Nationalism and the Cohesive Society

Abstract

A spate of work has demonstrated tensions between ethno-cultural diversity and social capital. Some have suggested that attachment to the nation can foster cross-group trust, particularly if this national self-definition is “civic” in character rather than “ethnic” (the Miller thesis). Similarly, others have argued that civic nations are less likely to suffer reduced social capital in response to increased diversity, as the sense of threat that typically emerges in ethnically diverse contexts will be mitigated (the Putnam thesis). The authors test these hypotheses on 27 countries using both contextual-level data and the latest wave of the European Values Study (2008). Though the evidence is mixed on civic nationalism, the authors find strong evidence that ethnic nationalism goes hand-in-hand with reduced social capital and that it increases the negative social impact of diversity. So although this study only partially confirms the benefits of civic nationalism, it clearly underlines the costs of its ethnic variety.

Keywords

social capital nationalism ethno-cultural diversity multilevel analysis European Values Study

Scholarship warning of the tense relationship between ethnic diversity and social capital first emerged from the American case (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Hero, 2003; Putnam, 2007) and is well summarized by Robert Putnam’s (2007, p. 157) warning that “diversity, at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us.” Across the Atlantic, this proposition appears more complicated, with British (Letki, 2008) and Dutch (Tolsma, van der Meer, & Gesthuizen, 2009) studies at odds, and cross-national work finding only limited evidence of it on various indicators of social cohesion (Gesthuizen, van der Meer, & Scheepers, 2009; Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle, & Trappers, 2009).

These competing findings have triggered a new interest in how the relationship might depend on context. Evidence remains scarce, and what little work presently exists points to the importance of institutional setting (Hooghe, Reeskens, & Stolle, 2007; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). Here, our interest is less in institutions and more in political culture. In “E Pluribus Unum,” Putnam (2007) argues that societies premised on a civic and inclusive understanding of nationhood are better able to overcome the negative consequences of increasing ethno-cultural diversity. In this respect, Putnam follows the logic of David Miller (1995), who claims that national identity, particularly when limned along civic lines, fosters trust and other aspects of horizontal solidarity among fellow citizens.

Trumpeting the putative virtues of civic nationalism has become popular in the public realm as well. To give but one example, in a famous 2009 Versailles speech former French President Nicolas Sarkozy asked, “Who does not see that our integration model isn’t working any more? Instead of producing equality, it produces inequality. Instead of producing cohesion, it creates resentment.” Simultaneously, the French government organized a debate on national identity with the guiding premise being that shared adherence to the French model, including respect for national norms and symbols, decreases social distances between natives and immigrants and generates cohesion. Whether this argument has merit, however, remains an open question.

This article takes as point of departure the question whether people’s social conceptions of what is required for membership in their national in-group can influence the social fabric of European societies in general, and particularly as diversity increases. More concretely, we develop specific hypotheses about how different dimensions of nationalism—namely the ubiquitous ethnic–civic distinction (Brubaker, 1992), where the former refers to full citizenship status depends on blood and soil and the latter to nationhood based on obedience to the liberal values of the nation-state—shape social capital differently. Using both country-level data on immigrant diversity and responses to the latest wave of the European Values Survey (2008), we demonstrate that national identity does matter for social capital. More specifically, we find mixed results for the role of civic nationalism, but strong evidence that ethnic nationalism is associated with lower levels of social capital, particularly generalized trust. Moreover, this latter relationship is strengthened as diversity increases.

Literature Review

Across the vast literature on nationalism and national identity, references to nations as “imagined communities” are common. They are groups of people with a common “we-feeling,” a sense of mutual belonging and obligation (Anderson, 1991; Deutsch, 1966); nationhood is “a claim on people’s loyalty, on their attention, on their solidarity” (Brubaker, 2004, p. 116). Although there are of course nations without states, the present work takes individuals’ conceptions of their home country as the predominant identity of interest, and uses of the terms nation, nationalism, and national identity throughout in reference to nation-states.¹

There is a growing consensus in a number of different literatures that national identity can facilitate social cohesion. According to David Miller (1995, p. 140; also see Miller, 2000), one of the strongest proponents of this argument, national identity increases the likelihood that people will place trust in their fellow citizens: “Trust requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, and this in turn depends upon a common identification of the kind that nationality alone can provide.” According to Will Kymlicka (2001, p. 225), this kind of trust is essential because it encourages us to make sacrifices for “anonymous others whom we do not know, will probably never meet, and whose ethnic descent, religion and way of life differs from our own.” The central premise is that a common shared identity functions as a category superordinate to ethnic, religious, or linguistic ties and can function as a kind of glue that holds society together.

This argument about the positive consequences of in-group loyalty for social cohesion has appeared in other literatures as well. For example, social identity theory predicts that a sense of collective identity engenders the prioritization of group welfare over individualism in decision making (Kramer & Brewer, 1984) and that a strong overarching national identity can mitigate competition between societal subgroups (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Transue, 2007). From the social capital scholarship too, the logic that loyalty toward the nation-state strengthens the social fabric is present. In the appropriate parlance, the nation-state can be considered as what is referred to as “bridging” social capital (Paxton, 1999; Putnam, 2000): It brings together people of various different class, religious, and ethnic backgrounds under a common banner and generates solidarity on the basis of it.

Social-psychological work on national identity has emphasized its multifaceted nature, distinguishing between its salience to individuals, the affect they feel toward it (patriotism, national chauvinism, and so on), and its normative social boundaries (e.g., Citrin & Sears, 2009). To date, Miller’s (and others’) argument about the cohesive features of national identity has in its basic form been largely framed around affect—a strong sense of attachment to the nation should foster higher levels of social cohesion. Here, our emphasis is on national identity’s normative content, or, in other words, the criteria individuals use as “symbolic boundaries” (Lamont & Molnar, 2002) to distinguish “us” from “them.” The importance of this distinction cannot be overstated, the reason being that if strong cognitive and affective attachments to the nation can serve to generate fellow feeling and loyalty within a diverse society, it is imperative to know where the symbolic boundaries of that identity lie (Theiss-Morse, 2009).

And, if history tells us anything, these boundaries are varied, malleable, and contested. Scholars of nationalism have constructed models of nationalist types from the study of laws and institutions, texts of popular culture, official speeches and celebrations, and the content of public education.² A long lineage of studies culminating in the work of Greenfeld (1992) and Brubaker (1992) distinguishes between two historical models of nationhood, the “ethnic” and the “civic.” The ethnic type defines itself on the principle of descent; the nation is a marriage of blood and soil. Objective and ascriptive criteria define whether one is considered a “national” or not, and citizenship is in turn accorded along jus sanguinis principles. Civic nationalism, on the other hand, is premised on the jus soli principle of devotion to basic liberal values.

For the most part, empirical research on normative conceptions of nationhood has been preoccupied with whether or not they exist in public opinion, and how they generate hostility against out-group members. On the former question, researchers have identified civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity at the mass level, both across countries and within them (e.g., Jones & Smith, 2001; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Wright, Citrin, & Wand, 2012). On the latter, civic and ethnic nationalism both encourage prejudice against immigrants, though less so for the former variant than the latter (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008; Citrin & Wright, 2008; Kunovich, 2009; Maddens, Billiet, & Beerten, 2000; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009).

Where argument and evidence have been scarce, however, is in the issue of how these disparate conceptions of national identity shape indicators of horizontal social solidarity and social capital. This matters because there is reason to suspect that ethnic and civic forms of national identity will affect social capital differently. The core principle of civic nationalism is that it reaches out toward “outsiders”: newcomers and ethno-linguistic and religious minorities are regarded as fully fledged conationals so long as they are willing to adopt the basic values and norms of the host country. As such, this closely resembles what is typically referred to in the social capital literature as “generalized trust,” namely, people’s willingness to trust others even though they might be different from themselves (Uslaner, 2002). Accordingly, we expect that “civic nationalists” will express higher levels of generalized trust and that they will be more highly involved in public life. By contrast, ethnic nationalism is, at its core, inward looking and inherently exclusive. Whether immigrants and minorities obey to the norms and values of the host country, they will never be considered conationals without ancestral ties to it. This reflects not trust of the generalized kind, but rather what many in the social capital literature call “particularized trust” (Uslaner, 2002). Along these lines, our expectation is that individuals endorsing an ethnic conception of nationhood should evince lower levels of generalized trust, and be less involved in public life. This leads to two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Respondents endorsing civic nationalism will express higher levels of social capital.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Respondents endorsing ethnic nationalism will express lower levels of social capital.

A related perspective on the relationship between national identity and social capital is, albeit indirectly, raised in Putnam’s (2007) study of diversity in the United States; therein, he suggests that “civic” nationhood can tamp down the negative effects of neighborhood ethnic diversity on various indicators of social capital. Based on the work of Mirel (2002), he argues that American orientation toward minorities has shifted from predominantly ethnic toward civic, and that this civic logic has had a positive influence on the social consequences of diversity (Putnam, 2007, p. 163). Simply put, a national community premised on norms of democratic behavior (rather than a marriage of blood and soil) is more likely to embrace—and less likely to be threatened by—an influx of ethno-culturally diverse immigrants into its population.

Though this argument has yet to be tested empirically, similar ones have been made in related work. A premise in the institutional approach toward social capital is that it is fostered by equality and fairness (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Uslaner, 2002). Institutional equality mutes competition, the argument goes, leading to more social harmony. Furthermore, institutional sanction of minority culture (e.g., political “multiculturalism”) also appears to cushion negative social effects of diversity (e.g., Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). Along similar lines, Weldon’s (2006) study of ethnocentrism in Western Europe found lower prejudice in countries that had adopted more civic and “multicultural” immigration regimes, and higher in societies operating on the jus sanguinis model.

None of this work explicitly addresses the question we ask here: Namely, how do ethnic and civic nationalism, conceived in social rather than institutional terms, moderate the relationship between immigrant diversity and social capital? Still, both Putnam’s insight and institution-based work suggest that more socially civic societies may be better equipped to handle immigrant diversity than socially ethnic ones. More formally, this leads to the following pair of hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Residents of societies where civic nationalism is high are better able to reconcile diversity with social capital than those where it is not.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Residents of societies where ethnic nationalism is high are less able to reconcile diversity with social capital than those where it is not.

These hypotheses suggest that relationship between contextual diversity and individual expressions of social capital (the “hunkering down” effect) can be moderated by the extent to which a society is, on the whole, ethnic or civic. Even so, the effect of national identity in this regard is still at its core a social-psychological process, and a given individual’s national self-conception may differ sharply from his or her society on average. So adopting a similar logic as with H3 and H4, we can also bring Putnam and Miller together and tease out hypotheses about the potential interaction between ethnic and civic nationalism at the individual level, diversity in social context, and individual-level social capital:

Hypothesis 5 (H5): Individual-level civic nationalism should decrease the negative relationship between social capital and contextual diversity.

Hypothesis 6 (H6): Individual-level ethnic nationalism should exacerbate the negative relationship between social capital and contextual diversity.

Data and Method

In our analysis, we employ the 2008 wave of the European Values Study (EVS), which is unique in that it queries respondents about both social capital and their conceptions of what it takes to achieve full membership in their national community. This cross-national survey project has been carried out in more than 40 European countries, comprising the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) in addition to a number of post-Soviet societies. In this article, we restrict ourselves to 24 EU member states plus three Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states.³

Dependent Variables

In this study, our outcomes of interest are based on Putnam’s definition of social capital, namely, those structural and cultural features of social organization that facilitate cooperation (Putnam, 1993, 2000). An exemplar of the cultural side of social capital is generalized trust, usually taken to indicate trust in people who are different from the respondent (Uslaner, 2002). From the EVS, we employ the time-tested question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” which was, in line with the World Values Study, offered with a dichotomous response scale.

To tap the structural components of social capital, we derive two further dichotomous variables: associational membership and voluntary involvement. Both are created from a list of specific organizations for which respondents could indicate whether they (a) belong to and (b) have done voluntary work for each.⁴ The variables have been dichotomized, with 0 reflecting no associational membership or voluntary involvement and 1 reflecting membership or involvement in at least one organization.

Independent Variables

The independent variable at the center of this analysis is respondents’ symbolic conceptions of their nation’s social boundaries, operationalized by questions querying the importance of civic and ethnic traits. Following the empirical literature on this subject, we tap civic nationalism with respondents’ rated importance of “respect for [country]’s political institutions and laws,” whereas ethnic nationalism is tapped by the level of importance they ascribe to “hav[ing] [country]’s ancestry.”

Two caveats are warranted about these measures. First, cross-national research has for the most part not focused on single measures such as these, but rather underlying dimensions of ethnic or civic nationalism composing multiple indicators. Although this is possible in the EVS, researchers have warned about problems of measurement bias in comparative research using this approach to these indicators of national identity. Depending on the country, some traits (such as, for instance, “speaking the national language” or “holding citizenship”) are both theoretically ambiguous with respect to the ethnic/civic distinction and, perhaps not surprising, load inconsistently on these latent concepts from one country to the next (Heath, Martin, & Spreckelsen, 2009; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). For this reason, we focus our analysis on the “purest” possible items in the ethnic and civic categories, eliding the difficult issue of teasing out latent factors.

In addition, it should also be noted that this measurement strategy is not well suited to capturing the ethnic/civic distinction as developed in the regime-level nationalism literature, the reason being that it is treated there as a trade-off: the ethnic and civic categories are mutually exclusive, at least in an ideal-typic sense. On the other hand, there is no forced trade-off in this battery, and almost no one answering it in the EVS or any other major national or cross-nation survey treats their answers as if there were simply because they do not have to (Wright et al., 2012). Rather, this battery is Guttman-esque: people who think that “true nationals” need to comply with the political systems do not necessarily want to impose a cultural blood tie as a requirement for conationality, whereas those feeling that ancestry is important will find it self-evident that “true nationals” also comply with ruling institutions and laws. As a result, wherever possible we consider both measures of nationalism simultaneously in our models to cancel out the common variance between them and produce a better picture of their unique effects.⁵

To test Putnam’s thesis that civic nations are better able to reconcile diversity with social capital, both the civic and ethnic individual-level independent variables are aggregated to the national level. Though these conceptions of nationhood are weakly but positively correlated at the individual level, their aggregate correlation is strongly negative (–.54): Being a highly civic nation and being a highly ethnic nation are to a large extent mutually exclusive. Since the correlation is quite high, we cannot examine them simultaneously; nevertheless, since a correlation coefficient of –.54 is not a one-to-one relation, we present results based on each measure independently.

In H3–H6, our main concern is in testing whether and how national identity moderates the linkage between ethno-cultural diversity and social capital. For this reason, we need harmonized data on the proportion of each country’s population that is foreign-born, which we obtain from the UN Population Division Statistics (2011). Though the preference in some other studies on national-level diversity has been for OECD measures (Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Hooghe et al., 2009), for which information on a large number of countries in our sample is unavailable, UN and OECD estimates are highly correlated among common countries,⁶ and other studies have fruitfully employed the UN figures we use here (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). Because UN estimates are available for 2005 and 2010 but not 2008, we calculate the latter using linear interpolation.

Control Variables

Since we are looking at the net effects of civic and ethnic nationalism on indicators of social capital, we control for a series of other factors known to explain individual variation in generalized trust, associational membership, and voluntary involvement (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Hooghe et al., 2009; Putnam, 2000). At the individual level, age, gender, ethnic origin, marital status, education level, work status, income level, and religiosity are all prime candidates in this regard.⁷ And to ensure that additional differences among countries with regard to the levels of social capital are explained, we also control for the effect of national wealth, expressed by the GDP per capita in 2008 (Eurostat, 2010). The expectation here is that social capital is more abundant in economically affluent societies (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2009; Inglehart, 1997). More information about all variables can be found in Tables A1 to A4 in the appendix.

Method

For estimation, we employ multilevel multiple regression analysis (Gelman & Hill, 2006; Hox, 2010), a strategy that provides unbiased standard errors for individual-level parameter estimates in the presence of clustered data (such as that existing when respondents in cross-national data sets are sampled within countries). What is more, about 21%, 26%, and 10% of the variability in generalized trust, associational membership, and voluntary involvement, respectively, occurs at the country level.⁸ The dichotomous nature of our outcomes suggests the use of a logistic multilevel estimator. To enable the interpretation of the effects, all independent variables (at both the individual and country levels) have been grand-mean centered.

In the analysis section, we proceed as follows. First, we look at straightforward bivariate correlations between ethnic and civic nationalism, on one hand, and the three social capital indicators, on the other, with a further eye on looking at these patterns in countries with either high or low levels of immigrant diversity. Subsequently, we analyze the direct relationship between nationalism and social capital. Third, we consider the extent to which the diversity–social capital link varies as a function of both societal and individual-level expressions of ethnic and civic nationalism.

Results

Bivariate Results

In Figure 1, we examine our hypotheses at the trivariate level. To get a rudimentary first cut at whether the apparent relationships differ across contexts, we classify countries as being either “low diverse” or “high diverse” using a simple median split on the contextual immigrant diversity measure.⁹ Since we treat the nationalism items as continuous and all social capital items are dichotomous, we calculate straightforward t tests for homogeneous and heterogeneous countries separately. The full t test results are listed in Table A5 in the appendix.

Figure 1.

Bivariate relationship between nationalism and social capital by share of foreign-born in the country

On first glance, the patterns are remarkably stable across outcomes. First of all, civic nationalism is consistently high across homogeneous and mixed countries, whereas ethnic nationalism prevails more in homogeneous countries. This can largely be attributed to the fact that ethnic nationalism remains widespread in the Eastern European countries, which are still rather homogeneous compared with Western societies. More germane to our purposes here, it also appears that civic nationalism appears to increase with social capital, whereas the opposite appears to be true with ethnic nationalism.

This figure also allows for some initial purchase on the interaction among ethnic and civic nationalism, social capital, and immigrant diversity. For one thing, although the differences between those high and low on social capital with regard to their civic nationalism levels might be small, comparisons across homogeneous and heterogeneous countries indicate that the differences are slightly larger in homogeneous countries. Thus, at first glance, in homogeneous societies social capital goes better together with adhering to a civic orientation. Moreover, concerning ethnic nationalism, it seems that the differences between respondents low and high on social capital are, contrary to the expectations, slightly smaller in heterogeneous societies compared to homogeneous societies. Given the interesting patterns discovered in Figure 1, we analyze whether these findings hold in the context of multilevel multiple regressions.

Logistic Multilevel Regression Results

Control model

We begin by estimating a baseline model (Table 1) that includes individual-level covariates shown in previous work to be of relevance in explaining individual variation on these outcomes. But for a few exceptions, this model confirms previous findings (Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Hooghe et al., 2009; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). Younger generations tend to score lower than older ones. In terms of gender, with the exception of generalized trust—where women do not differ significantly from men—the odds for being member of and volunteer for at least one organization are lower for the former. Foreigners also exhibit lower levels of civic engagement than the native population. Individuals who are divorced, separated, or widowed rank lower on social capital than married respondents. As for socioeconomic status, the results confirm the thesis that the educated and the well-off are significantly more likely to be “trusters” and to join at least one association or to volunteer. Last, there is evidence for the role of religiosity: Frequent churchgoers are also more likely to be a member of or to be involved in other associations and also have higher levels of generalized trust.

Table 1.

Logistic Multilevel Multiple Regression Model Predicting Social Capital by Individual-Level Determinants

	Generalized trust		Association membership		Voluntary involvement
	Param	T-Val	Param	T-Val	Param	T-Val
Intercept	−1.35***	−7.62	−0.75**	−3.30	−1.67***	−11.23
Age	0.00***	3.46	0.00*	3.96	0.00*	2.54
Woman (ref: man)	0.05	1.86	−0.22***	−8.88	−0.23***	−9.17
Of foreign origin (ref: native)	−0.15*	−4.34	−0.18***	−5.06	−0.26***	−6.82
Marital (ref: married)
Divorced/separated	−0.10*	−2.31	−0.08*	−2.02	−0.14***	−3.08
Widowed	0.01	0.29	−0.20**	−4.35	−0.20***	−3.97
Single	0.09**	2.68	0.04	1.09	−0.08*	−2.24
Item nonresponse	0.01	0.05	−0.07	−0.42	−0.04	−0.23
Education (ref: prim)
Lower secondary	0.17*	3.10	0.28***	5.53	0.26***	4.23
Higher secondary	0.47***	9.10	0.55***	11.34	0.56***	9.57
Tertiary education	1.00***	18.88	1.13***	21.96	1.01***	16.99
Item nonresponse	0.46***	3.38	0.21	1.36	0.46**	2.85
Work (ref: employed)
Unemployed	−0.45***	−6.91	−0.40***	−6.54	−0.21**	−3.01
Student	0.38***	6.88	0.33***	5.64	0.23**	3.77
Retired	−0.16***	−3.84	−0.23***	−5.58	−0.20***	−4.67
Other	−0.17***	−3.76	−0.38***	−8.15	−0.15**	−3.10
Item nonresponse	−0.30	−1.35	−0.24	−1.19	−0.34	−1.35
Income (ref: low)
Middle income	0.18***	4.05	0.09*	2.19	0.13*	2.54
High income	0.46***	8.93	0.39***	7.85	0.30***	5.23
Item nonresponse	0.12*	2.52	−0.03	−0.66	0.02	0.28
Church attendance	0.05***	6.55	0.19***	26.37	0.23***	31.97
N	36,734		35,385		36,734

Entries represent the results of three separate logistic multilevel multiple regression models. More information about the variables is available in Table A2.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Effects of nationalism

The main interest in this article lies of course in the relationship between dimensions of nationalism and indicators of social capital. Table 2 displays the effect parameters (obtained from three separate logistic multilevel models) of ethnic and civic nationalism once added to the control model. In support of H1, ethnic nationalism is negatively associated with all three indicators, though the strength of the effect does vary somewhat across them. In terms of odds ratios, respondents high on ethnic nationalism are only half as likely to agree that most people can be trusted.¹⁰ For the structural components of social capital, the suppressing effect of ethnic nationalism on joining and volunteering in civic associations is somewhat weaker, but still substantial. The apparent effect civic nationalism on these indicators is somewhat less clear, though still—broadly speaking—in support of our expectation that civic nationalism and social capital go hand in hand (H2). More precisely, civic nationalists are not more likely to volunteer; but they are more likely to think that most people can be trusted, and also to be a member of an association.

Table 2.

Logistic Multilevel Multiple Regression Model Estimating the Effect of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism on Indicators of Social Capital

	Generalized trust		Association membership		Voluntary involvement
	Param	T-Val	Param	T-Val	Param	T-Val
Intercept	−1.30***	−7.83	−0.73**	−3.30	−1.66***	−11.49
Civic	0.05**	2.65	0.04*	2.14	0.03	1.27
Ethnic	−0.24***	−17.44	−0.11***	−7.94	−0.09***	−6.50
N	36,734		35,385		36,734

Entries represent the results of three separate logistic multilevel multiple regression models with civic and ethnic nationalism added to the control models presented in Table 1.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

And so, as our extension of Miller’s basic argument would suggest, people endorsing an exclusionary view of nationhood, for example by premising full membership in the national community on an ascriptive blood tie, appear to also be less trusting. Moreover, although Miller’s focus is on trust, this effect also extends to the willingness to participate and volunteer. By contrast, endorsing an inclusionary view on citizenship, one that privileges good citizenship over blood, appears to foster a more trusting outlook. The question that remains is the extent to which doing so also makes it less likely that one will “hunker down” in the face of diversity.

Nationalism and the Relationship Between Diversity and Social Capital

Country-level nationalism

Putnam’s argument is that in the medium run, societies premised on civic nationalism are able to overcome the negative consequences of diversity on community cohesion. First, however, in Model 1 of Table 3, we confirm the recent finding that, at least in Europe, immigrant diversity at the national level erodes social capital only weakly (Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Hooghe et al., 2009; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). The regression parameters—indicating a negative but nonsignificant effect parameter on both generalized trust and associational membership but, of interest, positive and nonsignificant parameter on volunteering—largely support this. GDP per capita also behaves as expected, with higher levels of social capital in affluent societies. Given that the present analyses are based on a different cross-national survey, and using different measures of immigrant diversity, these findings are reassuring.

Table 3.

Interaction Between Ethno-Cultural Diversity and Country-Level Nationalism in Explaining Social Capital

	Generalized trust		Association membership		Voluntary involvement
	Param	T-Val	Param	T-Val	Param	T-Val
Model 1
Civic nationalism	0.05*	2.57	0.04*	2.09	0.02	1.20
Ethnic nationalism	−0.24***	−17.37	−0.11***	−7.90	−0.09***	−6.42
GDP per capita	0.0***	4.31	0.02***	4.70	0.01**	3.37
Immigrant diversity	−0.02	−0.12	−0.02	−0.48	0.02	1.08
Model 2
Civic nationalism	0.05**	2.60	0.04*	2.10	0.02	1.20
Ethnic nationalism	−0.24***	−17.38	−0.11***	−7.90	−0.09***	−6.42
GDP per capita	0.02***	4.15	0.03***	4.17	0.01**	2.40
Immigrant diversity	−0.03	−1.09	−0.02	−0.66	0.02	1.04
Aggregated civic	−1.13	−1.36	−1.09	−1.00	0.02	0.03
Model 3
Civic nationalism	0.05**	2.60	0.04*	2.10	0.02	1.20
Ethnic nationalism	−0.24***	−17.38	−0.11***	−7.91	−0.09***	−6.42
GDP per capita	0.02***	4.03	0.03***	4.73	0.01*	2.73
Diversity	−0.03	−1.12	−0.03	−1.06	0.02	0.77
Aggregated civic	−1.25	−1.37	−1.85	−1.66	−0.36	−0.48
Aggregated civic × diversity	−0.05	−0.35	−0.31^†	−1.88	−0.16	−1.42
Model 4
Civic nationalism	0.05*	2.55	0.04*	2.07	0.02	1.20
Ethnic nationalism	−0.24***	−17.31	−0.11***	−7.83	−0.09***	−6.32
GDP per capita	0.01^†	1.74	0.01	1.68	0.00	0.61
Immigrant diversity	−0.03	−1.08	−0.03	−0.95	0.02	0.90
Aggregated ethnic	−0.83^†	−1.91	−1.52**	−3.05	−0.91*	−2.80
Model 5
Civic nationalism	0.05*	2.56	0.04*	2.07	0.02	1.19
Ethnic nationalism	−0.24***	−17.31	−0.11***	−7.83	−0.09***	−6.32
GDP per capita	0.01^†	1.91	0.01	1.49	0.00	0.46
Immigrant diversity	−0.03	−1.05	−0.03	−1.01	0.02	0.87
Aggregated ethnic	−0.76^†	−1.75	−1.60**	−3.21	−0.95*	−2.88
Aggregated ethnic × Diversity	−0.06	−1.18	0.06	1.11	0.03	0.87

Entries are coefficients from 15 separate logistic multilevel models. In Model 1, the country-level covariates are added to the individual-level model of Table 2. From Model 2 onward, civic or ethnic nationalism at the country level is as a main effect added to Model 1 and interacted with the country-level share of immigrants.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

A strict test of the Putnam thesis is not necessarily the main effect of aggregated ethnic and civic nationalism on individual social capital (though that is an interesting question in and of itself), but rather whether they moderate the effect of ethno-cultural diversity on social capital (H3 and H4). We depict estimates from four different models in Table 3. In contrast to expectations, individuals living in countries in which the general population endorses a civic logic toward nationhood are not more likely to express generalized trust or be civically active (Model 2). In addition, Model 3 of Table 3 shows that H3 finds little support: Living in a diverse nation premised on civic nationalism does not appear to encourage social capital at the individual level.

The main effects of ethnic nationalism on social capital (Model 4 of Table 3) are, on the other hand, more pronounced.¹¹ In countries more strongly premised on ethnic nationalism, trust and civic engagement are reduced. What is more, the contextual effect of ethnic nationalism does not weaken the strongly significant negative effect of individual ethnic national identity on trust, demonstrating the importance of approaching nationalism from various ecological perspectives. H4 finds no support here, in that ethnic nationalism at the national level does not appear to moderate the relationship between share of immigrants and social capital (Model 5): Citizens of highly diverse countries characterized by ethnic nationalism do not exhibit significantly lower social capital levels compared to diverse country exhibiting less ethnic nationalism.

Individual-level national identity

In addition to the contextual effects approach of the Putnam thesis, in this section we examine whether his logic also applies at the individual level, as we suggest that it might (H5 and H6). The dual questions of whether civic nationalism buffers the predominantly weak negative relationship between diversity and social capital and whether ethnic nationalism exacerbates it are taken up in Models 2–4 of Table 4. In particular, we are interested in the main effect of immigrant diversity, as well as the cross-level interaction between it and civic (Model 2) or ethnic (Model 3) nationalism, and a global model with both cross-level interactions (Model 4).

Table 4.

Cross-Level Interactions Between Ethno-Cultural Diversity and Individual-Level National Identity in Explaining Social Capital

	Generalized trust		Association membership		Voluntary involvement
	Param	T-Val	Param	T-Val	Param	T-Val
Model 1
Civic nationalism	0.05*	2.57	0.04*	2.09	0.02	1.20
Ethnic nationalism	−0.24***	−17.37	−0.11***	−7.90	−0.09***	−6.42
GDP per capita	0.02***	4.31	0.02***	4.70	0.01**	3.37
Immigrant diversity	−0.02	−0.12	−0.02	−0.48	0.02	1.08
Model 2
Civic nationalism	0.05**	2.80	0.04*	2.03	0.02	0.81
Ethnic nationalism	−0.24***	−17.44	−0.11***	−7.86	−0.09***	−6.34
GDP per capita	0.02***	4.29	0.02***	4.69	0.01**	3.36
Immigrant diversity	−0.02	−0.82	−0.02	−0.48	0.02	1.07
Civic × diversity	−0.01**	−2.78	0.00	0.81	0.01**	3.30
Model 3
Civic nationalism	0.04*	2.37	0.04*	1.99	0.02	1.21
Ethnic nationalism	−0.23***	−16.09	−0.10***	−7.44	−0.09***	−6.31
GDP per capita	0.02***	4.40	0.02***	4.70	0.01**	3.37
Immigrant diversity	−0.02	−0.87	−0.02	−0.48	0.02	1.08
Ethnic × diversity	−0.01***	−4.07	−0.00	−1.44	0.00	0.17
Model 4
Civic nationalism	0.05*	2.55	0.04^†	1.91	0.02	0.80
Ethnic nationalism	−0.23***	−16.18	−0.10***	−7.35	−0.09***	−6.13
GDP per capita	0.02***	4.38	0.02***	4.69	0.01**	3.36
Immigrant diversity	−0.02	−0.87	−0.02	−0.48	0.02	1.07
Civic × diversity	−0.01*	−2.26	0.00	1.08	0.01***	3.31
Ethnic × diversity	−0.01***	−3.75	−0.00	−1.60	−0.00	−0.23

Entries represent coefficients from 12 separate logistic multilevel multiple regression models. In Model 1, the country-level covariates are added to the individual-level model of Table 1. Model 2 adds a cross-level interaction between the share of immigrants with civic nationalism. Likewise, Model 3 adds a cross-level interaction between diversity and ethnic nationalism to Model 1. Model 4 is a global model that includes the main effects of diversity, GDP per capita, and the individual-level controls from Table 1, both types of nationalism, and interactions between them and diversity levels.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

As Models 2 and 4 indicate, the results for civic nationalism (H5) are mixed. In terms of generalized trust, it seems that a positive main effect of civic nationalism is combined with a significant negative interaction effect between civic nationalism and the share of immigrants. This significant effect does, however, fade when adding the cross-level interaction between diversity and ethnic nationalism on trust (Model 4). Thus, counter to expectations, it appears that civic conceptions of national identity do not cushion one’s sensitivity to immigrant diversity. On the other hand, the results are rather different for volunteering, where a nonsignificant positive main effect of civic nationalism is combined with a positive interaction, meaning that civic nationalism has a positive impact on the effect of diversity on the odds of volunteering in at least one association. This significant interaction term holds when controlling for the cross-level diversity–ethnic nationalism interaction (Model 4). For being a member of any associations, only significant main effects without significant interactions are apparent.

Although the story with civic nationalism is somewhat ambiguous, as far as ethnic nationalism goes it is more fully in line with our theoretical expectations (H6). On one hand, ethnic nationalism has no moderating impact on the effect of diversity on the structural aspects of social capital (Models 3 and 4). On the other, the negative effect of diversity on generalized trust is exacerbated by ethnic nationalism: For those respondents who endorse an ethnic conception of nationhood, diversity exerts a stronger negative impact on generalized trust than for those who do not.

Conclusion

In this article, we developed and empirically evaluated two different (but related) ideas about the relationship among national identity, social capital, and diversity. First, we built on the argument—promoted by David Miller and others—that national identity generates trust and horizontal solidarity, by suggesting that this relationship should depend on the kind of national identity one holds. Civic nationalism should have this effect because it is premised on inclusivity. Ethnic nationalism, by contrast, should do just the opposite because its guiding logic is one of exclusion along ethno-cultural lines. Second, we developed several hypotheses based on Putnam’s (2007) suggestion—similar in spirit to Miller’s—that civic nationalism is able to reconcile diversity with social cohesion. Specifically, we expected that high levels of civic nationalism (at both individual and societal levels of analysis) should cushion the negative relationship between diversity and social capital and that ethnic nationalism (again at both levels of analysis) should have the opposite effect.

We find substantial evidence for the position that national identity generates trust. That said, only civic nationalism has this effect; lower levels of trust, however, seem to be the province of ethnic nationalists. This nuance, in and of itself, is not by any means a challenge of Miller’s position, since he and other “liberal nationalists” are quite clear that the kinds of trust that are required for social cohesion can exist only if the nation is subjectively defined on civic rather than ethnic terms. We do also find some evidence here that our measures of nationalism at the societal level are related to the outcomes we examine, above and beyond their effects at the individual level. Although civic nationalism does not appear to matter in a statistically significant way, high levels of ethnic nationalism at the societal level are associated with suppressed scores on social capital.

Putnam’s argument about the cushioning effect of civic nationalism on the relationship between diversity and social capital finds less support. For one thing, there is no evidence here that aggregated “civic-ness” or “ethnic-ness” of countries has any moderating effect on this relationship. At the individual level, the moderating effect of civic nationalism appears to depend on the indicator: It heightens the weakly positive effect of diversity on associational membership as expected, but, counter to expectations, it also appears to exacerbate the weakly negative effect of diversity on generalized trust. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism does augment the negative relationship between diversity and generalized trust, but it does not have any moderating effect with respect to the other two outcomes. At the very least, there is clearly a case to be made that the two types of nationalism function differently. Moreover, these mixed results underline the importance of studying multiple dimensions of social capital (also see, e.g., Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010) and also theorizing and testing these kinds of relationships at different ecological levels.

A critical observer might ask why the different dimensions of social capital we explore seem to give discrepant results. Although these findings might appear as something of a mixed bag, a deeper understanding of the conceptual differences between them indicates that they are not. As Hooghe (2007, p. 711) argues, several social-psychological studies and experimental designs have already indicated that “trust probably is most vulnerable for the effects of increasing diversity, much more so than other components of social capital.” Thus, on this view it is unsurprising that the strongest relationships we find tend to emerge on trust.

Of course, every study has limitations, and ours is certainly no exception. One of these is its reliance on “brute force” social capital measures that do not explicitly distinguish whether or not it cuts across group lines. Scads of work on social capital indicates that its positive effects depend on the social ties created by crosscutting in nature.¹² Although we do demonstrate findings in accordance with our hypotheses using the rough gauge of “generalized trust,” civic national identity’s great benefit—at least in Miller’s view—is that it creates a community of mutual obligation between diverse groups. We present some evidence in favor of this proposition (and the obverse conclusion about ethnic national identity), but without better measures of crosscutting trust and civic ties, we are still relying on assumptions as much as evidence.

A second issue regards the (potentially) conditioning role of the other two facets of national identity not explored here: namely, the salience one ascribes to one’s national identity, and the amount of affect one feels with respect to it. Arguably, nationalism should “matter” more for social capital to the extent that the nation is an important category in people’s everyday lives. Building off of H6, for example, ethnic nationalists for whom the nation is highly salient as an identity might be expected to hunker down more in the face of diversity than ethnic nationalists for whom it is not. We encourage future research to pay close attention to the ways in which both salience and affect of one’s national identity (be it ethnic or civic) conditions its consequences, in terms of not only social capital but also other relevant outcomes.

A final issue, perennial in the social capital literature, pertains to the causal arrow question. Namely, it is plausible that generalized trust and associational memberships might influence people’s normative conception of what it takes to be a “true national.” Certainly the potential for reciprocal causality exists, and given that these data do not allow us very much leverage in addressing the issue, it would obviously be imprudent to make causal claims with any degree of certainty until further research is conducted.

To conclude, this study lends weight to the argument that nationalism and social capital are related in powerful yet nuanced ways and that it can function as a moderator in the tense relationship between diversity and social capital. All of these relationships depend, however, on what kind of national identity is in question. A major part of the national identity debate swirls around “How proud?” but if this study indicates anything, it is that this relationship is devoid of meaning without a better understanding “Proud of what?”

Footnotes

Appendix

Table A5.

t Tests for Civic and Ethnic Nationalism Along Social Capital Indicators According to Ethnic-Cultural Heterogeneity

Immigrant diversity	Social capital category	Mean on civic nationalism	t test	Mean on ethnic nationalism	t test
Low	Distrust	3.45	−10.92***	3.08	28.50***
	Trust	3.56		2.69
High	Distrust	3.52	−1.52	2.88	28.82***
	Trust	3.54		2.45
Low	No member	3.42	−16.64***	3.13	31.34***
	Member	3.58		2.71
High	No member	3.51	−3.36**	2.88	24.47***
	Member	3.55		2.52
Low	No volunteer	3.47	−6.95***	3.02	18.08***
	Volunteer	3.55		2.73
High	No volunteer	3.52	−3.20**	2.78	14.08***
	Volunteer	3.55		2.54

For information regarding the split on immigrant diversity, see Table A4.

p < .01. ***p < .001.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Robert Putnam and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and detailed comments throughout. We take full responsibility for all infelicities and errors of judgment or interpretation.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Bios

Tim Reeskens is an assistant professor of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands) and a postdoctoral research fellow of the Research Foundation - Flanders at the Centre for Sociological Research at KU Leuven (Belgium). He obtained his PhD in 2009 from KU Leuven (Belgium). His research mainly deals with the cross-national analysis of political and social attitudes, with a particular interest in social capital and generalized trust, nationalism, and support for the welfare state. His research has appeared in Journal of European Social Policy, International Migration Review, Nations and Nationalism, Psychological Science, and Work, Employment and Society.

Matthew Wright is an Assistant Professor in the Government Department at American University, Washington DC. He received his PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 2010. His field of expertise is the study of political behavior, with particular attention to immigration, multiculturalism, and the politics of ethnic diversity. His specific research interests include the individual and societal bases of political identities, as well as their implications in terms of attitudes and behaviors. His research has appeared in Political Research Quarterly, Psychological Science, American Politics Research, Political Psychology, and Perspectives on Politics.

References

Alesina

La Ferrara

(2000). Participation in heterogeneous communities. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 847-894.

Alesina

La Ferrara

(2002). Who trusts others? Journal of Public Economics, 85, 207-234.

Anderson

(1991). Imagined communities (Rev. ed.). London, UK: Verso Books.

Bowler

Donovan

Hanneman

(2003). Art for democracy’s sake? Group membership and political engagement in Europe. Journal of Politics, 65, 1111-1129.

Brehm

Rahn

(1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital. American Journal of Political Science, 41, 999-1023.

Brubaker

(1992). Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brubaker

(2004). In the name of the nation: Reflections on nationalism and patriotism. Citizenship Studies, 8, 115-127.

Ceobanu

A. N.

Escandell

(2008). East is West? National feelings and anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe. Social Science Research, 37, 1147-1170.

Citrin

Sears

D. O.

(2009). Balancing national and ethnic identities: The psychology of e pluribus unum. In Abdelal

Herrera

Y. M.

Johnston

A. I.

McDermott

(Eds.), Measuring identity: A guide for social scientists (pp. 145-175). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

10.

Citrin

Wright

(2008, April). The collision of national identity and multiculturalism among mass publics. Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

11.

De Figueiredo

R. J. P.

Elkins

(2003). Are patriots bigots? An inquiry into the vices of in-group pride. American Journal of Political Science, 47, 171-188.

12.

Delhey

Newton

(2005). Predicting cross-national levels of social trust: Global pattern or Nordic exceptionalism? European Sociological Review, 21, 311-327.

13.

Deutsch

K. W.

(1966). Nationalism and social communication (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

14.

Eurostat (2011). Eurostat Home. Retrived from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/

15.

Gaertner

S. L.

Dovidio

J. F.

(2000). Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup identity model. Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis.

16.

Gelman

Hill

(2006). Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical models. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

17.

Gesthuizen

van der Meer

Scheepers

(2009). Ethnic diversity and social capital in Europe: Tests of Putnam’s thesis in European countries. Scandinavian Political Studies, 32, 121-142.

18.

Greenfeld

(1992). Nationalism: Five roads to modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

19.

Hall

J. A.

(1999). Social capital in Britain. British Journal of Political Science, 29, 417-461.

20.

Heath

Martin

Spreckelsen

(2009). Cross-national comparability of survey attitude measures. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 21, 293-315.

21.

Hero

R. E.

(2003). Social capital and racial inequality in America. Perspectives on Politics, 1, 113-122.

22.

Hooghe

(2007). Social capital and diversity: Generalized trust, social cohesion and regimes of diversity. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 40, 709-732.

23.

Hooghe

Reeskens

Stolle

(2007). Diversity, multiculturalism and social cohesion: Trust and ethnocentrism in European societies. In Banting

Courchene

T. J.

Seidle

F. L.

(Eds.), Belonging? Diversity, recognition and shared citizenship in Canada (pp. 387-410). Ottawa, Canada: Institute for Research on Public Policy.

24.

Hooghe

Reeskens

Stolle

Trappers

(2009). Ethnic diversity and generalized trust in Europe: A cross-national multilevel study. Comparative Political Studies, 42, 198-223.

25.

Hox

J. J.

(2010). Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

26.

Huntington

(2004). Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

27.

Inglehart

(1997). Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43 countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

28.

Jones

F. L.

Smith

(2001). Diversity and commonality in national identities: An exploratory analysis of cross-national patterns. Journal of Sociology, 37, 45-63.

29.

Kesler

Bloemraad

(2010). Do immigrants hurt civic and political engagement? The conditional effects of immigrant diversity on trust, membership, and participation across 19 countries, 1981–2000. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 43, 319-347.

30.

Kumlin

Rothstein

(2005). Making and breaking social capital: The impact of welfare institutions. Comparative Political Studies, 38, 339-365.

31.

Kunovich

(2009). The sources and consequences of national identification. American Sociological Review, 74, 573-593.

32.

Kramer

R. M.

Brewer

M. B.

(1984). Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 1044-1057.

33.

Kymlicka

(2001). Politics in the vernacular: Nationalism, multiculturalism, and citizenship. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

34.

Lamont

Molnar

(2002). The study of social boundaries in the social sciences. Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 167-195.

35.

Letki

(2008). Does diversity erode social cohesion? Social capital and race in British neighborhoods. Political Studies, 56, 99-126.

36.

Levi

(1996). Social and unsocial capital: A review essay of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work. Politics and Society, 24, 45-55.

37.

Maddens

Billiet

Beerten

(2000). National identity and the attitude towards foreigners in multi-national states: The case of Belgium. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 26, 45-60.

38.

Miller

(1995). On nationality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

39.

Miller

(2000). Citizenship and National Identity. London, UK: Polity Press.

40.

Mirel

(2002). Civic education and changing definitions of American identity, 1900–1950. Educational Review, 54, 143-152.

41.

Newton

(2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy. International Political Science Review, 22, 201-214.

42.

Norris

Davis

(2007). Continental divide: Social capital in the US and Europe. In Jowell

Roberts

Fitzgerald

Eva

(Eds.), Measuring attitudes cross-nationally: Lessons from the European Social Survey (pp. 239-265). London, UK: Sage.

43.

Paxton

(1999). Is social capital declining in the United States? A multiple indicator assessment. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 88-127.

44.

Pehrson

Vignoles

V. L.

Brown

(2009). National identification and anti-immigrant prejudice: Individual and contextual effects of national definitions. Social Psychology Quarterly, 72, 24-38.

45.

Putnam

R. D.

(1993). Making democracy work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

46.

Putnam

R. D.

(2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

47.

Putnam

R. D.

(2007). E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century. Scandinavian Political Studies, 30, 137-174.

48.

Putnam

R. D.

Campbell

D. E.

(2010). American grace: How religion divides and unites us. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

49.

Reeskens

Hooghe

(2010). Beyond the civic-ethnic dichotomy: Investigating the structure of citizenship concepts across 33 OECD countries. Nations and Nationalism, 16, 579-597.

50.

Rothstein

Stolle

(2008). The state and social capital: An institutional theory of generalized trust. Comparative Politics, 40, 441-467.

51.

Sarkozy

(2009). Déclaration du Président de la République devant le Parlement réuni en Congrès. Retrieved from http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/messages-et-declarations-du-president-de-la-republique/sarkozy-declaration-22juin2009.asp

52.

Smith

(1991). National identity. New York, NY: Penguin.

53.

Stolle

Rochon

(1998). Are all associations alike? Membership diversity, associational type, and the creation of social capital. American Behavioral Scientist, 42, 47-65.

54.

Theiss-Morse

(2009). Who counts as an American? New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

55.

Theiss-Morse

Hibbing

J. R.

(2005). Citizenship and civic engagement. Annual Review of Political Science, 8, 227-249.

56.

Tolsma

van der Meer

Gesthuizen

(2009). The impact of neighborhood and municipality characteristics on social cohesion in the Netherlands. Acta Politica, 44, 286-313.

57.

Transue

J. E.

(2007). Identity salience, identity acceptance, and racial policy attitudes: American national identity as a uniting force. American Journal of Political Science, 51, 78-91.

58.

United Nations Population Division (2011). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Age and Sex. Retrieved from http://esa.un.org/MigAge/

59.

Uslaner

E. M.

(2002). The moral foundations of trust. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

60.

Weldon

S. A.

(2006). The institutional context of tolerance for ethnic minorities: A comparative multilevel analysis of Western Europe. American Journal of Political Science, 50, 331-349.

61.

Wright

Citrin

Wand

(2012). Alternative measures of American national identity: Implications for the civic-ethnic distinction. Political Psychology, 33, 469-482.

62.

Wright

Citrin

Wand

(in press). Alternative measures of American national identity: Implications for the ethnic/civic distinction. Political Psychology.