Abstract
Since Deng Xiaoping adopted a pragmatic policy of opening up and reforming the country in the late 1970s, Islam has witnessed a revival in China. Just as the Chinese nation has experienced rapid economic, political and social development, so too has Islam grown and diversified. Since Muslims generally enjoy the freedom to practice their religion and the benefit of China’s Preferential Program (a policy giving special privileges to minority Muslims) – if they obey the state law and keep harmonious relations with other social groups – some Chinese Muslims regard today as a “golden age” for Islam in the People’s Republic. This paper offers an overview of the major developments in Chinese Communist policy on religion and discusses the internal and external influences of domestic and international relations on Communist Party policy towards Chinese Muslims. It argues that Chinese Communist Party policy since the 1970s protects religious freedom but does so while maintaining state control over religion. Further, in the case of Islam in the People’s Republic, state protection and control are defined according to the domestic and international concerns of the State.
Historical Journey: From Opposition to Tolerance of Religion
1 Islam and the Policy of the Communist Party in the Pre-reform Age
A conventional argument concerning the relationship between Islam and Communism in the Western mass media in general is that the two are absolutely incompatible since they belong to two different belief systems: monotheism and atheism. So Raphael Israeli predicted that Islam and Muslims would always be suppressed in China by the Communist regime and that Muslims in China would only have one choice for their survival: to rebel and establish an independent Islamic state (Israeli, 1980). This dualistic analysis might have been partly true before Deng Xiaoping’s reform policy in 1978. However, since the 1980s Islam in China has gained momentum in many respects. For example, mosques have been enlarged, repaired, or rebuilt in a distinctively Islamic architectural style; the number of madrasa (Islamic schools) has increased, as have the number of Muslims who participate in the Hajj (pilgrimage), the number of publications on Islam (books and periodicals), and indeed the overall size of the Muslim population. This period has also seen the emergence of a large group of Muslim clerics and scholars, and increased contact between Chinese Muslims and the rest of the Islamic world.
China remains one of the few Marxist/socialist countries in the world, a society that has retained basically the same Communist political structure for the last 30 years. This paper explores the interesting simultaneity of China’s fairly steadfast maintenance of its radical, revolutionary ideological rhetoric and the remarkable growth in many of its Islamic communities.
A Islam in China: 1949 to 1976
Although the Communists founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949, they realized that the newly born “Red China” was still unconsolidated. The Chinese Nationalists and also conservative forces, including religious ones, were hostile to the new regime. In this context, top Beijing leaders extended olive branches to religious persons and persuaded clerics to join “the United Front” in the Socialist Constructive Movement, which sought to strengthen socialism. In this way, these Beijing leaders softened potential resistance from religious authorities.
On the eve of the founding of the People’s Republic, the “Common Outline of Chinese People Political Consultation Committee” clarified that various ethnic minorities could keep their own languages, customs and religious freedom (Gong, 2010: 130). In addition, the Ministry of Financial Affairs of the State Council announced, on 26 January 1951, that real estate associated with mosques and qubbas (tombs of Sufi masters) as well as Tibetan Buddhist temples would be exempt from any taxes and land reform.
Therefore, based on the policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), special privileges were granted to Muslim clerics; except for a small number of clerics who had close relationships with the Nationalist Party, most Muslim leaders and groups enjoyed significant latitude. Since the Communist regime – motivated by pragmatism – made a great effort to consolidate its power in the newly conquered territories (Tibet and Xinjiang, in the beginning of the 1950s), it wanted cooperation from the clerics in stabilizing China’s northwestern frontiers. Therefore, various features of Islamic culture were preserved and Muslim customs were generally respected all over the country immediately following 1949.
B The Religious Reform Movement in the 1950s
In the late 1950s, after the Communists took complete control and after the rebellions of the remaining Muslim warlord-forces were thoroughly restricted to Northwest China, the Chinese Communist Party launched its Religious Reform Movement in an attempt to reduce the power of religious organizations. Under this policy, many mosques were closed, many clerics were forced against their will to work, and still others were forced to abandon their religious posts. Quite a number of Akhunds and Imams were condemned as “rightists” during the deadly political purges of the 1950s 1 and properties such as mosques were nationalized and eventually acquired by the People’s Commune (a process that nationalized land and established collective farms). During the most radical moments of this movement, CCP members destroyed many tombs (qubba) of Sufi masters. This was the first widespread persecution of Muslims after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
C The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)
The most intense persecution, however, came during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which aimed to launch a proletarian dictatorship in all aspects of both public and private life in order to destroy capitalism. All mosques, except for a few in Beijing and a few other places (which serviced Muslim diplomats from Islamic countries), were either closed down or used as public schools, workshops, factories, offices, or storage facilities. Almost all clerics were sent to state controlled working units or to the labor camps to undergo personal self-reform through heavy physical work. Furthermore, ritual services and traditional customs such as dietary restrictions, Muslim burials, and circumcision were totally prohibited. Many clerics were imprisoned for years. Numerous mosques were destroyed or totally demolished, copies of the Quran and other Islamic books were burned, and many Muslims were forced to raise pigs. Indeed, in some cases, authorities ignored Islamic burial customs, insisting upon cremation for Muslim citizens.
In essence, political leaders during the Cultural Revolution treated all religions and their practices as politically counter-revolutionary, and Islam suffered greatly from this fanatical hawkish type of Communism, which aimed to rule the country according to a rigidly ideological atheism.
D Status of Muslim Ethnic Minorities (the Period of the 1950s to the 1970s)
However, in spite of hostile treatment of many Muslims by the state, ethnic Muslim minorities were regarded as “brothers and sisters in the Chinese national family” and were to enjoy equal rights. Indeed, they were even offered the “special privilege” of being considered ethnic (as opposed to religious) minorities. For instance, in the areas where the Hui Muslim population is concentrated, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region’s government gave all Huis, both those employed by the state and those in village communes, permission to attend Islamic festivals (considered by the state to be “ethnic minority” festivals). In fact, during holiday work-leave for such festivals, people’s wages were paid as usual and the state provided cooking oil, halal meat, and other foods. During the 1960s when there were severe shortages of cloth and other daily needs, ethnic minority Muslims were given extra white cloth, which families need to carry out Islamic burial customs. Commercial departments also tried to supply certain goods such as ablution utensils, headscarves, and other materials needed by Muslims (Gong, 2010: 120). It is interesting to note that the state made such provisions even while it affirmed its support of atheism.
E The Foreign Policy of the CCP toward Islamic Countries and its Impact upon Muslim Minorities in China (1949–1976)
Meanwhile, in order to appeal to the majority of Islamic countries, many of which were concerned about what they perceived to be Western imperialism, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) reached out, offering an olive branch to Islamic countries during the Bandung Conference in 1955. As a result of this gesture, China established diplomatic ties with several Islamic countries. To further develop good relations with them, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs even invited religious leaders from several Islamic countries to visit the Muslim communities of Northwest China, attempting to leave the impression that the Chinese government was providing freedom of religion for Muslims. This cunning diplomatic posture played a key role in strengthening the link between China and the Islamic world. However, such attempts at forming relationships within the foreign policy of the People’s Republic were often interrupted due to drastic shifts in domestic politics, particularly those related to the fanatical leftist tide (such as the “Gang of Four” or Marshall Lin Biao) and the impending Cultural Revolution.
2 The Islamic Revival in China after the 1980s
With the demise of Mao Zedong (1976) and the arrest of the Gang of Four (1976), the Cultural Revolution concluded with a successor, nominated by Mao himself, who had played a crucial role in overthrowing the Gang of Four. Later, the new leader Deng Xiaoping emerged, took over the Party and military forces, and, along with the new leaders of the CCP, ushered in China’s famous reform and openness policy. China introduced the market economy from the West and, as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s influence, adopted a much more pragmatic approach to religion that has gradually resulted in a religious revival in China since the 1980s.
With the increasing influence of religion, the Communist Party of China has had to shift from framing religion as a kind of poison to considering it to be something that might adapt itself to “the socialist spiritual civilization.” Such a change in policy within the Communist Party demonstrates the pragmatic approach of the authoritarian regime during this transition to modernization, and is further reflected in increasing contacts with the Islamic world in order to capitalize on the Arab-Islamic world’s inclination to resist American criticisms of China’s policy on human rights, Taiwan, trade, and environmental protection.
A High Profile Muslims
Currently, Muslims live in most parts of China because of free migration and the so-called “market economy.” In fact, the population of Muslims has increased from 14 million in 1980, to more than 24 million in 2011, to 26 million currently. Although mosques are generally concentrated in Northwest China, big cities in inland China, and even in Tibet, also have impressive mosques and large populations of Muslims. Many new mosques have been built and many Islamic schools have been established by Muslim communities all over China. Today, the number of mosques in China has reached nearly 40,000, and more than 50,000 Akhunds serve in these mosques, as reported by the Islamic Association of China (Chen, 2009). For the last five years, China has sent about 12,000 people each year to Mecca to participate in the Hajj. Increasing numbers of Muslims are now living according to Islamic culture and law, although China has not permitted religious or ethnic groups such as Muslims to base their legal or ethnic regulations on Shari’a law. Nevertheless, since the 1980s and in the context of the revised and more religiously tolerant policies of the CCP, Muslims in China have worked diligently for the last thirty years to preserve their Islamic tradition, to rebuild mosques, to boost Islamic education, to enlarge their network, and to enrich their religious consciousness as they live as minority communities.
B New Types of Mosques in China
In an effort to “purify” Islam in China, many mosques which had been built in Buddhist architectural styles have been replaced with mosques built according to distinctively Islamic architecture. Many older mosque buildings have been decorated, repaired, and enlarged as local economies improved, in concert with China’s overarching financial boom since the 1980s. In this context and with this support, they have grown quickly. Both in urban areas and in the countryside, large mosques with minarets and domes have emerged and become the centers of many Muslim communities, not only for religious activities but also for social, educational, cultural, economic, and political activities.
C Revival of Islamic Education
China now has at least a quarter of a million Muslim students studying Islam at thousands of Islamic schools, 2 where a wide range of subjects are taught, including the Quran, Hadith, Arabic language, Islamic history and doctrine, Sufism, as well as secular subjects such as technology, history, Chinese language, philosophy, English and sciences. The graduates serve Muslim communities as core members, with many of them becoming Akhunds or Imams. This dramatic increase in Islamic education is a byproduct of China’s national education development in general and of the promotion of minority education in particular. However, when compared with other religions, Islam is the only one that has developed a large-scale educational network both at the private level and at the grass-roots level, a fact attributable in part to the government’s consideration of some as ethnic minorities.
D Establishment of a New Type of Madrasa
The newer madrasa we see in China are quite distinctive. The most typical is the Chinese–Arabic School in Linxia (it has the title “Little Mecca” in China), which has a history that goes back more than 32 years. Now it has developed into a private college with 1,400 students, two campuses (one for male and the other for female students), two four-storey classroom buildings, a large sports complex, dining halls, libraries, and a prayer-hall. It used to be led by the late Akhund Baha, who was the headmaster. Currently, it is fully sponsored by Muslim communities in Linxia, Gansu. Similar but smaller Islamic schools are now found in many Muslim communities all over China.
During the revival of Islam, more and more Akhunds and Imams are concerned with social affairs and politics in both their religious and social lives. Islam is not confined to the mosques. They supervise and participate in a broad range of works and programs, including disaster relief, secular education, population control, anti-drug and anti-crime campaigns, hygiene and health, anti-separatism, and social security. Of course, these Akhunds receive support from local authorities to promote the development of a “harmonious society” in local and regional contexts, and many of them are members of the local People’s Congress or the political consultation committees. Through their work, Muslim communities have adapted to China’s “socialist society with Chinese characteristics.” As such, it is clear that, nowadays, Akhunds play a greater political role than prior to the 1980s’ reforms to government policy on religion.
3 Internal Implications for the Growth of Islam
A Preferential Policies
On 7 November 2009, before Premier Wen Jiabao ended his state visit to Egypt, he described Chinese governmental policy toward Islam in his speech “Respecting Variety in Civilizations”: Chinese Muslims are important members of a large Chinese family; their religious beliefs, cultural traditions, and lifestyles are respected … In all cities of China you can find Islamic restaurants. Even Shanghai, an international metropolis, has established laws to guarantee the supply of halal food. In daily life … factories, schools, and governmental departments, if they contain Muslims, certainly have Islamic canteens. When friends hold a party, if there is a Muslim among them, people spontaneously arrange the halal food for dinner. The Chinese government has drawn up a series of regulations and laws to support Muslim minorities and their residential regions for economic, cultural, and social development. (Yan and Lin)
B Muslims Bargain with the State
The policies that give Muslims such preferential treatment have, on the one hand, some positive results in improving living standards and in raising the education and social welfare levels for Muslim minorities. On the other hand, from the perspective of some in the majority non-Muslim population, such policies create a dependence on government that encourages minorities to demand and expect special treatment from the majority and the government. Certainly, individuals belonging to non-Muslim communities attribute confrontations between Muslims and non-Muslims to the policies on preferential treatment for Chinese Muslims. For example, one blog site reports numerous confrontations between the Hui Muslims and Han Chinese in Henan, Shandong, Hebei and other areas in China between 2000 and 2012, all related to perceptions among non-Muslims that these preferential policies have spoiled Muslim minorities. 5
Some of China’s Muslim elites have proven very skillful at exploiting their relationships with the state. They bargain with the government by appealing to the potential influence of certain Muslim communities under their leadership, a tactic that often results in better treatment for the elites themselves and for their communities. Since local communities want to maintain “a harmonious society” and worry about the possible threat of Muslim nationalism or separatism, local authorities, and sometimes even the central government, seek to avoid direct confrontation with these minorities. However, and perhaps ironically, it is possible that such a benign or laissez faire attitude adopted by the government has promoted and stimulated Muslim nationalism and Islamism, including radical Islam, and doubtlessly has also contributed to the Islamic revival movement.
4 Diversity in Policy-Implementation
A The Case of Xinjiang
In a country as large and diverse as China, the implementation of state policies toward religions differs from region to region. In inland China, the implementation of state policy on Islam has generally been consistent with policy for the last twenty years as local authorities permit what the state perceives as “normal” Islamic practices such as Quranic studies, prayer, fasting, alms giving, and pilgrimages. However, in some regions such as Xinjiang, matters are more complex due largely to the rise in that region of separatist Islamic extremism.
At first, the local authorities employed a policy of conciliation in their handling of religion and of Islam in particular. On 8 September 1980, the United Frontier Department of Xinjiang in the Uighur Autonomous Region stipulated that religious clerics would be granted subsidies. About 3,000 clerics received subsidies and one million Chinese Yuan was spent for living allowances (Gong, 2010: 155). Meanwhile, the Xinjiang government followed the guideline passed from Beijing, to allow some degree of religious freedom. However, this approach facilitated the rapid development in South Xinjiang of an Islam with the characteristics of Saudi Wahhabism. Several violent incidents took place in the early 1980s: riots attacking the Han Chinese in which Muslim students held demonstrations in various cities, forcing Han Chinese to leave Xinjiang. There were also scattered terrorist assaults targeting civil facilities and public property. As a result, the nervous and angered Xinjiang government tightened its policy on Islam.
The Uighur Muslims of Central Asia were profoundly affected by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the independent republics in Central Asia. Since the 1990s, Xinjiang has suffered numerous terrorist attacks (bombings and arson) and separatist activities, for many of which Uighurs have claimed they are responsible and/or been officially identified as such by the government. Therefore, the government has increased its political rhetoric against terrorism, religious extremism, and national separatism. Furthermore, as a result of these conflicts, policies toward Islam and the implementation of them are far more severe in this province than in the rest of China. Since the state policy toward religion is a tactical not a theoretical or essential change in the attitude and strategy of the CCP on religion, the Xinjiang authorities could easily choose Islam as a scapegoat for even their own corruption and bureaucratic mishandling in administration and polity in the region. Perhaps because the CCP policy is motivated by a desire to maintain a harmonious society throughout the People’s Republic, rather than by a respect for freedom of religion per se, the policy and its implementation are more easily changed to uphold the values of the state.
Shifts in the Implementation of Policy toward Religion in Xinjiang
In April of 1990, Wang Enmao, the Party Secretary of Xinjiang, pointed out that “it [the government] should enhance the supervising work over religion” (Wang E, 1997: 502–503). The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China studied efforts to stabilize Xinjiang in 1996 and clearly raised “the scientific argument” 6 that “the most dangerous things preventing Xinjiang from stability are nationalist separatism and illegal activities done in the name of religion” (Gong, 2010: 255). After the mid-1990s, local authorities carried out a program to restrict religious activities in Xinjiang. They formed the Annual Check and Evaluate System to examine religious venues such as mosques. As well, they sought to register all religious venues, and prohibit illegal mosques and activities in the Khotan Region (Gong, 2010: 263). In some areas the officials curtailed the custom of women wearing veils (Li, 2005: 54). However, while the Xinjiang government in some contexts showed a hawkish attitude toward Islam, it continued taking a soft stance on what it deemed were “normal” Islamic activities, such as allocating funds to repair some old mosques in Xinjiang. However, the Xinjiang government also absorbed Islamic clerics into the government in the sense that it gave them subsidies. On the other hand, the authorities continued to ensure that clerics remained politically loyal and espoused “correct” religious knowledge; unless the clerics passed an examination assigned by the government they were not issued with a Religious Professional Certificate. The relevant departments in Xinjiang even set up a training network for clerics and edited their Friday sermons (Gong, 2010: 260–261). All these measures are clearly aimed to control Islam and its infrastructure and to enable the consolidation of the power of the PRC over the Xinjiang region where the majority is Muslim.
Although Xinjiang’s implementation of the policy on Islam was stringent, illegal religious activities still increased: “According to inexact statistics obtained since the year 2000, the number of illegal classes taught in madrasa in Xinjiang which could gradually develop into Jihad training classes was over 95% of the total number of illegal classes discovered by the Xinjiang local governments” (Dai, 2012: 4).
Guided by the two-pronged strategy of containment and absorption, the PRC government unhesitatingly cracked down on any nationalistic separatist movements and activities of those groups it deemed to be religious extremists. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, active particularly in Xinjiang, was labeled as a terrorist organization. However, the PRC has also taken a lenient attitude towards law-abiding Muslims who engage in social, economic, and cultural activities in a peaceful way. Thus, Chinese state and government authorities have seemed to be very successful in temporarily keeping “a harmonious social order” in Northwest and Southwest China where the Muslim population is concentrated. To avoid harming the majority of Muslims who practice what the state deems to be “normal” Islam, the Chinese government has repeatedly declared that “terrorist attacks” and “separatists” have nothing to do with Islam or with ethnic communities such as the Uighur people.
B State Supervision of Religion Reaffirmed
The State Council of the PRC drew up “Rules of Religious Affairs” on 7 July 2004, and put them into effect on 1 March of the following year. While the rules guarantee religious freedom on one hand, on the other they stress the role of the leadership of the Communist Party and its control over religious affairs. The rules aim to enhance government control of religions and religious adherents and to employ them as the tools of the United Frontier of the CCP (Wang Z, 2011: 1–7). On 12 May 2006, the Eighth Islamic National Congress of China passed the “Regulations for the Democratic Management of Mosques,” which was based on state laws such as the aforementioned “Rules of Religious Affairs.” Among other regulations, this policy states that “all mosques should be registered according to the law”; “religious activities of mosques should be undertaken in the spheres regulated by the constitution, state laws and rules, and state policies”; “[all] mosques should set up a ‘Democratic Management Committee’” and “its members should be put on record by the religious affairs department in the local government” (Regulations for the Democratic Management of Mosques). Furthermore, … the mosque management committee should accept the supervision of the administration of the religious affairs department of the People’s Government, accept the leadership of the local township’s and the sub-district office’s administration, and carry out the religious affairs and mosque work under the guidance of the Islamic Association. (Regulations for the Democratic Management of Mosques)
The regulations concerning Islamic education include the following provisions: Any classes of Islamic education should be approved by the Department of Religious Affairs of the local government. Any madrasa, its management model, scope, the number of religious students, curriculum and training period, etc. should be approved by the local Islamic Association. If mosque[s] edit or print Islamic books, periodicals, audio material, they should be submitted for approval according to the regulations set by the state. (Regulations for the Democratic Management of Mosques) If a mosque has its own enterprise or business, it should apply to the department concerned for registration, receive an operating license, and do business in accordance with the law. The property and income of a mosque should be registered and be approved by its management. The mosque committee should regularly report its financial balance, and meanwhile submit a report of the financial revenue and expenditure, and of the receipt and use of donations, to the Department of Religious Affairs of the local county’s government. (Regulations for the Democratic Management of Mosques)
Constructing a “Harmonious Society”
There are no doubt a variety of consequences of the state’s strong and direct control of Islam in China. Specifically, there have been several cases in the last few decades in which the state judiciously resolved conflicts between different groups of Muslims. In general, the state positions itself as adopting an approach of fairness, equality, and neutrality in handling disputes among the different factions and sects of Islam in the name of social stability. The government officials even invite Muslim clerics to play an intermediary role in tackling disagreements within Islam. In order to treat different factions in a balanced way, the state and local governments include Islamic clerics in the administration of religious affairs, and further recruit representatives from different Muslim groups for the making of governmental policy-decisions. With this so-called “just and balanced approach,” the Chinese government has at times successfully maintained apparent order and societal stability in Muslim concentrated regions such as Northwest China.
However, there are some cases in which factional fighting has been intensified because of the manner in which government officials have dealt with internal Islamic conflicts whether through passivity, administrative inefficiency, a lack of impartiality, or deliberate efforts to pit one group against another. In practice, the state usually prefers the more established and authorized group to any newly founded group (or any group deemed to be “new” by already recognized authorities). Therefore, sometimes the state fails to fairly arbitrate over internal fighting among Muslim communities in China.
5 The Impact of Foreign Affairs in the State Policy on Islam
China’s foreign policy during Mao Zedong’s time always aimed to strengthen relations with developing countries, including those with predominantly Muslim populations that also had an important place in international politics. To develop ties with Islamic countries was part of the diplomatic strategy of China in its struggle against the existing superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. China has adopted this approach since Mao; even Deng Xiaoping adopted a pragmatic program in both economic and political affairs. In order to foil the USA’s policy of containing China, and its efforts to encircle China, and in order to defeat the attempts made by many Western countries to discredit China because of its human rights record, China has sought to maintain friendly ties with several Islamic countries. In support of this strategic objective, the Chinese government usually relies on a soft approach with its own Muslim groups, granting considerable space for Muslims to practice Islam if such religious activities do not threaten its power.
A The Strategic Shift after the 9/11 Terrorist Attack
In interpretations of recent history from scholars, CCP members and the Chinese media, the tragedy of 9/11 caused the USA to launch a full-fledged war against international terrorism led by the al-Qaeda organization. The USA’s invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan gradually forced her military forces into a quagmire. The heavy financial and personnel costs borne by the United States temporarily drew American attention away from the Asian and Pacific Regions, which gave China an excellent opportunity for rapid economic development, and also gave China a chance to establish its political influence in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world. The result is that now China and the Islamic world have a close relationship. With the rapid economic development and the potential of being “the world’s manufacturing factory,” China became increasingly reliant on energy markets in the Middle East. About 60% of China’s oil and gas imports come from the Middle East. China has also made progress in the trade and labor markets in the Islamic world. The close relationship between China and the Islamic world has also greatly boosted the Islamization of Chinese Muslim communities.
One of the by-products of this friendship with Islamic countries is the introduction of Saudi-led Wahhabi Islam and Salafi Islam into northwestern and some other parts of China. Many Chinese cultural features that had been part of Hui Muslim communities (the result of historical syncretism), have been gradually expelled as “un-Islamic” by Salafi-influenced Chinese Muslims. Such a consequence of the fast growth of this form of Islam among Muslims in China was certainly not expected by the government, but has happened nevertheless. We are therefore witnessing an emerging tension between the state’s interests in friendly relations with the Islamic world and its desires to limit any form of religion likely to interfere with harmonious relations within China.
Conclusion
China’s policy toward Islam, a religion strongly tied with Muslim ethnic minorities, seems sensible for a number of reasons. For instance, implementing preferential programs for Muslim minorities bettered their living conditions; close, direct supervision of Muslim communities helped maintain social stability, which is strongly advocated by the Chinese Communist Regime but sometimes comes at the cost of the basic rights of its people as granted by the constitution; dealing in a balanced manner with factional clashes among different forms of Islam seemed to convince Muslims that the state had an interest in resolving disputes in a constructive way; using clerics to help administer mosque committees and to help at various levels of local organization in regions where Muslim populations are the majority involved religious leaders in state and regional governance; balancing domestic policy with foreign policy, given that the Islamic world is such an important political force, ensured that the state would maintain access to energy sources and new markets. All of these approaches to Islam and Muslims reflect an authoritarian approach based on the central government’s statecraft, and its tactical and instrumental policies. Also, the relative lenience of the state toward Chinese Muslims is not only motivated by international pressures to guard human rights and protect religious freedom, but also prompted by the political and economic need for strong ties with the Islamic world and a secure energy supply from the Middle East.
Of course, there are also problematic features of China’s approach to Muslims. For example, the pragmatic international strategy has increased the influence of precisely those forms of Islam that the PRC might find most difficult to control. Government policy that is intended to prevent the rise of “extremist” and separatist movements might have the paradoxical effect of enabling such movements. The preferential program for Muslim minorities is employed at the cost of the majority of non-Muslim people, and many non-Muslim people perceive it to be unfair for the majority. Moreover, an over-involvement of the state in the private religious matters of Muslim minorities could provide opportunities for state officials to abuse their power. There is also an ambiguity inherent in the state’s anti-imperialist approach to Western societies (and Western meddling in what are perceived by the Chinese to be internal problems, such as Tibet and Xinjiang) and the Chinese government’s own desire to fight international terrorism (especially as it appears in the form of the “Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement”). In addition, as indicated, the government’s apparent openness to Islam might lead to the growth of political Islam in China – an intrinsically threatening possibility for a state deeply committed to harmonious interaction between all of its constituent parts. Although the state orders that every mosque must establish a committee to run its affairs fairly, in reality it is hard to manage mosques in a democratic way since the mosque committee is not elected by the Muslim community (rather, the governmental administration often sends its representative or trusted personnel to appear on the committee), which means that in practice, the management of mosques usually reflects the will of the local officials and government department (see Ma, n.d.). This could cause tension between Muslim clerics and the mosque committee at the grass-roots level (see Jinwan, n.d.). Since the state does not employ a democratic system, the state policy usually relies on a powerful state apparatus to control Muslim minorities. Last but not least, the pragmatic policy that deals with a religion such as Islam is based on both pragmatics and expediency and therefore could easily be reversed to become a fanatic, revolutionary, and orthodox Marxist stance against religion, as has happened in the past.
Concerning China’s state policy toward Islam, China may have some very successful experiences to share with Canada, India and/or other members of the international community as those societies determine their own trajectories during the era of globalization. However, China could also learn many things from other countries that approach Islam, Muslim minorities, and indeed other religions, in very different ways.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I am deeply grateful to the generous support from the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society, University of Victoria, Canada; my special thanks are due to Dr Paul Bramadat and Dr Rinku Lamba for their kind invitation to me to participate in this international conference. My deep gratitude is also due to Dr Keith Campbell for his very kind work in proofreading this paper.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.