This article asks whether religion undermines the negative relationship between income and left voting that is assumed in standard political economy models of democracy. Analysis of cross-country survey data reveals that this correlation disappears among religious individuals in countries that use proportional representation. This is the case in large part because there is a moral values dimension that has a correlation with income that is equal in magnitude but has the opposite sign as the economic dimension, and the votes of the religious are better explained by their positions on moral than economic issues, especially in countries with multiparty systems. The authors conclude by discussing implications for theories of redistribution.
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