Abstract
‘This will shake the world’, were the prophetic words spoken by Premier Zhou Enlai that described the secret tryst between China and the United States on the eve of their entente cordiale in 1971. Today, over four long decades after the ‘secret visit’ to China by Henry Kissinger under the command of President Richard Nixon, it is this powerful thought of Zhou that acts as the fulcrum of this book. This classic volume seeks to study the momentum of Sino-US relations in the twenty-first century by recalling the bygones of shared upheavals and animosities. The way the Chinese think about problems of peace and war and international order and its relationship with the American approach is the main objective of the book. The focus is on the interactions between the leaders of the two large players in the international arena: one (the US) already a master and the other (China) striving to master the art of being a key player. It is the strategic rapprochement between the winner (US) and the underdog (China) that is the theme of this vast volume.
This book traces Sino-US relations from its roots that emerged out of the ashes of their ideological clashes. The author, having been the National Security Advisor and Secretary of State for United States under two successive Presidents (Nixon and Ford), comes to this topic from an international relations perspective, where most of the data come from his diplomatic manoeuvres and interactions with the leadership of China. The episodes discussed are documented well, drawn from historical narratives, anecdotes and personal dialogues and presented in a lively fashion highlighting evidence of the quest and zeal for Sino-US rapprochement on either side.
Kissinger’s attempt in understanding the Chinese thought-process draws heavily from China’s past. He thoroughly traces China’s strategic footprints in the shadow of Sun Zi and his ‘Art of War’ (pp. 102, 145, 155, 173, 343, 371), Zhuge Liang’s ‘Empty City Strategum’ (pp. 102, 149), the strategic game of weiqi (pp. 23–5, 89, 104, 156, 309, 342–67), Wei Yuan’s ‘using barbarians against barbarians’ (pp. 58, 69–85, 149, 202, 244, 290) and recently, the revival of Confucianism (pp. 112, 246, 448, 490–2). It is through these tactics that the author tries to understand China’s strokes in the international sphere. But the key question is the ‘love-hate’ relationship between China and the US vis-à-vis the international challenges and opportunities they faced. Reading in-between the lines of China’s prophetic leader Mao, the meticulous Zhou, the pragmatic Deng and the balanced Jiang along with the fourth generation of leaders (Hu and Wen) is the crux of Kissinger’s cognitive analysis ‘on China’ from the days of its revolution to that of its modernisation.
Despite these assessments, Kissinger still remains uncertain of the course this entente cordiale will take in the future. Whether there will be a leap of trust or a leap in the dark remains unpredictable as there is an acknowledgement of ‘China rise’ and the ‘power shifts in the hegemonic stability’ in the international sphere. Kissinger concludes, ‘What a culmination if, forty years later, the United States and China could merge their efforts not to shake the world, but to build it’ (p. 530). These lines mark the test of time in the coming years that will shape the international order of the twenty-first century.
Kissinger provides a comprehensive scenario of the way the dynamics played out in the Sino-US relations in terms of relative gains. He finally labels this relationship as less a partnership than ‘co-evolution’ (pp. 526–7). But this conclusion seems to be weak as there are gaps that still persist. The impetus for Sino-US rapprochement came from Nixon’s sudden decision to enter into cordial relations with China, to contain their common adversary Soviet Union. But in this analysis Kissinger fails to explain what triggered this decision of rapprochement under Nixon, why it did not happen earlier under Nixon’s predecessors, why the relationship took such a smooth turn even after such long years of animosity, and most important, how easy or hard was it for either side to build this sudden bonhomie, given their perceptions of the other that were at such variance.
Apart from these caveats, the author’s concept of ‘co-evolution’ also does not take into consideration the concept of ‘G2’, coined by Zbigniew Brzezinski that visualizes strategic cooperation or rather, partnership between China and US, as key actors in world affairs, that is, bipolarity in the making. There is also no reference to the concept of ‘Beijing Consensus’ that attempts an alternative prescription for development in the Third World, in contrast to the neo-liberal policies of the ‘Washington Consensus’. In all these instances, China wants to exist in parallel with the US in the global sphere. This competitive behaviour of China vis-à-vis the US makes the idea of ‘co-evolution’ highly problematic.
With growing shifts in power dynamics, there is greater engagement than containment in China-US relations. Therefore, the bigger question is whether China is ready to take up responsibilities for world stability or whether the US is ready to share the burden of its hegemonic stability with China.
To conclude, Kissinger’s study makes a strong case for treating the Sino-US relations as worthy of more attention. The study’s coverage of obscure and complex cases is detailed, reliable, illuminating and successful in establishing the breadth of his argument. However, the extended argument in terms of ‘co-evolution’ leaves a mark of uncertainty in predicting the future of this relationship. This can only be explained in terms of understanding the power shift that is coming into play. There are crucial questions that need deliberation: whether the power shift will be rough or smooth, will China be ready to replace the US hegemonic stability, is China ready to become an equal stakeholder like the US in the global order, and so on. These unanswered questions bring the dilemma back to the forefront—will the two ‘shake the world’ or build it?
Overall, the book is well-articulated, written in a lucid style and makes an important value addition to the existing literature on China-US discourse. With its rich body of material, it is highly recommended for specialists in the field of Chinese as well as American foreign and security policies. It is an indispensable book for students of international relations, academicians, policymakers and anyone who has a keen interest in understanding China and its relations with major powers especially US. The reader is introduced to situations that shaped the China-US entente and so even those without knowledge in the field will find Kissinger’s book a useful read.