Routine peace: Technocracy and peacebuilding

Introduction

A major theme of critiques of internationally supported peace interventions is that they are ‘technocratic’. Relatively few works, however, maintain a substantive gaze on the meanings and implications of technocracy for the development and maintenance of peace. ¹ Instead, it is a critique often made in passing, and the technocratic nature of peace interventions is often asserted rather than explained. This article seeks to unpack the implications of technocracy for contemporary peace-building. It aims to illustrate how the bureaucratic imperative explains much about the ascendancy of certain actors to positions of prominence on the peace-building landscape, and the types of activity that these actors engage in. The bureaucratic imperative is a foundational socio-cultural premise for many contemporary peace interventions yet it is largely invisible; so ubiquitous and commonplace as to merit little discussion (Abbinett, 2006). Moreover, bureaucracy and ‘administrative efficiency’ may give the impression of being neutral, and therefore be absolved from critical scrutiny. It is argued here that technocracy does not merely constitute a facilitative framework for peace-building; instead, it has become a major factor in determining the nature of the peace-building process, the actors involved and the ‘peace’ that it produces. It is highly political in that it favours ‘solutions’ that originate from, and perpetuate, particular ideological stances.

It is worth stressing, by way of an opening caveat, that it is difficult to generalize between contexts. The experience and application of technocracy in one context is unlikely to be precisely replicated in another. This difficulty of generalization is compounded by the variety and multiplicity of actors that may be described as ‘technocratic’ (from international financial institutions to local NGOs). Moreover, the list of activities that may be described as ‘technocratic’ is extensive (from internationally sponsored regional good governance programmes to local level reconciliation initiatives). The particular focus of this article is on technocracy in internationally supported peace-building, though it is difficult to isolate this completely from cognate areas such as emergency or development assistance. Some fields of conflict regulation lend themselves more easily to technocratic interventions, most notably governance interventions by well-organized and authoritative actors such as states. Despite the looseness of the term ‘technocratic’, and the apparent promiscuity with which the term might be used, it is worth persevering with the task of analysing the role of technocracy in relation to peace-building.

This article does not criticize technocracy per se. It is not disputed that technocratic interventions can be effective and fair. Instead, the article seeks to develop a more sophisticated conceptual understanding of technocracy in relation to peace-building. It is interested in the construction and institutionalization of discourses, understandings, expectations and practices of peace-building. Over a period of decades, peace-building norms have been constructed, maintained and policed. It is argued that these norms are bolstered by a mutually reinforcing set of institutions to create an increasingly hegemonic system of peace-building that is intolerant of alternatives and creativity. The argument is not that there is a vast conspiracy of bureaucrats. Instead, it is that multiple actors are complicit in the creation and perpetuation of a particular approach to peace-building. In many cases, this complicity is implicit and unconscious; actors have been acculturated to the normalization of bureaucratic approaches to conflict. Critical scrutiny is discouraged simply because bureaucratized responses are regarded as routine, neutral and ‘normal’. A situation of epistemic closure has developed in which technocratic values have acquired near hegemonic status.

Crucially, it is further argued that technocracy in peace-building has achieved a major success by framing conflicts in such a way as to necessitate technocratic responses. Thus technocracy has created a built-in permanent necessity for itself. International organizations, governments, INGOs and academic institutions use increasingly homogenized tools and language to describe conflicts. This framing lends itself to suggesting homogenized conflict remedies that feature heavily technocratic ‘solutions’ that often coalesce around the ‘good governance’ and state-building agendas. In a sense it is supply-led demand that reinforces the ‘expertise’ and primacy of elites.

The article begins with a discussion of technocracy and world polity theory. This section also reviews two claims advanced on behalf of technocracy: that it is neutral and that it is efficient. The article then outlines the ‘technocratic turn’ that has occurred in relation to peace-building, whereby there has been a gradual but persistent trend towards the application of technocracy in the framing of conflict and approaches to it. It is argued that a complex mix of structural and proximate factors has reinforced the technocratic turn in peace-building. The key structural factors relate to the construction of a facilitating ideological and institutional environment that privileges technical ‘solutions’ above approaches deemed to be traditional or arbitrary. A self-reinforcing logic has been created whereby ‘technical fixes’ are in sync with prevailing world-views on neo-liberalism. This is particularly the case in relation to those in command of peace-building strategies and budgets. The proximate factors, which are supported by the structural factors, relate to the professionalization of the ‘peace industry’, standardization of peace-building through ‘best practice’, increased opportunities for peace-support interventions (and thus technocracy) and an increased use of technology. Finally, the article considers the extent to which the discursive framing of conflict by key actors predetermines their conflict response.

The article is primarily an exercise in conceptual scoping, though it can also be read as a contribution to the critique of the liberal peace. In particular, it is interested in issues of local agency and resistance in relation to peace-building (Mac Ginty, 2012; Richmond, 2011). It also draws inspiration from Robert Cox’s seminal work on the epistemology of International Relations, and especially the limits of problem-solving methodologies that ‘… fix the limits or parameter to a problem area and … reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables …’ (1981: 129). The article looks beyond International Relations to draw on world polity theory from sociology (Boli and Thomas, 1999; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). The theory notes increased isomorphism in actors, interests and behaviour across global structures. This article envisages greater heterogeneity in the world polity than much of the sociological literature admits, but nevertheless world polity theory provides a useful theoretical mooring point for this study.

Technocracy and world polity theory

For the purposes of this article, technocracy is taken to mean the systems and behaviours that prioritize bureaucratic rationality. In an ideal type, it is directed from above, pursues the imposition of a single policy paradigm and is immune to social context (Centeno, 1993: 314; 1994: 4). It privileges what it regards as rational forms of knowledge and behaviour with a consequent erosion of critical and autonomous thinking and action (Riles, 2004: 393; Tinker and Lowe, 1984: 44). Ultimately, it can be seen as a form of social control, though its advocates can tell a good story of how it supplants arbitrary decision-making mechanisms with impartial and disinterested systems. Much depends on the closed logic of the technocratic system that simultaneously rationalizes, conditions and coerces. Epistemic closure or a closed-loop of thinking means that rival decision-making systems are excluded.

Our understanding of technocracy requires modification given our focus on peace-building. It is useful to think of varieties of technocracy and peace-building nuances within it. For example, it may be that technocratic agents are content to operate in discrete sectors of society rather than hold society-wide ambitions. It may also be that the indigenous state elite is sidelined by international actors who create and sustain parallel governance structures through INGOs and NGOs. Examples here would include the actions of the interveners in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti and Afghanistan who bypassed elected governments deemed to be recalcitrant, corrupt or incapable (Chandler, 2006). In these cases, alternative bureaucracies – with their own logics – were created.

More than any other factor, the concentration on state-building – a core aspect of contemporary peace-support intervention – has provided enhanced opportunities for technocratic peace-building (Call and Wyeth, 2008). International actors regard an efficient and capable state as a bulwark against conflict recidivism, as a clearing house for competing demands among citizens, as a provider of social goods and as an organ able to administer the economic and diplomatic responsibilities of statehood on the international stage. According to this logic, if the state is ‘perfected’ then conflict will be unlikely (White House, 2010: 8). Of course, advocates of the liberal peace tend to favour a particular type of state – a facsimile of the western democratic state with an open economy (Richmond and Franks, 2009). The centrality of the state, or more precisely state reform, to internationally supported peace interventions means that a significant proportion of activities termed as ‘peace-building’ are actually focused on bureaucratic recalibration and the construction of administrative systems that will, it is hoped, deliver outcomes more efficiently, transparently and accountably.

In many cases, external peace-building actors are able to effect significant and long-term changes on target societies because of their presence and resources during the formative stages of state-building. This particularly applies to those working on governance issues in government ministries. It is here that profound change can be effected in the relationships between states, markets and citizens (Mac Ginty and Hamieh, 2009). Under the guise of transparency, efficiency, accountability and other technocratic watchwords, political relationships can be altered. The normative value of such alterations need not concern us here. Instead, the key point is that technocratic state-building programmes go far beyond administrative reform. They have the potential to recalibrate not only how government operates and the nature of its bureaucratic interactions with citizens, but also what citizens should expect from the state in terms of social provision.

The interface between internal and external actors, and their technocracies, is likely to be complex. While many technocratic imperatives are likely to arise from external sources (for example, the International Organization for Standards), we should not underestimate local capacities to produce and reproduce technocracy. This is where the author departs from the determinism found in some of the world polity theory literature. Locally maintained technocracy is likely to be found at all levels of society. This may be prior-existing technocracy, perhaps the remnants of communist-style bureaucracy in Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, or forms of technocracy associated with the new institutionalism found in many peace-building interventions. Local actors can be enthusiastic converts to imported forms of technocracy. Rather than a neat silo through which western-style technocratic methods are passed down the chain from international interveners to national governments and then to municipalities, a more complex and hybridized pattern is likely to pertain (Mac Ginty, 2010a). There may be more than a little mimicry in how external technocracy is adapted by local actors (Bhabha, 1984). Importantly, however, technology associated with liberal peace interventions has the power to be particularly intrusive and expansive, and is often associated with coercion.

Two arguments are made with consistency in favour of a technocratic approach to peace-building: neutrality and efficiency. Advocates of a technocratic approach to peace-building posit that scientific and rational approaches to dispute resolution are superior as they are not influenced by arbitrary or potentially discriminatory decision-making based on historical bias or identity claims. There is an ‘implicit and often explicit rejection of “politics” as inefficient and possibly corruptive’ (Centeno, 1993: 313). Technocracy offers the possibility of constructing mechanisms that are free from bias and that can depoliticize issues that are often viewed through political lenses. Technocratic ideals have infused many approaches to conflict resolution and conflict management (as opposed to conflict transformation) (Lederach, 1995). These approaches believe that conflicts can be ‘solved’ or ‘managed’ via arbitration mechanisms that are able to reach judgments based on evidence rather than on competing claims that might be based on sentiment or identity. Moreover, conflict resolution and conflict management approaches believe that a key driver of conflict is a lack of transparency between conflicting parties. As a result, they believe that the opportunities for misunderstanding (and thereby conflict) can be minimized by the creation of forums for transparent communication. This administrative rationality takes institutional form through tribunals, arbitration panels and truth commissions. These may be staffed by outsiders and ‘experts’ who do not have an obvious stake in the conflict.

Technocrats would see this approach as being value-free and neutral: decision-making would be based on objective criteria. They would see their approach as being anodyne and free from the subjective pitfalls of value judgements. Yet it is difficult to see how some issues can be separated from their affective hinterland. Consider the status of Jerusalem: a committee of inquiry could develop a conflict resolution rubric based on demography, urban planning and other ‘scientific’ criteria. Given the highly emotive claims involved, it seems unlikely that administrative rationality could satisfy all parties since many claims to the city are based on religious faith, identity, symbolism, historical interpretation and emotion. It is difficult to think of civil war situations in which the majority of these factors are not at work (Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008: 115–135).

Rather than being value-free, it can be argued that technocracy amounts to an ideology in itself. Centeno (1993: 312) refers to it as ‘an ideology of method’ or ‘a belief in the ability to arrive at the optimal answer to any discussion through the application of particular practices’. Systemic efficiency is valued above all else. The defence of the system, and the bureaucracy that supports that system, becomes a political project. An inbuilt pro-system bias can develop. Shapiro (2005: 343) observes how ‘experts are themselves special interest groups whose perspectives and self-interests render them non-representative of the demos as a whole’. Technocratic systems are highly political in at least two respects. Firstly, technocratic elites rely on material power and social capital in order to acquire legitimacy and assume positions of power (Amir, 2007: 88). Technocrats do not emerge from a vacuum: they rely on a supportive politico-economic environment. As argued later, international peace-building programmes often provide such an environment. The second highly political aspect of technocracy derives from its assumption that technocratic methods and ‘solutions’ are superior to alternatives. From this starting point, alternative approaches to dispute resolution are deemed invalid. Donais (2009: 8) notes that: ‘In [the] technocratic version of peace-building, local perspectives are more often viewed as hurdles to be overcome or obstacles to be avoided than as potential sources of sustainable solutions.’ Although justifying itself as being value-free and neutral, technocratic approaches are capable of exhibiting significant intolerance and exclusivity.

This intolerance is especially apparent in relation to participative mechanisms. In a purely technocratic system, popular input is irrelevant: decisions are made according to a rational rubric whose findings are unchanged by popularity. Participation is sacrificed to efficiency. If uncontrolled, the logic of technocracy may be to minimize the demands of participation in order to maximize efficiency. As Bryld (2000: 701) notes: ‘An authoritarian regime with a single string of command is presumably the most efficient and least participatory government you can get.’ Exclusion and lack of participation can occur in non-authoritarian contexts as well. Reflecting a wider patriarchy in education and society in general, technocratic networks often display a gender bias (Daday and Burris, 2001: 243 f.). Moreover, technocratic approaches are often characterized by the deployment of a specialist language that is exclusionary to non-speakers. Referring to economic reforms in 1990s Argentina, Corrales (2004: 9) observed a ‘democratic dissonance, whereby state officials justify economic policy by using technocratic arguments while groups from civil society feel unable to “talk back” to the state because they do not have the language of the technocrats.’

The major achievement of world polity theory has been to emphasize transnational processes of homogenization among organizations and practices. It highlights a ‘structural isomorphism’ (Boli and Thomas, 1999: 5) and ‘standardized agency’ (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000:107) around notions (even myths) of bureaucratic competence. Meyer and Jepperson (2000: 111) note how ‘ … the model of the effective modern individual is remarkably isomorphic everywhere, and people in fact come to talk and behave in similar ways when they enact these models. This is also true, and increasingly so, of organizations, so that management texts and consulting firms now flow rapidly into and across sectors and countries …’. This ‘associational integration’ (Beckfield, 2010: 1021) can be found in the peace-building sector with its standardization of personnel, vernacular, types of intervention and reporting mechanisms. Meyer et al. (1997: 161) add the insight that ‘because world society is stateless, many scholars have been unable to see it’. This particularly applies to international relations and its state-centricity. The state is often taken as the default setting without very much thinking as to why this might be the case.

Crucial to world polity theory is ‘agentic construction’ or the cultural and institutional frames in which actors are embedded. These ‘enveloping frames’ (Boli and Thomas, 1997: 172) are constitutive and directive for the actors within them, producing and reproducing the actors themselves. Boli and Thomas (1999:18) observe that ‘actors do not act as much as they enact’. In the peace-building context, as in many others, the script enacted tends to be aligned with western interests and mores.

There is a risk that too much determinism can be read into world polity theory and that it leaves insufficient room for the agency and resistance of non-conformist actors. Peace-building environments are likely to be the scene of significant hybridity where indigenous and exogenous factors are in a state of constant social negotiation and renegotiation (Mac Ginty, 2010a: 391–412; Roberts, 2011: 26–28).

Although the construction of a fully-fledged typology of peace-building technocracy is beyond the scope of this article, it is useful to think of varieties of peace-building technocracy or variations in the extent and strictness of the technocracy. Much will depend on the interaction between prior-existing technocracy and new forms of technocracy that are introduced through peace-building or state-building initiatives. Much too will depend on the extent of the peace-support intervention. Some interventions are maximalist in terms of their intrusion (for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina), while others are more limited (Northern Ireland). Important here too is the nature of the international intervention in terms of its orientation towards stabilization or more emancipatory goals (Richmond, 2005: 217). Different types of intervention activity will entail different styles of technocracy. Another factor relates to the identity of the primary partners in the peace-building intervention. Relevant here will be whether international actors can find or establish a ‘reliable’ national government through which to operate, or whether they create parallel institutions or use a network of INGOs and NGOs. Also important will be the stage of the peace-support intervention. Different stages of a peace intervention will involve different types of technocracy. For example, an emergency stabilization intervention may differ from a longer-term reconciliation programme that operates in tandem with a state-building programme.

This article does not envisage a constant or inevitable peace-building technocracy. As discussed above, multiple variables will condition the extent and nature of the technocracy involved in peace-building. Yet, it is fair to say that technocracy is playing an increasingly prominent role in peace-building, that its effect is standardizing and that the impetus and cultural imprimatur of these changes can be associated with the global north.

The technocratic turn in peace-building

There is strong evidence of a ‘technocratic turn’ in internationally supported peace interventions. The seminal document in post-Cold War liberal peace-building, the UN’s An Agenda for Peace (1992: para. 59) makes clear the UN’s role in technical intervention: ‘There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions.’ A genealogy of sorts can be traced from An Agenda for Peace through other seminal UN documents and initiatives: An Agenda for Development (1994); Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (1995); the establishment of the Peace-building Commission (1995); Agenda for Democratization (1996); the Brahimi Report (2000); The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004); Kofi Annan’s ‘In larger freedom’ report and the Review of the UN Peace-building Architecture (2010). A technicist and state-centric DNA runs through this genealogy, mediated albeit by an increasing recognition of the importance of local ownership. A significant trope running through these documents is the importance of coordination. As the 2010 Review (UN, 2010: 13) notes: ‘Fragmentation, territoriality and competition among UN actors as well as among international organizations and donors are generally corrosive to the entire aid effort, and will critically undermine the peace-building effort.’ The remedy was greater coordination and efforts to enhance the compatibility of peace-building actors and practices.

Beyond the UN, ‘technical assistance’ is hardwired into the documents and modus operandi of the leading international institutions that comprise the key players in the liberal peace. Thus, for example, the World Bank (2011b) describes itself as ‘a vital source of financial and technical assistance’. The International Monetary Fund (2001) notes: ‘In accord with the IMF’s first Article of Agreement, the objective of the IMF’s technical assistance program is to contribute to the development of the productive resources of member countries by enhancing the effectiveness of economic policy and financial management.’ The phrase ‘technical assistance’ features prominently in the mandates, self-proclaimed areas of expertise and activities of the Asian Development Bank (2008), ECHO (2011), USAID (2011), OSCE (2011) and CIDA (2005). Importantly, these organizations and others like them have devolved many peace-building tasks to INGOs and NGOs and established a chain of technocracy in the process (Richmond and Carey, 2005).

A complex set of reasons helps explain the increased evidence of technocracy in peace-building. These reasons can be divided, somewhat roughly, into structural and proximate factors. The former are overarching meta-contextual conditions that facilitate technocracy. The proximate reasons can be regarded as accelerators, or more immediate factors that have propelled the technocratic turn in recent years. The choice of factors is exploratory and based on the author’s reading of the liberal peace and observations from the peace-building field. While the focus of this article is on technocracy in peace-building, it is worth noting that the technocratic turn in peace-building cannot be separated completely from more general developments in technology, business administration and the perceptual environment in which these developments became mainstreamed.

Technocratic discursive framing of conflict

The final section of this article argues that conflicts are increasingly discursively framed by technocratic actors in ways that demand technocratic responses. In this view, the paradigm in which conflict is defined, discussed and dealt with becomes closed. Technocratic responses become the default option simply because they are so embedded and accepted that they are largely the only option. This is in line with Robert Cox’s (1981) perspective on the lack of inquisitiveness of the problem-solving paradigm. ‘The general pattern of institutions and relations is not called into question’ (Cox, 1981: 129) with the result that issues of structure and power are often left unexamined. Richmond’s (2011: 425) withering assault on the complacency of the discipline of International Relations concludes that the discipline ‘… does not comprehend any possibility of legitimate resistance except through its own predetermined channels, which effectively censor and narrow resistant agencies’. The result is a problem-solving paradigm that is often a-historical, a-political and ignorant of wider structural factors. It is, in short, ‘compliance oriented’ (Richmond, 2011: 429).

The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report (2011a) and work by international organization insider Graciana del Castillo (2008) are typical of the problem-solving approach. They are aware of the limitations of current approaches to reconstruction and peace-building but they are unable to move beyond institutionalist approaches. They advocate more of the same through ‘smarter’ institutions seemingly oblivious to the possibility that institutionalist ‘fixes’ might be part of the problem.

The technocracy behind the framing of contemporary conflict is particularly visible in the conflict analysis methodologies adopted by international organizations, national governments and INGOs, and in attempts to standardize these methodologies.

The contents of leading conflict analysis frameworks reveal how some aspects of these analysis frameworks steer analysts, and those advised, directed and funded by their analyses, in technocratic directions. The World Bank’s approach to conflict analysis is instructive in this regard. Although most contemporary conflicts are transnational in character or are internationalized civil wars (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2007), the Bank, like most other organizations that conduct conflict analyses, uses states as its primary level of analysis (World Bank, 2002). This is a case of the administrative structure of the conflict analyser (the World Bank has country teams) driving the approach to the analysis. Revealing its technocratic world-view, the World Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework places significant emphasis on institutions and governance as well as on quantitative indicators such as inflationary trends and changes in per capita income (World Bank, 2005, 2011).

Conflict analysis frameworks have become increasingly nuanced and sophisticated in recent years, and many strive towards ‘conflict sensitivity’. Yet, there is a fundamental tension at the heart of contemporary approaches to conflict analysis. On the one hand, almost every conflict analysis begins with a phrase along the lines of ‘every conflict is different and requires an individual approach’. As Furlong (2005: 8) notes ‘there is no single diagnostic model’. On the other hand, there is a perceptible trend towards the standardization of approaches to conflict analysis. One part of this standardization arises from the source of publicly available conflict analysis models: virtually all originate from the global north (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2010: 15–40). More significant, however, are the conscious attempts to enhance consistency across conflict analysis models (Causton, 2009). This has occurred at both the intra and inter-organizational levels. Within the United Nations there was an attempt to create ‘a framework for a common contextual analysis for the causes of conflict, which will help base program planning on a common framework of analysis that clearly identifies key elements of peace-building. In this sense, a transitional strategy of the UN for countries emerging from violent conflict should be based on a standardised inter-agency methodology for conflict analysis’ (emphasis in original UNDG/ECHA, 2004; UNDG, 2004). Beyond the UN there have been a number of attempts to collate and benchmark preferred approaches to conflict analysis (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2009; GSDRC, 2009).

The identification and collation of best practice in conflict analysis is not problematic in itself. Problems may arise, however, if conflict analyses are too enmeshed in the technocracy of peace-building. They may become mechanistic and unreflexive responses to conflict, perhaps conducted by self-styled conflict analysis ‘experts’ and ‘professionals’ (Perlman, 2009 and 2010: 1). According to critics, the determinism of conflict analysis models means that equal weight may be awarded to all actors, or all claims made by conflict actors, no matter how abhorrent they may be. In this view, moral and political judgement is too hastily subjugated to the analytical framework (Dudouet et al., 2005: 9; Evans, 2008).

Perhaps the most significant criticism made of conflict analysis frameworks is that they regard conflict as a ‘dysfunction’ that must be ‘fixed’. This fits with the designation of states as ‘fragile’, ‘weak’, ‘failed’ or ‘failing’. Although much criticized by academics, these terms still have considerable purchase in the policy sphere (Carment, 2003; Hagmaan and Hoehne, 2009; Hehir, 2007; Nuruzzaman, 2009). British Foreign Secretary William Hague described Somalia as ‘the world’s most failed state’ during a visit of a few hours in 2012 (The Guardian, 2012). This designation of a dysfunction in governance or the operation of the state automatically prescribes a technocratic remedy: state-building. It is a classic piece of epistemic closure through which the problem and remedy become a single unit. Confirmation bias is built into many conflict analysis frameworks simply because many of their questions focus on the presence or effectiveness of the state. This confirmation bias pertains to many conflict analysis frameworks that claim to be ‘conflict sensitive’.

The essential point is that the framing of conflict shapes how conflicts are understood, discussed and responded to. Technocracy and the bureaucratic imperative play a significant and increasing role in how conflicts are analysed, categorized and compared, as well as the intervention strategies that ensue. While the development of common systems for the understanding of conflict may allow for the mainstreaming of ‘best practice’, it may have the unintended consequence of limiting the opportunities for innovative approaches to the analysis of conflict. The promotion of apparently innocuous bureaucratic norms, such as templates for defining conflict actors or standard categories for conflict behaviour, can have profound consequences for how conflict is understood.

Concluding discussion

It is important to stress that this article does not argue that the peace-building field is without creativity or innovation. The sector has numerous institutions and individuals who are reflective and progressive, and are interested in experimentation and exploring alternatives. Indeed, recent years have seen greater interest in the south-south transfer of ideas and practices. For example, since 2004 a Brazilian based NGO, Viva Rio, has been transferring its methodologies of working with street gangs to Haiti (Fordelone, 2009). There has also been a renaissance of interest in traditional and indigenous conflict resolution approaches (Dempsey and Coburn, 2010; Mac Ginty, 2008; Wassara, 2007). In addition, it can be argued that elements of technocracy, and particularly the sharing of lessons learned via handbooks and educational programmes, have facilitated the diffusion of approaches to peace-building that could be described as ‘progressive’ and ‘enlightened’.

The chief purpose of this article has been to illustrate the extent to which both the thinking behind and the practice of peace-building are significantly shaped by technocracy. In keeping with world polity theory, technocratization develops a self-fulfilling logic of its own. Interestingly, although technocracy is often described in terms of administration and bureaucracy, it does have a substantial affective and perceptual dimension. Technocracy, if it operates in an efficient and ‘neutral’ manner, can inspire confidence. Often this rests on ‘institutionalized myths’ or a widely held expectation that an organization will act in a particular manner (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 359). Although confidence does not quite equate with legitimacy, it can be useful in encouraging the notion that transactions will be predictable, transparent and replicable. Thus in a society emerging from civil war, bureaucratized processes may be considered a confidence-building measure.

Four points can be made by way of conclusion. The first is to underline that an element of coercion resides in the technocratic turn. As already discussed, the line between peace-building and war-fighting has been further blurred in the post-9/11 period courtesy of stabilization, regime change and the general securitization of peace-building. State-building and formation projects in Afghanistan and Iraq can be described as technocracy at gunpoint. Perhaps more significant than direct coercion has been indirect forms of coercion associated with technocratic peace-building. At least two forms of passive coercion can be in operation: imposition and exclusion. Imposition comes in the form of the ability of peace-building actors (perhaps those charged with state-building and governance programming) to impose administrative procedures on others. Opportunities for imposition are enhanced through conditions attached to reconstruction assistance. Exclusion comes in the form of the power to exclude actors from access to resources (funding, symbolic power, political power, information) if they do not conform to preferred bureaucratic or technocratic standards.

Of course, local actors may willingly embrace technocracy, and external actors may incentivize its adoption rather than impose it. Moreover, the intention is not to depict local actors in societies undergoing peace-building interventions as ‘cheerful robots’ who will automatically reflect the will of external actors (Flacks, 1973: 3). Local actors may resist, delay, subvert and exploit peace-building interventions by external actors (Mac Ginty, 2011; Scott, 1987, 1989). Often they have the power of mimicry, able to infuse external interventions with local inflections, perhaps diluting the technocratic maxims of efficiency and neutrality (Bhabha, 1984: 125).

The second concluding point is the need to transcend a strict dichotomy in which technocracy is the preserve of peace-building actors and somehow alien to those in states experiencing civil war or post-accord peace-support interventions. Many states and societies that may be described as ‘war-torn’ or ‘authoritarian’ are deeply technocratic. What is different and is a key point of this article is the peculiar nature of the technocracy associated with contemporary peace-building interventions and practices. This technocracy has a number of particularisms that help set it apart from other forms of technocracy. Firstly, it is in sync with prevailing norms of neo-liberalism. Secondly, it makes adept use of technology and derives considerable power from this, especially through the management of information. Thirdly, it is transnational in character. This is exemplified by a growing cadre of peace-building ‘professionals’ and ‘experts’, and by the transnational nature of the ideas and practices that are deployed. But this is bounded transnationalism; the dominant flow of personnel, ideas, practice and peace-building funding is from the global north to the global south.

A third concluding point is to note the task expansion associated with the technocratization of peace-building. A strong logic of technocracy is to expand its area of functional competency and to make linkages with other areas of technocracy. Technocrats find it convenient to deal with technocrats. This technocratic determinism does not preclude local resistance and interpretation, but it is worth noting that a world-view of irreversibility is associated with technocracy; it is a system that assumes the continuation of the system. A key enabling factor behind the task expansion is the discursive framing of conflicts in order to legitimize technocratic responses.

The final concluding point, and one touched upon in the above paragraphs, is that technocracy shifts the locus of power away from the local in peace-building contexts. Technocracy is thus in tune with other aspects of the liberal peace, such as economic reforms that minimize the productive capacity of societies while encouraging consumption of overseas goods. Through its norms and practices, technocracy can facilitate the substitution of external interests over local ones. Again, it is worth stressing that this is not always the case, and that the agency of local actors must not be overlooked. Yet, technocracy, in concert with other aspects of the liberal peace, can help hollow out local agency and vector it towards institutions. In many cases, these institutions, and the practices upon which they are based, are oriented with external interests and values. This is not part of some vast conspiracy. Instead, it is part of a complex process in which many local actors may be complicit and willing participants.

There may be slight signs of a retreat from technocracy by international actors. The International Dialogue on Peace-building and State-building’s New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011: 1) noted that: ‘International partners can often bypass national interests and actors, providing aid in overly technocratic ways that underestimate the importance of harmonising with the national and local context, and support short-term results at the expense of medium to long-term results brought about by building capacity and systems.’ The UNDP’s Governance for Peace document notes that: ‘No amount of technical support by foreigners can substitute for local capacity’ (UNDP, 2012: 3). It goes on to observe that: ‘While “technical assistance” and “project implementation units” are frequently employed “to get the job done”, they can sometimes impede progress precisely because of their overwhelming impulse to deliver functional expertise’ (UNDP, 2012: 4). Thus there are some, modest, grounds for optimism that international organizations are recognizing their own positionality and the need to allow deviation from the technocratic path.