously wrong legally to enforce one’s religious practice on those who do not share that religion” (1994: 97). Religious prohibitions have to come “from within”; anything imposed by force through law from outside would be akin to compulsion. And, “such compulsion is repugnant to religion” (1994: 97).

From a secularist perspective it could appear predictable to put bounds on the extent to which some believers might use the law to enforce their own religious views on others. However, Gandhi’s views are more sophisticated than that. Even as he rules out sectarian uses of law in a religiously plural context, he does not expect believers to bracket their religious convictions in associational public life (which, incidentally, is the chief site for action in the Gandhian view). Rather, as is evident in his views on cow slaughter, he offers resources through which to consider modes by which adherents of one religion, say Hindus, might actively garner the support of others, say Muslims, for the observance of Hindu convictions. The aim of such persuasive associational activity is not to institute law in keeping with Hindu requirements, but to generate an environment in which believers can cleave to their religious convictions and hope that others will act in ways cognizant of these convictions.

But what is the appropriate manner for me to cleave to my religious convictions in the face of disagreement with adherents of other religions? Can I expect their actions to become consonant with my religious requirements? In defending my religion what, if any, are the constraints that I must bear in mind whilst interacting with others?

Gandhi’s responses are grounded in the importance of love, trust and friendship and an insistence on soul-force and self-sacrifice as bases for action and interactions in the context of religious conflict. It seems that the importance of the listed attributes stems from his presupposition that “Mercy or kindness is the essence of all religion” (1994: 45). If mercy is the essence of all religion, the victimization of the weak by the strong is ruled out. In fact, Gandhi says that if Hindus and Muslims “really wish to live as men of religion, they must develop strength from within. They must be both strong and humble” (1994: 54). Hubris while engaging one’s interlocutors is ruled out. And so is dependence upon the good will of a majority for members of a minority to follow their religion (1994: 53–54).

But what is strength? Strength refers to the courage to patiently wait for a change of heart on the part of one’s disagreeing interlocutor, and shunning tactics of bargaining or bullying to bring about a change in the other’s actions. Courage in this context relates to establishing relations of friendship and trust with one’s adversarial interlocutor. Writing on the issue of the protection of the cow, ⁴ Gandhi says: “It must be an article of faith for every Hindu that the cow can only be saved by Musalman friendship. Let us recognize frankly that complete protection of the cow depends purely upon Musalman goodwill. It is as impossible to bend the Musalmans to our will, as it would be for them to bend us to theirs. We are evolving the doctrine of equal and free partnership” (1994: 99).

To act in accordance with the doctrine of equal and free partnership one must not only eschew yielding to threats but also refrain from causing irritation to others. For Gandhi, “a faith gains in strength only when people are willing to lay down their lives for it … without killing their opponents or intending any harm to them” (1994: 43). Gandhi’s statements on cow slaughter epitomize his stance on how religious believers might pursue their convictions. He said:

As a Hindu, a confirmed vegetarian, and a worshipper of the cow whom I regard with the same veneration as I regard my mother … I maintain that Muslims should have full freedom to slaughter cows, if they wish, subject of course to hygienic restrictions and in a manner not to wound the susceptibilities of their Hindu neighbours. Fullest recognition of freedom to the Muslims to slaughter cows is indispensable for communal harmony, and is the only way of saving the cow. (1994: 90)

Let no one, however, conclude from this that I am indifferent when a non-Hindu kills a cow or that I can bear the practice of cow-killing. On the contrary, no one probably experiences greater agony of the soul when a cow is killed. But what am I to do? Am I to fulfill my dharma myself or am I to get it fulfilled by proxy? … But supposing even that I myself do not kill the cow, is it any part of my duty to make the Musalman, against his will, to do likewise? (1994: 89)

Also: “What is readily yielded to courtesy is never yielded to force” (1994: 78). Gandhi goes a step further and adds a disclaimer saying, “a person, who never will yield to threat, would always minimize and, if possible, even avoid occasions for causing irritation” (1994: 77). Arguably, Gandhi considers the restrained conduct of individual adherents of a religion to be germane not just for determining the goodness of a religion but also for considering the appropriateness of associational attempts to defend religion. For example, adherents of a faith cannot indulge in slander of another faith. “No propaganda can be allowed which reviles other religions. For, that would be negation of toleration. The best way of dealing with such propaganda is to publicly condemn it” (1994: 41–42).

Arguably, the commencement of relations of friendship, which in turn could entail an accommodative stance on one’s part, requires the exercise of great restraint on the part of persons associating with one another while following their religiously inspired goals. And the commencement of such relations requires the presence of courage on the part of those involved – the courage to conduct themselves in ways that can foster friendship and trust with adversarial interlocutors.

III

Gandhi indicates a few more avenues for inter-religious communication and understanding that also relate courage with the ability to trust the other (1994: 54). Anticipating reflexive devices discussed in contemporary liberal theory, such as reasoning from conjecture (Rawls, 1997) and internal reasoning (Bilgrami, 1998), Gandhi draws attention to the importance of people’s attempts to comprehend and appreciate the religious conceptions of their interlocutors with a view to facilitating communication and understanding. For example, he encourages Hindus to consider studying the Qur’an “reverently” and adds that they “will love it as [I] do” (1994: 54). Gandhi holds the Hindu unwillingness to study the Qur’an to be the reason for “fanatical” interpretations of it (1994: 54). “If the Hindus set their house in order, I have not a shadow of doubt that Islam will respond in a manner worthy of its past liberal traditions. The key to the situation lies with the Hindus. We must shed timidity or cowardice. We must be brave enough to trust, and all will be well” (1994: 54). Here, once more, Gandhi underscores the need for courage to establish and participate in relations of trust.

Gandhi endorses the impulse toward impartiality in his interpretation of the requirements of a religion. In the context of understanding Hinduism, for example, he says: “I hold that every Hindu believes in one and only God. Excrescences have grown round Hinduism, and its votaries have not always been true to Hinduism undefiled. It is, therefore, up to an impartial man to understand Hinduism as its votaries like him understood it, just as it is the duty of an impartial Hindu to understand Islam as a good Muslim understands it. That, I hold, is the safest rule of interpretation for any faith. Then it will be found that all great religions spring from the same source and the fundamentals are common to them all” (1994: 54–55). Interesting in the quotation above is the notion that one’s interpretations of others’ religions can draw upon the way “impartial” adherents of those religions understand and enact them.

To sum up, the ability to launch a struggle for one’s religious beliefs in a way that seeks to change the heart of one’s interlocutor requires the courage to love and tolerate the other’s religion, “even prejudices and superstitions,” and to “trust one another. This requires faith in oneself. And faith in oneself is faith in God. If we have that faith, we shall cease to fear one another” (1994: 41). To be sure, the challenge that arises for readers of a Gandhian response to religious diversity and conflict – expressed in the term “religion as disposition” – is to “dare to believe” (1994: 97) that an approach grounded in trust and friendship can yield resources for pursuing and consolidating a “heart-unity.” The crucial question is whether we can “dare to believe” in the way Gandhi suggested we should.