Abstract
Danish foreign policy is under transformation. Different versions of activism have gradually replaced adaptation and lately Denmark has participated more actively and independently in world politics than ever before. The core in activism is based on a liberal value system that seems to have replaced the adaptation logics dominating Danish foreign policy during the Cold War. Activism has evolved from a multilateral inspired activism in the 1990s to a more Atlantic centred activism during the 2000s. While analysts see the different phases as opposites, my argument is that the types of activism should be seen as a difference of degree rather than a difference of kind. ‘Activism’ as a foreign policy strategy, however, should be considered analytically as a difference in kind from the adaptation strategies that dominated Danish foreign policy during the Cold War. The main driving force behind this transformation can be found domestically in the Liberal Party’s dominant position in Danish politics.
Introduction
By late 1989, the bipolar Cold War system was eroding as a consequence of the weakening and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The end of the Cold War meant the disappearance of any immediate military threat towards Danish territory and led to a period of unprecedented territorial security (Petersen, 2006b). The changes meant that Denmark, as a small state, could have continued to pursue the traditional adaptation strategy that characterized its foreign policy during the Cold War (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995) or reinforced elements in its neutrality tradition (Holbraad, 1991). Instead, Denmark chose to pursue what came to be labelled an ‘active foreign policy strategy’ followed by a policy of international engagement; primarily in order to secure that the existing favourable security situation became permanent for the years to come but also motivated by the ambition to promote liberal ideas and impose liberal values regionally and globally. The core of this ambition was a strong defence of an international order, rule of international law and reinforcement of the role of international organizations in the international system. This was accompanied by an increasingly active participation in the peace-keeping and peace-making operations within the UN and NATO frameworks and an ambition to place Denmark firmly within the EU mainstream. This activist strategy shifted after 2001, assuming a more bilateral character by emphasizing a strong commitment policy towards the United States in the so-called ‘War on Terror’.
While the adaptation strategies prior to 1989 are rather well specified in the literature on Danish foreign policy (Branner, 2000; Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995; Holbraad, 1991; Kelstrup, 1993; Petersen, 1977, 2000), there is less consensus on the term ‘activist foreign policy’ and whether small states such as Denmark are even able to pursue ‘active’ foreign policy. The literature has often associated activism with ‘internationalism’ or ‘multilateralism’ due to its ambition to integrate and increase the Danish engagement in international organizations and alliances (Holm, 1997). Some observers have viewed the development after 2001 as a departure from the multilateral variant of activist foreign policy, since the priorities shifted from ‘active multilateralism’ to a narrower bilateral cooperation with the United States and – short-lived – support for the establishment of flexible ad hoc coalitions of the willing outside the UN framework under US leadership (Knudsen, 2004; Lawler, 2007). Others have interpreted the Danish participation in the two coalition wars as a preliminary culmination of the activist strategy marking the transformation of the Danish strategic culture to a more independent and offensive strategy very unlike the traditional adaptation strategies prior to 1989 and the multilateral emphasis during the 1990s (Rynning, 2003). These interpretations seem to emphasize a difference in kind between the activism of the 1990s and that of the 2000s. The argument throughout this article is that activism should be analysed as a more homogeneous strategy in Danish foreign policy and that the variations between different activism strategies should be considered a difference in degree rather than in kind to the common underlying liberal core that has steered Danish activism since the end of the Cold War.
But how can we interpret these assumed changes from adaptation to activism and the development in activism in Danish foreign policy? Foreign Policy Analysis literature (FPA) has pointed out that foreign policy can be understood as a mixture of external and internal determinants (Rosenau, 1971; White, 1989; Hill, 2003; Hudson, 2007). 1 External determinants are assumed to set the frames for the foreign policy choices, but the design of concrete choices and strategies can often be retraced to domestic factors and the decision of the policy-makers (Doeser, 2011). Following an inside-outside perspective (Davies, 2008; Miles, 2005; Putnam, 1988; Volgy and Schwartz, 1991), this article argues that the primary force behind Danish activism and its dynamics can be found in a number of domestic and ideological factors. 2 This emphasis on domestic factors is also seen in the research on foreign policy developments within the Scandinavian countries, which apparently emphasizes the role of a particular ‘Nordic model’ for active internationalism based on a predominant Social Democratic ideology (Bergman, 2007; Kuisma, 2007; Lawler, 2007: 102) which, according to Mariager (2005), has also been predominant in much of the empirical analyses of the Danish foreign policy history. In opposition to this perspective, however, this analysis draws attention to the importance of the transformation of the Liberal Party’s domestic and foreign policy and the party’s periodically dominant position in the formulation of Danish foreign policy that seems to have reduced the role of the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals as the leading architects of the Danish foreign policy (Petersen, 2009a).
Adaptation and activism in Danish foreign policy
Adaptation in Danish foreign policy
Analyses of Danish foreign policy often distinguishes between adaptive and activist foreign policy, where the emphasis in the literature has been on the former (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995). The Danish foreign policy tradition has been inspired by the work of Rosenau and his so-called adaptation theory. Here, national leaders are seen as situated at the interface between their domestic and international environments and tasked with balancing the changes and demands emanating from these environments (Rosenau, 1970). Rosenau’s analytical framework has subsequently been refined, elaborated and applied in Danish foreign policy analysis (Hansen, 1974; Mouritzen, 1988; Petersen, 1977).
Analyses of Danish foreign policy have often pointed to either neutralist aspects of Danish foreign policy (Branner, 2000; Holbraad, 1991) or underlined special adaptation logics that have been dominant and guided Danish foreign policy (Petersen, 2000). The adaptation perspective has allowed for a rough prediction of the most likely overall foreign policy positions of Denmark and small states 3 in general by pointing out that the relationship between a state’s ‘influence capacity’ and ‘sensitivity’ to the external environment will determine which strategy to follow (Petersen, 1977). Small states like Denmark can thereby pursue different adaptation modes depending on the constellation of balance between its capabilities and external stress sensitivity (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995; Petersen, 2000). The adaptation literature identifies four different modes of adaptation: An accommodating policy of acquiescence, i.e. a small state bandwagon with the strongest forces in its external environment if stress sensitivity (SS) is high and influence capacity (IC) is low. On the other hand, if SS and IC are low, the small state would follow a less compromising policy of quiescence. In effect, this signifies a policy of minimal external activity designed to steer the country free of possibly harmful contacts with the external environment. Countries with relatively high influence capability in the international system have other, more agreeable, policy options. If combined with a low degree of SS, a high degree of IC makes possible a policy of dominance that attempts to mould the external environment according to domestically generated values. Only great powers are capable of dominating strategies, even though smaller states may occasionally attempt and even succeed in such a position in their regional surroundings (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 16). Finally, with a combination of high IC and high SS, a policy of balancing based on a kind of give-and-take attitude towards international politics is likely to ensue. Accordingly, the defining aspect of the Danish foreign policy strategy during the Cold War was that Denmark followed a reactive adaptation pattern in its foreign policy leading to a kind of politics of adaptation characterized by adaptation to great powers, pacifistic positions and a strategy of non-commitment within the alliance structures (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 14–17; Petersen, 1977).
The major changes in the international system after the end of the Cold War meant that the external pressure on Denmark disappeared. This allowed for a more active Danish foreign policy which, according to the analysis tradition, was still adaptive in its nature. Denmark moved ‘… from reactive to active adaption, from “foot-dragging” to initiation, from a defensive protection of goals only partially in accordance with the international trends that Denmark felt obliged to accept, to either fulfillment of goals, or a change of Danish goals that made objectives compatible and therefore allowed changes of different strategies’ (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 50). This has led to the conclusion that the new strategies after the end of the Cold War would suggest a more complex adaptation mode, which includes both active and reactive elements.
Activism in Danish foreign policy
It has been commonplace to depict Danish foreign policy prior to the end of the Cold War as primarily pragmatic and reactive, in contrast to the ‘active internationalism’ (Holm, 1997) overtly pursued after 1989. The term ‘activism,’ widely used in the literature on Danish foreign policy, has served for some scholars to obscure some of the continuity in the values and long-term priorities apparently underpinning Danish foreign policy traditions (Lawler, 2007: 107).
Surely what we call ‘activism’ must be seen against the background of the traditionally rather passive Danish foreign policy during the Cold War (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 50). The term activism has often been associated with the formulation of the so-called international activism strategy in 1989 by then Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. Foreign policy activism can accordingly be defined as a policy or strategy aimed at creating, preserving or changing a given international order according to the interests and values of the policy-maker (Holm, 2002). The ambitions in activism have some significant overlaps with the concept of security policy and liberal order policy (Petersen, 2009b). However, while security policy can be said to be aimed at handling existing security problems with existing instruments and capabilities, ‘order policy’ relates to longer-term efforts to create a world which is safer in the view of the actor. Activism can be said to relate to the concept of order policy by outlining strategies for long-term goals, ambitions and guidelines for the conduct of a state’s foreign policy.
But when is a state’s foreign policy active? Holm (2002) has argued that all states like to claim that they are pursuing an active foreign policy rather than an inactive one. How might we then differentiate between rhetoric and genuine activism? Holm (2002: 22 f.) has suggested that the concept of activism has three dimensions: (1) the degree of initiative. An active policy may be defined as the opposite of passive or reactive. Policy is not merely a reaction to events and other policies but rather a (2) strategically based use of available means in a continual pursuit of these goals. It is active when (3) resources are set aside and mobilized in a prioritized fashion. Holm further identifies that which defines activism as being the degree of external opposition to the policy. It is active when initiatives are taken even in the face of opposition from other important international actors. An active policy involves taking risks. It is active when based on a high public profile where policy is clearly manifested and spelled out even when it would be safer to be quiet. 4
Activism in Danish foreign policy after the end of the Cold War
A path-breaking Danish ‘activist’ foreign policy strategy is often linked to the end of the Cold War (Heurlin, 1993). Liberals like Holm (2002) and Knudsen (2004) have related the formulation of internationalism with activism and saw the inclusion of the internationalist aspects as defining elements for the new activist turn in Danish foreign policy.
Others have tried to date the beginning of the activist foreign policy earlier. For example, Danish NATO membership in 1949 has been interpreted as an expression of an activist departure. Villaume (1995) has indicated that Danish foreign policy was characterized by a higher degree of activism during the Cold War than after. It has also been argued that the Danish footnote policy of the 1980s could signify real activism. 5 A certain consensus seems to exist about understanding the period after 1949 as expressing a certain degree of continuity in the Danish tradition of neutrality where the principal lines in a neutralist policy of non-involvement were sought maintained (Villaume, 2008). A third interpretation has attempted to push the origination of the activist policy to the present time by pointing out a fundamentally new pattern in the Danish foreign and security policy after 9/11 (Rynning, 2003). This interpretation indicates a basic change in Denmark’s role on the international stage after 2001. From a kind of balancing international mediator and/or peace-keeping role during the Cold War and up through the 1990s, Denmark has now developed into a declared ‘strategic actor’, participating directly in combat against externally defined enemies who are thought to threaten Denmark directly (Rynning, 2003). The argument is that although activism in the 1990s was to be perceived as a new strategy, this did not represent a fundamental break with the principal line in the Danish foreign policy aimed at balance and international mediation (Lawler, 2007).
Although elements of activism in the Danish foreign policy existed during the Cold War, 1989 can be seen in some respects as a starting point for an activist strategy due to the explicit formulation of a long-reaching strategy for Danish foreign policy aimed at gaining international influence and by the higher degree of Danish commitment to the international institutionalization and the systematic mobilization of resources to implement this strategy. The interpretation here is that activism can be seen as a coherent framework for Danish foreign policy, but that it has developed through different phases with emphasis on different foreign policy strategies. The major characteristics are summarized in Table 2. What follows analytically is that the variants in the two phases of international activism should be considered as differences in degrees of activism rather than differences in kind. In broader terms, the different ‘modes of activism’ ‘internationalism’ or ‘international activism’ (Holm, 2002; Knudsen, 2004) and ‘active internationalism’ (Rynning, 2003), respectively, share a common liberal core and have developed along some of the tensions within liberalism itself (Sørensen, 2006, 2011). Following this logic, the development of activism in Danish foreign policy after 1989 represents a difference in kind from the adaptational logics dominating Danish foreign policy during the Cold War. Despite the differences in the activist strategies and how they have been practised in Danish foreign policy, the different variants – or modes – of ‘activism’ therefore reflect a trend of international engagement and commitment to European and Atlantic allies. Furthermore, the development in the activist strategy has been guided by a greater emphasis on liberal ideas and values separating it from the different adaptation modes, and represents something other than an ‘active’ or ‘complex’ adaptation strategy. These trends are most visible after 2001, but even throughout the 1990s stronger elements of a liberal-inspired Danish foreign policy profile led to arguments that the different phases in activism should be seen as a difference in degree rather than as a difference in kind.
Strategies and politics of adaptation
Based on Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995.
Strategies and policies of Danish activism 1989–2010
Active and engaged internationalism (1989–2001)
Within the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was an interest in exploiting the international and national vacuum occurring after the end of the Cold War in order to formulate a new unifying vision for Danish foreign policy intended to replace the reactive practice from the footnote period in the 1980s. The post-Cold War strategy aimed to contribute to the construction of a European and global order in accordance with liberal values and principles. The strategy was to unite the different ‘cornerstones’ (Hækkerup, 1965) in the Danish foreign policy under the headline ‘active internationalism’ understood as a unified guiding principle for Danish foreign policy. In the spring of 1989, Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen coined the concept to describe his main strategy for the emerging post-Cold War international order (Foreign Policy Commission, 1990). Even though he cautioned against underestimating Denmark’s capabilities, he also drew attention to the limited resources and influence. The strategy was one of ‘dual engagement’ (Petersen, 2006a), meaning that Denmark should engage itself in neutralizing the conflict potential inherent in Central and Eastern Europe and, secondly, to promote international cooperation in a complex infrastructure of new and old institutions at the regional and global levels. The aim was especially to encourage the Eastern European and Baltic states in particular to be integrated into the new political and economic networks in order to create a European security architecture based on multilateral cooperation and shared security obligations (Petersen, 2006a: 482 ff.).
The strategy also contained an element of realpolitik aimed at binding Germany to a new European security political structure through the EEC, later the EU. This initiative was driven by ambitions to establish an economic and monetary union to ensure the realization of a well-functioning internal market. The Foreign Minister indicated that the international development required a more active foreign policy to promote and secure Danish interests in the new multilateral frameworks and to exploit and strengthen the European regionalization trends (Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, 1991: 168–170). Another central point was the need for maintaining and strengthening the transatlantic involvement in the Danish neighbourhood. International institutions and committed international cooperation were seen as the backbone of the new European and global security infrastructure. The new activist foreign policy aspired to optimize the framework of interlocking institutions into a European security architecture with NATO as the central security component (Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, 1991; Petersen, 2009b).
But there were other motives as well. Danish decision-makers formulated strong ideological ambitions to include aspects of democracy, human rights and market economics as explicitly formulated ambitions in the Danish foreign policy. With this new emphasis on liberal values followed a changing conception of sovereignty. These liberal considerations saw the light of day when the Danish parliament initiated its first principled debate on Danish post-Cold War foreign policy on 12 November 1992 (Danish Parliament, 1992–93 columns 1535 ff.). The debate revealed a new Danish position on the question of the protection of minority and human rights that now had become a global responsibility, which required a new view on the concepts of non-interference and humanitarian intervention in the internal affairs of other states (Petersen, 2006a: 444). The debate demonstrated a broad political agreement that the transformation of the international system implied greater ‘room for manoeuvring’ for Danish foreign policy that ought to be utilized to pursue a new version of international activism guided by liberal principles and the reinforcement of strong international organizations. Moreover, there was broad agreement that Denmark should be working for the promotion of international norms and liberal values in the post-Cold War period. The government suggested that the situation required a new understanding of concepts such as ‘non-intervention in internal affairs’ and the establishment of national sovereignty. These principles would have to be subject to the consideration of international norms and values and supposedly strengthen UN possibilities to comply with the framework for a global security system (Danish Parliament, 1992–93 columns 1535 ff.). A parliamentary agenda was adopted assigning the government to make a statement for the Danish foreign policy priorities. The conclusions demonstrated the entry of a number of the liberal principles and multilateral ideas, which had been a priority for the liberal governments throughout the 1980s. As part of the formulation of a regular activist vision for Danish foreign policy, Danish foreign policy should increasingly be organized to allow for the activation of Danish foreign policy through the multilateral security platforms (Foreign Policy Commission, 1990; Danish Parliament, 1992–93, columns 1535 ff.).
In 1993, the new Social Democratic government introduced a ‘Principles and Perspectives in Danish Foreign Policy’ memorandum to the Danish parliament accompanied by a lengthy report on ‘Danish Foreign Policy on its Way to 2000’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994). The two documents were in almost all important respects a continuation of the former government’s policy and the conclusions of the 1992 parliamentary debate. To a greater extent than was previously the case, the proposal emphasized the ideal aspects of the foreign policy with certain feedback regarding traditional Social Democratic/Social Liberal policy (Peterson, 2006a). The reports expressed a strong adherence to liberal values and the intention to upgrade multilateral efforts as a governing framework for Danish foreign policy throughout the 1990s. Generally speaking, the Social Democrat-led government adopted the former government’s foreign policy programme and visions and incorporated its liberal principles in their own programme. 6 While the ideological aspect of activism was formulated by the Conservative–Liberal government, the Social Democratic governments that followed came to implement their strategy during the course of the dramatic 1990s. While the symbolic Danish participation in the first Gulf War marked the beginning of a new and more active Danish profile in upholding international law and order, the Danish participation during the 1990s developed this profile to include decisions to participate in UN peace-keeping and peace-making operations in ex-Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. In 1992, Danish troops helped secure the food supply and humanitarian aid for the population. In 1993, Denmark participated in the international blockade against Serbia and military operations in Croatia. In 1995, Danish troops were sent to Bosnia under NATO command, and Danish troops were also sent to secure the Dayton Peace Agreement. Moreover, the government sent 200 soldiers to Albania in 1998 as part of a NATO-led force. The Social Democratic government then proceeded to give the green light to Danish soldiers participating in the air attack on Iraq in 1998, although operation Desert Shield was never carried out. In addition, Denmark participated in the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo against Serbia to protect the civilian population from atrocities perpetrated by Serbian forces. The latter operation, which had not received any UN mandate, was justified on the basis of consideration for the civilian population; that is, purely liberal principles which broke with the considerations of sovereignty and the previous guiding principles of Danish foreign policy. Active foreign policy remained the main objective, and the guiding principle became ‘engaged internationalism’ in a multilateral context (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). The Social Democratic-led governments actively promoted the further integration of the Baltic States into the Western security architecture which culminated with EU and NATO membership.
International activism (2001–2010)
The fact that Danish foreign policy was focused on a committed multilateral defence of an international order was manifested immediately after the terror attacks on 11 September 2001, which was perceived as an attack on Western democratic values. Denmark therefore endorsed NATO’s decision to classify the attack according to Article 5 (Rynning, 2003). The initial Danish reaction from the then Social Democratic governments was exercised in terms of a multilateral response in the context of either NATO or the UN in accordance with the practice and principles of Danish security policy formulated throughout the 1990s.
However, the attack meant that the United States developed a more independent international profile by insisting on an American answer irrespective of security alliances. This position put pressure on the traditional multilateral strategies of the small states, which were exacerbated by intensified American expectations to ‘take a stance’ in the subsequent War on Terror and in relation to so-called rogue states. The dynamics that had now been set in motion placed pressure on the states in the international community to maintain their multilateral anchoring or to move into a narrow coalition with the United States. The question was relevant for Denmark, that had to decide whether to participate in a direct military commitment in the campaign in Afghanistan under American leadership or whether to give priority to a more traditional role as a peace-keeping actor in a multilateral UN-coordinated effort at the end of the war.
The change of government resulting from the November 2001 election meant that the Liberals were the biggest party in the Folketing. For the first time in 70 years, it was possible to find a majority for foreign policy that did not have to include the Social Liberals and Social Democrats. One of the first tasks for the new government was to formulate and consider a Danish contribution to the impending American invasion of Afghanistan. The new Danish Foreign Minister, Per Stig Møller, requested parliamentary approval on 13 December 2001 for Danish participation in an operation as direct, belligerent power under American leadership. The Danish contribution was linked to UN Resolution 1368 and represented a significant military contribution compared to the Danish capabilities (Peterson, 2006a). The parliamentary debate revealed a dividing line between the call from the opposition to maintain a traditional, multilateral point of departure for the Danish reaction as opposed to the new government’s interest in pursuing an American-leaning foreign policy line. The government expressed its intention to contribute directly to an American-led coalition. Conversely, the Social Democrats and Social Liberals maintained a more traditional multilateral point of departure for the Danish contribution. The Social Democrats declared that they ‘would not oppose’ the adoption of the motion about Danish participation because the opposition felt obligated by earlier statements. However, the Social Democrats expressed strong reservations regarding the motion put forward because they were against a military commitment under direct American leadership. The party would have preferred participation in a (subsequent) UN peace-keeping operation.
The tension between maintaining a traditional, committed internationalism and a more offensive interpretation of international activism became apparent in 2002, when it became clear that the United States was planning to invade Iraq in 2003. Beginning in the autumn of 2002, the Liberal-led Danish government was obviously intent on supporting the Americans in their endeavour. While Danish participation in Afghanistan could potentially mobilize a reluctant broad majority in the Danish parliament, a proposed Danish participation in the War in Iraq could only mobilize a narrow parliamentary majority, since the Social Democrats and Social Liberals refused to support such participation. The argumentation was primarily based on the fact that there was no clear UN mandate. Apart from the votes of the government parties, Danish participation in the War in Iraq was adopted only with support from the Danish People’s Party. The political dispute was motivated in opposition to the lack of a UN mandate and the general validity of an American alliance strategy, but it was based on a fundamental question regarding the ambitions and scope of Danish foreign policy.
It was a question of moving activism to a more independent course whereby Danish support of the American-led coalition was seen as a precondition for increased international gains and increased international room for manoeuvre. The considerations reflected a range of fundamental questions about the general goals and ambitions of Danish foreign policy which was intensified subsequent to the drafting of a new programme for Danish foreign policy in 2003 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a). The decision to support the American line appeared to mark an even more offensive type of foreign policy activism with an increased willingness to seek cooperation and support the establishment of flexible (American-led) ad hoc coalitions outside the multilateral arenas in the efforts to pursue independent Danish ambitions and interests. The argumentation indicated that they were trying to find a particular value-based policy justification for Danish foreign policy. In June 2003, the government sought to integrate the foreign policy activism and participation in the American-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in a broader international value struggle between dictatorships and democracies.
‘International activism’ differs from earlier activist traditions in terms of its foundation in a number of offensive liberal and neo-conservative ideas about not only the right but the duty of democratic states to make a difference in international politics and promote liberal values. The primary argument was that Denmark should put aside its small state complex, drop all notions of isolation and neutrality, and instead see itself as part of a broader global consensus that offered new and greater opportunities to exert Danish influence internationally, since the Danish room for manoeuvre had been expanded by the alliance with the United States (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a). This policy should be carried out through active participation in flexible coalitions which share common interests and values.
Besides the ideological arguments, there was also an element of realpolitik in the new foreign policy thinking. The alliance with the United States was perceived as further helping Denmark to transform the Danish position in the international system from a small state to a middle state as opposed to merely an expression of active adaptation (Fogh Rasmussen, 2003a, b). To ensure this, it was vital for the government to secure further American commitment to the region surrounding Denmark. The government statement of July 2003 included mention of how the ‘… commitment of the United States in Denmark’s surroundings is important for security and stability …’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a). The political price was cooperation on American interests and demands in the field of security politics. The Greenland question was crucial, and the ambition to secure American goodwill was probably reflected in the obliging reaction of the Danish government to the American request for expanding the Thule radar as part of future plans for the American missile defence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b; Petersen, 2009a). The Liberal-led government continued Danish engagement in the various operations until 2010 and continued to pursue close cooperation with the US and British forces. 7 Denmark withdrew its troops from Iraq in 2006 along with the British withdrawal, and a similar strategy has been planned for the withdrawal of Danish forces from Afghanistan. The new Danish Government under Social Democratic leader Helle Thorning Smith seems to continue this ambition to gradually withdraw Danish troops from Afghanistan and to have greater emphasis on a more active European policy compared to the Liberal-led government during the 2000s.
Danish activism: Differences in degree, not in kind?
The argument is that the strategy of activism can be seen as a difference in kind compared with the adaptation strategies that dominated the Danish foreign policy prior to 1989. However, the variation in the activist strategies after 1989 should be considered as a difference in degrees of activism due to the introduction of a liberal paradigm in Danish foreign policy that apparently replaced the concept of adaptation. This interpretation also goes against a wider interpretation in the literature on the roots and causes of the foreign policy in the Nordic countries. Danish foreign policy has in recent years been interpreted within a Nordic tradition where the argument has been that a key to understanding ‘Nordic internationalism’ should be found in their shared history as social democratic welfare states in which the values of solidarity, egalitarianism and social justice have loomed comparatively large by Western standards (Bergman, 2007; Heclo and Madsen, 1987; Ingebritsen, 2002; Kuisma, 2007; Lawler, 1997). Lawler, for instance, argues that the normative internationalist and cosmopolitan dimensions of Danish foreign policy have been less recognized than in Norway and Sweden. According to his interpretation, Denmark has, until 2001, largely fitted the Nordic template of solidarity and egalitarian foreign policy (2007). He points out the rather large degree of continuance in Danish foreign policy from the Cold War period until 2001, where the Liberal government won the general election and, for the first time since 1929, did not have to include the Social Democrats and Social Liberals in order to obtain a parliamentary majority in the foreign policy area. The post-1989 policy of ‘active internationalism’ was accordingly followed by greater assertiveness, including the flexing of military might, but was interpreted as a continuance of a Social Democrat-inspired Nordic Internationalism. Wæver (1995, 281 f.) has pointed out how this apparent stepping away from a tradition of anti-militarism verging on pacifism during the 1990s was not as significant a move as it might appear. Wæver’s argument is that Danish military forces were always deployed in an overtly UN context in the 1990s, or at least a context that could be construed as such. Lawler (2007) therefore concludes that Danish internationalism after 1989 has thus been largely consistent with the wider Nordic tradition and its Social Democratic roots as characterized by a financially very well-supported and comparatively long-standing commitment to providing assistance to the developing world as well as a set of normative preferences emphasizing the virtues of multilateralism in general and international organization in particular toward further developing the international legal order. Accordingly, the shift in government in 2001 tends to be considered as the main point of departure for a change in Danish post-Cold War foreign policy due to its more militarized character, leading to an argument that the development of activism within Danish foreign policy after the end of the Cold War should be considered a difference in kind rather than degree.
This article has shown how, at the end of the Cold War, we witnessed the introduction of a new liberal paradigm in Danish foreign policy. This paradigm has replaced the traditional image of Denmark as a state whose main priority was to promote a politics of non-involvement, uncommitted alliance and restraints in international affairs. The variation in Danish activism and its foreign policy reflects some of the tensions inherent in liberalism itself. Sørensen has described this as tension between a ‘Liberalism of Restraint’ based on negative liberty emphasizing the principles of sovereignty, autonomy and non-intervention in a framework of international institutions respecting the legal equality of states (Sørensen, 2006, 2011). After the end of the Cold war, any previous fetters on liberal dominance were removed and marked a new international situation. Headed by the United States, several states were quick to argue in favour of a ‘Liberalism of Imposition’ – which is founded in a positive liberty stressing the right or even the obligation for liberal states to intervene. Several humanitarian interventions and the war in Iraq followed under this premise, accompanied by new plans for the promotion of universal freedom. 8
The different variants of Danish activism after 1989 shares similarities with the main characteristics of the liberalism of imposition, i.e. the idea to expand and promote liberal values liberal democracy, liberty and human rights in the world not only with soft power but also, if necessary, with hard power. In the main, Danish foreign and security policy during the 1990s bore impeccable liberal credentials. The empirical manifestations in Danish foreign policy strongly favoured alliance solidarity and committed engagement in the international organizations, a close connection with the USA and a general security ambition to utilize and expand the institutional security infrastructure in Europe. Besides promoting democracy, human rights, market economy, etc., it centred on integrating East and Central European countries in a network of interlocked institutions in the attempt to build a strong security architecture in Europe. Not all cases of disorder could be handled in this way, which is most prominent in the Yugoslavian and Iraqi cases just as liberal values were increasingly pursued and imposed by military means within and outside the UN framework. In Iraq, the engagement evolved from a maritime blockade in 1990–1991 to willingness to join a punitive air campaign against the Iraqi regime, called Desert Fox in 1998, and to participate in a full-scale invasion in 2003. In Yugoslavia, the engagement evolved from participation in UN-led peacekeeping operations to participation in the NATO-led (and not UN-sanctioned) air war against Serbia in 1999.
The ambition to promote democracy and other Western values with both soft and hard power stems from the cautious approach during the Cold War when there was a reluctant approach towards enforcing Western values on other countries. Most notable is the militarization that has accompanied these ambitions in order to enforce international order and impose Western values on other states and regimes. Its strong identification with the USA also stands in sharp contrast to the reluctant opt-out line in NATO and the EEC during the Cold War and especially during the 1980s due to the Social Democratic opposition towards further Danish involvement in these alliances.
Domestic roots of Danish activism?
This article does not engage in a longer discussion on the relative role of what determines external and internal states’ foreign policy decisions. Pragmatically, it is argued that external determinants can be assumed to set the frames for foreign policy choices, but the design of concrete choices and strategies can often be traced back to domestic factors. This means that the external factors constitute important necessary factors for changes in the foreign policy of small states, but that these factors cannot be considered sufficient to explaining a particular strategy or changes formulated by national governments. 9 Petersen (2009a) has pointed out that one of the main domestic explanations for the introduction of this new paradigm can be found in the domestic and foreign political transformation of the Liberal Party. While the domestic transformation can be linked closely to the change in party leadership in 1998, the roots of the foreign policy transformation can be traced back to Uffe Ellemann-Jensen’s period as Foreign Minister and Liberal Party leader in the 1980s and the 1990s (Petersen, 2009a, b). The aim was to transform the Social Liberal/Social Democratic understanding of history and dominance in the foreign policy field, where small state identity and neutrality played a central role (Fogh Rasmussen, 2006). In that connection, Petersen (2009) has indicated that the aim of the transformation was to ‘marginalize the small state period in Danish foreign policy’ and, from a general perspective, to re-launch a number of the elements in the national liberal foreign policy of the 1860s. The core of the paradigm seems to lie in a new interpretation of how to understand foreign policy practice since 1864; that is, when Denmark changed its status in European policy from being a small/medium power to a small state. The new activist foreign policy has several similarities with the earlier tradition, which also attempted to establish foreign policy activism on a democratic value-based foundation on the basis of national sovereignty and the right for a nation to define its own foreign policy goals.
In his farewell speech as Foreign Minister in 1993, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen expressed his hope that historians would view the foreign policy he pursued in the 1980s and international activism as ‘diametrically opposed’ to the foreign policy of Social Liberal Foreign Minister of Peter Munch (1929–40) (Ellemann-Jensen, 1996). What Ellemann-Jensen especially had in mind was Munch’s perception of Denmark as a small state, his neutralism and defence scepticism, and especially his preference for low-key foreign policy. Ellemann-Jensen’s disdain for the Munch small-state tradition was probably reinforced by his tortured experience with the ‘heirs’ to this tradition in the 1980s (Petersen, 2009a). Between 1982 and 1988, Prime Minister Poul Schlüter’s coalition government had been compelled by a left-of-centre ‘alternative majority’ in the Folketing to pursue a so-called ‘footnote policy’ in NATO and the EEC (Doeser, 2011). The consequences were a gradual retreat from important NATO positions, such as the dual-track decision of 1979, and serious conflict with leading NATO powers. The government was forced to accept repeated parliamentary defeats over foreign policy as the price of support for its economic reconstruction policy. When the ‘alternative majority’ dissolved in 1988, the party was ready to seek the active international role made possible by the window of opportunity emerging in the wake of the Cold War.
Upon regaining power in 2001, the Liberals therefore initiated a value and cultural struggle intended to replace the dominant role of the Social Democrats. For a number of reasons, this retrospectively oriented foreign policy was characterized by a clash with the left-wing politics during the Cold War, distancing from the neutralist tradition, and accompanied by a moral critique of the people behind it; mostly from the Danish left-wing and the Social Democrats (Petersen, 2009a). Since the government linked the project to the fight over values and culture with the resistance of the opposition in the foreign policy area, the debate had a special value-based aspect. The opposition against the Iraq War was linked to the neutralist foreign policy tradition, the policy of collaboration during the German occupation of Denmark from 1940–45, and the actions of the Social Democrats and the left-wing during the Cold War. The cultural-political clash came to serve as a contemporary disciplining tool, particularly in connection with the government’s justification of the War in Iraq in 2003, and continuously influences the debate on Danish participation in Iraq and the implementation of an exit strategy for regarding the Danish operations in Afghanistan; forgotten seemed to be the 1990s Danish activism and Danish participation in UN-led operations in the Balkans under a Social Democratic Minister of Defence and Social Liberal Foreign Minister.
Conclusions
The Cold War period was dominated by varying adaptive logics which have gradually been replaced by an activist version of foreign policy. In opposition to adaptation, activism has been characterized by a more internationalist and committed Danish involvement in international alliances. The argument has been that activism as a foreign policy strategy should be considered as a difference in kind from the different adaptation modes. Activism has not been a static concept, however, and has developed over two phases. A first period, from 1989, often labelled activist internationalism, and a second phase from 2001–10, often referred to as international activism. While some observers hold that the development after 2001 seems to blur the continuance of the Danish foreign policy tradition, the article has argued that the development of a new variant of activism should instead be considered a difference in degree from the activism of the 1990s rather than as a distinctly different kind of activism. Although the two phases of activism place emphasis on different aspects of the role of international institutions, activism shares a common core of liberal values and ideas that seem to have guided Danish foreign and security policies following the Cold War. While the predominant tradition in the Danish and Nordic literature has emphasized the role of a particular Nordic form of internationalism guided by Social Democratic values and ideas, the argument has been that – in the Danish case – this tradition gradually seems to have been replaced by a liberal paradigm in Danish foreign policy. While the main impulses and inspirations for foreign policy changes in Denmark and the other Nordic countries have often been associated with the dominant position of the Social Democrats, the argument here is that the main impulses for the change in Danish foreign policy can be found in political transformation of the Liberal Party. Since 1998, the party has worked to establish a liberal hegemony in Danish domestic politics on the basis of a combination of domestic redistributive policy from the centre and a more conservative position regarding value-based politics. The goal was to initiate and win a value struggle intended to push the citizens and the current policy in a centre-right liberal direction. While the domestic transformation can be linked closely to the change in party leadership in 1998, the shift in foreign policy can be traced back to the experiences of the Liberal Party and its leadership in the 1980s and the opportunities that emerged in the wake of the Cold War. So far little research has explored these dynamics in Danish foreign policy. Theoretically, we still need to understand what lies behind the actual mechanisms that make activism possible and to understand how the different governments implemented the strategy during the 1990s. Furthermore, we lack empirical research on how the Liberal Party was able to press on with its activist agenda, both in the early 1990s but especially in the period after the 2001 election. A better empirical understanding of these important formative periods in modern Danish foreign policy would enable us to unpack, analyse and understand both the core and causes of Danish foreign policy activism.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial of not-for-profit sectors.