Cold from Gold: Chinese Miners Face New Realities in Ghana

Abstract

China has maintained strong relationships with many African countries, and Ghana is one such country. While the two countries have normally enjoyed good friendly relations, concerns over the involvement of Chinese citizens in small-scale mining in Ghana threaten the cordial relationship between the two countries.

There is evidence of a cultural evolution and a gradual shift from a culture of enthusiastic reception of local people to the Chinese in the area of mining to one of cold reception to Chinese interests in mining communities. There is also evidence that this cold reception to Chinese miners is stimulated by non-state actors led by the media and inspires in Ghana a new paradigm of more rational engagement with China at the political level, although challenges still remain.

Keywords

China–Africa relations China–Ghana relations Chinese miners in Africa international relations

Introduction

China presents a strong development partnership to the African continent; China’s development assistance to Africa has, over the years, recorded a significant boost, with data indicating that Chinese foreign direct investment into Africa increased from US $75 million in 2003 to US $2.7 billion in 2019 (SAIS-CARI 2019). The status of China as one of Africa’s major development and trade partners has been the subject of research with the expectation that research would provide better clarity to both Chinese and African interests on how to build useful bridges of cooperation (Mulugeta and Liu 2013).

This article examines the issue of tensions and conflicts in Sino-Ghana relations as a result of illegal or artisanal mining by Chinese miners and their Ghanaian collaborators in Ghanaian mining communities, and the factors that are played up in addressing such tensions and conflicts.

China’s influence in many African countries, particularly, in resource-rich African countries, continues to grow, and Ghana is one such country. This influence has very significant implications for growth and development of African economies. Sino-African relations have emerged as a contemporary area in research, primarily because of the development implications for both parties.

Ghana, as one of Africa’s economic success stories, presents an important example for studying China’s strategic engagement with African countries. In 2019, Ghana’s economy recorded 6.5% growth, which was rated as one of the highest in the World. The country’s economy is also expected to record a growth rate of 4.5% for 2021 and expected to be one of the fastest growing economies in Africa for the year 2021 (Global Data, 2021; Global Economy, Undated; The World Bank 2021).

It is expected that this study will lay bare the implications of policy choices and decisions of the Ghanaian government in its engagement with China in the area of natural resource exploitation with particular reference to illegal small-scale mining.

This article provides useful guidelines that can help build mutually beneficial relationships and also helps enrich academic knowledge in this area. This article, potentially, provides new paths or entry points for exploring other areas of China’s engagement with Africa, particularly, within the context of natural resource exploitation and development partnerships. The Ghanaian example can provide a reference point for comparative studies of China’s engagement with other countries to help identify differing or similar trends and help establish best practices in terms of bilateral engagements in the area of natural resource exploitation between countries.

Theoretical Framework

Pluralism

Pluralists argue that states are not necessarily independent in their politics or policy-making efforts. Their assertion is that the politics or policies of states are determined by many factors, and they make four assumptions:

First, pluralists state that non-state actors play an important role in world politics.

Second, they are of the view that states are not unitary in their decision-making, and decisions of the state are the products of competition, compromise and coalition building among various interested parties, which may include multinational companies.

Third, states are not rational in their actions or decisions as a state’s action and decisions are products of competing interests that may not necessarily assure any rationality.

Finally, pluralists argue that global politics is characterised by an extensive agenda and transcends security issues to incorporate issues of economy, social interaction and the environment.¹

Relating to this article, the theory provides a basis for analysing state actions within the context of decisions of Ghanaian government relative to activities of Chinese miners and the disputes arising thereof.

It helps provide a credible framework for examining the factors that define the policies of both China and Ghana and the place of non-state actors, like civil society organisations, in influencing policies that define the relationship between the two countries.

For instance, it provides a framework for analysing the role of non-state actors like the media and civil society organisations in defining the politics and policies that guide the relationship between China and Ghana.

It, therefore, seeks to determine, whether there is any evidence in support of the pluralists’ view that non-state actors play a very critical role in determining politics and policies of states within the ambit of international relations and politics and to what extent is this role played.

Additionally, this theory helps us to understand the critical factors vis-à-vis political compromises, competing needs and coalitions that provide the basis for policies and decisions within the context of natural resource exploitation in Ghana by Chinese interests and related issues.

Third, this theory provides a basis for analysing the level of rationality in decision-making, particularly, on the part of Ghanaian political heads, relative to Chinese involvement in the artisanal mining sector. It seeks to establish whether policies within the artisanal mining sector relative to Chinese involvement as well as other policies and decisions and flowing from this engagement are driven by rationale thoughts or other competing factors.

Peripheral Realism

This theory assumes that in the global system and among the comity of nations, all states are not equal; there is a hierarchical system with some states above others. This hierarchy leads to the classification of three types of states—those that enact rules, those that obey the rules and those that oppose the rules set by the dominant states. The theory states that peripheral states are those whose place and influence in the international system are peripheral and, hence, play to the rule book of the states higher up the hierarchy²:

Thus, the foreign policies of peripheral states are typically framed and implemented in such a way that the national interest is defined in terms of development, confrontation with great powers is avoided, and autonomy is not understood as freedom of action but rather in terms of the costs of using that freedom.³

The theory may provide a useful framework in analysing the factors that are played up by Ghanaian authorities in addressing the issue of conflicts with Chinese miners and how these shape the country’s foreign policy.

It provides a framework for examining the power relationship between China and Ghana by establishing the existence or otherwise of a ‘peripheral state’ and a ‘dominant state’ in the power relationship between Ghana and China as defined in the theory.

This theory can also help provide a good appreciation of the real factors that define Ghana’s foreign policy within the context of Sino-Ghana relations and the natural resource exploitation and can help answer the question as to how Ghana’s development policies relative to natural resource exploitation are shaped.

Again, as an independent and sovereign state, how does the theory help reflect Ghana’s expression of its freedom as an independent and sovereign state in its relationship with China within the context of its mining and economic interests? Is there a real expression of freedom or an expression of ‘constrained freedom’, as a result of potential reprisals from a dominant state, should the freedom be expressed without a consideration of the interests of China?

Relationship with Africa

One school of the narrative perceives China as the new neocolonialist of Africa with an eye on the continent’s vast natural resources. For instance, Parenti (2009) argues that the increased economic relations between China and Africa are founded on three key motivations: (a) increased reliance on the African natural resources, particularly, oil; (b) relaxed policies to promote China’s business activities in Africa; and (c) deliberate courting of high-level African political and business leaders to help protect Chinese business interests.

But this is a view that is reasonably contested by other scholars and experts. For instance, according to Chen (2016), China’s engagement with Africa is founded on five pillars described as the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, and these are identified as mutual respect for states’ sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence.

Chipaike and Mhandara (2013) also state that China’s relationship with Africa is founded on three pillars: (a) a policy of non-interference in internal domestic affairs; (b) hunger for natural resources, particularly, mineral and agricultural products; and (III) a desire for market for its industrial products.

China’s response to some of these assertions appears quite nuanced, preferring to highlight the oft-touted assertion of building mutually beneficial relations with their African brothers who carried them on their shoulders to the United Nations, in reference to the role African countries played in getting China back to the United Nations (Qi 2012; Xinhua 2014). China’s description as a developing country by The World Bank (2014) has also enforced the viewpoint of shared development ideals with the African continent. Thus, the political reference to a new imperial China that seeks a neocolonial hegemony over Africa is not embraced easily; yet, it is also not a viewpoint that is easily dismissed.

In presenting an evolutionary overview of the genesis of China–Africa relations, Li (2007) states that since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the opening up of the Chinese economy in 1978, ideology had been the bedrock of China’s Africa policy. He argues further that China was at the frontline of the fight against colonialism, imperialism and revisionism in the third world. Li (2007) notes that while China has expressed a commitment to build mutually beneficial ties with the African continent, there has been suspicions of the real intentions of China.

Yet, the relationship between China and Africa has sometimes been placed in the ambit of a complex and contradictory relationship; Naidu and Davies (2006) identify that in the area of trade, African industries have felt the imposing and debilitating effect of relatively cheaper products from far East that meet the affordability of a large segment of the African market but have also contributed towards crippling some African industries.

Alden and Hughes (2009) examined what they described as the ‘increasingly complex’ China–Africa relationship characterised by ‘harmony and discord’ and concluded that efforts by Beijing to address the challenges have not been very effective. They observed that China was making attempts at introducing some policy options ranging from ‘increasing participants in the policy-making process to tentative engagement with international development regimes’ but questioned the effectiveness of this approach. They identify strong African civil society groups and political opposition as obstacles China face in dealing with some of the challenges in its relationship with African states:

In particular, the lack of a strong civil society inside China inhibits the ability of its policy makers to draw on the expertise of the kind of independent pressure groups and NGOs that are available to traditional donor/investor states. (Alden and Hughes 2009)

Berman et al. (2017) argue that in many African countries, abundance of mineral resources seems to come along with challenges as mining-induced violence accounts for many instances of political instability. In 2006, Chinese shops and nationals faced the anger of indigenous Zambians, following the defeat of a political party opposed to China’s dominance in Zambia’s mining sector. The Zambia copper and coal industries are controlled by Chinese companies and have provided very bitter labour disputes. Since 2006, there have been a couple of attacks against Chinese businesses, and many local Zambians are of the view that the Chinese have been emboldened because they are favoured by the government. Writing in the Financial Times, Mundy (2011) stated that many Zambians do not welcome the presence of Chinese nationals in their country:

‘The more we keep the Chinese out, the more we will stay impoverished’, says Sebastian Kopulande of the Zambian International Trade and Investment Centre. Yet many Zambians are openly hostile towards Chinese companies. ‘They think if they stay friendly with the government then they can ignore the law’, says Consort Malumani, 25, a miner at Collum. ‘If you make even a small mistake, they dock your pay’. (Mundy 2011)

Haglund (2009) using a Chinese state-owned enterprise as a case study noted that the Chinese enterprise operated a corporate governance system that emphasised short-term gains within the context of investor relations with the Chinese government but did not assure environmental sustainability.

Sino-Ghana Relations

Gagliardone et al. (2012) state that Ghana provides an important entry point for studying China–Africa relations. Sino-Ghana relations generally reflect the trend in Sino-Africa relations (Tsikata et al. 2008). However, there are clear indications that both countries are evidently becoming more pragmatic and critical in their ways of engagement. For instance, in 2011, the state-owned China Development Bank (CDB) announced a US $3 billion facility for Ghana, but that arrangement was the subject of intense controversy. Civil society organisations raised doubts about the deal and cautioned that even if it pulled through, it could affect the price of the crude oil to be sold to China. In an analysis, leading African think tank, Imani (2012), predicted that ‘the maximum facility available to Ghana shall not exceed US $1 billion over the timeframe of 2012–2013. And even this US $1 billion shall not come on a silver platter’:

Per the credit-assessment method afore-described, any amount of money loaned to Ghana beyond US $500 million is a windfall due directly to a relaxation of standards on the part of the CDB. It is only fair to assume that any such relaxation of standards would be accompanied by significant hand-wringing by CDB’s credit officers over such matters as pricing for the oil and delivery schedules and logistics. (Imani 2012)

Indeed, subsequently, there was communication that, despite series of negotiations, the deal was not going to be procured in full. The point of contention, according to the former Ghanaian Finance Minister, Seth Terkper, had been the demands from China for more of the country’s crude oil at a price the Ghanaian government maintained was low. Ghana was not prepared to budge and, according to a report by Ghana’s leading news portal, Myjoyonline (2014), in his 2014 mid-year budget review to the Ghanaian Parliament, Seth Terkper stated that Ghana would only pursue half of the US $3 billion facility.

Following investigations into the issue, Debrah and Asante (2017) in a paper also noted that:

Beijing presented a fresh proposal for a renegotiation of the terms of the loan on the excuse that Ghana had become an oil-exporting country even though extraction of oil in commercial quantities preceded the loan. China also decided to alter the ground rules for granting future loans to Ghana by including a soft condition that enjoins the Government of Ghana to resolve Chinese illegal miners’ issue within Sino-Ghana diplomatic rules of engagement.

Present trends signal that China is very prudent about its investment choices on the African continent and will not give freebies to its friends from Africa. Ghana’s former President, John Mahama, believes that ‘China itself is changing its policy. They are looking more at projects that have the potential to repay over time’ (Arnold 2014). On the flip side, there are indications that African countries may be becoming more wary of Chinese investments as the Ghanaian example portrays, and the demands for resources present a major challenge in this regard.

However, there seems to be a new wave of cooperation between Ghana and China (Chinese Embassy 2021), and in August 2018, Ghana’s President, Nana Akufo-Addo, visited China and signed a US $2 billion barter trade deal between the two countries under which China will provide development assistance worth US $2 billion to Ghana in exchange for bauxite (Adogla-Bessa 2018). A few months later, President Nana Addo lifted a 2-year ban on small-scale gold mining in the country, a sector that has been dominated by the Chinese (Daily Guide 2018).

In addition to the state-level cooperation, Chinese private companies are also beginning to actively extend operations to the continent, and the recognition that Africa presents a huge market for China provides an important drive in the interest of Chinese businesses on the continent. Ghana represents a top trading partner for China on the African continent. Ghana’s imports from China in 2019 was estimated at US $1.90 billion, while exports to China for 2019 was estimated US $2.81 billion (WITS/World Bank).

While, in the past, African businessmen and women had actively served as the bridge between Chinese companies and the African market, the evidence emerging suggests that the Chinese are beginning to break grounds on the continent and are engaging directly with their African consumer market.

Sino-Ghana Relations: The Mining Conundrum

Over the years, there has been a surge in the numbers of Chinese miners in the natural resource–rich African communities, and Ghana has not been an exception (Liu 2013). He (2013) notes that the number of Chinese migrants in Ghana rose from about 100 migrants around the mid-1990s to tens of thousands of Chinese migrants towards the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, and these miners were mainly in Ghana in search of gold. Gold is a major foreign exchange earner for Ghana, and the country is the continent’s second highest producer of gold after South Africa (Gold Hub 2020). For many years, small-scale or artisanal mining has been a source of livelihood for many local indigenes, many of whom in the past used simple implements for surface mining (Hirsch 2013).

Gordon and Gabriel (2017) note that in Ghana, surge in gold prices in 2008 met a corresponding increase in the number of foreign miners, particularly from China, trooping into the country in their thousands and competing with locals over small-scale artisanal mining, which, in reality, is reserved for the indigenes.

They explain further that the lack of government intervention for the locals led to a free-for-all in which local miners and Chinese miners engaged in both contestation and collaboration in the quest for gold. With the situation getting out of hand and leading to large-scale environmental pollution and destruction, many wondered where the state or for that matter the government was? But according to Gordon and Gabriel (2017), the state was virtually in collusion with foreign interests. They aver that ‘foreign miners operated with impunity precisely because they were protected by those in authority, that is, public officials, politicians and chiefs, in return for private payments’.

Hilson and Yakovleva (2007) note that disputes in mining communities appeared to have been exacerbated because the mining sector reform programme instituted by the Government of Ghana overemphasised on large mining firms controlled by foreign interests but failed to advance the interests of local artisanal miners. Indeed, many of the foreign-owned mines were multinationals like Newmont and Gold Fields Ghana Limited, and the entry of Chinese miners with some financial wherewithal was embraced by local artisanal miners.

The presence of Chinese miners in Ghana is a break from the past and signals the intention of the Chinese to actively be in the mining fields and sell their gold without recourse to middlemen. This means more profitability as the Chinese have also introduced more efficient machinery and equipment that have increased the output (Bax 2012). The negative impact, however, is that water bodies have been polluted and farmland destroyed as a result of the activities of Chinese miners and their local collaborators drawing the ire of local people and the Ghanaian government (Bax 2012).

As a result of complaints from native people against activities of Chinese miners with their Ghanaian collaborators, and the observed environmental degradation and pollution of water bodies, the Government of Ghana, through its security agencies, launched a series of operations to clamp down on illegal mining (Liu 2013).

The presence of Chinese miners in many mining communities had been so pronounced that in some communities, there was the presence of settler Chinese communities with many of the trappings of a traditional Chinese society, and the crackdown had brought uncomfortable moments to many of the Chinese migrant miners (Hirsch 2013).

The arrest and deportation of illegal Chinese miners made news headlines in Ghana, China and the international media. At the height of the crisis, there had been some hints of some strain on Sino-Ghana relations. Ghana’s former Minister for Lands and Mines, Alhaji Inusah Fuseini, wondered whether a tightening of visa regime for Ghanaians at the Chinese Embassy in Accra was a fallout from the mass deportation of illegal Chinese miners (Hirsch 2013).

However, former Chinese Ambassador to Ghana in 2012, Mr Gong Jianzhong, maintained that China was committed to building ‘fruitful bilateral relations’ with Ghana (Ghana News Agency [GNA] 2013). Mr Gong Jianzhong rather ‘called for concerted efforts by officials of China and Ghana to handle the problem of illegal gold mining properly’ (GNA 2013).

Senior Minister in Ghana’s executive government, Yaw Osafo-Maafo, stirred a controversy when he made some comments to justify the deportation of a Chinese woman, En Huang (aka Aisha Huang), once considered to be Chinese illegal mining ‘queen’ in Ghana after Ghana’s Attorney General had filed a nolle prosequi during her trial. Many Ghanaians had expressed anger at the government for ‘freeing’ and deporting her instead of proceeding with her trial. But in justifying the government’s decision, the senior minister stated that:

We have a very good relationship with China. Today, the main company that is helping develop the infrastructure system in Ghana is Sinohydro, it is a Chinese Company. It is the one that is going to help process our bauxite and provide about two billion dollars to us.

So when there are these kinds of arrangements, there are other things behind the scenes. Putting that lady (Aisha) in jail in Ghana is not going to solve your economic problems. It is not going to make you happy or me happy, that’s not important, the most important thing is that she has been deported from Ghana…I am saying that there are many other things beyond what we see in these matters and everybody is wide awake, the most important thing is that we have banned this, we have established regulations and we are protecting our environment. That is far more important than one Chinese woman who has been deported out of the country. (Graphic 2018)

The Chinese involvement in Ghana’s artisanal mining industry can be seen across the country. Ghana has many gold deposits across the entire country from the south to the north. While illegal immigration makes it difficult to establish the actual number of Chinese miners in Ghana, some estimates put it in the tens of thousands, and according to reports, there could be as many as 50,000 illegal Chinese miners in Ghana (Huifeng 2013; Song 2013).

Huifeng (2013) states that many Chinese miners, who would have earned about ¥1,000 per month in the Shanglin County of China, earned about ¥10,000in Ghana as artisanal miners.

Three years ago, Chinese miners operated about 10 small gold mines in Ghana, but that number has now grown to about 2,000. Some produce up to a kilogram a day, some only 30 to 50 grams, while others produce nothing. (Huifeng 2013)

Many more Chinese miners continue to mine in Ghana and in water bodies even after the arrest and deportation of Aisha Huang. While arrests have usually been made, there is clearly a reluctance to prosecute illegal Chinese miners arrested in the country. China has often played up the diplomatic factors and used subtle threats to dissuade Ghana from dealing harshly with its citizens who are arrested for their involvement in illegal gold mining.

In 2017, the Chinese Mission in Ghana, in a seemingly threatening letter to Ghana’s minister of lands and natural resources, decried what it termed as biased media reports and media hype on the activities of illegal Chinese miners while also cautioning against mass arrests of Chinese miners. Local media outlet Citi FM Online in a report said, the letter, in part, stated that many Chinese nationals involved in illegal gold mining were also victims of fraud and blackmail by Ghanaian actors and warned that should there be any casualty, looting and plundering in the course of arrests of illegal miners that would be ‘extremely harmful to the bilateral relations’ between the two countries.

According to Citifmonline, the letter also stated that:

There are a number of distorted or biased reports and stories on Chinese people, especially some reports and cartoons that are defaming Chinese leaders and senior officials. The Chinese side is very concerned about this unhealthy tendency. We hope that the Ghanaian government will pay due attention to this situation, take the necessary action to stop such things from happening again and guide the media to give an objective coverage on the illegal mining issue so as to create a good environment for further development of our bilateral exchanges and cooperation.

The Chinese government acknowledges the threat some of these miners pose to their host country and have made some efforts to address them. Mr Zhu Jing, the Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of China, believes that China and Ghana should collaborate to address the illegal mining challenge (GNA, 2019). Indeed, while illegal mining does not truly represent the full picture of Sino-Ghana relations, many are of the view that Ghanaian authorities have a greater responsibility to address the challenge. It is obvious that the Chinese may be a bit indifferent about fighting illegal Chinese miners, and this may be understandable because Chinese miners usually require the help of local Ghanaians for artisanal mining.

China’s Ambassador to Ghana, Shi Ting Wang, in a public lecture at the University of Cape Coast in April 2019 is reported to have stated that:

We also recognise the issue with galamsey (illegal small-scale mining) but one thing we want to make clear is that the Chinese government will not tolerate any national engaging in the illegal act in any other country. So, we support your government to fight against galamsey and we will like to work with you. However, this issue is a very complicated one, I believe some local people provided some protection and support to the Chinese people. (GNA, 2019)

The nature of this collaboration has not been clearly defined, but the Ghanaian government acting through the country’s security agencies in the past have arrested and deported illegal Chinese miners during swoops at mining communities (Xinhua, 2013). At the height of a crackdown in 2014, the Ghanaian authorities reportedly deported 4,592 illegal Chinese miners in the country (Blessing, 2014). Yet, many still question the commitment of the government in the fight against illegal small-scale mining. In March 2019, the CEO of the Forestry Commission of Ghana, Kwadwo Owusu Afriyie, bemoaned what he described as the interventions of some people in authority, which was hampering the fight against illegal mining in forest reserves.

He stated that some people who had been arrested for engaging in illegal mining in forest reserves had returned to the forest to continue with their mining after they were freed following the intervention of some people in authority (Myjoyonline 2019).

Benefits of Engagement

While both China and Africa declare that they seek to engage effectively and in more mutually beneficial ways, both have witnessed massive transformations of their economies, and that presents challenges, particularly in the area of natural resource exploitation and management. African economies seem to be waking up to the reality that in order to address pressing development challenges more effectively, there is a strong and critical requirement to maximise foreign exchange from the continent’s natural resources or add value to them before exporting them. Evidently, the concern of many Africans about a ‘natural resource curse’ seems to have stirred passion and action for more responsible management of the continent’s natural resources by the political elite in a perceived era of the African renaissance.

China has benefitted from African natural resources, and the world’s most populous country has also supported the continent generously in many sectors such as education, health, governance, peace and security, and economy. But how can a new Africa sensitive to a new economic paradigm manage expectations and demands of its people and also sustain good relations with a partner that is generally considered by many on the continent as trusted and dependable?

This path can be a difficult path to take. For instance, there has been an allusion to the height of Ghanaian resistance to Chinese artisanal miners—a US $3 billion Chinese financial facility to Ghana essentially failed to materialise in full. How valid is the viewpoint that Ghana’s resistance to Chinese artisanal miners can adversely affect its ability to procure development assistance from China, and what problems or challenges does this view portend for Sino-Ghana relations?

Discussion

Evidently, China has, over the years, played a central role in defining the path of Africa’s economic transformation. For instance, a Department for International Development–Economic and Social Research Council (DFID–ESRC) research established that Chinese investment in Africa has contributed towards increased economic growth with particular emphasis on investment made in the manufacturing sector. The research further established that, in some cases, Chinese investments contribute towards ‘contributes to the strengthening of existing sectors (construction material manufacturing) or the creation of new ones’ (Calabrese and Tang 2020).

Ghana, like many African countries, operates from an economically weaker position, and this naturally weakens its negotiating power in its engagement with China. Clearly, the power relationship is uneven and lopsided in China’s favour. This provides some support to viewpoints that suggest that China’s engagement with Africa is more beneficial to China. However, emerging trends, as evidenced in media and civil society organisation (CSO) activism, against illegal small-scale mining in Ghana suggest that there seems to be a new wave of concern tinged with some level of disapproval in the manner of engagement.

There is evidence in the Ghanaian case that public resentment has been responsible for government action against what is considered to be unfavourable actions by Chinese miners. There is a discerned contradiction; in one breath, that government officials are keen to engage the Chinese and accept the terms offered by the Chinese; yet, in another breath, the government’s acquiescence is repelled by media and civil society activism. While there are cases whereby government officials have publicly condemned the Chinese as was the case when the head of Ghana’s Forestry Commission questioned the mining in forest reserves by illegal Chinese miners, such public rebukes are rare.

The evolving posturing of the Ghanaian government to Chinese involvement and engagement is largely due to the sensitivity of African governments to popular sentiments among the citizens. The question that begs to be asked is why this evolution? The critical answer perhaps is the shifting balance of power from autocratic regimes to democratic culture. Ghana’s democracy has thrived over the years, and power has alternated between the two dominant political parties—the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). With the help of a very vibrant media and engaging civil society front, China’s policy with particular reference to illegal mining is a critical election issue, and parties in power try to balance the policy imperatives attached to the Chinese engagement with the desires of the Ghanaian people.

For instance, in the case of the Chinese woman, Aisha Huang, who was described as the ‘queen of illegal mining in Ghana’ by the media in 2017, media activism and public agitation were keys to getting her arrested. However, following her arrest, the government was apparently faced with the likelihood of dealing with a possible fallout with the Chinese authorities in the event of her imprisonment, an outcome many had predicted, if the legal proceeding had run its full course. Eventually, she was deported by the Ghanaian government after the state expressed disinterest in the case, and it was considered a compromise; a compromise that was, nevertheless, condemned by many Ghanaians.

Theoretically analysed, peripheral realism is seen in some expression; first, those in authority seem to reflect the full import of the theory; yet, down the social and political strata, citizens’ repulsion suggests that the full expression of this theory is hampered. Indeed, while the freedom to act in the interest of the state resides in the political authorities, the key political actors have not always acted in the interest of the state, and there is obvious conflict among the top government officials as to what policy directives are in the interest of the state. Thus, while the state may sometimes be willing to accept the Chinese conditions, popular views against such conditions have usually led to compromises.

For instance, in the case of the US$3 million China Development Bank (CDB) loan, there was clear dissatisfaction with the terms of engagement by both parties, and in the end, the two countries had to make compromises.

In addition, in the case of the US $2 billion bauxite deal, there are claims that the government had still not acted rationally in its engagement, following the concerns and protestations from CSOs and the opposition parties in the parliament. The approval of the deal in the parliament had not proceeded smoothly as the Minority NDC vehemently opposed the deal. The Minority’s Ranking Member of Roads and Transport in Parliament, Kwame Agboza, for instance, argued that while, in 2016, a two-layered road cost the Ghanaian taxpayers GHS 1 million, it cost GHS 5 million under the contract. He also expressed concern that under the deal, a picture to be attached to a certificate cost US $60. Yet, it is worth to know that the government offered just 5% of the total bauxite reserves in the area in question, perhaps, opting to avoid giving a greater concession to avoid a backlash from the media and CSOs (Classfmonline 2018).

In the case of Aisha Huang, while the Senior Minister Yaw Osafo Marfo justified the deportation of Aisha with an explanation that the nation stood to benefit from her deportation rather than her imprisonment, the President of the country, Nana Akufo-Addo, later condemned the deportation and described it as a ‘mistake’ (Zurek 2019). This admission has been criticised, and obviously, it was an admission on the heels of huge public backlash (Annang 2019); a backlash that has serious implications on the electoral fortunes of the ruling party. The concession by the president, sounded lame, especially, coming more than a year after her deportation, but that, notwithstanding, it affirmed the viewpoint that like the pluralists argue, states may not always act rational because of the competing needs and considerations.

Similarly, there seems to have been a compromise when, in 2014, Ghana opted to pursue just about half of the initial US $3 billion loan from the CDB. Again, while the government had initially wholeheartedly accepted the deal, popular agitation against it from CSOs, the media and ordinary citizens inspired a rethink and what had initially been considered rational was later deemed to be an unfair deal.

The shifting balance of power from political actors or officials to CSOs, the media and ordinary citizens signals a new dawn where politicians have become more ‘rational’ in their engagement with the Chinese not necessarily because of spontaneous or natural rationalism conceived at the inception stage of the projects or agreements, something I refer to as ‘intuitive rationalism’, but rather because of what can be described as ‘induced rationalism’, which is inspired by citizen agitation resulting from civil society and media activism. In Ghana, China is gradually becoming a top political issue during elections.

In essence, there are contending forces to the pluralist and peripheral realism perspectives, and these forces are gradually balancing the scales and changing the narratives and paradigms.

Discernibly, the government’s response to illegal mining and its resultant damage to the environment and water bodies are usually activated by non-state actors such as the media, CSOs and faith-based organisations. In 2013, the government established an inter-ministerial task force, to rid the country of illegal miners, following a sustained period of public complaints and strong media activism (Ghana Business News 2013). But after thousands of Chinese miners were deported from the country, the government ceased to act further, and the miners returned to the mining sites again.

In 2017, the issue again resurfaced, following agitations in mining communities and pollution of water bodies. The government failed to act proactively until a media coalition, faith-based organisations and civil society groups actively campaigned for government’s intervention (GNA 2017). The new NPP government, like its predecessor, established an inter-ministerial task force, and a ban on small-scale mining was enforced. A series of arrests were made by a joint security task force, and hundreds of Chinese nationals were again deported.

Nonetheless, after the lifting of the ban in 2018 by the government, following the announcement of the US $2 billion bauxite deal, another media campaign in 2021 exposed the severe pollution of water bodies and destruction of the environment. The state-owned water company, Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), complained about the extremely high cost of water treatment and damage to water treatment plants as a result of the severe pollution of water bodies as a result of illegal mining. The NPP government subsequently launched another joint military task force to deal with the problem. Some Chinese nationals were arrested and deported (Tawiah 2021).

Thus, since 2012, the canker has refused to be extinguished, and this is partly as a result of the lack of political will by successive governments. Time and again, governments have only acted, following activism by the media, faith-based organisations and CSOs.

Induced Rationalism

Thus, a new dawn of what may be described as ‘induced rationalism’ drives Ghana’s political leaders in their engagement with China in the area of illegal or legal small-scale mining. Such rationalism may also find expression in other thriving African democracies. ‘Induced rationalism’ as opposed to ‘inceptive rationalism’ is inspired by the feedback of popular views from non-state actors such as CSOs, faith-based organisations and ordinary citizens on the wings of strong media activism. Such rationalism is not inspired by a prudent assessment of the implications of the terms of engagement at the initial or inceptive stage.

As a political theory, pluralism recognises that while decision-making is the responsibility of governments, non-state actors sometimes exert some influence and contribute significantly to the nature and effect of government decisions and policies. This theory finds some expression in this context as non-state actors exert some influence and influence policies with respect to Chinese involvement in artisanal small-scale mining.

In Ghana, the media has emerged as a strong agent of development and the Ghanaian media is rated as one of the freest on the African continent. Additionally, CSOs in Ghana are very active. Another strong non-state actor group in the country is religious or faith-based organisations, and these organisations command huge respect among the populace.

Over the years, these institutions, anchored by the media, have formed coalitions and have strongly advocated activism against small-scale mining, virtually, keeping the governments on their toes and indirectly dictating government policies with respect to the Chinese involvement in artisanal small-scale mining and related issues.

It is evident that the Government of Ghana has often played a laid-back role primarily because of the natural expression of a subservient or peripheral state in the relationship with the more dominant state, in this case, China.

As already noted, peripheral realism states that ‘…foreign policies of peripheral states are typically framed and implemented in such a way that the national interest is defined in terms of development, confrontation with great powers is avoided, and autonomy is not understood as freedom of action but rather in terms of the costs of using that freedom’.

Thus, by inception, the unwritten policy is a more relaxed engagement of Chinese interests in artisanal small-scale mining at a price to the environment, particularly water bodies, there is a fight back inspired by non-state actors, usually acting in a coalition to induce a more rational engagement with the Chinese authorities with respect to artisanal gold mining.

Thus, the two theoretical positions help explain the dynamics at play—while peripheral realism acts inceptively to institute irrational engagement, sacrificing environmental concerns for more genial engagement with the dominant state, pluralism serves to counteract such an irrational approach towards engagement with the Chinese, and this new paradigm of induced rationalism is dictated by non-state actors usually acting in a concerted manner.

The resultant effect generally has been the emergence, on the part of Ghanaians, of a new culture of enhanced assertiveness in regulating China’s involvement in the country’s natural resource exploitation, particularly, in the specific case of small-scale gold mining, although there still remains significant challenges in addressing the threat posed by illegal miners in the country.

Conclusion

This study provides an affirmation of the view that in the relationship between China and Ghana, there is a dominant state (China) and a peripheral state (Ghana). Evidently, Ghana’s policies have been influenced by this power relationship as evident in the way in which it has treated the Chinese nationals engaged in illegal mining and the concessions on small-scale mining despite the public complaints about the involvement of the Chinese in illegal mining. The deportation of Aisha Huang and other Chinese nationals engaged in illegal mining rather than their prosecution enforces the notion that the subtle threats from China as indicated, for instance, in the letter to the Ghanaian minister of lands and natural resources seem to have had an effect on the government’s policy on the involvement of Chinese nationals in illegal mining and their prosecution thereof.

It is obvious that as a policy, Ghana has opted for a more genial treatment of illegal Chinese miners since it believes that it is in the interest of the country’s development to avoid a confrontation with the Chinese government.

Notwithstanding the above, there is evidence of a gradual emergence of more rational engagement on the part of Ghanaians with their Chinese counterparts. Some of the key actors who have helped stimulate such rational engagement are non-state actors, particularly, the media, CSOs and faith-based organisations, with the media usually playing a leading role.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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